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


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MOROCCAN DRAMA  
1900-1955

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# MOROCCAN DRAMA

1900—1955

*by*

ROM LANDAU

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ASIAN STUDIES

*A School of the College of the Pacific*

SAN FRANCISCO

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
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
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## PREFACE

FOR the best part of half a century Morocco has given us constant reminders that, with the rest of North Africa, it is one of the world's potential danger spots. In 1906 it needed the concerted effort of the twelve leading Powers at the Conference of Algeciras to prevent Morocco from becoming the *casus belli* between France and Germany. From 1921 till 1926 the world followed with lively interest the war between the Rif leader Abd el Karim and Spain. In 1941 Morocco served as springboard for the Allied campaign against Hitler. Since 1951 hardly a month has gone by without some major or minor Moroccan "crisis". In spite of Morocco's perennial topicality, there is not a single account of twentieth-century Morocco in the English language; and the one or two excellent histories of the late nineteenth century have long lacked a successor. This in itself seems sufficient reason for trying to fill the gap. Even in French, Spanish or Arabic, we would search in vain for a Moroccan history of the first half of the present century. There are innumerable French studies dealing with certain aspects of Moroccan history—economics, nationalism, social conditions, and so forth—but no volume attempting to deal with the overall picture. Moreover, with a few notable exceptions, the more recent studies of various facets of Moroccan history written by French, Spanish, or Arab authors are wont to represent one particular point of view—either, broadly speaking, the colonialist or the nationalist. Thus, for all the scholarship lavished upon them, they illustrate once again how difficult it is to be both contemporary and objective.

It may be that an unbiased account of recent and contemporary events cannot be written, if only for lack of published documents. Even if fuller documentation were possible, the author's personal point of view is bound to emerge from his choice of materials and from the way in which he interprets them. If his aim is unadorned truth, all he can do is to try not to identify himself with any one set of doctrines.

Few documents concerning Moroccan events since 1912 have so far been published; and not all that have been made accessible to the scholar are unbiased. He must, therefore, rely in part on his personal knowledge of the events described, and in part on materials published by other observers. The chronicler of olden days has been replaced by the Press reporter and the Press commentator.

Together they provide indispensable source material for the present volume.

My problem was not paucity of available Press material, but rather its great volume and its unequal quality. On the one hand there is the Press of the French colonialists (both in France and in Morocco), representing powerful vested interests, and concerned chiefly with the defence of those interests. At the other extreme we find the Press of the Moroccan nationalists and their Arab supporters in the Middle East, defending the opposite point of view. Both factions are apt to write emotionally rather than soberly, and only seldom can their statements be accepted as expressing a dispassionate concern for truth. While I have limited myself to a minimum of quotations from both of these camps, in a number of instances quotation was unavoidable.

Even the reports of observers with no axe to grind could not be accepted indiscriminately. In the early fifties, no American or British newspaper had a permanent correspondent in Morocco. Their Moroccan news was usually based upon reports of their Paris correspondents. Inevitably these reports were apt to reflect the French milieu in which they were written, giving the point of view of the Quai d'Orsay, and only on rare occasions that of the Moroccans. However, some of these Paris correspondents were more independent of mind and better informed than others, and it is to their reports that I have turned most frequently.

The bulk of my Press material came, however, from France. Many of the Paris dailies have their permanent correspondents in Morocco; many are ready at a moment's notice to send special correspondents to report on some particular event. Though I have made use of several dozen French papers, I have relied chiefly on those which are, by common consent, regarded as having the most liberal-minded representation in Morocco, good examples being *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *Témoignage Chrétien*, and one or two political weeklies and monthlies.

In the final analysis it is probably the author's personal knowledge of the area he describes that will imprint itself most forcibly upon his book. For a number of years my work has been concerned with Morocco, and I have been in daily touch with Moroccan affairs and with many of the leading personalities of that country. I have naturally developed my own views on the Moroccan situation, views that I have expressed in several books, surveys and articles. In writing the present *History*, my aim has not been to elaborate my own point of view but to give as objective a picture of events as knowledge and integrity have allowed. I do not flatter myself that either the colonialists or their opponents in the nationalist camp

will accept my interpretation. Even readers who do not support either the former colonialists or their opponents in whatever camp fair to this or that section, this or that point of view. In replying to them I can only say that I have no personal axe to grind. Moreover, I approach Morocco and its problems as a student, a historian and, last but not least, a lover of that country. To my French friends who may claim that I have dealt overcritically with *l'œuvre française au Maroc*, I can only point out that more than eighty per cent of my sources are French, and that most of these are connected with names of Frenchmen of known integrity and proven scholarship.

\* \* \* \*

Most writings dealing with the Protectorate in Morocco concentrate on economic matters at the expense of political considerations and of issues that might be described as human or psychological. Yet even French experts were bound to acknowledge that one of the causes of the emergence of a Moroccan dilemma was the almost exclusive preoccupation of the French authorities with economic progress and their almost total neglect of political and human development.

In the present volume, Morocco's remarkable economic progress under the French has been described in some detail, but the main emphasis is laid on factors that have proved more decisive in recent Moroccan developments: namely the course of political events and their repercussions on the individual.

This book was being written between 1952 and 1955. At that time the dramatic events of 1956, leading to Morocco's attainment of complete independence, still belonged to the future. Nevertheless, I have refrained from altering my text in the light of those events, and have limited myself to replacing the past tense for the present in a number of cases. While the recent events may have given a new significance to many of the incidents recorded in these pages, I am naturally not at liberty to depart from my accurate narration of earlier developments and to argue *a posteriori*. Nor did it appear necessary to discard the present title of this volume in favour of a new one. However ardently we may hope that the future of independent Morocco shall prove a bright one, there can be no doubt that its history of the last few decades justifies the term "Drama", so uncertain was the outcome.

R.L.

Barnstaple,  
North Devon,  
England.

San Francisco,  
California,  
U.S.A.





*Introduction*

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MOROCCO THAT WAS



## MOROCCO BEFORE 1900

MOROCCO, the Maghreb el Aksa—Land of the Farthest West—has many claims to distinction. In both legend and sober history, this region, until recent times “more inaccessible to foreigners than China itself”, has figured from a very early date. Here legend located the Garden of the Hesperides, here dwelt Antæus, or Atlas, the son of Neptune and of Earth. On the northern shores, where Atlantic and Mediterranean currents mingle, Hercules overcame the Giant and married Tingé; and their son, Sophax, later founded the city of Tangier, named in honour of his mother. In more prosaic accounts we may read that the Phoenicians founded Tingé city nearly 1,500 years before Christ, and that when the Romans welded Moroccan and Numidian territory, at the same time absorbing the many Carthaginian trading posts, they chose Tingé as their coastal, and Volubilis as their central, capital.

Morocco still has its prehistoric traces, its Stone-Age remains, Neanderthal evidences, dolmens, cromlechs, megalithic tombs. Vandals and Goths, mercenaries and prospectors, a succession of invaders, have all left their monuments, slight or impressive, accidental or deliberate. The country is mentioned by Greek authors of the sixth century B.C. and by Herodotus. Before the seventh century A.D. Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals and even Byzantines disputed possession with the indigenous Berbers. In the seventh century Muslim Arabs invaded the country under Sidi Okba, and began to convert the still-unconquered Berbers. A hundred years later, Idris, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed's son-in-law Ali, founded the first Islamic dynasty, and laid the foundations for Morocco's future greatness. From then on until 1912 no foreign Power succeeded in conquering Morocco—the only Arab country that resisted the Ottomans, and retained independence while they ruled over the rest of the Arab world for four hundred years.

After the glow of the Renaissance the world easily forgot Morocco's greatness that had illumined the early Middle Ages, and knew North Africa only as a lair of pirates, the dreaded “Salli Rovers”. Yet when, in the seventeenth century, the Alaouite

dynasty came to power, Morocco summoned sufficient strength and unity of purpose to expel unwanted and insolent foreigners, and thenceforth to offer or withhold privileges, and discriminate against merchants and marauders in favour of this or that European rival. Strangely enough, it was after 1750, when Morocco's power and prestige were fading, that the country began to figure prominently in the schemes and counter-schemes of the outside world. In the nineteenth century the world came to regard Morocco as a colonial problem, "problem" being, perhaps, a politer word than "pawn", and from then to the present time it seldom left the stage on which the play of international politics was being enacted.

\*     \*     \*     \*

Whatever the changing fortunes of hereditary monarchs and adventurers, the bloodshed of fratricidal war, the intrigues of foreign Powers, Morocco has always produced philosophers and scholars whose rich contribution to culture is universally recognized. The Moorish<sup>1</sup> achievements in the Iberian Peninsula have often been deliberately belittled, such enlightenment seeming to be a slight on Christianity. The Moors made of Granada a paradise of fertile fields and orchards, at a time when so much of Europe was a poverty-stricken wilderness for want of knowledge of sound agronomic principles. They built in Spain aqueducts, siphons, huge irrigation systems. They experimented with composting, fertilizing, grafting, food preservation, root pruning, silos and highly selective horse and cattle breeding.

When most of Europe was a realm of darkness, its ill-fed multitudes only just shedding their fears that the world was to vanish in a vast cataclysm, illustrious philosophers, scientists and theologians of Asia, the Middle East and Europe's happier cities, were converging on the University of Fez. The Almohade and Merinide dynasties, between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, were the patrons of some of the world's most renowned scholars. Such celebrities as Averroës (Ibn Rushd), the philosopher Ibn Tufayl, the geographer Idrissi, the historian Ibn Khaldoun, the travellers Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus were either born in Morocco or active there. There were schools and social institutions, studios for both artists and craftsmen, libraries and bathing establishments, dwellings and shops that were not inferior to those in Baghdad, Cordova, or Naples. Both the purely Moroccan and the Iberian-Moorish

<sup>1</sup> "Moorish" and "Moroccan" are interchangeable terms, but the former has assumed a tinge of derogatory comment quite unjustifiably. I hope for the word's honourable reinstatement.

civilizations of the period were spectacularly ahead of medieval Europe's best.

\* \* \* \*

Before its Islamization, Morocco was but a turbulent backwater hidden behind forbidding mountain ranges in the north-west corner of Africa. It was Islam which more than any other factor gave it the status of a nation with its own distinctive culture, and a power to be reckoned with. The foundations for its greatness were laid by the two first Idrissi Sultans early in the ninth century. Though their rule did not extend far beyond the Berber North, their kingdom became a closely knit unit with a central government, over-riding but not abolishing the tribal rule.

The Mekkassa, Maghraw and Berghouata Dynasties that followed the two hundred years of Idrissi rule were the outcome of tribal wars. But half-way through the eleventh century a band of Berber Muslims from the south, led by Youssef ben Tashfine, carried all before it, sweeping right into Spain. The Almoravide Dynasty founded by him was effective but shortlived (1061-1149), for it was soon superseded by the Almohades, who prevailed until the middle of the thirteenth century. They brought Tunisia, Algeria and even Andalusia under their control, and organized internal government and taxation.

Under the Almohades, Iberian-Moorish civilization reached its summit of achievement. With their successors, the Merinides, Moroccan culture still flourished. Great patrons of the arts, they gave Fez its medersas,<sup>2</sup> which are among the most beautiful monuments of Moorish architecture. By the fourteenth century Muslim supremacy in Spain was overthrown. The Beni Ouatta that followed the Merinides were unable to repel the Portuguese venturers who arrived in shoals and were bold enough to settle in different places along the Atlantic coast. The Saadien Dynasty, founded at the beginning of the sixteenth century, restored Morocco to much of her former eminence. The Saadien renaissance continued up to the second half of the seventeenth century.

After 1660, Morocco fell under the sway of the dynasty that still occupies the Shereefian throne. The Alaouites (or Filalis), being both Sultans and Shereefs,<sup>3</sup> began their rule as religious reformers. Possibly in no other Muslim country was the interplay between religion and dynastic history so lively as it was in the Maghreb.

<sup>2</sup> College buildings.

<sup>3</sup> Shereef: descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The Alaouite Dynasty claims direct descent, and this explains the designation of "Shereefian Empire" applied to Morocco of the past three hundred years.

The Moroccan Sultan is also "Imam" or spiritual leader of his people. In fact, his religious rôle is his greater source of power. For, while all Moroccans accept his spiritual authority, some of the Berbers refused to submit to his secular rule. In his capacity of Imam, the Sultan personifies Islam. And adherence to the dictates of Islam—even though at times vitiated by maraboutism (the worship of saints and their graves), pagan survivals, and other deviations from orthodoxy—has always been, and still is, an overwhelming compulsion, the dominant feature of Moroccan life at every level.

The outstanding Sultan of the Alaouite Dynasty was Moulay Ismail, a contemporary of Louis XIV in France, occupying the Shereefian throne from 1672 till 1727. Underestimated by European writers, overpraised by those of his own country, he was undoubtedly one of history's great personalities. His work of unification and of establishing a strong and efficient administration and a permanent army did much to enhance Morocco's status. Yet he was a monster of cruelty and self-indulgence who slew with his own hand large numbers, not only daily but hourly, to satisfy a whim, to assuage a spell of irritability, to amuse his visitors, to point a moral, or to enliven a dull hour. Many of his girl children were done away with soon after birth, and quite a few of his hundreds of sons were dispatched for showing signs of ambition. While deploring his lack of urbanity, Europe had to take notice of him, especially when he proposed to add a princess of France to his court. Arab writers have tried to rehabilitate Moulay Ismail by asserting that his defiance of the teachings of the Kuran, sinful as it was, must be set in the balance against his achievements. This will never convince non-Arabs, however, for his Morocco was a blood-bath and his abnormalities too gross to be glossed over.

\* \* \* \*

Much of Moroccan history was determined by geographical elements. The Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the mountain barriers of the Atlas and the Rif, and the vastness of the Sahara served for many centuries to shut out the world and encircle Morocco as though within a fortress. Isolation made Morocco suspicious not only of foreigners but also of the principles and doctrines they represented. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Morocco remained detached from the intellectual, scientific, and social advances that were revolutionizing conditions of the Western world. This explains why, in so many spheres of learning and achievement, Morocco went so far and then remained static, unaware of or hostile

to the advantages of pooling and comparing knowledge. There was no gradual sloughing off of layers of superstitions accumulated over the centuries, no concerted effort to replace anarchy by order, tribal strife by national unity, the rural-urban rivalries by co-operation. But once foreign money was admitted, in an attempt to repair the damage wrought by ignorance or mismanagement, Morocco was bound to emerge from its seclusion. Foreign money also meant foreign intervention, which has made of the past seventy or so years, the most crucial period of Moroccan history.

To discover the true beginnings of the years of upheaval we must look back to 1830 when France invaded Algeria, and to 1880 when she established herself in Tunisia. Morocco, the only independent country left in North Africa, beckoned temptingly and became a focus of European appetites and jealousies. Already in 1873, when Moulay Hassan, the only strong Sultan of the nineteenth century, had been trying to restore unity and establish prosperity, pressures exerted from Europe were complicating and magnifying his task. On his death in 1894, the Shereefian throne was occupied by his son Abd el Aziz, a boy in his early teens. The young Sultan's good intentions were not matched by achievement, and he was not sufficiently competent nor commanding to establish the unity which would have been necessary to render his country invulnerable to foreign aspirations. Thus, from 1900 onwards the history of Morocco is submerged in the history of European colonialism.

## THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

MOROCCO of to-day covers some 170,000 square miles,<sup>1</sup> the former French zone embracing four-fifths of the area, and the rest, save for the 150 square miles of the Tangier zone, having been under Spanish control. In its combination of desert, fertile plains and mountains reaching 14,000 feet, Morocco shows a great variety of climate and vegetation, the latter ranging from Alpine to sub-tropical. The country's natural resources, still only partially explored and exploited, are vast and varied, including fruit and grain crops, fisheries and pastures for hide-producing cattle, mines and deposits of phosphates; also great forests of timber and cork trees. And as there is beautiful scenery in both highlands and lowlands, as well as a wealth of architectural treasures, Morocco can claim to be the most interesting country of North Africa.

Population statistics are particularly unreliable. French figures, released from time to time, are never straightforward statements of facts carefully ascertained. In the first place, there was no foolproof machinery for collecting the data. In the second place, the issuers of these statistics were handicapped either by the necessity to use them as propaganda tools or by the difficulty of obtaining, as minorities, full information that the more highly organized majorities possess more abundantly. To give an example: the French Protectorate authorities, anxious to demonstrate how spectacularly the living conditions of the natives had improved between 1912 and 1950, claimed that the earlier figure of three millions was trebled to nine millions. It is impossible to regard this as a "hard" figure arrived at by disinterested calculation, especially since the earlier figure can be little more than a wild guess. For we know that precise population figures for the years prior to 1912 were hard to come by. There had been no census, and all assessments were but approximate.<sup>2</sup> But all the dependable authorities, including observers living in Morocco before

<sup>1</sup> It is almost impossible to obtain correct figures for any physical features of Morocco. Thus *Whitaker's* gives 270,280 square miles; the *Atlas of Islamic History*, published by Princeton University: 150,000 square miles; the *Herald Tribune* "Information Please": 161,691 square miles; and the *French Guide Bleue*: 520,390 square kilometres, which is just over 200,000 square miles.

<sup>2</sup> In the official publication, *Facts and Figures about French North Africa*, published in 1952 by the Office of Technical Publications of the French Prime Minister, the figure for 1912—"BEFORE the arrival of the French"—is given as only 2,500,000.



1912, give a figure at least twice as high as three million. Thus the *Encyclopædia Britannica* for 1911 mentions between five and nine million. The relevant article was written by Budgett Meakin, at the time the leading expert on the subject. And Budgett Meakin was nobody's dupe. He studied original documents and contemporary chroniclers, and invariably made allowances for the natives' vagueness on dates and numbers.<sup>3</sup> The *Annuaire du Maroc*, published in 1907 by the Comité du Maroc, the chief instrument of the French colonialists, estimated the population as being "about nine million". Marshal Lyautey, the first French Governor General of Morocco, said in December 1912, "Whatever the different estimates of the population of Morocco . . . Morocco has at least five or six million people." In spite of all the authoritative evidence to the contrary, French official spokesmen went on insisting that the figure of nine million for 1950 is a proof that the population has trebled. How reliable these official figures are can be gauged from the following examples: *News from France*, the official publication of the French Embassy in Washington, gives the population figure for 1921, when the French had already been nine years in Morocco, as 3,533,800, while the Government-sponsored book of the same year, *Morocco To-day*, published in Rabat, raises that figure to 4,161,800.

Even if we accept the lowest figure of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and that of the Comité du Maroc, giving a number between six and seven million, and the generally accepted figure of nine million for 1950, we see not a trebling of population, but a mere 30 per cent increase. "Mere" is not undue disparagement, if we take into account the exceptional virility of the Moroccans, such an increase can hardly be considered spectacular when set against world statistics. If standards of hygiene, if economic background of the natives had shown steady progress over the past forty years, the figure would be more striking.

By 1957 the population will probably have reached ten million, made up of some 200,000 Jews, under 500,000 Europeans (the majority French), and the remainder Muslims of pure and mixed race. In view of the great number of mixed marriages, figures for racial distribution can only be guessed at. The least erroneous estimate would seem to be that about one-third of the Muslim population will be Arab, rather more than one-third Berber, and the approximate one-third remaining will comprise mixed strains.

\* \* \* \*

<sup>3</sup> In his book *The Moors*, published in 1902, Budgett Meakin quotes Moroccan population figures as given by various "leading writers": Jackson, 15 millions; Bonelli, 10 millions; Réclus, 8 to 9 millions; Graberg, 8½ millions; Lanoye, 6 to 7 millions; Chénier, 6 millions.

The indigenous inhabitants, from time immemorial, were the Berbers, a predominantly white-skinned race, the precise origins of which have never been satisfactorily defined. Early in their history their characteristics were no doubt modified by their intermingling with cave-dwellers, with vanished folk whose megalithic remains are still to be seen in various parts of Morocco. Of short build, but with finely proportioned figures, the Berbers might be described as the "manly" element of the population. They are hard-working, unsophisticated, relatively simple-minded and apt to lavish affection on those they have accepted as friends. Though chiefly agriculturalists, they have proved surprisingly astute in certain branches of commerce, and many of the most efficient provision dealers throughout Moroccan cities are Berbers, usually from the Sous.

The Arabs from the Middle East began to arrive in the Maghreb in the seventh century, and their influx continued until the fourteenth century, when the Merinides were in power. The main Arab tribes to settle in Morocco were the Oudaya, the Menebha, the Sherarda, the Riah, the Khlot and the Hamiane. The Moroccan Arab is, on the whole, more sophisticated, better educated, more intellectual, far more given to discussion and argument, possibly more easy-going than his Berber brother, to whom he provides the perfect complement. Both share the same love of independence, even though it is in the Berber tradition to set tribal loyalty above any consciousness of nationhood; the Arab, more emancipated from the feudal conception, has taken more easily to the notion of the wider unity.

However strong the temperamental differences between the two races may be, they have shared some twelve hundred years of common history and traditions, and what counts for infinitely more, the same Muslim religion. While in native architecture and the arts, Berber and Arab elements are perfectly blended—the individuality of the one predominating but not overpoweringly so, in one instance, the second outlook prevailing in the other. But so far as literary activity is concerned, the Arab genius has always been incomparably greater. This was inevitable, for the Berbers possess no single language—nothing but a variety of dialects—and such alphabet as they once possessed was unwieldy and peculiar to themselves. They have no written documents. In consequence, Arabic has always been the language of religion, of learning, of government and administration.<sup>4</sup>

Following the bent of their natures, the Arabs usually settled in towns, and were active in administration, scientific and cultural

<sup>4</sup> The subject of Berber linguistics and other matters appertaining to the Berbers will be dealt with at greater length on page 86.

pursuits, the professions and commerce, whereas the Berbers stayed within the *bled* (prairie or land), pursuing their ancient ways as shepherds or tillers of the soil. The inevitable cleavage is very like the antagonism between urban and rural populations that prevails in most parts of the world.

We must be extremely cautious in assessing the extent of this difference of outlook and aspiration, for several reasons. The first is that politically interested parties exaggerate or minimize it in order to justify their actions. The second is that it represents, in the Maghreb, a racial as well as a psychological separateness. But to pretend, as has been done, that fusion is either impossible or a process requiring further centuries of coalescence, is to ignore the examples of history. Anyhow, in recent times hundreds of thousands of Berbers have been compelled to migrate into the cities, and mixed marriages have become far more numerous. There are still, of course, many Berbers who take pride in the "purity" of their blood. But we must not forget that Arab "pride of blood" can be equally fierce. Counterbalancing the "pure Berber" regions of Atlas and Rif are the Arab communities of, say Fez or Salé, who take such inordinate pride in their very white skins that they will never expose themselves to the sun. However, more often than not it is practically impossible to tell from physical aspect whether a Moor is Arab or Berber. The situation is even more complicated by intermarriage with negroes which has been very common for hundreds of years.

\* \* \* \*

Both historically and socially, the Moroccan minority group of Jewish faith represents an extremely interesting phenomenon. It is one of the oldest Jewish communities in existence. We have knowledge of the presence of Jews in Morocco in the third century B.C.; we also know that some of them arrived with the Vandals, and later contingents came from Spain in 1492 after their expulsion by Ferdinand and Isabella.

At various periods the Jewish minority suffered the fate of religious minorities throughout the world. But, by and large, their lot was better than that of most of their co-religionists in other countries. While one Christian Power after another saw fit to expel its Jews—Italy in 1348, Holland in 1380, France in 1403, England in 1422, Portugal in 1496, and Spain in 1391, 1414, 1492 and, again in 1610—Morocco never banished its Jews. On the contrary, the country was an asylum for many thousands driven out of their European homes.

Morocco has been innocent, too, of the State-inspired persecutions of Jews that were so common in various Christian countries. This is not to say that they have not, in the past, been subjected to restrictions severe enough to be styled local persecutions. Yet they have, simultaneously, held positions of great responsibility, thanks to a realistic appreciation of their gifts.

In the thirteenth century the Jews were given special quarters, *Mellahs*, "to safeguard them from the persecution of the populace".<sup>5</sup> They were placed under the *demma*, that is, the protection of the Sultan. "In exchange for certain obligations, the chief of which was the payment of the *djeziya* [a special tax], they were guaranteed the enjoyment of their possessions and their liberty."<sup>6</sup> The Jews did not all continue to speak the same language, although some retained their Hebrew. Most of them adopted either a "bastard Spanish mixed with Hebrew or Arabic", or the local dialect in use by the Muslims among whom they lived.

In their attitude towards the Jews, the Arabs proved more tolerant than the Berbers. In Arab areas they had better chances of advancement, and a number of Jews did well in the world, attaining wealth and even power. In the *bled es siba*, that is the Berber territories that would not accept the Sultan's authority and control, their fate might be uncertain. But in the *bled el makhzen*, the districts controlled by the central authority, they lived as "freemen", working and worshipping as they wished. Often, if their surroundings were Berber, they would become tinged with certain Berber characteristics, such as religious intolerance and rigidity; or even adopt pagan superstitions. They followed, for example, the Berber custom of worshipping saints and their graves, and made extensive use of charms, "magic boxes", amulets, and so on. Altogether they were aware of closer affinities with Muslims than with Christians, or even with Jews from other countries, for they regarded these as heretics.

Divorce was quite as frequent with them as with Muslims, and at times they would follow the Moorish custom of polygamy. In the days before the protection of the *mellahs* was exerted, the womenfolk of ostracized Jews were quite acceptable additions to a Muslim harem.<sup>7</sup> Besides, the Jews indulged in certain customs which "cannot be laid at the door of Berber or Arab influence. . . . Little Jewish girls were married between the ages of five and eight. In the best Jewish houses one finds wives of fourteen years who are already mothers."<sup>8</sup> This custom prevailed right into the present century.

<sup>5</sup> Eugene Aubin, *Morocco of To-day*, J. M. Dent & Co., 1906, p. 285.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> See Arthur Leared, *Morocco and the Moors*, 1876 ed.

<sup>8</sup> Aubin, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, when European interference in Moroccan affairs caused the natives to be particularly suspicious of anyone not a Muslim, the Jewish communities continued to enjoy their traditional autonomy. Within the *mellah* they were under the administration of the *maamad* or community council, composed of three rabbis and four laymen. The *maamad* administered all public funds, received revenues furnished by a tax on meat, known as *kosher*; looked after Jewish public buildings, and the lighting and cleaning of *mellah* streets. By that time the Jewish communities had even ceased to pay the *djeziya* to the Sultan's local representative. Instead, they offered gifts to the Sultan—an act of courtesy rather than a recognition of legal obligation—on certain festive occasions. Even in the days when semi-incarceration in the *mellah* was necessary as a protection of law-abiding citizens, the administration of both law and the police forces was in Jewish hands.

Walter Harris, the famous correspondent of the London *Times*, who spent a lifetime in Morocco and who had many friends among that country's Jewish community, says that the Jews "were able at any time to gain access to the authorities, and even to the Sultans, who in their conversation with the many Jews and Jewesses who worked in the palace, were far more intimate and affable than with their own people". And he concludes that "in many ways their position was preferable to that of the Muslim. . . . The result was that the Jews of Morocco as a race were far more often able, through their friendships at Court and with the viziers, to obtain justice for their wrongs than were their Muslim neighbours."<sup>9</sup>

Of particular interest is the following decree published on February 5, 1864, by the Sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah: "It is our order that all Jews residing in Our Empire, regardless of the situation in which they were placed by the Almighty, should be treated by our governors, administrators and other subjects, in conformance with strictest justice, and that before our legal courts, they should be on an equal basis with any other person, so that not even the slightest injustice may be done them nor any unmerited treatment accorded them. Neither the authorities nor any other person shall do any harm to the Jews, either to their person or their property. . . . Because such an injustice is an injustice in the heavens, and we cannot under any circumstances prejudice their rights. Our dignity is opposed with all its might to such proceedings. In Our eyes, all men have an equal right to ask for justice."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Walter B. Harris, *Morocco That Was*, London, Wm. Blackwood, 1921, p. 311.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in *Moroccan News Bulletin*, Moroccan Information Office, New York, November 28th, 1952.

Particularly advantageous was the position of the Sephardim Jews (that is, the Jews of Spanish origin who reached Morocco after their expulsion from Spain in 1492). "Hardworking, intelligent, keen business men, and capable organizers, the Spanish Jews of Morocco have progressed in civilization, in education, and in fortune." Besides being bankers and money-lenders, they also rose to the top in many other professions. Towards the end of the nineteenth century they began to build modern schools for their children, "with the result that there is scarcely a Jew in the coast towns of Morocco who does not speak, read and write at least two languages, while the majority speak three".<sup>11</sup>

The Spanish Jews tended to look down upon their more backward co-religionists, those who had been in Morocco long enough to become fully acclimatized to their surroundings. Soon after their arrival from Spain, quite a few of the Sephardim became converts to Islam, and local gossip has it that a considerable number of the more distinguished Arab families in Fez and Rabat descend from those converts. But even those who have remained in the Jewish faith, and have made their progress to prestige within the last hundred years, have produced something of an "aristocracy" of their own, deriving its claims to distinction from its considerable wealth. To-day the best known among them are the Toledanos, Laredos, Hassans, Parientes, Pintos. In the nineteenth century the forebears of most of these families settled in Tangier.

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Morocco's attitude to religious minorities has on the whole been one of comparative tolerance. They have no such black blots as the Inquisition, the St. Bartholomew Massacre, the burnings and beheadings of Protestants by Catholics and of Catholics by Protestants. In consequence it has become more appropriate to speak of "Jewish Moroccans" than of "Moroccan Jews".

Tales of the inhuman treatment of Europeans captured by Moorish privateers are extremely well documented. But it is open to question whether their lot was very much worse than that of Muslim and other slaves captured by European pirates. Whenever an anti-Christian wave swept Morocco, the root antipathy was xenophobic rather than religious. It is quite true that in many instances the dividing line between the two was imperceptible, and that to the tortured and slain it made little difference, but it must be remembered that the prime fault lay usually with the Christian Powers that attacked Morocco and tried to establish themselves on

<sup>11</sup> Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

Maghrebi soil, once the great Empire had declined. Thus, the Christian slave often had to suffer for the misdeeds of the Spanish or Portuguese governments. The *rumi* was generally hated not because he was a *rumi* but because he was the aggressor, or was so closely associated with the aggressor as to share his odium.

It would be hard to point to any period during which a Muslim mission might conceivably have received a welcome to a Christian land. But Christian missions in the Maghreb have a very long history. The first Franciscan mission, sent out by St. Francis himself, settled in Marrakesh, the City of Morocco, as it was then named, and for a number of years the same city harboured a Catholic bishopric.<sup>12</sup>

At the beginning of the twentieth century there were Christian missions in most major Moroccan towns, such as Fez, Marrakesh, Mogador and Safi. The one in Marrakesh consisted of Scottish Protestants, run by Presbyterians from Glasgow, who also had missions in Safi, Azzemour and Mazagan. These missions were "excellently organized, and were carried on by people the purity of whose intentions, and the dignity of whose bearing were alike beyond reproach".<sup>13</sup>

The British missions, run chiefly by women, concentrated on charitable work, providing medical help for the natives, and indulging in hymn-singing at the bedsides of their Moroccan patients. They did not attempt to proselytize. In fact we seldom, if at all, hear of Moorish converts to Christianity: the Moors were sufficiently realistic to appreciate benefits on the material plane without payment in spiritual coin on their part.

Early in the present century the British were followed by American missionaries. These were supported by the Gospel Union of Kansas City. They established themselves in Fez, the citadel of Moroccan Islam. Not surprisingly, they found it advisable not to appear out-of-doors except in native dress. For some reason they were "less esteemed than the British ladies", possibly because "at first they adopted the trying custom of preaching in the streets". Seeing the drawbacks of this practice, their fellow-Christians requested them to keep quiet, so as "not to compromise the other Europeans. They betook themselves to the country, and toured the villages with an entire lack of success."<sup>14</sup>

The other Christian groups consisted of tradesmen living in compact colonies of their own, and seldom exceeding more than a handful in any one city. Apart from Tangier, Mogador alone offered

<sup>12</sup> See Aubin, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p. 281.

something approaching a little British colony. There were also a number of Europeans in the employment of the Sultan—military adviser, doctor and, possibly, dentist. Only under Moulay Abd el Aziz did the ranks of foreign commercial travellers, business men and miscellaneous adventurers assume considerable proportions. The foreign diplomats kept to their own little paradise, that is, to Morocco's "diplomatic capital", Tangier.



THE MOROCCAN STATE  
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE  
TWENTIETH CENTURY

MODERN Arab writers claim that had it not been for foreign interference, the Sultan Abd el Aziz would, by leading his country towards progress and reforms, have assured its stability. Some European writers, on the other hand, would have it that at the beginning of the twentieth century Morocco was living in complete anarchy, and that nothing but the French intervention in 1912 saved the country from complete disintegration.

It goes without saying that both views give a distorted picture of the situation. Without foreign intervention, and all that it implied, Abd el Aziz might indeed have achieved more than he actually did. But time and tide went against him. Where a monarchy is absolute, the king must either be strong and wise, and therefore constructive, or must through lack of such attributes bring his country to the brink of disaster.

There was little in Abd el Aziz's make-up to suggest that he should have followed in his father's footsteps or effected anything approaching the interior consolidation brought about by his determined ancestor Moulay Ismail. And it would have needed a ruler at least as ruthless as that remarkable man to extirpate the thousand weed-growths that had smothered the fabric of the Shereefian Empire. Certain traditions, dying hard, needed re-orientation in a modern world. Perennial conflicts needed to be kept within reasonable bounds. The contention that the Moroccan State was at this point in its history neither strong nor efficiently administered is on all counts justifiable, for the Maghreb now represented an anachronism in a world that had witnessed or experienced the American and French Revolutions and the Industrial Revolution, and had seen the emergence of Democracy. For the Moroccan State was still being run according to principles of medieval autocracy, and condoning practices that were a denial of many of the finest humanitarian and scientific achievements of the preceding two centuries.

The vast difficulties and the internecine strife, while inevitably

## SULTAN AND MAKHZEN

At the head of the nations stood the Sultan. Now any particular Sultan might be strong or weak, beloved or hated, he was nevertheless held in respect by his people whatever his characteristics—not because he was king, but because he was Imam, and, as such, the Prophet's representative on earth.

Since the days of the Almoravides, the Moroccan Sultans have borne the title of Emir el Mumimin, Lord of the Believers. As the great Imam, the Sultan was entitled to say prayers in the name of the entire nation. But what set him apart and made his supremacy inviolable was the fact that, as a Shereef, he had inherited a *baraka* from his ancestors, that is, the power of blessing (and of doing good). "In the belief of the Maghreb, the hereditary and inalienable benediction is the celestial unction, which sanctifies the Sultan, and renders him the Shereef-el-Baraka of the dynasty. From this arises the whole dynastic conception on which Moroccan sovereignty is based."<sup>3</sup> Because of his *baraka*, the Sultan's position is well-nigh impregnable. Even his most blatant errors will be excused as an inexplicable outcome of "divine inspiration" which is beyond the comprehension of ordinary mortals.

We might add, with Professor Levy-Provençal: "Morocco's

<sup>1</sup> Speech delivered on 29 February, 1916. Louis H. G. Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, Paris, A. Colin, 1927, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> *Le Monde*, 30 June, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> Eugène Aubin, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

theocratic conception of sovereignty is the same now as it was in the days of the Khalifate in Cordova. The structure of its State, inherited directly from the Almohade system, has remained unchanged."<sup>4</sup> Of course, European nations, too, subscribed for many centuries to the conception of the "divine right of Kings" which was finally laughed out of court. But in Morocco that conception was rooted in the deepest religious feelings of the people. In fact the notion that the Shereef el Baraka could not err has been one of the most powerful motives in Moroccan history. It has guided action or dictated inaction—at all levels; made and unmade dynasties; infused culture, and been one unfailing generative source over centuries of troubled history.

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The Sultan's spiritual power was his own and indivisible. It could not be delegated to anyone save his successor, who, like himself, must be a shereef. The instrument through which he exercised his secular power was the Makhzen, or government.

The Makhzen, as known in the twentieth century, is a comparatively modern institution which evolved organically out of local conditions, that is, from the conflict between the ruler and certain dissident tribes. Nevertheless, the essential characteristics of the Makhzen were contained, seed-like, in the ancient structure of the Moroccan State from its very inception in the early ninth century. And throughout the country's history, it was the Makhzen (under the Sultan) that provided the chief force of national cohesion, and prevented the disintegration that threatened Morocco on more than one occasion.

The Makhzen was, as it were, a formulation of the tribes' submission to the Sultan, of their readiness to defend him and protect his rights. "The Makhzen tribes form the theoretical basis of the Shereefian authority, the defence of the dynasty, the garrison of the imperial cities, and the chief reserve from which the government officials are drawn."<sup>5</sup> The basis of the Makhzen was in fact the army.

The four original Makhzen tribes that did all the fighting in defence of the Shereefian authority were either Arab or Berber-Arabized. These tribes were military settlements "whose whole life was devoted to the service of the sovereign". For their services they were given grants of land, exemption from taxes, and facilities for reaching the highest ranks in government service.

<sup>4</sup> *Le Monde*, 30 June, 1953.

<sup>5</sup> Eugène Aubin, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

Though the term "Makhzen" had come, by the twentieth century, to denote "the Shereefian Government", it actually described the entire ruling class, from the Sultan down to the last *mokhhasni*, or government soldier. The Makhzen led a life apart from the populace, the soldiers living in their own settlements or in the Dar el Makhzen (Government "house" or palace) in close proximity to the monarch and his government.

While the members of the Makhzen represented a permanent element—sons usually following in their fathers' footsteps—there were also temporary Makhzen members, such as *Caid*s (tribal chieftains) or *Sheikhs* (village elders or magistrates), entrusted with special jobs—often the collection of local taxes; also secretaries or calligraphers called into service as scribes. Thus, alongside the hereditary Makhzen caste, there gradually came into being a supplementary class which by the twentieth century was providing most of the civil servants.

As a rule, members of the Makhzen, both on higher and lower levels, were badly paid, and had to augment their stipends by "gifts" from those with whom they had professional dealings. The amount of such gifts was prescribed by a scale established by custom. Whatever we may think of the method of leaving the remuneration of civil servants to their "clients", this habit was customary in the Orient, from Morocco to remotest China. Even in the Western world there have been many periods when it was an accepted feature of public life, and only the extent to which disguise was thought necessary has varied over the centuries.

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The Makhzen proper was divided into two distinctive sections: the Service of the State and the Court Service. Since the heads of the latter were in more intimate contact with the sovereign than their colleagues in the State Service, their influence upon the conduct of affairs was often disproportionately large.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the composition of the Makhzen's Service of the State was as follows: at the head stood the Sultan; then came the Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) who was also Minister of the Interior, and the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and the Habous (of land-holdings entrusted to religious authorities). Besides the cabinet itself, there was a consultative body, the *Majlis el Ayane* (Assembly of Notables), with whom the Sultan would deliberate on important matters, chiefly in relation to foreign affairs.

Some of the functions of the Makhzen were delegated to local

authorities, in the persons of governors and tribal leaders; to Khalifas (representatives) of the various Viziers, to *djemaas* (tribal assemblies), and urban consultative assemblies.

#### BLED EL MAKHZEN AND BLED ES SIBA

Before we can proceed to an account of the *djemaas*—next to the Makhzen, Morocco's most important political institution—something must be said about the country's over-all division into the *bled el makhzen* and the *bled es siba*.

The secular power of the Sultan and thus of his Makhzen seldom reached the whole of the Maghreb. Ever since the days of the Almohades in the twelfth century, certain Berber tribes have refused to submit to the Makhzen. Innately unruly, and with an almost morbid passion for their tribal independence, these tribes will not pay government taxes or supply the Shereefian army with troops, or in any other way acknowledge the monarch's overriding secular authority. These dissident tribes, spread over different parts of the country, and with little in common except their Berber race and their opposition to the Sultan, were known as the *bled es siba*—unsubmissive country. The regions that accepted the Sultan's secular authority, the protection of the Makhzen, and the duties that this adherence imposed, were known as the *bled el makhzen*—the government country. Often the conformity was partial and opportunist and did not include a steady faith in the Sultan. On the other hand, even the dissident tribes might maintain a loose attachment to the Makhzen. In fact "even in the most distant parts of the *bled es siba*, there is no tribe which is not in communication with the Makhzen. All of them are careful to keep up some connection with it, and not to sever themselves completely from a Muslim power which upholds the standards of imperial unity".<sup>6</sup>

Even at its largest, the *bled es siba* was, if more than one-third still less than one-half of the population. Far more has been said and written about it than about the *bled el makhzen*, yet it was always the latter that preponderated numerically. Under a strong ruler, such as Moulay Ismail, the dissident parts were small; under a weak ruler they would naturally grow bigger. As the dissident tribes lacked cohesion, it was always the *bled el makhzen* that represented the element of stability, that made more or less efficient administration possible, and, last but not least, that permitted the country to cultivate the arts of peace and to develop its culture. The *bled es siba* invariably made for unrest, civil war, and accentuation of racial differences. As unity was repugnant to it, and the

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 194.

maintenance and enhancement of tribal prestige everything, it has materially served as a brake on the unification of Morocco, and therefore as a brake on progress.

A second source of weakness was the arrogance of the "great" caids, especially of those in the south. Some of these, acting in their own region with an unchecked feudal autocracy, regarded themselves as minor independent rulers, refusing to acknowledge the Sultan, and remaining within the *bled es siba*. There were others, however, who proved more easily assimilable. Having been granted a fair measure of autonomy, they came within the scope of the *bled el makhzen*, paid tribute to the Sultan, and provided him with troops. On the whole the "great" caids were concerned with personal power (and enrichment) rather than with the prerogatives of their tribes, except when these were essential for ensuring that power. Even in their opposition to the central authority, the dissident caids had no common policy beyond a belief in the slogan "Everyone for himself". Their lack of a common ideology was clearly demonstrated after 1912, when some of them instantly made common cause with the French, others fought the French for twenty years, and others yet remained neutral.

Within their fairy-tale palaces, with their sumptuous *diffas* (feasts), their troupes of gaily clad dancers and musicians, the "great" caids may have formed an irresistible attraction to foreign visitors entertained by them. But, in so far as the well-being of Morocco as a whole was concerned, they were of as little use as a group of feudal barons would be in modern England or France. Had their aims been less selfish, they might, in periods of a weak sultanate, have provided a salutary counterpoise to an ineffective central administration. But since their aims were usually the furtherance of personal ambition, they exercised no positive influence. Their existence, however, persistently threatened Makhzen authority and undermined Shereefian power, for only strength at the centre could assure to Morocco either peace or unity.

#### DJEMAAS

It would be misleading to imagine that because of the Sultan's exalted position and the centralized character of his rule, Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century was an unredeemed autocracy. In certain ways, the Maghreb can claim to have, in the *djemaas*, or tribal and village councils, one of the oldest democratic institutions in existence.

The *djemaa* is a distinctly rural institution. Since Morocco has always been predominantly rural, the *djemaa* has naturally had an important rôle to play. Each rural settlement, however big or

small, had a kind of "home rule" through its own *djemaa*. Some historians have even propounded the view that "the Berber tribes were little republics, in which sovereignty rested in the hands of the *djemaa*".<sup>7</sup> In view of the fact that many of the *djemaas* accepted the Sultan's authority, such an assessment probably goes a little too far. Not all Berber tribes belonged to the *bled es siba*. In fact, in the first few years of the present century, when the tribes were strongly aroused against the "modernism" and the imposition of the new *tertib* tax by Moulay Abd el Aziz, "not a single rebel tribe broke off negotiations with the Makhzen".<sup>8</sup>

Local affairs were always settled by the *djemaas*. In its lower councils all male adults of the given settlement or tribe participated. In the higher council the delegates were chosen by members of the lower one. There was complete equality among the members, and even their president had no more power than anyone else. The president, or *amrhar*, was elected for one year only, and his main duty was to see that the decisions of the council were put into effect.

The land was common property of the *djemaas*, and its rewards were shared by all. In some places there were even collective shops and communal store-houses, called *agadir* in the Shleuh country of the High Atlas, and *tirhemt* in the Middle Atlas. These shops and store-houses (the latter partially supplying the former) might truly be considered as the antecedents of more modern co-operative societies.

In view of the proclamation, in 1930, of the Berber Dahir, one of the crucial events in modern Moroccan history, it is necessary to mention that the *djemaas* did not act as legal tribunals, and did not usurp the legal power of established courts. Their main legal function was to act as arbitrator.<sup>9</sup> Unless they wished to exclude themselves completely from the fold of Islam—which they never did—they could not presume to replace the *Sharia*, the time-honoured and almost sacred Islamic law, by some tribal, and thus purely local, jurisdiction.<sup>10</sup>

#### FINANCE

The exploitation of Morocco's potentially very rich subsoil did not begin on a large scale until after the Second World War, even though the phosphate deposits were worked soon after 1912, and various minerals were extracted on a small scale between the two

<sup>7</sup> Jean Célérier, *Maroc*, Paris, Editions Berger-Levrault, 1948, p. 105.

<sup>8</sup> Aubin, op. cit., p. 194.

<sup>9</sup> See A. de Laubadère, *Réforme Judiciaire*, 1948.

<sup>10</sup> This subject will be discussed in detail on pp. 142-8.

wars. Morocco's main wealth always derived from agriculture and pasture. While in good years there might be general prosperity, years of drought, with poverty and even famine, were fairly frequent.

It was inevitable that taxes should be based upon yield of agricultural produce. Certain taxes were paid in kind, others in money. The oldest taxes were those laid down in the Kuran, the *ashour* and the *zekkat*. We hear of them already in the reign of the Almohades, in the twelfth century. In the sixteenth century, that is under the Saadiens, a supplementary tax, the *naiba*, was added, originally to pay for military expenses, but later on collected regularly, though somewhat arbitrarily, each year, or imposed upon some tribe as a punishment. A tax well known to foreign travellers of the past was the *mouna* (supplies), not because they had to pay it but because they might find themselves its beneficiaries. Guests of the Makhzen, which so many travellers of bygone days had to be, would be supplied with food by the various government representatives or tribal leaders through whose region their journey took them. More costly was the *mouna* that had to be provided for a travelling Sultan, who never displaced himself without his Makhzen, his court, part of his harem, and his army.

Tribes of the *bled es siba* naturally paid State taxes only when a special *harka* (an armed tax-gathering expedition) was dispatched to them. The main object of a *harka* was to collect the money and men required for a Shereefian war.

The custom of presenting the Sultan with gifts on the occasion of certain religious feasts, or of paying him for office (the *hadiya*), must be regarded as yet another form of taxation which, though paid over only by certain privileged individuals, had to be extracted by these from people over whom they had some form of sway.

Except for the two Kuranic taxes, even the submissive tribes tried to evade the payment of dues. In fact the whole system of tax collecting was arbitrary, and under Abd el Aziz it fell into even deeper disrepute and became chaotic. In September 1901, in a glow of reforming ardour, he tried to replace the two Kuranic taxes by an entirely new one, the *tertib*, or ordinance, based on worth of arable land, live stock and fruit trees. Not even members of the Makhzen who happened to own land were to be exempt from it. The *tertib* aroused violent opposition, even though it was gradually accepted, to survive to the present day.

The total revenues from the various taxes mentioned above, from the supplementary taxes derived from customs and borne chiefly by foreigners, and from extensive properties in land and buildings



owned by the Sultan or the Makhzen, proved too inconsiderable to save the national exchequer in the years preceding the establishment of French rule. Foreign loans, indemnities, foreign monopolies of Moroccan customs dues, all these (collectively described by a French author as *diplomacie à la financière*) combined to give Morocco's financial structure the final stab that caused it to collapse.

## CULTURE AND SOCIETY

WHILE Morocco's more recent contact with Western civilization has brought immeasurable improvements in several spheres, it is open to question whether that contact has been equally profitable to the more intimate aspects of the country's social life. Those who have not known Morocco except in modern times can only guess at the great attraction which vanishing customs exerted. Yet even to-day social intercourse in Morocco is marked by certain graces that still convey some of the virtues of Moroccan culture at its best.

## THE FAMILY

As in all Muslim countries, Morocco's chief social unit is the family, a very closely knit entity, demanding from its members boundless devotion and charity. As a rule, the foreigner is prevented from seeing more than one facet of Moorish family life, the one represented by its male element. For even in the fifties of the present century, mingling of the sexes in social life was an exception and not the rule. But the privileged foreigner, a visitor unreservedly accepted, might be permitted to penetrate even into the inner recesses of family life, and thus to observe both men and women in their intimate surroundings.

The first feature that will strike him is the inordinate love of children, indulged by both sexes with equal abandon. While undoubtedly spoiled, children are at the same time taught all the niceties of social conduct and respect for their elders. Moorish families are, in general, large, and half a dozen children are as normal as the two or three of the average American or British family. As often as not, the foreigner will be amazed at the number of adopted children. Even the poorest, blessed with a large family of their own, will unhesitatingly adopt a strange child left an orphan. And usually there will also be one or two children of some poorer relative absorbed into the family of a man who has prospered moderately. It is not only that where no state welfare organization exists to care for destitute children, the onus is on the relatives; for

there is nothing grudging about the offer of homes for the homeless young.

#### SOCIAL INTERCOURSE

The social characteristic most apparent to foreigners is Moorish hospitality, a hospitality that is expended not merely on the special or formal occasion, but is a conspicuous feature of *daily* life. To share what you have with a guest is regarded as not merely a duty, but also as one of life's joys. Open-handed hospitality is, of course, typical of Arab life. But the Berber, too, has the same awareness of duty and pleasure, and the hospitality of any Moorish host would give you no clue to his race.

Before each meal, as even during the most casual visit at any time of the day, mint tea, Morocco's national drink, is served. And its drinking usually resolves itself into something of a ceremony with its own ritual. Thus not less than, but also not more than, three glasses should be taken. The tea should be drunk slowly, and to toss off three glasses, and consider one's social conformity thereby assured, would not meet the case at all. During a *diffa* of the well-to-do, even in the middle of the meal, mint tea is likely to be served. For a festive meal consists usually of innumerable, fairly rich courses, and a break half-way through, with the refreshment of a few glasses of mint tea, helps the digestion and restores the appetite for pleasures still to come.

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Unless the guest is on very intimate terms with his host, the meal will be an all-male affair. Even if the occasion is not formal, the sons of the host will not sit down at table, but will stand in the background, supervise the arrangements, and direct the servants waiting at table. At certain more stately meals, even the host may not join his guests but will choose to wait on them and act as a watchful major-domo.

Should young men, in their teens or early twenties, form part of the ceremony, they will excuse themselves from joining their elders in an after-meal cigarette, since to smoke in the presence of one's elders is considered disrespectful. Thus, even if no guests are present, sons will not smoke if their father happens to be in the same room. Even to-day, and how foreign this is to our own experience, age commands respect. A young man addressing an older one is supposed to keep his eyes down, and to speak only when addressed by the senior.

The respect that is paid to the aged is accorded, as well, to the

learned. Any form of intellectual attainment has always been held in great esteem by the Moors, as indeed by all Muslims. A scholar is deemed to stand far above a man of rank or wealth. As you walk through the narrow streets of ancient Fez, you still see simple tradesmen, opulent merchants, labourers, artisans or youths approaching the figure of a venerable professor of the Karaouine University to implant a respectful kiss on the sage's hand or the hem of his garment.

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There are other features of Moorish social intercourse that stand in marked contrast to the growing casualness of our own social life. Thus it would be impolite to contradict or argue with a guest, especially if he were a foreigner. Nothing unpleasant must be said to him unless he is a close acquaintance. You must never raise your voice in his presence or ask him questions that he might consider too personal or embarrassing. And if you yourself do all or any of these things, everything in the Moor's deportment must still suggest that he thinks very highly of you. These rules apply even to converse between Moors themselves. But experience tells them how far a man's speech is reflecting his true sentiments and how much the listener may discard as mere politeness.

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Imitation of the West has naturally weakened some elements of Moorish courtesy. Such cities as Fez may have retained most of their old customs and social traditions; but in places like Casablanca or Tangier, where the native is constantly exposed to Western influences, he has given up much of what was his own and replaced it by importations. Yet whatever our virtues in other spheres, it can hardly be claimed that the manners of the West have retained much of the grace and refinement that are said to have distinguished them in the past. The modern mania for shouting instead of conversing; for talking rather than listening; for rushing into heated argument and losing our temper at the slightest provocation; for thinking more of what pleases ourselves than of what might be agreeable to others; for considering a courteous approach and a subdued tone of voice either effeminate or "not democratic"; these are tendencies which make our social exchanges resemble encounters in the jungle. But because we are richer, better educated, and blessed with the "know-how", the more simple-minded Moor believes that, in order to acquire our attainments, he also has to

adopt our manners. Casablanca is full of young people thus misled, and the French call them *évolués*.

#### ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE

The conquest of the Arab world by the Turks at the beginning of the sixteenth century meant not only the end of Arab independence but also the eclipse of an independent cultural Arab life. Even in Morocco the lean years had come, and there was a thinning-out of cultural achievement.<sup>1</sup> The flowering of West-Islamic civilization, known as the Moorish, had coincided with Muslim hegemony in Spain, and its decline had begun to set in before the expulsion of the Moors from Spain in the sixteenth century. Later, it is true, there were sporadic manifestations of artistic creativeness—under Moulay Ismail in Meknes, and at the time of the erection of the enchanting town of Mogador on the Atlantic coast—but they were rare. Because of their fundamental lack of originality, the later works cannot be compared with the peak products of Moorish art, such as the Koutoubia minaret in Marrakesh, the medersas of Fez, or the Saadien tombs, not to speak of the mosque in Cordova or the Alhambra in Granada. As Walter Harris said: "The Moors lived on the mere echo of the past but were proud both of that past and of the spirit that they had inherited from it—a spirit of closing the door to all aggression, and the door of their hearts to all external influence."<sup>2</sup>

Such new buildings as were being erected in Morocco early in the present century—mosques, a few palaces—had no originality of conception or craftsmanship. They merely repeated the forms and ornaments favoured and prescribed by the great builders of the early Middle Ages. But though freshness of outlook was lacking, the technical skill of the craftsmen remained at a very high level. The stone and stucco arabesques, the mosaics, woodcarvings and faïences produced in modern Morocco showed the same competence—though not the same refinement—that had distinguished the work of Moorish artisans throughout history.

The masterliness of the Moorish craftsman was developed by a system of specialization probably unequalled in other civilizations. The different trades of woodworkers, masons, plaster-carvers, tanners, and so on were divided into guilds, and each guild had its own hierarchy as complex and as rigidly adhered to as any at the court of the Chinese emperors. (The English medieval guilds were broader-based, less specialized and for the most part of economic bias.) The city of Fez alone had 126 groups of skilled artisans. A

<sup>1</sup> See "Morocco Before 1900", p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 292.

man who wished to build a house would employ a master mason, a master carpenter, and a master tiler. The master mason alone would have under him five kinds of stonemason, five kinds of lime worker, and four kinds of plasterer. The master carpenter would have six, and the master tiler four kinds of specialist, each trained to do one restricted job only, and doing it, of course, supremely well. Each of the workers would begin learning his trade in childhood—sometimes at the age of five or six—and by the time he reached manhood he had usually developed a skill unsurpassed by that of the finest Swiss watchmaker.<sup>3</sup>

The superior abilities of craftsmen employed in the various branches of the building trade were equalled by the degree of skill of weavers of native carpets, of workers in metal and leather ("Morocco"), and especially of the potters of Safi and Meknes. It is only since 1912 that Moorish carpets have shown a decline in beauty of design and colour. Ever more extensively the subtler native dyes of vegetable origin have been replaced by imported chemical dyes, and native patterns by crude "Turkish" or even European ones.

If many of Morocco's most renowned crafts must be considered Arab, and certainly Islamic, the Berbers' most distinctive artistic contribution has been in the field of architecture. Their fortress-like and almost skyscraper-dimensioned kasbahs, with crenellated walls, imposing towers and a general air of majesty, have no counterpart on any continent. But even the kasbahs erected within recent years are mere replicas of older ones, revealing no novel features.

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Education, while of a primitive type, has always been comparatively widespread. "In the towns and rural areas," writes a French expert on the subject, "there were a large number of Kuran schools, maintained by the Sultan, by religious foundations or by individuals. We were confronted, in fact, by a marvellous blossoming forth of schools, large and small, functioning within the shadow of the towns or under the tents of the villages."<sup>4</sup>

In the Kuranic schools the children learned the holy book by heart, and may have acquired some knowledge of reading, writing and elementary arithmetic. The rural communities saw little need for education for girls, and in the larger towns it was left to individuals to organize it. Eugène Aubin, who, in 1902 and 1903, spent a whole year in Morocco, states: "There are fifteen schools for girls

<sup>3</sup> Prosper Ricard, *Les métiers manuels à Fès*, Hesperis, IV, 1924.

<sup>4</sup> André Collietz, *Nôtre Protectorat*, 1930.

at Fez, which are really private classes held by educated women. . . . There are, besides, technical schools, which work in the same way, for sewing and embroidery."<sup>5</sup>

Morocco's most urgent need was for facilities for secondary education, and, to-day, for modern education in the Western sense. Education on a university level has been confined to Fez, Marrakesh and Meknes.

The university attached to the ancient Karaouine mosque, at Fez, was the country's chief seat of higher learning, and to-day can claim to be one of the oldest, if not the oldest, university in the world. For it was founded soon after A.D. 862, when the Karaouine mosque was erected by Mohammed el Feheri, an Arab from Kairouane in Tunisia, or in 933 when the original mosque was replaced by a much larger one.

The curriculum of the university was slow to advance from the days when scholars from all over the world used to sit at the feet of the famous Karaouine professors. At the beginning of the present century, the morning sessions were given over to study of various aspects of the law; in the afternoon, to grammar, syntax, prosody, logic, education and rhetoric. There were seventeen professorial chairs, and each professor "of the first class" had a number of assistant professors.<sup>6</sup> Education was free, but a new student had to buy the key to a room in one of the medersas (university dormitories), and there he would live throughout his years of study. (Students whose home was in Fez lived with their families.) Of the nine medersas—one of the remaining glories of Moorish architecture—only five were in use early in this century. Together, they contained 514 rooms. Though these rooms are no bigger than a monastic cell, usually two or three young men would share one. Each inhabitant of the medersas would be provided by the university with a daily loaf of bread, placed each morning by the *moqaddem*—the supervisor and janitor who, while not a student, had to be elected by the students—through a special hole in the wall of each cell. Even to-day this custom is maintained. And even to-day many of the students depend upon public charity for any food apart from the daily loaf. It has always been a tradition of many Fassi families, excepting the poorest, to provide food for the Karaouine students. On special occasions, such as feast days, a student might be invited to share the meal of the family that had "adopted" him; on ordinary days he would merely call at his benefactor's house to collect a daily ration of viands.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Aubin, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>6</sup> Aubin, op. cit., and Robert Le Tourneau, *La ville de Fès avant le Protectorat*, Casablanca, 1949

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

Having completed their studies, the students could seek jobs as secretaries in the Makhzen or as cadis (judges) either in the cities or the tribes; they might become imams in mosques, or professors at the Karaouine or at the smaller university in Marrakesh. Some would seek no paid position, but content themselves with the rôle of men of letters, often spending long years working on some historical or abstruse philosophico-theological book which only in the case of one or two stood a chance of publication.

Though comparatively little was being published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, intellectual life was by no means dead. A city such as Fez never ceased to throb with philosophical discussion or literary debate. A stylist in the classical Arab tradition was still a welcome guest in every home; and a man who knew how to explain the complexities of a certain Sufi doctrine, of a philosophical problem or of a legal sophistry enjoyed general respect. Even in times of political upheaval and insecurity, the Moroccans showed a deeper respect for learning than is the case in most Western countries, where "a little learning" is so easily acquired. Leo Africanus, the great fifteenth-century traveller, reports that in Fez he found scholars who were learned in moral philosophy "reverenced by the common people as gods".<sup>8</sup> Detractors mention, in this connection, the one-eyed man in the country of the blind. Others, of more romantic outlook, see nothing but good in this uncritical respect for learning. Truth, as usual, lies between two extremes.

#### HABOUS

While the activities of the *habous*—the ancient Islamic institution of public charities—cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as manifestations of cultural life, they provide many amusing or touching examples of inspirations that are by no means strictly utilitarian. From time immemorial the *habous* administered charitable funds bequeathed by private individuals. These individual bequests might go into the general fund, or they might be earmarked for some particular purpose. The money from the general funds would be used to maintain most of a city's services, such as public works, administration of justice, higher education, the upkeep of mosques, and the stipends of their imams and muezzins.<sup>9</sup>

Less prosaic, however, were the donations assigned to a purpose particularly dear to the donor's heart. One such benefactor was a wealthy Fassi<sup>10</sup> by the name of Ben Hayoun, who, during a spell

<sup>8</sup> Leo Africanus, *Descrittione dell' Africa*, III, p. 43.

<sup>9</sup> Muezzin—the mosque official who calls the faithful to prayer.

<sup>10</sup> Fassi—inhabitant of Fez.



of illness suffered from insomnia, and was profoundly affected by the sense of solitude occasioned by the silence of the night. So he decided that, in future, the sick of Fez should not be haunted at night by anxieties such as he had endured. He gave the *habous* a special fund, to be devoted to maintaining "the companions of the sick". These companions were ten muezzin, whose duties became hereditary. Every half-hour during the night one of them would recite a prayer from the heights of a minaret. Since each of them had his unchanging allotted hour, and since before long their individual voices became familiar to the inhabitants of the city, not only the sick, but also all who happened to be awake could instantly divine the exact hour by recognizing the particular muezzin.

Another Fassi bequeathed his money for an even more curious purpose, one that gave evidence of his profound psychological insight. Conscious of the influence the first few days of married life might have upon the entire future of conjugal existence, and also of the unpropitious conditions in which those first days had to be spent by many of the poor, he arranged for the establishment of a kind of honeymoon house in which newly married couples might spend, free of charge, the first week after their wedding in handsome and comfortable surroundings.

Yet another bequest provided a band of musicians whose job it was to visit the local lunatic asylum daily, and to play music to distract the inmates. "The progress of the case was judged by the effect the music produced"<sup>11</sup>—a pleasant *double-entendre* which we ought to interpret as kindly as possible.

#### BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

Compared with the advanced countries of the West, Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century was not merely backward but an utter anachronism. Its way of life had remained unaffected by modern innovations, such as railways, electric or gas light, telegraph and telephone, macadam roads, progressive social organizations. There was no guarantee of security to the traveller; no effective effort to put down banditry or check bribery in the administration. The individual citizen was not always certain, as he went home in the evening, that on the following day he would still find himself in possession of his business or his dwelling.

Morocco was not, of course, unique in these respects. Asia could furnish many examples of similarly desperate conditions. It is true that they were not situated, as it were, in Europe's back garden. Yet, even if we turn to Europe, the picture is not uniformly

<sup>11</sup> Aubin, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

pleasant. In most of Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, in Southern Italy and Sicily, in Spain and Portugal, we find conditions that were not much better. The same applied to most of the Latin-American Republics. Could many of these countries pride themselves on honest and efficient governments, on modern sanitation, progressive schools, an up-to-date road system, or security for the traveller? We must remember that in 1900 the state of things in the Maghreb was shared, to some degree, by most countries of the world, with the exception of the few in the vanguard, such as most of Western Europe and North America.

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A word must also be added about the custom of acquiring office by payment, the highest bidder (and not necessarily the most competent candidate) obtaining the plum. We in the West have known, of course, our own versions of these practices, and our struggle towards equity has been long and bitter. Nepotism is, of course, a hardy perennial of extensive habitat.

Morocco's spiritual affinities are with the countries of the Middle East from which it is separated by thousands of miles. By religion, language, civilization and customs it belongs to the Middle Eastern world. So what ranks, in Western countries, as corruption, is in Morocco merely a manifestation of those habits of personal rule, undisguised nepotism and buying of office that have always been common in the Orient, and that are rooted in their specific social and political attitudes.

The Morocco of 1900 had certainly not evolved to the same level as peoples who had learned to examine their own traditions in the light of progressive thought. But it is open to question whether that circumstance fully justified the attitude of superiority assumed by so many Western chroniclers of modern Moroccan history.

*Part One*

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THE ORIGINS OF THE PROTECTORATE



## THE REIGN OF MOULAY ABD EL AZIZ

TOWARDS the end of the nineteenth century it became evident that the days of Moroccan independence were numbered, and that national rebirth would have to be preceded by foreign intervention. Though the boy who was to become the Sultan Moulay Abd el Aziz departed from the scene in 1908, that is four years before Morocco was turned into a foreign protectorate, most of the preliminaries for that event took place during his reign.

With all his human frailties, his extravagance, his lack of foresight, he remains a fascinating, and in some respects an attractive character.

Moulay Hassan died in 1894 while on a campaign in the subdued region of Tadla,<sup>1</sup> and was succeeded by Abd el Aziz, his son, then in his early teens. The mother of the new Sultan was a Turkish lady from Constantinople, a woman of great intelligence and considerable force of character. For the first few years the new

<sup>1</sup> Some Moroccans saw an ill omen in the very circumstances of this death in Tadla of his father, the last strong sultan. Now it was essential for the dynastic continuity and the peace of the country that a new monarch be proclaimed as soon as his predecessor had died. But the dead king was several days' march from the capital and from the son whom he had wished to become his successor. So his chamberlain Bou Ahmad, the only person besides the slaves who had been present at the Sultan's death, fell upon an ingenious ruse. He dispatched fast couriers to the young Abd el Aziz announcing his father's death, and at the same time kept the news of Moulay Hassan's death from the army and the ministers in whose midst the dead ruler had been travelling. Orders were issued that the king would start on his journey at daybreak. Before the sun rose the royal palanquin was carried into the Imperial enclosure. The corpse was laid within it, its curtains drawn, its doors closed. Led by flying banners, the procession set out on its journey. Only once in the course of the day did the procession come to a halt. The palanquin was carried into a tent so that "the Sultan might enjoy his breakfast". Dishes covered with food were carried in and out again; but only the slaves who knew the secret were permitted to enter. Bou Ahmad remained all the time with the corpse, and after a while he emerged to announce that His Majesty was rested and had enjoyed his breakfast. The procession could continue on its journey. Another long distance was covered, and when night fell, a camp was pitched.

For several days this gruesome comedy was kept up, and the palanquin bearing the rapidly decomposing corpse was carried to Rabat. "The escort had bound scarves over their faces—but even this precaution could not save them from constant sickness; and even the mules that bore the palanquin seemed affected by the horrible atmosphere, and tried from time to time to break loose." Walter Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 14. Meanwhile the runners had reached Rabat, Abd el Aziz had been proclaimed Sultan, and Moulay Hassan's death could be made known.

Sultan relied chiefly upon her advice and that of his strong-willed counsellor Bou Ahmad, the son of a Negro slave, who succeeded in asserting his power over the heads of the viziers. Hiding behind the authority of his master, Bou Ahmad ruled the country until his death in 1900, when the viziers felt that their moment had come. The Sultan, who had been a mere instrument in Bou Ahmad's hands, was inexperienced, and the viziers met little resistance as they thrust him and his opinions into the background. But since Abd el Aziz was "thoughtful, intelligent, and desirous of doing well", his entourage still felt unsafe. They feared that he might wish to embark upon administrative and social reforms that would deprive them of some of their power and sources of revenue. "It was clear that the Sultan must be amused, and his amusements must be so numerous and so varied that his entire attention would be distracted from affairs of State. For further distractions, appeal must be made to Europe."<sup>2</sup>

So from 1900 the world watched the tragi-comic dissolution of a monarch who, in spite of all his alleged gifts of character and mind, proved himself too weak to fight the disastrous circumstances in which he was placed. There followed a period of reckless extravagance, of debts and follies, a period the trappings of which belonged to farce, although the inevitability of the outcome was more in keeping with Greek tragedy.

The palaces of the Sultan were littered with Western gewgaws and luxuries—from bicycles, lawn-mowers, cameras, cigarette-lighters and musical boxes to corsets, silk dresses and ostrich-feathered Parisian hats for concubines. Grotesquely decked in unaccustomed finery, these ladies were made to ride bicycle races, to the delight of spectators. Salesmen, adventurers and sharks from half a dozen countries came in a constant stream to the courtyards of the Shereefian palaces, unloading their wares. Moulay Abd el Aziz, taking the line of least resistance, watched the crazy procession, and with boyish hesitancy, joined in the frivolity. It seemed as though some evil genius were casting its shadow over the hapless king. Whatever the Sultan touched turned not to gold but to base metal. When, in a spell of reforming zeal, he tried to improve the financial situation of his country by replacing the miscellaneous taxes of the past by a single agricultural tax, the *tertib* (see p. 40), even that fundamentally sound measure backfired, and he aroused the wrath of rich and poor, and saw a further decline of his waning popularity.

Domestic and foreign affairs were soon in such chaos that he was compelled to seek loans from European Powers, "The Sultan

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 40.

is selling the country to the infidels!"<sup>3</sup> was the universal cry of his people.

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An impotent ruler, struggling vainly against the rising tide of his unpopularity, provided the ideal opportunity for adventurers and usurpers. From the Spanish zone arose the repellent and yet fascinating figure of Raisuli, a bandit in the truly great tradition.

Moulay Ahmed ben Mohammed er Raisuli was not born a bandit. He was, in fact, a Shereef of noble descent, and had received an excellent grounding in law and religion. As a youth he had recoiled from the monotony of a respectable occupation and thrown in his lot with cattle rustlers who accepted his leadership and admired his handsome bearing and ruthless perseverance. He soon graduated to large-scale felonies, taking kidnapping and murder in his stride. As his power and following increased, his impudence grew in proportion. Ere long, Walter Harris, correspondent of the *London Times* and close friend of the Sultan, and some time afterwards, Sir Harry Maclean, the Scottish commanding officer (caid) of the Shereefian armies, found themselves in his clutches.<sup>4</sup> Raisuli's successes, of course, undermined such prestige as remained to the Sultan, who could only declare himself helpless when influential subjects and enraged foreigners protested at the bandit's depredations.

In 1904 Raisuli and his men penetrated as far as Tangier, and descended upon the garden and villa "Aidonia"—"the place of nightingales"—owned by Mr. Ion Perdicaris, a wealthy American of Greek origin. Mr. Perdicaris led a life of cultured retirement, delighting in his monkeys, tame pheasants and cranes. He was a law-abiding citizen of the city of Tangier, and his activities at their most spectacular did not extend beyond the painting of oversize

<sup>3</sup> Foreign loans will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter entitled *Financial Diplomacy*.

<sup>4</sup> The Caid Sir Harry Maclean was one of the most remarkable personalities at the court of the successive Sultans, Moulay Hassan, Abd el Aziz and Hafid. A subaltern in a British regiment stationed at Gibraltar, he was "lent" to Moulay Hassan, first as an instructor, and, later, to become Commander-in-Chief of the Shereefian army. Rotund, but of diminutive stature, with sparkling eyes and a trim white goatee, he would strut about in yellow English riding boots, a turban round his head and a voluminous burnous in the Maclean tartan draped about his figure. Though he identified himself completely with the interests and manners of his country of adoption, he preserved until the very end his Scottish accent and his passionate proficiency at blowing the bagpipes. An essentially simple personality, he yet retained his influential position at the Moorish court by sheer force of character. The three sultans whom he served valued his services at every tide and turn of their lives, consulting him not only on military matters and State affairs, but also on the solution of the intimate problems marring their private lives.

pictures in which characters representing Virtue fought battles with others symbolizing Vice.

Now on May 18, 1904, the owner of "Aidonia", surrounded by his family, was enjoying the evening meal that was served in the forecourt of his luxurious establishment. When the coffee stage was reached, an unwonted din arose from the servants' quarters. Mr. Perdicaris, in dinner jacket, and his son-in-law, M. Varley, rushed into the house, and there they found their Moorish servants gagged and bound, and surrounded by a number of armed strangers. In short order they themselves had their hands tied behind their backs and were placed on tethered mules, and whisked away.

The kidnapping had serious diplomatic repercussions. "The American government sent a fleet to Tangier, and the whole world watched the ensuing negotiations."<sup>5</sup> The British and American admirals who appeared on the scene telegraphed to their respective governments that they could not guarantee that the American and British Ministers at Tangier might not also be kidnapped. President Theodore Roosevelt's indignation was couched in the unequivocal phrase, "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead". Conscious of his impotence, the unfortunate Moulay Abd el Aziz made the gesture of sending troops to Tangier, but his warriors dared not follow Raisuli into his lair in the mountains.

After five weeks the two kidnapped men were finally restored to liberty, but on conditions humiliating to both President Roosevelt and the Sultan. For Raisuli extorted from the U.S.A. a ransom of \$70,000, and from the Sultan his appointment as governor of all the districts about Tangier, stipulating the imprisonment of his enemies and the setting free of his friends. Raisuli found himself more powerful than ever. Moreover, he had become a hero in the eyes of the Moors.

For the sake of historic completeness, it should perhaps be added that when Mr. Perdicaris returned from his imprisonment, everyone agreed that he was immensely improved in health. In spite of this, and possibly somewhat ungratefully, he decided to abandon his abode of nightingales, and in its stead he purchased a less romantic but presumably more tranquil retreat at Tunbridge Wells.

In his official position "by the grace of the Sultan", Raisuli became a despot. He knew that the Moroccan government lived in terror of him. He ignored its orders and even its treaties with foreign Powers. By 1907 Raisuli was outlawed by the Sultan; but for all that his career outlasted that of Abd el Aziz. In fact he was able to speed the Sultan's overthrow in the following year; and

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 199.



later still he allied himself with the Spanish, and progressed from glory to glory. But by that time Abd el Aziz was leading in Tangier the life of opulent frustration of throneless kings.

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As though Raisuli's conduct had not been enough to weaken the Sultan's authority and to undermine his power, Abd el Aziz also had to contend with Bou Hamara, a pretender to the Shereefian throne who claimed to be the Sultan's eldest brother. He lived in the inaccessible land of the Rif Berbers, where he governed as a petty ruler.

Commonly known as Bou Hamara, or El Rogui (usurper), he called himself Mohammed ben Hassan, to imply that he was a son of the late Sultan Moulay Hassan. His true name was Jelali Zarhoni. Arab nationalists claim that Bou Hamara found support among the French.<sup>6</sup> It does not seem unlikely that Raisuli, too, who, at one time received open support from the Spanish authorities, may occasionally have acted with French connivance. Walter Harris, who knew all the leading actors in the Moroccan drama intimately, says, "that Bou Hamara and Raisuli were in communication is certain".<sup>7</sup> It is understandable that birds of that feather should flock together so long as their interests were identical.

There is an interesting reference to Bou Hamara in German diplomatic documents of the period concerned. When Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was making ready for his historic visit to Tangier in March 1905, his Chancellor, von Bülow—the man responsible for that visit—sent him detailed instructions as to what he should say when greeted by the Sultan's representative. "Thus," von Bülow says in that secret despatch, "if, for instance, Your Majesty should ask, 'Where does the rebel Bou Hamara get the means for his long resistance?' and the envoy should reply, 'Probably from France,' then the right answer for Your Majesty would be, 'It would be difficult to credit the French with such an infamy.'"<sup>8</sup> As more precise documentation is missing, one may go no further than to suppose that French support of Bou Hamara was deemed a possibility in Europe's diplomatic circles. We find evidence that France had not overlooked the possibility in certain of Lyautey's

<sup>6</sup> Thus Mostafa Bechir, the late Algerian nationalist, wrote: "The French fomented and financed the rising of Bou Hamara in the Alger-Moroccan region." Mostafa Bechir, *Hello Babitt, Les Cahiers de l'Unité Arabe*, Cairo, 1954. This is, of course, only slender evidence.

<sup>7</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 212.

<sup>8</sup> Prince von Bülow, *Deutschland und die Mächte*, Carl Reissner Verlag, 1930, p. 249.

private letters published many years after the event. At the time Lyautey was holding important commands in Morocco, and in his letters he speaks quite openly of the advantage of utilizing Bou Hamara and supporting him with money.<sup>9</sup> This seems fairly conclusive evidence.

Unlike Raisuli, Bou Hamara began his life as a mere scribe in Meknes. A crook from the very beginning, he opened his career by forging his employer's signature, manufacturing a replica of the Imperial Seal, and making profitable use of his conjuring tricks. But he possessed certain scholastic qualifications, and he knew how to impress simple folk with his knowledge of the Kuran and the Sharia (Islamic law). "Almost unconsciously he was accepted as a 'leader' . . . caused a great Seal of State to be struck, and was proclaimed Sultan" by his followers.<sup>10</sup>

Bou Hamara exercised almost absolute power over eastern Morocco, and the Sultan's ill-paid and unenthusiastic armies were not only unable to force him into submission, but even suffered a painful defeat at his hands. It was not until 1912, when Moulay Hafid was on the throne, that the Rogui was finally captured and executed. But so long as Abd el Aziz was Sultan, Ben Hamara remained yet another corrosive element that combined with all the others to destroy the Sultan's supremacy.

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The finally decisive causes of Abd el Aziz's downfall must be sought in the records of foreign affairs, and these will be found in their appropriate chapters. Here it will suffice to state that by 1908 the unfortunate monarch found himself hated and deserted by most of those who originally had placed high hopes on his "enlightened" reign. Right to the end he "talked of what he intended to do for his people; still poured out plans for their betterment".<sup>11</sup> But the sands had run out. In the eyes of his people, whom long centuries of indifferent treatment had inured to hardship, his sins of omission were almost negligible. His chief crime was his "association with Europeans". This was not so much resentment of personal contacts and addiction to Western "toys" as conviction that he was selling out his country to rapacious "infidels".

In 1908 his brother, Hafid, proclaimed himself Sultan, and a half-hearted war between the two brothers ensued. Finally Abd el Aziz

<sup>9</sup> See Lyautey, *Choix de Lettres*, Paris, Colin, 1947, p. 272; and *Lettres de Rabat* (1907), *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 July, 1927.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, p. 109.

abdicated voluntarily in favour of Hafid, and retired to Tangier, where for many years he led the life of a "Moorish gentleman". Moulay Hafid was accepted as Sultan. But even had he been a genius, he could hardly have done much to prevent his own downfall a mere four years later, for by 1908 the destiny of Morocco was no longer dependent on the actions of its Sultan or the reactions thereto of its people. International politics and the aspirations of European colonialism were too deeply concerned in it, and their strength was soon to prevail. The end of the independent Shereefian Empire could not be long delayed.

## FINANCIAL DIPLOMACY

THE story of the establishment of the French Protectorate over Morocco is long and complex.

The most frequent version of the birth of the Protectorate has been summarized as recently as 1954 in an article by a senior member of the French Residency General at Rabat. He writes: "It is the Moroccan people themselves who, wishing to see an end of the anarchy that reigned in the country, forced the Sultan Moulay Hafid to appeal to France to inaugurate a new regime."<sup>1</sup> This appeal was instantly heeded, and for his part the Sultan agreed to the establishment of a French Protectorate. According to the same author, the majority of the Moroccans welcomed the event, for it would mean that the chaotic conditions and the prevailing misrule, both of which Moulay Hafid had inherited from his brother, would come to an end. "Thus on March 30, 1912," was inaugurated the modern era of Morocco's history, when the country, by "fully entering into a covenant of *her own free will*",<sup>2</sup> changed her status. According to an American historian of that era, this covenant was "merely a formality to legalize the existing French situation". For it was by a "long series of treaties and accords that France had at last obtained the right to establish a protectorate over Morocco".<sup>3</sup> As far back as 1902, "the French opened direct negotiations with the Spaniards for the partition of Morocco", and made a similar approach to the British government. The terrified Sultan "despatched Caid Maclean to London with a personal letter to King Edward, asking Great Britain to guarantee the integrity of Morocco".<sup>4</sup>

The "treaties and accords" represented only one part of the masterly campaign by which France finally gained control over

<sup>1</sup> *Réalités Marocaines*, by H. M. Tamsamani, Conseiller chérifien pour l'Information et les questions culturelles. In *France Outremer*, Paris, August-September 1954, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> The opening words of *Morocco 1950*, an official publication of the *Résidence Générale* at Rabat, December 1950. My italics.

<sup>3</sup> Graham H. Stuart, *The International City of Tangier*, Stanford University Press and Oxford University Press, 1931, p. 78.

<sup>4</sup> Harold Nicolson, *Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart.*, Constable & Co., 1930, p. 147.

Morocco. That campaign was three-pronged—financial, military and diplomatic. It had begun not in 1912 but many years earlier, and we shall have to examine its various stages from the very beginning.

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In 1903 Abd el Aziz had to borrow £800,000 from British, French and Spanish syndicates. To enable him to pay off this debt, the French persuaded him in the following year to take up a new and bigger loan. The sum involved amounted to 62,500,000 francs, and carried an interest of five per cent. In a statement made on March 14th, 1911, in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris, Jean Jaurès, the famous socialist deputy, stated that French bankers "kept 12½ million as a commission", leaving the Sultan 48 million francs only.<sup>5</sup> To ensure that the five per cent interest on the full 62,500,000 francs was paid, the Sultan had to set aside sixty per cent of all customs revenues, which were placed under French control. In 1905 and '06 he was induced to contract for a number of smaller loans from France for the purchase of arms and ammunition. France stipulated that these goods must be bought from Creuzot, the French armament manufacturers, and not in the free world market.

These transactions—the bankers' commission apart, perhaps—smell of keen business rather than of sharp practice. No major power could, without hypocrisy, take exception thereto. However, it might appear odd that the Sultan—in no position to conduct wars—should feel any need for arms. But, to quote one historian, "there seems to have been a close connection between the willingness of French finance to oblige Abd el Aziz and the willingness of Abd el Aziz to oblige Creuzot on the one hand, and the willingness of the tribes in closest proximity to the Algerian-Moroccan border to play the game both of French finance and Creuzot on the other. It was not surprising, in these circumstances, that various pretenders should have arisen in Morocco, and that the authority of the Sultan should have become more than habitually undermined." And this same author adds: "From British sources worthy of credence it has been constantly asserted that the 'stirrings up' of the tribes on the Algerian frontier partook then, and since, of the nature of a fixed policy on the part of the French authorities in Algeria."<sup>6</sup>

The unrest on Morocco's Algerian frontier was by no means a novel phenomenon. As in many frontier disputes, with similar

<sup>5</sup> *Le Journal Officiel*, 14 March, 1911.

<sup>6</sup> E. D. Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1912, pp. 38 and 48.

geographical and political background, it would be hard to determine which party bore the main responsibility. As far back as 1900 the Sultan was greatly worried by the situation, and even went to the length of writing to Queen Victoria a personal letter which he asked the British Minister to deliver in person to the ageing queen. In this letter Abd el Aziz suggested that the queen should "induce the French government finally to fix a frontier between Algeria and Morocco beyond which they would agree not to advance".<sup>7</sup> The Sultan's request was transmitted to the French government, and M. Delcassé, French Foreign Minister, assured the British Ambassador "that the French government had no intention of attacking Morocco, and repudiated all rumours of 'any underhand or unacknowledged projects'". In spite of these assurances, and whatever the rôle of France, the raids and counter-raids across the border continued. According to Jean Jaurès, "M. Declassé has artificially and unnecessarily created the Moroccan question. The minute incidents that troubled the Algerian frontier might have been eliminated with the least vigilance. With patience and wisdom it would have been possible to establish peaceful relations. But such a policy of wisdom and patience did not suit the grand designs of some of our great men."<sup>8</sup> Our difficulty, then, need it be said, is to decide after the lapse of so many years how far politicians were using the tribal-war situation as a stick with which to beat their political opponents.

In the year that followed, financial diplomacy was coupled with military intervention. On March 22, 1907, the French physician Mauchamp was murdered in Marrakesh, the Berber capital in the south. As a reprisal, the French crossed the Algerian border in Morocco's north-east, and occupied the city of Oujda.

A few months later a similar fate befell the Atlantic harbour town of Casablanca. In the face of native opposition, a Franco-Spanish syndicate had obtained a concession for harbour-and-railway works, and nine of the syndicate's labourers—three French, three Spaniards, and three Italians—were murdered by the mob. In retaliation, the French shelled Casablanca from the sea, and then landed troops both in the town itself and in its large Shawiya hinterland. As M. Augustin Bernard declared a year later at the North African Congress in Paris, "the pacification of Shawiya has caused much blood to flow". Moroccan authorities officially condemned the outrage committed upon the foreign workmen, and offered the French support in maintaining order. In fact the French sailors from the

<sup>7</sup> Harold Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>8</sup> From a speech given on 19 January, 1906, at the Salle du Grand Orient in Paris, under the presidency of Anatole France. Quoted in *Al Istiqlal*, No. 23, 1952.

warship *Galilee* landed under the protection of native troops provided by the Governor, Moulay el Amine. The safety of the handful of Europeans in the town was assured by the presence of the British warship *Demetrian*. When the native governor promised to restore order, Count de Sainte-Aulaire, acting French Minister in Tangier, replied: "Assuming that order will return of its own accord or thanks to the intervention of the Moroccan government, such intervention will not suffice to assure the necessary sanctions. . . . Repression cannot be efficaciously pursued except by our own means even before reparations can be obtained."<sup>9</sup>

Rabat, too, was occupied. In order to cover her expenses for the occupation of the various Moroccan territories, France demanded from the Sultan an indemnity of 60 million francs. She added to this a bill for 13,069,600 francs for the damage sustained by French merchants during the punitive expeditions and the bombardment of Casablanca by the French warship. To raise but a small part of the indemnity money, the Sultan imposed prohibitive new taxes. The people thought these taxes extortionate and degrading, and revolts followed.

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When, in 1908, Abd el Aziz lost his throne to his brother Hafid, France combined the various loans due to herself and to other foreign creditors, and in 1910 presented the new ruler with a bill for 163 million francs. To enable him to meet this, she was prepared to grant him a further loan, and as security for repayment, sequestered the remaining forty per cent of the customs revenue. The bonds on the loan were issued nominally at 500 francs each; but the French public could buy them for 485, and French bankers for 435. Jean Jaurès disclosed in the Chamber of Deputies that the value of the bonds had been boosted artificially, so that on subscription day they sold for 507 francs, permitting the French bankers to make an immediate profit of 72 francs "out of the pillaged and robbed Moroccans".<sup>10</sup> He attacked particularly the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, an institution that in the years to come was to play so important a part in Moroccan affairs.

The Sultan could not lay his hands on a single franc of the new loan, the whole of it being earmarked to pay off earlier debts—mostly for indemnities. Most of the harbour dues and the tobacco monopoly had already been mortgaged by foreign creditors, chiefly France. The only source of revenue left to the Sultan was direct

<sup>9</sup> Victor Berti, *Les Événements de Casablanca*, in *France Outremer*, August-September, 1953, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> *Le Journal Officiel*, op. cit.

taxation. Such taxation could be wrung from the tribes only by violence and by exactions that frequently involved cruelty. The *London Times* reported that "the greater part of the country has been driven almost to despair by the Sultan's exactions". Morocco was insolvent. Poverty, administrative chaos, and general dissatisfaction grew more ominously apparent with every day that passed. Morel observes that as the Sultan's authority diminished, lawlessness had the whole country ever more firmly in its grip.<sup>11</sup> Morocco had for long been described as a nest of brigandage, a hotbed of strife, by all who wished to discredit it. Now the description was apter than ever it had been.

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By occupying Casablanca, France secured an entry for her troops from the sea; with the possession of the fertile Shawiya district she held some of Morocco's richest land; with her occupation of Oujda she had cleared an entry from Algeria.

The most fateful event of the military penetration, however, was the conquest, in 1911, of Fez, the country's capital and symbol of Shereefian authority. For the Fez conquest was the principal cause of Germany's dispatch of the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir in the same year, and thus of the subsequent Franco-German agreement which eliminated the last diplomatic hurdle that had barred France's progress towards the establishment of a protectorate. The conquest of Fez throws light on the activities of the Comité du Maroc, the body which might be said to be the chief power responsible for the occupation of Morocco.

The Comité du Maroc came into being at the very beginning of the twentieth century. Its chief supporters were certain politicians and representatives of big business and finance with colonial ambitions. Among its earliest backers were the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, the Compagnie des Forges de Châtillon-Commentary et Neuves Maisons, Schneider & Cie, the Banque Française pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, the Société Internationale de Régie co-intérée des Tabacs du Maroc, and l'Union des Mines.<sup>12</sup> In the words of Morel, the Comité was composed of "financiers who were engaged in the process of strangling Morocco, and the value of whose securities stood to rise with a French occupation. This school was out for absorption and conquest at the earliest possible moment. It was destined to carry the day."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Morel, op. cit., p. 185.

<sup>12</sup> For full list see *Manchester Guardian*, 8 May, 1911, and *l'Humanité*, March 1911.

<sup>13</sup> Morel, op. cit., p. 111.



In April 1911, spokesmen of the Comité, both inside and outside the government in Paris—by that time M. Rouvier, former Prime Minister, was the principal executive agent of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas—spread the news that Fez was “blocked by insurgents, and the Europeans in danger”. Responding to the pressure of the Comité, the government instructed General Moinier to devote a body of 30,000 troops to the relief of the capital. While “continuing its everlasting assurances of respect for the integrity and independence of Morocco, the Government announces that General Moinier will withdraw to the coast after securing the menaced Europeans”.<sup>14</sup>

This is how F. du Pressanse described the Fez venture: “To justify the financial operation which was to crown the sordid tragedy, the Comité du Maroc organized a campaign of systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire Press, they swamped the public with false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole French colony was suddenly discovered there, living in anguish. The ultimate fate of women and children was described in the most moving terms. . . . One day the alarmed public learned that the town had undergone a formidable assault. The next day the public was gravely told that the rebels had not yet assembled, but in a few days would surround Fez with a circle of iron and flame. . . . Finally it was affirmed that in case of siege the city was only provisioned for two or three weeks. Thus carefully ‘cooked’, public opinion soon took fire. What was the government thinking of? . . . With a salutary dread of complications it would have preferred not to move. But the greater fears occasioned in another quarter prevailed; fears inculcated by the patriotic shoutings and the concerted clamours of the orchestra of which the Comité du Maroc holds the baton. The order to advance was given. While the expedition was still on its way, light began to pierce. Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared like the morning dew. The expeditionary force complained of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season was keeping all the healthy males in the fields. Thus did the phantom so dexterously conjured up by the Comité du Maroc for its own private ends disappear overnight. One of the correspondents who had contributed his share to the concert of lying news, wrote with an admirable *sang froid* that, in truth, at no moment had the safety of Fez and its inhabitants been menaced. So far as the provisioning of the place was concerned, he could reassure the most timorous that there was sufficient grain in the city to feed the whole population, plus the expeditionary column, for

<sup>14</sup> Morel, op. cit., p. 117.

more than a year. The farce was played: after Casablanca, Fez, France, without realizing it, almost without knowing it, had taken a decisive step. An indefinite occupation of the capital was the natural prelude to a protectorate. . . . The era of concessions, profits and dividends was about to open."<sup>15</sup>

The close of June 1911 saw the French government still protesting its "correctness" and its respect for Morocco's independence and territorial integrity; "General Moinier still in occupation of Fez; the entire country between the coast and the capital overrun by French troops".<sup>16</sup> Morocco as an independent political entity had, in fact, ceased to exist in the spring of 1911. Commenting on these events, an American author remarks: "A curious circumstance, is it not, that republican France, whose motto is *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, should have become the most imperialistic of European nations?"<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Quoted by Morel, op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>17</sup> E. Alexander Powell, *In Barbary*, The Century Company, New York, 1926, p. 255.

## DIPLOMATIC CONQUEST

THUS far, we have dwelt on the military aspects of the advance into Morocco, and the financial *démarches* that preceded these, touching only briefly upon the diplomatic climate in which the Comité du Maroc was able to flourish. The moment has come to explore the diplomatic attitudes associated with a succession of French governments and Moroccan sultanates. As soon as France had completed her occupation of Tunisia in 1881, she turned her gaze towards Morocco, the only independent country left in North Africa. She had not, it is true, been indifferent before. Her active interests in Morocco were older, and "dated from her seizure of Algeria in 1830. . . . From that time on France watched with jealous eyes her Spanish and British rivals in Morocco, and the occupation of Tunis in 1880 only whetted her desires for a vast North African empire."<sup>1</sup>

French relations with Morocco dated back to the sixteenth century. In 1533 François I sent an embassy to the Sultan Ahmed ben Mohammed. In 1559 Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre and father of Henri IV, signed a treaty with the Saadien Sultan Moulay Abdallah. A new treaty was signed in 1635 between Louis XIII and the Sultan Moulay el Oualid. Less than fifty years later yet another treaty was signed by Louis XIV and Moulay Ismail. In 1807 Napoleon received a special envoy from the Sultan Moulay Slimane. For several centuries, then, a fairly lively diplomatic and commercial interchange had existed between the two countries. But in the nineteenth century England superseded France in Morocco. The bulk of Morocco's foreign trade was with Great Britain; the body of foreign diplomats trusted and consulted by successive Sultans always included those representing Queen Victoria. After the French conquest of Algeria, Moroccan distrust of France grew. It was reflected both in diplomatic relations and in the extent of commerce between the two countries.

Even before the occupation of Tunisia, various French politicians and statesmen were voicing the determination of certain sections of the nation to annex Morocco. The year 1860 saw the publication

<sup>1</sup> Graham Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

of two volumes entitled *Description et Histoire du Maroc* by Léon Godard, honorary chaplain in Algeria. Giving a scheme for the future conquest of Morocco, the author declared: "We should start a war from different directions, so that the Sultan would not know where to concentrate his defences, and then we should put forward some pretender to his throne." Henri de la Martinière refers to Morocco in his book *Essai de Bibliographie Marocaine*, published in 1886, as "a country that all Frenchmen must consider as the future complement to our Algeria".

As the leading colonizing Power, Great Britain was obviously suspect. Britain's attitude had always been that international peace demanded an independent Morocco in which no single foreign Power should enjoy special favours. The French interpretation of this attitude was that although Britain had no designs on Morocco she was determined, in spite of her own rich dower, to obstruct those who had. Britain could not tolerate the establishment of a major foreign Power on a coast separated only by a narrow stretch of water from her own Gibraltar fortress. Britain's policy is summarized in a single sentence concerning procedure given in 1845 by Her Majesty's Government to its representative in Tangier. "Our permanent object," these instructions state, "must be to exert ourselves to the utmost in assisting to uphold the authority of the Sultan and to arrest every incident which might threaten it with fresh danger."<sup>2</sup> Even if the cynic is justified in equating the terms "the authority of the Sultan" and "the security of Gibraltar", the intention that Morocco should remain independent still shines through.

"Hands off Morocco" was also the policy of the United States. In 1871 the Sultan, apprehensive about French (and Spanish) expansionist designs, approached the American Consul, General Felix A. Matthews, and made clear his willingness to place his country under an American protectorate. In its reply the State Department offered its friendly offices, but declared that it would have to "decline to accept any offer from His Majesty to confer upon the U.S.A. a protectorate over his domain".<sup>3</sup>

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In spite of French protestations of peaceful intentions, the Sultan read signs and portents with increasing misgiving. With the entry of M. Delcassé into the French Foreign Office, things began to

<sup>2</sup> Archives of the British Legation in Tangier, F.O. Despatch of 26 May, 1845.

<sup>3</sup> Archives of the American Legation in Tangier. Despatch Book 1869-74, No. 30, 29 June, 1871, and 1861-80, No. 18, 22 August, 1871.

move rather quickly, in the wrong direction, from the Moroccan standpoint, and the young Sultan Abd el Aziz took fright. "The Moorish Government, filled with dismay at the attitude suddenly assumed by France, appears to have decided to throw itself upon the protection of Great Britain, and arranged to send a mission to London. But here again French diplomacy effectively intervened. A mission did come over, but another accompanied it . . . to Paris, and the envoys to Britain merely discussed business and trade."<sup>4</sup> The mission to Paris, on the other hand, resulted in the signing of a new political treaty between France and Morocco, in which France spoke of her "respect for the integrity of the Shereefian Empire".<sup>5</sup> But on July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé informed the French Minister in Tangier that "France could be either Morocco's most reassuring of friends or most redoubtable of enemies".<sup>6</sup> French policy was, before long, outlined even more clearly. In a document prepared in the same year for M. Delcassé, the French representative in Fez, suggested, "The best policy would be to occupy Oujda, stating in advance on what terms France would be prepared to return to her own positions. In addition, I am convinced that an action undertaken in Europe would be very effective to ensure the predominance of French influence over the Makhzen."

In the period immediately following, this diplomatic action in Europe represented France's most strenuous effort on the road towards the establishment of her Moroccan protectorate. And she pursued her aim with a single-mindedness and a diplomatic skill that made the moves of the other negotiators look like ineffectual amateur fumbblings.

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Morocco's backwardness and her rapidly worsening conditions—responsibility for which will never be decisively attributed—were a source of concern to most European governments. In the prevailing state of insecurity, with tribal risings against the Sultan and widespread banditry, trade could not prosper, and the safety of foreigners travelling in Morocco could not always be guaranteed by the Makhzen. Trade with Morocco was, however, of considerable importance to several countries, especially to Great Britain, France and Spain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany and Italy. Morocco was an exporter of grain, horses, hides, cork, and other commodities, and a buyer of tea, sugar, and manufactured goods,

<sup>4</sup> Morel, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>5</sup> French Yellow Book, 1901-5, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

especially cottons. But without a reliable police force and an efficient customs administration, foreign traders could not be assured of a dependable basis for their transactions.

The Sultan Abd el Aziz and his successor repeatedly expressed their willingness to introduce long-overdue reforms. But as they also saw the danger of allowing any one foreign Power to be instrumental in effecting them, they would accept no "Greek gifts". Their best safeguard was, they believed, to accept only such improvements as were brought about by the concerted effort of several.

On May 27, 1905, Abd el Aziz made this proviso clear to M. Delcassé. "The Moorish notables," he wrote, "would allow no reforms, either civil or military, to be carried out by any one foreign Power, if such reforms had not been previously discussed by an international conference. His Shereefian Majesty is unable to act against the will of his people especially regarding questions of such vital importance, in which the people of Morocco certainly have a right to be heard." And in 1909 Moulay Hafid, needing army instructors for his forces, was so much alive to the peril involved in purely French assistance that he asked Germany to supply them.

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In view of Morocco's assessment of the designs of France, the realistic French wasted no time on the lost cause of allaying Moroccan alarm. They aspired, rather, to win over their potential European competitors. It was to disarm their opposition that French diplomacy worked so assiduously and successfully during the ten years preceding the final occupation of the Maghreb.

On November 1, 1901, France signed an agreement with Italy. In exchange for giving Italy full liberty of action in Tripolitania, she secured for herself a corresponding freedom of action in Morocco.<sup>7</sup> A far graver obstacle to French designs was the obduracy of Great Britain. In fact as late as October 1908, the French statesman André Tardieu lamented at the National African Congress in Paris, that "for twenty years Britain has been France's most redoubtable adversary in Morocco".

M. Delcassé had the good fortune to find in King Edward VII a monarch anxious to improve relations between Britain and France. An outcome of that desire was the Anglo-French treaty of 1904, which formed the foundation of the *entente cordiale*. The portion of the treaty which affected Morocco was a reciprocal agreement according to which France granted her new ally a free hand in

<sup>7</sup> For details of Franco-Italian negotiations, see Rouard de Card, *Accords secrets entre la France et l'Italie concernant le Maroc et la Libye*, Paris, A. Pendone, 1921.

Egypt, in return for the same freedom in Morocco. The crucial article proclaimed that the British government "recognize that it appertains to France . . . to preserve order in that country [Morocco] and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, financial and military reforms it may require".<sup>8</sup>

The Sultan was not alone in his grasp of the implications of these pleasantly worded proclamations. "The Sultan, the Moorish Government and the British merchants," writes Harold Nicolson, "were incensed by the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement. They complained of abandonment and betrayal. . . . The Sultan wrote [to the British Minister in Tangier], stating that French assistance could only be accepted if Great Britain would guarantee that after the introduction of the desired reforms all French advisers would leave."<sup>9</sup> And to quote Morel once again, "though France had in 1901 and 1902 publicly assured Morocco upon repeated occasions that she had not the least intention of threatening her independence or the integrity of the State", and "though France and Great Britain were publicly pledged towards Morocco and towards the world at large to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco . . . in point of fact, they had privately entered into contracts with one another whereby the destruction of the independence and integrity of Morocco was decreed".<sup>10</sup> The strictly dispassionate are at liberty to quarrel with that last word "decreed", and to prefer some such gentler word as "facilitated". It is fairly certain, however, that at the dawn of the century Morocco had come to a stage in its history when both "independence" and "integrity" were in sad need of bolstering and reinforcement.

In France, the Moroccan policy of M. Delcassé was not universally approved. "M. Delcassé has artificially and unnecessarily created the Moroccan question," said Jean Jaurès in 1906 in a public speech. "There was the coterie supporting a military expedition. There were the generals who wished to advance, colonels who wished to become generals, captains who wished to become colonels. What they are after is a nice little war, an excursion beyond the frontier. . . . The occupation of Morocco—this was a mission of glory."<sup>11</sup>

In England the treaty was denounced, not from altruism, by the former Prime Minister, Lord Roseberry, who concluded his speech at the Queen's Hall, in London, on 10 June, 1904, with the hope

<sup>8</sup> For text of agreement, see *Parliamentary Papers* (1905), C.III (cd. 2384), London, H.M. Stationery Office, and *Documents diplomatiques*, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères: *Accords conclus, le 8 avril 1904 entre la France et l'Angleterre au sujet du Maroc*, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1904. See also Appendix I.

<sup>9</sup> Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

<sup>10</sup> Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in *Al Istiqlal*, No. 23, 1952.

that "the power which holds Gibraltar may never have cause to regret having handed over Morocco to a great military power". Alexander Powell condemned the treaty thus: "The cynical diplomats of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, in performing the arrangements for this colossal land-grab, deemed it quite unnecessary to consult the opinions of the peoples whom it directly affected."<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the Moroccan people found it hard to swallow Great Britain's *volte-face*. Von Bülow, the German Chancellor, informed the Kaiser that the Sultan and his advisers had been unable "to overcome the shock" at their abandonment by their acknowledged protector.<sup>13</sup>

"The agreement of 1904 contained secret clauses."<sup>14</sup> Whatever the merits or otherwise of the former, the secret clauses were criticized even by those who were full of praise for the public commitments. For while, according to Article 2 of the public treaty, the French government declared that it had "no intention of altering the political status of Morocco", in the secret agreement that same government presented the Mediterranean ports of Morocco to Spain. This was confirmed by France in a Franco-Spanish agreement signed on October 3, 1904. Its secret convention was not made public until seven years later when *Le Matin* (Paris) published it.

Spanish interests in Morocco were, of course, of much longer standing than those of either Great Britain or France. The Spaniards considered their ancient Presidios in the Maghreb (Manilla, Ceuta, etc.) not as colonies but as parts of metropolitan Spain, and they regarded Morocco as their particular sphere of interest. Anglo-French competition in Morocco filled them with profound anxiety, which turned into acute alarm when, in 1904, it became known that Britain and France were negotiating, "behind Spain's back", a treaty affecting Morocco. When the terms of the treaty became known, the alarm gave place to jubilation, and the Spanish Prime Minister, Antonio Maura, declared: "Since 1860 Spain's African policy has been based upon Anglo-French antagonism. That antagonism is now eliminated, and all that remains to be done now is to divide the territories of the protectorate [in Morocco] that France has just assured for herself."<sup>15</sup> It was that "division" which was decided upon in the secret Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904.

In the public declaration the French and Spanish governments pledged themselves to respect and maintain "the integrity of the

<sup>12</sup> Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

<sup>13</sup> Bülow, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

<sup>14</sup> For text of secret clauses, see Parliamentary Papers (1911), CIII (cd. 5969).

<sup>15</sup> Albert Mousset, *La Négociation Franco-Espagnole sur le Maroc*, in *Le Monde*, 10 September, 1954.



Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan". But in the secret agreement, Article 3 states: "In case the continuance of the political status of Morocco and of the Shereefian Government should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of that Government, and to its continued inability to uphold law and order, or to *any other cause*, the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the status quo can no longer be maintained, Spain may *freely* exercise her rights of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence."<sup>16</sup>

By permitting *any other cause* to give France and Spain the right to change the *status quo*, these two countries made themselves the sole arbiters of Morocco's future. It was for them to decide when Morocco's independence should come to an end.

Neither the British, nor the French, nor yet the Spanish parliaments or public knew anything about the secret agreements by which France, Spain and Britain had given one another the right to end Moroccan independence. In fact public and parliaments had no grounds for suspecting that such far-reaching decisions had been taken. Even a year after the signing of the secret treaties with Britain and Spain respectively, that is on 8 July, 1905, the French Premier Rouvier assured the German Ambassador in Paris that France's rights in Morocco were "in harmony with the principles of sovereignty and independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his Empire".

The fiction that no scheme of conquest or even of establishing a protectorate had entered anyone's head was kept alive as long as the secret terms remained secret. On 20 June, 1907, the Kaiser and the former French Minister for War and of the Interior—a leading figure in the Comité du Maroc—were discussing Morocco at a private dinner party on the Kaiser's yacht. According to the Kaiser's personal record, M. Etienne complained, "A permanently troubled Morocco is an insufferable neighbour for Algeria." "So . . . conquest?" the Kaiser asked. "No, not conquest, it would need at least 150,000 men." "Then a protectorate?" "Not on the Tunisian model. Only a *prépondérance morale*, to be able to give advice."<sup>17</sup>

When at last the secret agreements became known there were people, even in France, destined to be the chief beneficiary of those agreements, who accused the government of "breach of faith, and

<sup>16</sup> My italics. See: *Documents diplomatiques, "Affaires du Maroc"* (1901-5), No. 187, and *British and Foreign State Papers*, CII, 432, London, H.M. Stationery Office. See also Appendix IV.

<sup>17</sup> Bülow, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

duplicity". At a meeting of the Senate, in Paris, Senator Baron d'Estournelles de Constant made the following statement on February 6, 1912: "The French Parliament, by an abuse morally, if not constitutionally, unpardonable, was kept in ignorance of this policy. . . . Why was the French Parliament told only half of the truth? Why was it not allowed to suspect that this arrangement had as its complement and corrective some secret clauses? It is this double game towards Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse of trust. . . . A treaty of friendship with England, recognizing our freedom of political action in Morocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the integrity of that country—that was what the public knew and approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between France and Spain was prepared; of that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity. There existed a policy of equity which was not the true one, and a policy of secret arrangements postulating a protectorate and the partition of Morocco."

## ALGECIRAS

ALGECIRAS is one of the less spectacular townlets on Spain's Mediterranean shore, and were it not for the Moroccan "problem", its name would probably still be as little known as it was before 1906. But for a few months, in that year, Algeciras became as important in international affairs as Geneva was to become between the two world wars. To-day, the name of Algeciras is primarily associated with one of the famous acts of present-century diplomacy. The chief sponsor of the Conference of Algeciras may have been the Sultan Moulay Abd el Aziz, abetted by President Theodore Roosevelt, but the man who really, though unwittingly, brought the conference about was the German Kaiser.

By 1905 the Kaiser, and his Chancellor von Bülow, were acting on the assumption that France was determined to change Morocco's standing, and that German commercial interests in that country would thereby be irreparably jeopardized. In his ill-conceived resolve to give France a warning, Bülow persuaded the Kaiser to appear personally in Tangier.<sup>1</sup> On 31 March, 1905, Wilhelm II landed in that city, and received the Sultan's personal envoy, his uncle Moulay Abd el Malek. He greeted him with the words, "I am to-day paying a visit to the Sultan of Morocco, an independent sovereign; and I express the hope that under his inspired guidance free Morocco will continue to be open to the peaceful competition of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on a basis of complete equality. The object of my visit is to make it known that I am determined to do everything in my power to safeguard effectively the interests of Germany in Morocco. I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign, and it is with him that I desire to come to an understanding as to the best means to bring such a result about. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> However fond the Kaiser might have been of unpredictable actions and theatrical gestures, he did not look forward to his visit to Tangier. Even at the very last moment he tried to avoid the journey. In a secret message to the Foreign Office in Berlin, Ambassador von Schoen—attached to the Kaiser on board the *Hamburg*—telegraphed immediately after the visit was over: "Until the last moment His Majesty was hesitant, and inclined to avoid visit under pretext of landing difficulties." (Bülow, op. cit., I, p. 268.)

<sup>2</sup> *Documents diplomatiques, "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-5), No. 224.*

In the spring of 1905 the world was still unaware of the existence of the secret agreements between France and other Powers. In consequence, the Kaiser's speech, while delighting the Moroccans, first astonished and then angered the Treaty Powers. Evidently the Kaiser was trying to drive a wedge between Great Britain and France! He was challenging the genuineness of the Anglo-French public agreement of 1904 guaranteeing Morocco's independence! He was attempting to browbeat France! Yet even in France, many public men, anxious that France's good name should not be besmirched by doubtful colonial adventures, agreed with the Kaiser. At the North African Congress in Paris, M. Augustin Bernard expressed the views of that minority, saying: "We desire a Morocco free and independent, as the Emperor William remarked in Tangier. . . . We are concerned that no Power should establish itself in Morocco. But it does not follow that we wish to establish ourselves in Morocco."<sup>3</sup>

The Kaiser's visit to Tangier alarmed not only Paris but also London and Madrid. There was danger of the Moroccan issue becoming a *casus belli* between Germany and France. On the other hand, Germany's suspicions of French designs were deepened by the violence of French public reaction to the Kaiser's visit. These suspicions were fully shared by Abd el Aziz. In this climate Germany approached him, suggesting that he should take the initiative in arranging an international conference at which reforms for Morocco could be considered by all the Powers concerned, and not by France alone.

The last thing France desired was an international conference, carrying the possibility of decisions which might easily cut across her secret agreements. A conference was sure to insist upon confirmation of the independence of Morocco and of the equal rights, independence assured, of all powers in that country. "Delcassé refused categorically. Even after Delcassé had been forced to resign and Rouvier [his successor at the Quai d'Orsay] had shown himself more willing to meet the German demands, France was unwilling to submit the question to an international conference."<sup>4</sup> France's opposition to the conference found the strongest support in England, especially firmly expressed in *The Times*. On June 9, England's leading paper described the proposed conference as a "humiliation", a "capitulation"—"the sooner the whole matter is negatively disposed of the better". Two days later the paper demanded that the idea of a conference "ought not to be entertained for a moment". The attitude of *The Times* was based on a conviction expressed

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by Morel, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>4</sup> Graham Stuart, op. cit., p. 68.

on April 7: "There is no Moroccan question. It was finally settled by the Anglo-French *entente*."

Finally, President Roosevelt was persuaded by the Kaiser to make his voice heard. At first the American President felt disinclined to intervene, but at the beginning of June he considered the situation so critical that he wished to do something to avert a possible war. He urged France to accept the conference. Reluctantly, the French agreed.<sup>5</sup> On July 8 the two governments exchanged notes, according to which they accepted the principle of an international conference based upon the maintenance of Morocco's sovereignty and independence.

\* \* \* \*

The meeting at Algeciras was a great international occasion. The twelve Powers (besides Morocco) taking part in it were represented by some of their most distinguished diplomats.<sup>6</sup> The Moorish delegation, apprehensive and mistrustful, and profoundly conscious that every other delegate was hoping to carve out some profit for his own country at the expense of Morocco, was led by Mohammed Torres, a man in his eighties, obviously uncomfortable in such company. "Mohammed Torres," wrote Carlo Sforza, a member of the Italian delegation, "appeared utterly disgusted at having to spend so much time of his old age in daily intimacy with so many infidels."<sup>7</sup>

Of the great Powers, only the U.S. and Russia could be deemed fairly disinterested. Italy, as a Mediterranean country, was naturally all eyes and ears; Spain, for obvious reasons, watched events closely. But the two main protagonists were France and Germany, the former anxious lest her special plans for Morocco be affected unfavourably, the latter aware that both her prestige and her economic rights in the Maghreb were vulnerable.<sup>8</sup> Great Britain was by no means impartial. On the eve of the conference, Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary, informed the British representative in a private letter that their country's "main object must be to help France to carry her point".<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See *Documents diplomatiques*, "Affaires du Maroc", 1901-5, No. 287.

<sup>6</sup> Spain, by her Foreign Minister, the Duke of Almodovar; France, by her Minister in Morocco, Révoil; Italy, by Cavour's Foreign Minister, Visconti Venosta; Germany, by Baron von Radowitz; Great Britain, by Sir Arthur Nicolson (later Lord Camrock); the U.S.A., by Ambassador Henry White.

<sup>7</sup> Carlo Sforza, *L'Italie telle que je l'ai vue*, Paris, Grasset, 1946, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> In his secret instructions to the German Ambassador in Paris, Prince Radolin, Chancellor von Bülow stated: "We are not seeking a diplomatic victory over France. We demand in Morocco nothing but the Open Door for the trade and commerce of all nations." (Bülow, *op. cit.*, p. 76.)

<sup>9</sup> Harold Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

Morocco emerged comparatively unscathed from the conference, but no real advantage was apparent. It was decided to create a Franco-Spanish police force and an internationally supervised State Bank of Morocco; questions of taxation and customs were discussed; the principle of trading equality of all the Powers represented was established. The only decision that would otherwise have been important was the reaffirmation of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan. But in view of the secret agreements of 1904, this affirmation had of necessity only platonic significance.<sup>10</sup>

The truly epoch-making outcome of Algeciras had little to do with Morocco directly. For the great Powers Algeciras was an opportunity for defining more clearly their own relations. As a result of the conference, Great Britain, France and Russia drew closer together, while the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy was weakened by Italy's defection. The real victors—if such there were—must be considered France and Great Britain. André Tardieu, to be French Premier in days to come, sums up Algeciras pretty shrewdly in these terms: "If one wished to define the change that took place, one could say that at Algeciras the Entente passed from a static to a dynamic state."<sup>11</sup> But an even more astute expert on the subject, Harold Nicolson, recognized "that this was very bad for Europe".<sup>12</sup> He might even have added that it was not much more profitable for Morocco either. For, as was to be proved later, it was Morocco that had to defray all costs.

Throughout the conference President Roosevelt followed with great interest all the deliberations, and repeatedly intervened personally. Though French writers tend to minimize his rôle, there is no gainsaying the fact that "the deciding voice was really that of the United States, which on this occasion took a part in European affairs for the first time".<sup>13</sup> On one occasion he told a friend that in his opinion "it was largely the moderating influence exercised by the United States which prevented war between Germany and France over the question of Morocco".<sup>13</sup>

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The Act of Algeciras, drawn up in April 1906, was based upon "the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his Dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality". Nevertheless, the Sultan was, at

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix II.

<sup>11</sup> André Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algèiras: histoire diplomatique de la crise marocaine*, Paris, F. Alcan, 1909.

<sup>12</sup> Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

first, disinclined to sign it. To induce him to do so, the senior member of the diplomatic corps in Tangier, the Italian Minister, was despatched to him with a personal letter from King Victor Emmanuel, in which the Italian monarch declared, in the name of the twelve participating Powers, that "by adoption of the General Act in its entirety, much honour will accrue to Your Majesty, and incalculable good to Your Majesty's Empire". Finally, on 18 June, Moulay Abd el Aziz ratified the Act.

Because of the secret agreements of 1904—of which the signatories of the Act, with the exception of France, Spain and Great Britain, knew nothing at the time—the guarantees given Morocco at Algeciras were of little value. The only thing that saves the Act from being utterly worthless is that, in international law, it constituted, for over fifty years, the charter of Morocco. Even the Protectorate Treaty of 1912 had no power to supersede it. Though France and Spain were permitted, by the Act, to provide instructors for a new Moroccan police force (the chief of which, however, was to be an officer of the Swiss army), France was entitled to no special privileges. All signatories were to enjoy equal rights in the Maghreb. By signing the Act in the name of the President of the French Republic, the French representatives, Révoil and Eugène Régnauld, pledged their country to respect Morocco's sovereignty and integrity, and to refrain from claiming therein any special privileges.

\* \* \* \*

German suspicions of French designs in Morocco were by no means assuaged by the conference of Algeciras. But it was not until 1911, after the French had occupied Fez, that she allowed these suspicions to dictate an overt gesture, the despatch of the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir, a small Atlantic port in the extreme south of Morocco. Immediately after the occupation of Fez, the German government "informed the French government that it reserved henceforth complete liberty of action", and "when it became clear that the French were at Fez to stay, the German government made up its mind that the time had come to move".<sup>14</sup>

The government of the Reich explained its step to all the signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras in the following note: "Some German firms established in the South of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in its vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment among the local tribes, due, it seems, to the recent occurrences in other parts of the country [a reference to the French occupation of Fez]. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for

<sup>14</sup> Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

protection of their lives and property. At their request the Imperial Government have decided to send a warship to the port of Agadir to lend help and assistance, in case of need, to their subjects. . . . As soon as the state of affairs in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect the ship charged with this protective mission shall leave the port of Agadir."<sup>15</sup> The note was signed by Herr von Kiderlen Waechter, the Foreign Minister. Though the French troops remained in Fez, the *Panther* left Agadir almost immediately.

On November 9 Chancellor von Bülow explained the *Panther* incident in the Reichstag. "The Algeciras Act," he declared, "was intended to maintain the independence of Morocco with a view to the economic development of the country. It was soon evident that one of the essential conditions was lacking, namely a Sultan who was actual ruler of the country, and was in a position to carry out the reforms contemplated. Even Sultan Moulay Hafid could not do so, in spite of his personal qualities. He became more and more dependent upon foreign influence. . . . This led to ever-increasing intervention on the part of France. . . . France declared that she proposed to send troops to Fez and to conduct the Europeans back to the coast. We had received no similar disturbing reports from Fez, and, therefore, declared that our colony did not stand in need of foreign assistance. . . . We added the explicit reservation, however, that we retained our liberty of action, should the French expedition go beyond its alleged object. . . . This occurred, as was to be foreseen. France exerted practically unlimited sway over the Sultan in virtue of her influence, which had gradually become absolute. The independence of the Sultan assumed by the Algeciras Act thus ceased to exist . . . a ruler who relies solely upon the support of foreign bayonets, is no longer the independent ruler on whose existence the Algeciras Act was based. . . . While French military control continued to extend in Morocco, the fiction came gradually to be established, not only in France but also with the other Powers, that France was acting in pursuance of a European mandate. When, therefore, German interests appeared to be threatened in consequence of the events in Morocco, we sent a warship to Agadir."<sup>16</sup>

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The *Panther* incident led to the Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911. A convention whereby France secured the last guarantee for legalizing her Moroccan gains, and for safeguarding

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Morel, op. cit., p. 133.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted by Morel, op. cit., pp. 136-7.



herself against German opposition. This is not to say that Germany revised her opinions at all. In the light of von Bülow's canny analysis of French aspirations and methods, France was well aware that in Germany she had no easy dupe. How determined she was to bring to fruition the policy initiated by the Comité du Maroc, and pursued so determinedly by M. Delcassé, became evident from the fact that, in order to secure Germany's goodwill, she was prepared to give away very substantial parts of her Congo possessions. To be precise, she gave away to Germany 107,270 square miles of the Congo, paying that enormous price merely for the sake of making her Moroccan plans foolproof.<sup>17</sup>

On December 14, 1911, M. de Selves, French Foreign Minister, was able gleefully to declare in the Chamber of Deputies, "The first words which the German Foreign Minister pronounced consisted of the announcement, 'Morocco—it shall be yours'". He even added, "Establish therein your Protectorate, draw up yourselves the documents necessary for specification of details".<sup>18</sup> Germany had obviously learned, and played, the colonial game to perfection. By this time, of course, the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his country, and economic liberty without inequality, said to be guaranteed at Algeciras, had been violated several times over.

The road now lay open for the proclamation of a protectorate over Morocco. When at last Moulay Hafid, caught in the net of foreign interference, and driven almost to despair by the increasing chaos within his own country, was compelled to request French assistance, France responded with alacrity, and presented him with the Protectorate Treaty.

Latter-day assertions by French spokesmen will have it that the native population received the French as deliverers from the "anarchy" brought about by Moulay Hafid. But when M. Eugène Régnauld, the French Ambassador entrusted with negotiating the Protectorate Treaty, reached Fez at the head of a large mission, described by a French eyewitness as "*notre brillante cavalcade*", he was received with silence and hostile looks by the Fassis. Most of the normally crowded streets were empty. Only in one section of the city was the cavalcade greeted with signs of pleasure. The local authorities had summoned the available prostitutes to bid the visitors a joyful welcome, so as to "give them the illusion of a spontaneous manifestation on the part of the female population of the city".<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Documents diplomatiques, "Affaires du Maroc"* (1910-12), No. 428.

<sup>18</sup> *Le Journal Officiel*, 14 December, 1911.

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Weissgerber, *Au Seuil du Maroc Moderne*, Les Editions La Porte, Rabat.

The negotiations preceding the signing of the Treaty of Fez—the legal instrument that was to confirm France's mastery in Morocco—were rather less than a formality. For the treaty that transformed Morocco into a protectorate was "imposed upon the Sultan".<sup>20</sup> Its signing, on March 30, 1912, produced general consternation. In Fez the entire population, from the highest to the lowest, regarded the Sultan's submission as a betrayal both of Morocco and of Islam.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> "Nous avons imposé le traité au Sultan," writes M. Paul Buttin, Bâtonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats près le Tribunal de Meknes, in his book *Le Drame du Maroc*, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1955, p. 62.

<sup>21</sup> Weissgerber, *Au Seuil du Maroc Moderne*.

*Part Two*

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THE ERA OF MARSHAL LYAUTEY



STATEHOOD AND  
THE "BERBER PROBLEM"

**B**EFORE we can examine the nature of the French régime in Morocco, it seems essential to envisage, as clearly as we can, the shape of the structure upon which it was imposed. What kind of fabric was it? Or, in other words, how far was Morocco, in 1912, a national and political entity? And to what extent was the structure undermined, if not cleft from top to bottom, by the allegedly insoluble conflict between Arab and Berber?

It has frequently been claimed that prior to 1912 Morocco was neither a nation nor a state, in the usual sense of these terms. Thus Professor Henri Terrasse, in his *Histoire du Maroc* (Editions Atlantides, 1952), writes: "Muslim Morocco has never been a State worthy of the name. . . . After the days of the Merinides, there came into being a *bled es siba* which has gone on increasing in size. . . . The Shereefian Morocco was nothing but an incomplete and unstable agglomeration of tribes; in fact, far from becoming a State, Morocco failed even to achieve the status of nation" (pp. 189-190).

Against this view we may set the opinion of Professor Levi-Provençal, who writes: "For almost five hundred years Morocco has been the only Islamic country which had the notion, albeit far from clear-cut, that it constituted a nation. It was aware of its ethnic and political unity, and saw the birth of a true national sentiment."<sup>1</sup> Indeed if it were not so, and if Morocco had achieved no "personality" as either nation or state, how are we to explain its uninterrupted existence, for twelve hundred years; the marked individuality and continuity of its civilization; and the opposition of practically the entire country to the French occupation? And how account for the fact that Morocco was the only country of Arab culture sufficiently united to resist the Ottomans and to remain independent for four hundred years while all other Arab countries came under Turkish rule? Professor Julien of the Sorbonne stresses particularly the fact of the *continuity* of the Moroccan State. "In spite of the chronic fights between the Northern

<sup>1</sup> *Le Monde*, 30 June, 1953.

and Southern zones," he writes, "and contrary to what was happening in Algeria, the persistence of the Moroccan State was manifest."<sup>2</sup>

Having heard the historians' pronouncements, let us turn to the assessment of a man whose talents were of a different order—to Marshal Lyautey himself. In a speech delivered in 1916, Lyautey's view was made perfectly plain: "We found, in this country, a state and a clearly defined people. Most of the existing institutions still stood on their feet, and they represented something real. There was not only a definite political organization but also an important judicial machinery." On another occasion he said: "The more I see of the natives, the longer I live in this country, the more I am convinced of the greatness of this nation. While in other parts of North Africa we found nothing but a society crumbling into dust, as a result of former anarchy and lack of power, here, thanks to the permanent power assured by the fact of all the dynasties having succeeded one another continuously, thanks to the maintenance of essential institutions, in spite of revolutions, we found a stable empire." Another of Lyautey's analyses was this: "Whereas in Algeria we found ourselves confronted principally by dust, an amorphous state of affairs where the only constituted power resided in the person of the Turkish Dey, and which collapsed upon our arrival, in Morocco, on the contrary, we found ourselves face to face with an historical and independent Empire. . . . There are still alive, in Morocco, several important persons who until six years ago were the ambassadors of an independent Morocco at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Madrid and Paris . . . men who negotiated on equal terms with European statesmen. . . . Nothing similar exists either in Algeria or Tunisia."<sup>3</sup>

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The supposed conflict between Arab and Berber formed the central theme of the so-called "Berber doctrine". The main postulates of that "doctrine" were that the Berber was superior to the Arab; that Berber people and civilization had a homogeneous character entitling them to the dignity of "nationhood" denied to the Arabs; and, finally, that the Berber and Arab were in uncompromising opposition.

The following examples of that doctrine are picked almost at random. Our first quotation, while in intent non-political, is representative of the entire body of opinion. It comes from the brief

<sup>2</sup> Ch. André Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en Marche*, Paris, René Julliard, 1952.

<sup>3</sup> All quotations from Lyautey's *Paroles d'Action*.

Introduction to a beautiful book of pictures sponsored by the French authorities, and runs thus: "Converted to Islam, and loyal subjects of His Majesty the Sultan,<sup>4</sup> the Berbers have retained their customs, their language and even their superstitions. Proud of being themselves, and desirous of remaining themselves, the Berbers have become close collaborators of *l'œuvre française*. They till and defend their soil shoulder to shoulder with us, and help us to introduce them to all that is best in European civilization. They are our brothers in arms and in work. They understand us. We love them."<sup>5</sup>

Our second quotation comes from Jean Célérier's book *Maroc*: "While it is wrong to speak of a Moroccan people, there is a Berber people."<sup>6</sup> Dealing with yet another aspect of Berber "homogeneity", Prof. Henri Terrasse states: "The Berbers have preserved a strong unity of language", and he concludes, "The Berbers represent a triple unity of race, language and civilization."<sup>7</sup>

According to the exponents of the Berber "doctrine", the racial, national, social, cultural and linguistic individuality of the Berbers has always been too pronounced to permit of a fusion with the Arabs. But what are the facts of the matter? The first and fundamental fact is that there is no single Berber race, in the sense that we can speak of an Arab race, whether we refer to an Arab from Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia or the Yemen. The Berbers themselves do not call themselves by that name or indeed by any other comprehensive name that would cover all their various groups. Thus the Berbers of the Rif call themselves Imazighene, while others of the High Atlas call themselves Shleuh, and others again, Braber.

M. André Adam, a former member of the administration in Morocco, puts the matter unequivocally: "We are dealing not with a single race but with several. There are even Berber-speaking people of black race, in pre-Sahara and Sahara oases." As for the supposed gulf that separates the Berber "language" from Arabic, M. Adam informs us that "to-day most linguists accept the hypothesis of Marcel Cohen, who classes Berber among Hamito-Semitic languages, which comprise Semitic (principally Hebrew and Arabic), Egyptian, Libyco-Berber and Conchitic".<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> There is evidently some disagreement in official statements on this matter. For in another official publication, *Facts and Figures about North Africa*, published in 1952 by the Office of Technical Publications of the French Prime Minister, we read that "the Sultan could never manage to apply reforms, the Berbers being unwilling, for the most part, to accept his authority".

<sup>5</sup> *Images du Maroc Berbère*, Office Marocain du Tourisme, Rabat, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1947.

<sup>6</sup> Editions Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1948, p. 67.

<sup>7</sup> Terrasse, *op. cit.*, pp. 14 and 15.

<sup>8</sup> *Les Berbères*, in *Ecrits de Paris*, April 1953.

One of the most obvious manifestations of a people's racial or national consciousness and culture is said to be a single language in which they can express their thoughts and emotions both orally and in writing. Berber dialects can only be spoken. For "Berber is spoken but not written. Most of the documents found in Berber territory are written in Arabic. As for the truly Berber literature—stories, songs, poetry—it is purely oral, and remains confided to human memory." M. Adam arrives by way of such discoveries at the same conclusion as many another philologist and anthropologist—British, French, German, American and other—that "Berber is not a language of culture". Indeed, he affirms that no "common language capable of linking the various Berber-speaking groups" exists.

It is, of course, not much more than a joke to say that "there are as many Berber languages as there are Berber tribes", but the fact remains that the Berbers of Morocco speak a number of distinctive dialects that have very little in common. Thus the Shleuh in the Western High Atlas speak Tashelit; the Imazirhen of the Middle Atlas and Tafilalet speak Tamazirht; the Zenets of the Eastern Rif speak Zenatiya. There are other dialects as well, and each of these larger dialect-groups is subdivided into numerous smaller ones. And the differences are radical; they go far beyond mere variations in pronunciation. Wide variations, we know, differentiate the English of a Cockney and that of a Scotsman in the Highlands, the Arabic of a Syrian and that of a Moroccan. But all these "dialect"-speakers understand one another's tongues, whereas "a Berber from the Middle Atlas and a Shleuh from the Sous do not understand each other".<sup>9</sup>

In spite of the Berbers' supposed linguistic unity and consequent antagonism to the Arab tongue, we find in the end—and no one with an intimate acquaintance of Morocco has ever doubted it—that "the Berber's language of culture is Arabic", and that the literate Berber "is one who can read and write Arabic".<sup>10</sup>

This is hardly surprising, for after twelve hundred years of co-existence we must expect that "the Arabs have been Berberized as much as the Berbers have been Arabized". In fact, as M. Adam

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> The following figures (of the official French estimate of 1949) give a useful picture of the situation: 29 per cent of the population speak Berber only;

14 per cent of the population speak Berber as their mother tongue, but also have a command of Arabic;

64 per cent speak Arabic as their first tongue, but some of them have some knowledge of Berber. Incidentally, these figures suggest that the population-ratio for Arabs and Berbers, as given in an earlier chapter, were more or less correct. (Only those unacquainted with French statistics on Morocco will be surprised that the above figures refuse to add up to 100 per cent.)



insists, "the two populations have an undeniable unity of civilization". Any other result would be quite as surprising as the discovery, in modern England, of Saxon groups speaking their own language and preserving a Saxon civilization, of Norman colonies acting likewise within their own racial framework, and of numbers of all other "racial" groups that have combined to make the British people the speakers of English.

No one with any personal knowledge of Berbers and Arabs would deny that there is still ample evidence of numerous features that separate the one group from the other; but they seem relatively insignificant in comparison with the elements that unite them, and that yoke them as bearers of Moroccan history and Moorish civilization.

## THE LYAUTEY TOUCH

WITH the signing of the Franco-German Agreement of 1911 France was diplomatically secure on all fronts. Fez, Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes, and Oujda, all the important centres of Northern Morocco, were in French hands, and nothing now stood in the way of the final legalization of the conquest. Once the Treaty of Fez was signed, General—later Marshal—Lyautey was appointed as the first Resident General.

According to General Catroux, at this time one of Lyautey's close collaborators and a member of his staff,<sup>1</sup> the Treaty of Fez "was rejected by the entire Moroccan population", and immediately "provoked bloody risings", in the course of which many hundreds of French soldiers were massacred in Fez alone. "A wave of anarchy submerged Morocco and turned against the French and against Moulay Hafid. By having made common cause with them, he became a traitor to Islam and to his country."<sup>2</sup>

Only crushing superiority of arms enabled France to establish the Protectorate. For practically the entire nation, Arab and Berber alike, rose against the "infidel" foe. It took France, in fact, over twenty years to bring the whole of Morocco under her rule. A young French officer who played an active part in the campaign of "pacification" was to write, many years later, when he had become Lyautey's successor as Resident General, "No tribe submitted without resistance and some did not submit until they had exhausted their last means of resistance. No tribe came over to us without having first been defeated by arms. Each stage of the advance was marked by fighting. Each check created a new frontier which had to be held by a system of fortifications in which our troops were compelled for many long years to mount guard, exposed to danger and without glory."<sup>3</sup>

Moulay Hafid, caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, vacillated at first and then tried to oppose the imposition of the

<sup>1</sup> In more recent years, General Catroux has been French High Commissioner in Syria, and Ambassador to Russia.

<sup>2</sup> General Catroux, *Lyautey le Marocain*, Paris, Hachette, 1952, pp. 131 and 132.

<sup>3</sup> General A. Guillaume, *Les Berbères marocains et la Pacification de l'Atlas Central*, Paris, Julliard, 1946.

Protectorate. "Rather would I abdicate than sign my forfeiture and be responsible for bringing France into my Empire," he declared to the French Minister Régnauld who conducted the painful negotiations. But France would not accept an abdication. "M. Régnauld," wrote Robert Raynard in *En Marge du Livre Jaune*, "conducted these laborious negotiations by using the alternate methods of promising and threatening. Thanks to this system, the success of his protracted mission was crowned by the signing of the treaty."

As soon as the Sultan had signed the treaty he was made to realize how passionate and widespread was the opposition to it, and how untenable his own position had become. He knew, as a French author puts it, that "it was as conquerors and by force of arms that (the French) came to Morocco, and it is hypocrisy to pretend otherwise".<sup>4</sup> The Makhzen was entirely inimical to the Protectorate; but its only means of voicing protest was by refusal to co-operate with the French. Moulay Hafid declared to the French Minister, M. de Saint-Aulaire, that he refused to put into effect the clauses of the treaty, and Lyautey himself complained: "It is impossible for me to ensure effective co-operation with a Sultan and a Makhzen who will not act."<sup>5</sup>

At the time of the signing of the treaty, and immediately afterwards, it was essential for France that a Sultan should be on the throne. For only the continuance of the people's submission to Shereefian authority could enable Lyautey and his administration to carry out their projects. When it became evident that Moulay Hafid would not co-operate, the French decided to get rid of him. They were helped in this by the Sultan's own wavering. Like most potentates, he believed that his presence was essential to the protection of the rights of his people. At the same time he was fully aware of his own impotence under the new régime. Once Lyautey had assured himself that the Sultan's younger brother, Youssef, would provide an adequate substitute, the French "imposed" (the word is Lyautey's) his abdication upon Moulay Hafid.

On August 12, 1912, "the last independent Shereefian ruler" left Morocco. It was now the sole right of the *oulema* of Fez—the learned doctors of Islamic law—by ancient prerogative, to name his successor. Without their legal and religious sanction, the nomination of Moulay Youssef would have carried no weight. Knowing that they had no resources for backing up a refusal, on August 14, 1912, they "elected" the new Sultan. The acute stage of the crisis

<sup>4</sup> Pierre Parent, *Causerie sur le Maroc de 1951*, Toulouse, Imprimerie Régionale, 1951, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Catroux, op. cit., p. 138.

had reached its end. And so long as Lyautey remained in power, the profounder aspects of the Moroccan problem were pushed into the background. The outside world, receiving no sharp reminders, imagined that the "Moroccan question" no longer existed to trouble them.

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There is no mystery about Lyautey's recipe for success in his pro-Consulate in Morocco; success it certainly was, notwithstanding the hard fact that most of those who came after him reaped only failure. The key to his accomplishment was his sincere love of Morocco and the Moors. Because he loved both, he tried to preserve what was best in their civilization, while infusing into it, as gradually as his temperament allowed, constructive elements serving to inculcate a fresh approach, a more modern outlook. This was his best assurance of a passport to the natives' approval, for they were hostile to the "clean sweep" approach. He gained their respect because he tried to preserve their institutions, their customs and their laws, because he showed their sovereign the highest respect, and because he was ever watchful lest he humiliate them. He never tired of emphasizing to those who worked under him that the first condition for the success of their mission was "minutest knowledge of the natives, their chiefs, their traditions and their needs, and constant and direct co-operation with them".<sup>6</sup>

The terms of the Protectorate Treaty were such as to enable Lyautey to act along the libertarian lines he envisaged. According to its provisions, Morocco had not become a colony but still enjoyed all the rights of a sovereign nation, with France acting merely as helper and adviser. Lyautey summarized his principles in the following description: "A protectorate, and not direct administration. Govern with the mandarins, not against them. Do not offend a single tradition, do not change a single habit. Identify the governing class with our own interests. Govern with the Makhzen, not against it."<sup>7</sup>

Something of a diehard, both by birth and by inclination, a born representative of the *ancien régime*, with all his notions informed by an intelligent perspective of history, Lyautey believed that there was much to be said for the "great" caids, in whom he perceived kinship with the class of feudal barons of Europe's Middle Ages. But, considering themselves more or less independent rulers, these turbulent chieftains represented a very real danger to the unification

<sup>6</sup> *Textes et Lectures de Lyautey l'Africain*, edited by Pierre Lyautey, Paris, Plon, 1953.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted by Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

of Morocco. Lyautey's somewhat romantic predilection for them—self-willed, autocratic, picturesque, hospitable and generous as they were, but also cruel as well as magnificent warriors (and, as a rule, but poor administrators)—is one feature of his Moroccan policy that suggests lack of clairvoyance. For his respect for their rôle acted as a counter-pull to his efforts to increase the prestige of the Sultan. It also tended to make Lyautey neglect the rôle of what might be styled the middle classes and fail to foresee the inevitable upsurging of democratic tendencies. Impressed by Britain's example of lending power to India's princes at the expense of those popular democratic forces which, finally, achieved crystallization of their aims in the Indian Congress and in the person of Gandhi, Lyautey was hoping that by strengthening the position of the caids, he would safeguard French rule against the possibility of too much power remaining in the hands of the central authority, as represented by the Sultan and the Makhzen.

As events proved, however, this policy acted as a dangerously disruptive element by undermining the authority of the Sultan Mohammed V and by cramping the nationalists, the only body aspiring to democratic reorganization; for it placed disproportionate power in the hands of reaction and feudalism, as symbolized by Thami el Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakesh. It was Lyautey's partiality for authoritarianism, as personified by the caids, that earned him the bitter, impassioned opposition of Clémenceau, as, in fact, of many of the more progressive elements in France.

He returned dislike for dislike—he, dyed-in-the-wool conservative that he was, eyed their innovations with mistrust. When, in 1924, President Millerand was forced to leave the Elysée, and the more progressive government of Edouard Herriot came to power, Lyautey happened to be on a prolonged visit to France. Before he returned to Morocco, he wrote to a friend: "My feelings towards the present government can be summed up in these words: during the six weeks that I have been in France, I have not even established any contact with it. I know I should have done so, but, so far, I haven't had it in my heart to set about it."<sup>8</sup>

However, so long as Lyautey was at the head of affairs, the harsh fruit he was cherishing, mistaking its nature, did not ripen. The harvest fell to other hands.

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A typical *grand seigneur*, Lyautey believed in a benevolent autocracy and a conscientious feudalism. This aspect of his char-

<sup>8</sup> Letter to General Catroux.

acter was counterbalanced by a genuine humanity, an understanding of the hopes and fears of simple folk. There was no hypocrisy or condescension about his concern for the well-being of the poorest and the lowest. He knew how to draw them out, while yet permitting no breath of familiarity. This applied equally to contacts with his own officers and collaborators, who might respect, admire and even love him, but who would never be encouraged to feel that they were dealing with an equal.

The one section of Moorish society who were not so easily encompassed in his paternalistic benevolence were those members of the middle class who had already absorbed some of the spirit of modern France and developed political ideas of their own. For in his dealings with them, he did not feel as much at ease as when he was visiting the great chieftains in their carpeted tents or addressing lowlier folk. His aristocratic manner, as well as his conditional benevolence, were wasted on those inquisitive *bourgeois* with their keen minds and their unbecoming Western clothes.

Less impersonal, less chilly than the Duke of Wellington, he inspired the same spontaneous confidence, radiated the same air of authority, and made it equally clear that he would brook no contradiction. But, unlike the Duke, he could be passionate and act impulsively. These last traits helped him to establish direct human contacts, and to convince people that he had their personal difficulties very much at heart. Rather than enforce his views upon those under him or limit himself to written orders, he would try to win people over to his ideas in direct conversation, in discourse that flowed in rapid, often violently expressed, usually picturesque, and invariably clearly formulated sentences, without ambiguities. His straightforward approach, and the hint of suppressed impatience in his delivery, revealed him as unmistakably a man of action, a professional soldier. But his motives, when grasped, and his policies, when analysed, left no doubt in his listener's mind that behind the soldier there stood a statesman.

By no means unaware of his gifts and his effectiveness, Lyautey regarded his mission in Morocco as a highly personal venture; as, in the somewhat romantic phraseology of one of his friends, "a marriage between himself and Morocco". Morocco was virgin land for him, and it was his task to make her fertile and rich; to endow her with all the wealth which could accrue from the quickening fusion of French civilization and her own latent possibilities. Morocco was his personal "monopoly"; and his jealousy and anger were easily aroused by the slightest hint of interference. The following incident shows him typically secure on his high horse. At the beginning of the First World War, Clémenceau published a violent

attack on Lyautey, accusing him of misusing his Moroccan assignment for furthering his personal ambitions. Lyautey's reaction was instantaneous and violent. He wrote an explosive letter to the government in Paris, in which he called Clémenceau, the man who soon afterwards was to be the chief architect of French victory, "a personage of such notoriety", and concluded his diatribe with: "My authority, here, must be utterly unquestioned." If even the greatest man of the moment in France was so rudely warned off, it is easy to imagine the kind of rebuff which lesser critics could expect.

Though he was the Prince Charming who would awaken Morocco from her long sleep, Lyautey, unlike some of his successors, was profoundly conscious of Morocco's noble past, and he missed few opportunities of exalting it. "Let us not forget," he said on one occasion, "that we are in the country of Ibn Khaldoun, who arrived in Fez at the age of twenty; in the land of Averroës; and of their descendants, who are not unworthy of them."<sup>9</sup>

Small wonder that Lyautey enjoyed nothing more than to spend an evening in the house of a great caïd in his mountain lair or in the ancestral palace of a distinguished Makhzen member, hidden in one of the winding lanes of old Fez. He would set out for his host's dwelling on horseback, preceded and followed by mounted soldiers in flowing robes and by running torchbearers to light the way. He knew that, upon arrival, he would find his host with all the senior members of his family, dressed in their richest djellabahs and burnouses,<sup>10</sup> awaiting him in the flickering light of torches borne by slaves. Having dismounted, he would greet them with an air that left no doubt as to who was *primus inter pares*, but also with a captivating smile and the warmest of handshakes to assure them that he was their friend. He delighted in the setting of marble-arched patios with murmuring fountains, exquisitely carved doors and ceilings, and the other manifestations of a "great and beautiful civilization". And he was aware that in such surroundings his every word would be regarded as law, and that he was listened to with a respect that no diplomatic *salon* in Paris could ever provide.

He was anxious to give, as well as receive, intangible boons. He seldom missed an opportunity of praising the great chieftains in terms he was slow to lavish on anyone else. Thus he described Thami el Glaoui as "the most intelligent, the most active, really the greatest warrior of all", and Taieb el Goundafi, another tribal

<sup>9</sup> Speech of April 17, 1921.

<sup>10</sup> Djellabah—hooded cloak worn as main Moorish garment. Burnous—cloak worn over a djellabah.

chieftain, was, he said, "as brave in combat as wise in negotiations".<sup>11</sup>

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Lyautey abhorred any move that would suggest direct administration by the French or in any way diminish Morocco's sovereign status. The members of the administration were expected to act as advisers, he proclaimed, not as governors. "As long as he could, he fought against the introduction of direct control, and he refused to open the administration to subaltern officials [French] and to permit its proletarianization in the Algerian manner."<sup>12</sup> Warned by the Algerian example and, to some extent, the Tunisian, he did not wish to see Morocco swamped by French *colons*, or settlers.<sup>13</sup> The far-sightedness of his precautions was later manifest, when the almost insoluble problems created by the influx of such settlers, and by the influence they were to exercise upon France's Moroccan politics, stirred up a sea of troubles.

His attitude was consistent. He encouraged the traditional Moorish arts, native music and dance, and old customs and observances. Under his aegis, the country was rapidly emerging from its medieval past and accepting the twentieth century. Administration, agriculture, transport, economic methods, all were being modernized. Even in the sphere of architecture he accomplished something entirely new, and set a worthy example for his successors—one of the few they followed.

In accordance with his respect for Moorish architecture—old towns, old city walls, mosques, medersas, fountains—Lyautey decided that the European population which Morocco had suddenly to accommodate should be housed in towns of their own. Thus, in all the principal cities, Fez, Rabat, Meknes, Marrakesh, new European towns were erected at a few miles' distance from the existing ancient medinas (native towns). These, except for certain sanitary and hygienic improvements, were left exactly as the French had found them. Even in the new European settlements Lyautey would not permit the introduction of an alien Western style of architecture. Under his guidance, the chief architect of the Protectorate, Henri Prost, with the assistance of his colleagues Laforgue and Laparde, evolved a form which, while distinctly modern, has an unmistakably Moorish character. They accomplished this by making skilful use of a variety of Moorish motifs. Rabat, especially

<sup>11</sup> Pierre Lyautey, op. cit.

<sup>12</sup> Catroux, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>13</sup> "Lyautey was convinced that the disadvantages of settling Frenchmen in Morocco greatly outweighed the advantages." *ibid*, p. 289.



its government quarter, exemplifies admirably the attractiveness of the new style, a style, incidentally, that was to be much copied in the south of France, and, at one time, even in California. When the time was ripe for providing the natives with new quarters, the architects of a later generation had this example on which to model their buildings. The new medinas they erected, while entirely Moorish in appearance, were modern in conception, embodying various innovations that had no place in the older native architecture.

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Lyautey's building policy had one result that even he, for all his foresight, had not envisaged. By causing the French population to live apart from the natives, he unwittingly set a gulf between them, a distance which, in time, was to prove more than merely physical. Living in their own separate settlements, the French newcomers were even more exclusive than other considerations might have dictated. Much of the ignorance of French "Moroccans" about the people in whose country they were guests, much of the tragic failure of the two races to mingle spiritually or rub shoulders physically, was due to their geographical segregation. Had the spirit and the policies of Lyautey been kept alive by his successors, that early miscalculation might have had no lasting effect. But under policies that were drifting ever closer to colonialism, this separation into race groups very soon underlined a situation in which there were only rulers and ruled, two factions with very little in common. Thus, by 1954, it was only on the rarest occasions that French people would receive Moroccans in their homes. "In Casablanca, the rupture between the French and the Moroccans is complete."<sup>14</sup>

The decline towards colonialism, direct administration, and all that followed therefrom, had set in while Lyautey was still Resident General. Quite early in his governorship he had to fight policies emanating from Paris, and inspired primarily by the Comité du Maroc. His own notion of his duty proved a thorn in the flesh of the colonialists, and invited bitter attacks. Sidetracking him, the colonialists began to work for the replacement of protectorate-functions by direct administration, and for the granting of political rights to French citizens in Morocco. On November 24, 1919, Lyautey warned his opponents in the following terms: "Morocco is an autonomous State, which remains under the sovereignty of the Sultan, with its own status. French political institutions have no place in Morocco. Our nationals may set up organizations in that

<sup>14</sup> Paul Buttin, *Le Drame du Maroc*, p. 139.

country and they may enjoy professional but not political representation."<sup>15</sup> On another occasion he said, "The conception of the Protectorate is that of a country retaining its own institutions and government, and being self-administered with its own organized bodies . . . Morocco is an autonomous State to which France has guaranteed protection but which remains under the sovereignty of the Sultan with its own statute. One of the duties with which I am charged is to ensure the integrity of this form of government and observance of this statute."<sup>16</sup>

In spite of Lyautey's opposition, ever-increasing numbers of officials were poured into Morocco from France. These officials who, according to General Catroux "had forgotten all their faith; were incapable of adapting themselves to the new conditions, and of making constructive reforms . . . acquired the habit of making extreme decisions, while the Sultan isolated in his palace and very superficially informed by his French counsellor, knew really nothing of projects until they reached him in the form of decrees for his signature".<sup>17</sup>

We can consult many documents in Lyautey's own hand that reveal how even he was powerless to halt the introduction of methods diametrically opposed to his own. Typical of many is the following report which he sent to the government in Paris on November 18, 1920. "All administrative measures are taken in [the Sultan's] name; it is he who signs the decrees. But in practice, he has no real power. His only contact is with the Shereefian Counsellor, whom he sees daily, but that is all. In reality his advice is solicited only as a matter of form. The Grand Vizier and the Viziers do not take part in any deliberations on important matters, these being examined without reference to their views by the French officials. There is practically no exchange of departmental or business reports between the [French] heads of the departments and the Viziers. Thus the Makhzen, no longer capable of being galvanized into action, is in danger of sinking peacefully into oblivion."

As M. Pierre Parent, a former Deputy of the French National Assembly and ex-President of the Disabled War Veterans' Association in Morocco, writes, "All these sharks of France and Morocco thought that the Protectorate régime would not make the Moroccan people sufficiently subservient for the complete 'exploitation' of the country. . . . Since the same sharks always have a great deal

<sup>15</sup> From his speech on November 24, 1919, given at a meeting of the French Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture.

<sup>16</sup> Lyautey, *Paroles d'Action*, op. cit., p. 301.

<sup>17</sup> Catroux, op. cit., pp. 287 and 397.

of influence over French governments, Lyautey was subject to pressures which he could not always withstand."<sup>18</sup>

Lyautey foresaw clearly the dangers inseparable from the introduction of colonialist policies. In a speech he made on November 18, 1920 (that is, at a time when nationalism was a practically unknown concept in Morocco), he said, "A young generation [of Moors] is coming along which is full of life and which needs activity. . . . Lacking the outlets which our administration offers them so sparingly and in very subordinate positions, they will find an alternative way out, and will seek to form themselves into groups in order to draw up their programmes of demands. . . . It is high time to shout 'Danger'."

So long as Lyautey remained in power, his enormous prestige and his strength of character enabled him to keep the contamination of his policies within bounds. With his profound understanding of Morocco and its problems, he fought for the rights of the natives and, incidentally, for the good name of France. His attacks were directed against opportunist politicians and big business, equally ignorant of what was at stake, whose main concern was personal aggrandizement. Their schemes were engineered at a time when young Morocco, so recently regarding France as the arch-enemy, was just in the first flush of envious admiration of French aptitudes, and longing to absorb as much information as possible. Though some of the politically educated Moors viewed his own unique combination of autocracy and paternalism with disquiet, the Lyautey approach was admirably suited to dealings with the more backward elements, especially the rural Berbers with their child-like respect for both strength and the kindly guiding hand. And since the politically immature naturally predominated, he was looked upon as a newly acquired but omnipotent father, benevolent and generous when his charges behaved themselves, but able to be stern when they did not do his bidding. Not only his power—due to his position—but also his prestige—built up by himself—surpassed those of the Sultan. He was not trying to usurp the latter's rôle, however, for he was scrupulously faithful to his interpretation of his function under the Protectorate agreement.

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Not the least of Lyautey's achievements was the pacification and unification of the Maghreb. This was a dual action, part military and part political. It was self-evident that a unified modern admini-

<sup>18</sup> Pierre Parent, *The Truth about Morocco*, Moroccan Office of Information & Documentation, New York, 1953, p. 62.

stration could not be introduced so long as large parts of the country lived in a state of revolt. They had to be brought under the control of the central authority. This, in turn, meant that an end had to be made to the existence of the *bled es siba*, and that the *bled el Makhzen* must come to embrace the whole country.

Though pacification was not finally accomplished until 1934, that is nine years after Lyautey's departure, it was he who initiated it, and who laid down the strategy for effecting it. Lyautey's principle was "to display force in order to avoid using it". It follows from this that a political or, rather, psychological pacification had to be attempted before guns were, as a last resort, brought into action. An astute diplomat with a profound knowledge of native psychology, he always tried to win over the dissident by force of persuasion. Only if this failed would he leave the job to the troops. His method was to cut up a dissident group into different sectors, and then to deal with one section after another, trying first the diplomatic line and, if this proved fruitless, the soldierly. The diplomacy was not over-subtle. Promises of favours to be gained were varied with threats of pitiless punishment. As a rule this method of offering both velvet glove and unsparing lash produced excellent results, and Lyautey won as many battles by diplomatic means as he did by force of arms.

Referring to Lyautey's achievement of winning over some of the great caids, Alexander Powell, who knew Lyautey personally, observes, "Certain it is that he did not wave the tricolor and appeal to them on grounds of sentiment and patriotism; for most of them detested the French, as invaders of their country and dogs of unbelievers."<sup>19</sup>

All ranks of the French army were permeated with Lyautey's spirit, regarding their opponents not as deadly enemies but as potential allies to be won over. His younger officers, especially, were wholeheartedly committed to his ideas.

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The campaign of pacification falls roughly into three main periods:

1. The first effort, the chief object of which was the restoration of the Sultan's authority in the lands of the *bled el Makhzen* proper. These included the main northern towns, such as Fez, Meknes and Rabat, already in French hands; the plains of the Atlantic seaboard, and their link with the eastern border through the "corridor" of Taza. By the time the war broke out in 1914, this object was

<sup>19</sup> Powell, op. cit., p. 357.

achieved, and the Berber caids of the south—Marrakesh and the High Atlas—had been won over, mainly by diplomatic means.

2. The second period coincided with the outbreak of war in 1914, and Lyautey at once found himself in a grave predicament. France needed troops in Europe, and Lyautey was compelled to send his best contingents to France. More than ever he had to rely upon diplomatic and strategic subtlety. The area that had to be subjected—mainly south of Meknes, in the Middle Atlas—was inhabited by some of the most dissident tribes of the *bled es siba*. By pushing small armed wedges between various areas and isolating these, Lyautey achieved his main object by 1921, even though a number of pockets of resistance remained in both the northern and southern parts of the Middle Atlas.

In 1917, when Lyautey returned to Morocco from France, he found the country comparatively calm. "That this state of tranquillity was due to the lavish subsidizing of the native caids and pashas in no wise detracts from the great credit due to [him], who, by his statesmanship, breadth of vision, sincerity and knowledge of native character, held an empire for his country."<sup>20</sup>

While the combination of guns, diplomacy and "lavish subsidies" played a decisive part in Lyautey's campaign, there was still one other factor that must not be disregarded, even though Moroccan nationalist propaganda was loath to admit it. The perennial dissidence in the *bled es siba*, and the consequent phenomena of banditry, insecurity and the sporadic appearance of usurpers to the throne, made unity and security impossible. Since the death of the last strong Sultan, Moulay Hassan, all these troubles had increased both in number and in intensity. By establishing order and introducing an efficient administration, Lyautey brought both security and peace to the subjected areas. "The ever-present fear of death, confiscation, and imprisonment disappeared. The extortion of the caids ceased, or was greatly curtailed, and justice was obtainable."<sup>21</sup> However much the hardly won justice, security and peace may have become a travesty in the fifties, in the days of which we speak they were very real, and were deeply appreciated by all those who benefited from them.

3. The object, during the third period, was to establish a bridge between the French troops of the north and those of the south. Lyautey himself was concerned only with the initial stage of that operation, for he left Morocco in 1925, and the final absorption of the *bled es siba* into the *bled el Maḥzen* was not accomplished until 1934. Moreover, the consolidation of the French positions in the

<sup>20</sup> Powell, op. cit., p. 359.

<sup>21</sup> Walter Harris, op. cit., p. 294.

north was checked by the Rifian war in which, for four consecutive years, Abd el Karim inflicted defeat after defeat upon the Spanish armies.

And so Lyautey's successors, and not the architect of Morocco's unification, finally brought the whole country under the (purely nominal) authority of the Sultan; but no reputable historian dreams of attributing to anyone but the Marshal prime credit for the mapping out of the entire political and military campaign. Without Lyautey, the French might have grown weary of a hopeless-seeming task. At any rate the process would have been bloodier and costlier without the "Lyautey touch".

In thirteen years Lyautey achieved that which native rulers strove in vain to accomplish over almost as many centuries. Yet we must not forget that great forces were working with him—vast historical processes impossible to halt. For national unification had become a natural process within the last hundred years. Nations that had for many centuries known civil strife and internal cleavages, had at last emerged as unified states. Italy and Germany are examples that leap to the mind. Modern weapons and modern means of transport and communication have made it much easier for central authorities to impose their will upon dissident minorities. Without the telegraph, automobile, and other modern contrivances, it might have been impossible for an Ibn Saud to unify the Nejd and Hejaz into one Saudi Arabian kingdom. So it is, at least, open to question whether the Moroccans, if left to themselves, would not have achieved in their own way the process which Lyautey hastened for them. The process would have been much slower, much costlier. But should it have succeeded, it might have saved Morocco from coming into prominence as one of the most pressing "colonial" problems of the modern era.

## LYAUTEY'S REFORMS

HOWEVER far-reaching were many of the reforms introduced under Lyautey, the decisive one was the change in the administration, since every departure and innovation was pregnant with political implications. Departmental reforms within an existing framework are one thing; the complete refashioning of an organic structure, another. In a once independent country occupied by a foreign Power it becomes inevitable that politic considerations should be at the heart of all change: for once an action is performed with a view to bettering the lot of one group of people, there is bound to be a corollary sacrifice demanded of another group. And such root-and-branch reorganization gives traditional practice a very rude shock.

As soon as Lyautey had established order in the principal cities, he concentrated on introducing reforms. Though abiding loyally by the spirit of the Treaty of Fez, he admitted very few motives for native political action. It was only after his departure that politics began to overshadow most domains of Moroccan life, and that the new administrative machinery came to be employed for political ends not foreseen by him.

## SULTAN AND RESIDENT GENERAL

The establishment of French rule meant first of all that while *de jure* the Sultan remained the sole sovereign, for all practical purposes his sovereignty was divided between himself and the Resident General. Even with Lyautey's cautious approach, it soon became evident that the Sultan's sovereignty had become mainly symbolic, whereas that of the Resident was real and effective. It might even be said that it was well-nigh limitless. The only restrictions imposed upon it were those resulting from certain international commitments which the Protectorate could not avoid respecting.

There were three such commitments:

1. By the convention of Madrid of November 27, 1912, France had passed on to Spain complete control of the northern shores of Morocco along the Mediterranean coast. The Spanish zone was

administered by a Khalifa (representative) of the Sultan, and a Spanish High Commissioner whose rôle corresponded with that of the Resident General in the French zone. Tangier, too, soon to become a "free and international city", lay outside direct French jurisdiction.

2. The Act of Algeciras established complete trading equality in Morocco for all foreign Powers, depriving the Shereefian State of its freedom to impose such customs duties as it might deem desirable.

3. Certain foreign Powers enjoyed the privilege of their own jurisdiction on Moroccan soil. That privilege emanated from the "Capitulation" rights they had acquired in the past. Great Britain renounced her Capitulations in 1938, after which date the U.S.A. remained the only foreign Power to retain its own system of justice for its nationals in Morocco.<sup>1</sup>

It was in the sphere of foreign affairs that the Sultan's power was most noticeably diminished. He could no longer negotiate or sign foreign treaties; Morocco's relations with the rest of the world became a concern of the Quai d'Orsay in Paris; the Resident General acted as the sovereign's Foreign Minister; and Morocco lost all its former right to foreign representation, that is its diplomatic body.

Since the Resident also acted as the Sultan's Minister for War, France having assumed responsibility for Morocco's defences, the new Makhzen had neither a Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor a Ministry for War. The functions of the Finance Ministry also slipped out of native control. The only offices retained by the Makhzen were those of: Grand Vizier (Prime Minister), Minister of Justice (whose powers became restricted to Islamic justice alone), and Minister of Habous (who looked after the lands of the religious authorities and charitable foundations).

While no new dahir (decree) could become law until it had been signed and sealed by the Sultan, it was the Resident alone "who in legislative matters had the right of initiative; it was he on whose proposals the Sultan sanctioned the dahir".<sup>2</sup>

Liaison between the Sultan and the Makhzen on the one hand and the French authorities on the other, was maintained by a *conseiller du gouvernement chérifien*, a French official attached to the monarch.

While there were next to no native organizations to support the Makhzen, the French Administration (centralized in the Residency) received support from a number of newly established and purely

<sup>1</sup> The scope of that system was reduced after the verdict of the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 1952.

<sup>2</sup> Célérier, op. cit., p. 4.



French organizations, such as the *commissions municipales* in the larger towns, the regional Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, and, later on, the elected *Conseil du Gouvernement*, a consultative assembly dealing with budgetary matters. This assembly, in whose deliberations the seeds of the subsequent Moroccan crisis were sown in 1950, was at first purely French. Not until 1948 were natives admitted to its assemblies.

#### ADMINISTRATION

A backward country such as Morocco could not supply the requisite cadres of officials sufficiently conversant with Western thought and practice to be able to initiate the necessary modernization. The Residency was thus bound to become the natural centre of executive power.

Besides the Resident General's personal cabinet, comprising departments of general civil administration, military affairs, Shereefian affairs, and a political secretariat, new departments of finance, public works, economic affairs, agriculture, commerce and colonization, health, education, justice, and tourism were introduced. Though the heads of these departments bore the title of Directors, their rôle and functions corresponded to those of cabinet ministers. All these Directors were French; but in 1947 several Moroccan under-secretaries were given positions subsidiary to theirs. The executive power of the various departments was centralized in the office of the Secretary General of the Protectorate, an office held by a Frenchman. A special (diplomatic) Minister was accredited to the Resident General as a representative of the French government. He replaced the Resident in his absence, and acted as his second-in-command.

For administrative purposes the whole country was divided into *régions* or *territoires*, corresponding roughly to states in the U.S.A. and counties in Great Britain. Each region was governed by a *Chef du territoire* (or *région*), or by a *Contrôleur Civil*: the regions of Casablanca, Rabat, Oujda, Port Lyautey, Mazagan and Safi under civilian *Contrôleurs Civils*, those of Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh, Taza, Agadir, Tafilalet and Dra under military Governors. Each of these districts was subdivided into smaller administrative units. Over most of the countryside—the largest part of Morocco—the local potentate was the French *officier des affaires indigènes*. These District Officers have, on the whole, an excellent record of devoted service to Morocco. Even as late as the forties and fifties—long after Lyautey's departure—the Marshal's spirit still inspired some of them. It is in their ranks that one must seek for the genuine idealist, the hard worker, the man of integrity. Political

manœuvring and power-seeking they left to their colleagues in the towns, and concentrated on the welfare of the rural natives. There was, of course, greater opportunity for co-operative effort, less temptation to adopt a superior-nation attitude among the fields and pastures, and quite often a real affection developed between French officials and indigenous agriculturalists.

In the towns the French appointed *chefs des services municipaux*, municipal administrators "charged with control of the native authorities".<sup>3</sup> These administrators were to work with their native counterparts, the pashas, nominally appointed by the Sultan. But the principal difference in status was made clear by the arrangement whereby the French administrator exercised final control over the affairs of the indigenous population, the pasha having no counterbalancing say in the affairs of the local French community.

In country districts, native administration was based on the time-honoured tribal structure, and the chief corresponding to the urban pasha was the caïd, or tribal chief, assisted by sheikhs. His controlling agent, the final arbiter, was the District Officer.

#### LEGAL ADMINISTRATION

At first, native Islamic jurisdiction was maintained, and was in the hands of cadis (professional judges) with the safeguard of Court of Appeal. In criminal cases the judge was either the pasha (or his delegate) or the tribal caïd, assisted by a French *commissaire*. Since both pasha and caïd were at the same time chief administrators, there was no division of juridical and executive power, a weakness in the system that was to cause much friction between the nationalists and the administration.

Cases affecting French citizens only, or French citizens and Moroccans together, came under French jurisdiction, which was almost identical with that obtaining in France.

#### TRANSPORT

"The development of Morocco's material wealth, while not the sole idea of the French Protectorate in Morocco, is nevertheless the *outstanding justification of our presence*."<sup>4</sup> In these words, a French author, Jean Célérier appears to be equating the aims of France's official policies in Morocco with those of the Comité du Maroc. This is not necessarily so: he might merely be implying that only the use of modern apparatus and techniques could ensure to Moroccans full enjoyment of their unexploited wealth. The employment of the word "justification" is, anyhow, an acceptable reminder that

<sup>3</sup> Prosper Ricard, *Maroc*, Hachette, 1948, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> (Author's italics.) Célérier, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

France was not in Morocco by divine ordinance. It is also perfectly reasonable to expect the Moors to pay for the improved conditions which the wealth as yet untapped could purchase for them—provided that the profits therefrom were not exported.

Lyautey himself, from the very beginning of his mission, planned his Moroccan campaign according to economic considerations. To do otherwise would have been unrealistic. His first preoccupation was what he called *Maroc utile*, the fertile areas west of the Atlas mountains and along the shores of the Atlantic. The *Maroc inutile*, the more easterly and southerly regions, encroached upon by the sands of the desert or covered with mountains, could wait until later. Thus it was the former, with its great promise of economic wealth, that he brought under French control by 1923.

It would not be fair to apply our present, more enlightened views on colonialism to policies pursued earlier in the twentieth century. Colonial exploitation seemed in those days as legitimate as high-sea piracy was in the seventeenth century. So if criticism of French activities in Morocco is justified, it should be applied to developments in the thirties, forties and fifties rather than to efforts of their pioneer years. And Lyautey's intention was to show the Moroccans how easily they could buy a brighter material future by turning their patrimony to better account—the mentors, of course, and the white settlers they introduced, must share in the new prosperity.

In a word then, the principal reforms envisaged by the French were to follow on from material enrichment, possible only through economic development. The standpoint is unexceptionable. Development of the kind foreseen would be dependent on a rapid modernization of Morocco's means of transport and communication. Pastoral and agricultural improvements, closer to the native hearts, were placed quite low on the list, but this was reasonable enough. The larger improvements were basic, and the minor ones, although benefits would be almost immediately apparent, could not be tackled piecemeal. Exploitation along European lines required roads and railways, but above all harbours for the importation of requisite machinery and the export of the vast mineral produce. "The needs of the Europeans," says M. Célérier, "accounted for the principal activity of the ports."<sup>5</sup> Excellent harbours were built. The new railway lines, too, were constructed with an eye to the needs of the military campaign. Thus the main railway line cuts the country from Marrakesh in the south-west to Oujda in the north-east, running through Casablanca, Rabat, Port Lyautey, Petit-

<sup>5</sup> op. cit., p. 124.

Jean, Meknes, Fez, and Taza. Minor lines that were added later had to serve the new mining interests. "The line from Sidi el Aidi to Oued Zem takes to Casablanca the phosphates of Khouribga and the iron from Air Amar; the line from Ben Guerir to Safi assures the transport of phosphates from Louis-Gentil; the line from Oujda to Bou Arfa directs the coal of Djerada and the manganese from Bou Arfa towards the Algerian-Moroccan port."<sup>6</sup> Here again the utilitarian bias is perfectly understandable: any other approach would have been utterly unrealistic.

#### AGRICULTURE

One of the greatest problems awaiting the newcomers was the provision of adequate systems of irrigation. In many extremely fertile regions Morocco has always suffered from the uncertainties of the weather. Summers of disastrous droughts may be followed by seasons of torrential rains which, after flooding the countryside and ruining the harvest, seep away and leave no stored water behind for future use. To ensure a more equitable distribution of water, the French "established the principle of control over all surface-and-subterranean water supplies. They introduced a system of water priorities that amounted almost to rationing."<sup>7</sup>

Water was badly needed in the towns, and the new industries could not function without it, but the needs of agriculture were most urgent of all, since nine-tenths of the population lived from the land. The French have applied many improvements to what they called "*la petite hydraulique*"—the use of subterranean springs that suddenly surface as wells or rivulets, to be diverted by the farmer into an ingenious network of channels leading to every single plant and tree. But the French had no need to teach the primitive Moorish farmer how best to use the available water. "These farmers show an incomparable ingenuity in the utilization of their feeble resources of water . . . they are the heirs of a civilization founded for millennia on agricultural methods in an arid country."<sup>8</sup>

However, even ancient, inherited knowledge cannot be applied on a respectable scale where no money is available. It was beyond the financial resources of the natives to utilize even such water as was from time to time within reach, and the French saved the formerly wasted water by building dams. This work was begun soon after the Protectorate came into being, and to-day Morocco possesses dams that are as impressive as any in the world. (To

<sup>6</sup> Célérier, op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, p. 129.

this subject, as to all the others dealt with in this chapter, more detailed reference will be made later.)

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It is difficult to make any hard-and-fast statement about the political and financial conditions of Morocco at the beginning of the century, as such assessments are usually comparative, and we lack data that would enable us to compare Morocco even with other Islamic lands, for they do not share the Maghreb's political and geographical peculiarities. One thing, however, can be judged on the comparative basis—the country's agriculture. Agricultural production was, in Morocco, more spectacular than that of any other country of North Africa. On 5 December, 1923, Lyautey said: "The first time I visited Morocco, in 1908, . . . I was deeply impressed to see—quite unlike the Algerian acres which are parcelled up into irregular strips of indeterminate area—extensive and skilfully cultivated estates with perfectly defined boundary lines, encircling veritable farms. All that was the work of natives. It was a tremendous surprise to me."<sup>9</sup> He was obviously commenting on the soundness of agricultural practice, and the question of ownership and enjoyment were left to the social historians.

The methods of the native farmer were, even if successful, antiquated and wasteful of labour. One of the urgent tasks of the French was to modernize those methods and so produce higher yields. To combat the dangerous old system of agricultural usury—a system that had driven so many native farmers from their land and into pauperdom—agricultural credits were introduced; these provided assistance with both money and material. Later on, agricultural co-operatives were developed, as well as experimental farms, and centres for training agricultural apprentices. Beside native agricultural advisers, District Officers usually had to act in that capacity.

Lyautey himself did not welcome the influx of French settlers, and he mistrusted some of the means by which they were permitted to acquire land. As far back as 1916 he stated, with reference to events even earlier than 1912, "The French legation was induced to encourage a horde of Frenchmen to stake out land without inquiring too closely into their legal rights to do so."<sup>10</sup> Yet in spite of his opposition, one of the earliest and most persistent aims of the authorities in Paris was the "creation of European farms by

<sup>9</sup> Lyautey, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by Parent, *Causerie sur le Maroc*, p. 8.

settlers".<sup>11</sup> In later years that policy was to have far-reaching repercussions.

#### OTHER ECONOMIC SPHERES

Having no modern machinery and no commercial inducement, the Moroccans had, before 1912, barely investigated their great mineral deposits. Large-scale modern industry, likewise, is in Morocco entirely a development of the second and later decades of this century.

Even the fishery possibilities were but little exploited in the days before 1912. Yet the waters washing the Moroccan shores, especially along the Atlantic coast, are extremely rich in fish. The Moroccan sardine is one of the best in the world. We have no figures for the catch of fish before 1912 or for the few succeeding years, but the growth of the industry is shown by the comparative figures for 1922 and 1951: in the former year the catch amounted to 5,000 tons, in the latter to 91,000.

#### CONCLUSION

Some of Lyautey's reforms in the economic sphere were almost too elementary to achieve the record book. Others were so conditioned that we view them, from this distance, with some dubiety. But even the most rabid supporter of anti-colonialist policies must concede that Lyautey's fundamental reforms were for Morocco's good. He came to a country split and weakened by tribal strife; its Sultan's power undermined; its exchequer empty; its people discontented; its security still further threatened by banditry and lawlessness. In 1925 he left behind him a more prosperous land, a land heading toward unity, much of it pacified, its ruler and Makhzen re-established in authority (however nominal it might have been, it still made for smoother running), and a great measure of order. The overall position was unfavourable to the spreading of tribal dissidence. State finances were now organized according to twentieth-century notions, and the administration, modernized and moderately efficient, had at least a hope of solving its difficulties without appeal to outmoded processes. The country's economy, agriculture, business methods were, at long last, adjusting themselves to the modern order. Modernization was not complete, but in thirteen years Lyautey had laid the foundations of health services, improved sanitation, transport and road systems, and even changes of heart and mind indispensable in the world of to-day. His list of triumphs is even more remarkable for the fact that five of the thirteen years which circumstances granted him belonged to the period of the

<sup>11</sup> Célérier, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

First World War, a period during which the slowing down of his work was inevitable.

Much ill-intentioned workmanship may have later ruined the edifice of which Lyautey laid the foundations. He himself may, in certain respects, have miscalculated and dealt over-cavalierly with an alien tradition. His idealism and his ideas in practical spheres may have received ruthless treatment at the hands of uninspired but far from disinterested successors. Much of the good he did has failed to live on. But his achievement was too honourable and too brilliant to be completely overlaid by the unwitting botchings and the less unconscious misdeeds of the men who came after him.

## THE BROTHERHOODS

IT has been the custom, since the reign of the powerful Sultan Moulay Ismail in the early eighteenth century, for the Sultan, on his accession, to summon the head of the Ouazzan family and request him to perform a little ceremony without which the consecration of the new monarch was considered incomplete. This ceremony would consist of the Ouazzan chieftain holding the stirrup while the new ruler mounted his horse. The custom has its origins in that world of magic which has shaped so much of the symbolism and ritual of mankind. Because of its geographical seclusion and its social organization, Morocco retained its heritage of magic until very recent times—in fact it still survives in certain rural areas and in the famous religious brotherhoods. It was the leader of one such brotherhood who officiated, by traditional right, as holder of the stirrup.

This is how it all began. Ouazzan, in the north of the country, was the cradle of the Ouazzani family; a family of most ancient lineage, claiming a number of saintly members. One of them, Moulay Abdessalam ben Mishish, was propagator, in the thirteenth century, of a mystical doctrine that was to exert considerable influence on Morocco's religious life. Each successive head of the family was deemed a saint by inheritance. As such, he wielded considerable spiritual and secular power. Now the Sultan Moulay Ismail did not care for the Ouazzani competition, and he forbade his subjects to join their brotherhood. He summoned Moulay el Touhami, head of the brotherhood, to receive severe censure for his "heretical" doctrines. The examination of the saint was entrusted to two important palace officials. "Before the unjust recrimination, the belly of Moulay el Touhami swelled with wrath, and threatened to fill the whole chamber. The two great officials, thunderstruck by this prodigious *baraka*, fled to the Sultan, and implored him to abandon all action against a Shereef so highly favoured by heaven."<sup>1</sup> As was to be expected, the fearless Moulay Ismail was profoundly impressed by the miracle, and he hastened to pay his respects to the saint, riding on horseback to his abode. As soon as he perceived

<sup>1</sup> Aubin, *op. cit.*



Moulay el Touhami, he speedily dismounted from his horse, but the saint begged him to remount and, while the Sultan did so, held his stirrup. "It is only from this moment," Moulay Ismail is supposed to have exclaimed, "that I am a true sultan."

The last few sultans dispensed with the ceremony of the stirrup, but the legend has been kept alive in Ouazzan up to recent times. Such tales minister most consolingly to the people's delight in saints and miracles, brotherhoods and the power of *baraka*.

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Religious brotherhoods are, indeed, an important feature of Moroccan history. There are records of their flourishing as far back as the eleventh century. The brotherhoods' retreats, or *zawiyas*, besides being centres of religious activities, often served also as schools, infirmaries and charitable institutions. They might be compared with the medieval monasteries of Europe. Religion has, of course, always been closely enmeshed in the hour-by-hour existence of every Moroccan—it is his life, not a mere adjunct. So brotherhoods soon came to play an important part in national life. Several of the founders of Moorish dynasties started their trek towards the throne from a *zawiya*. In the days when the Spaniards and the Portuguese were attempting to conquer Morocco, the *zawiyas* were among the chief focal points of patriotism and resistance.

The founders of brotherhoods were usually men respected for their saintliness. Some of them were genuine Sufis<sup>2</sup> in the great tradition of Islamic mysticism. Though most of them claimed to be orthodox, they did not scruple to teach a doctrine of their own which, although it reposed within the wider framework of Muslim teaching, might deviate from its very precise postulates in many respects. For hundreds of years Morocco was riddled with religious sects centred in brotherhoods. These varied from the loftiest, concerned solely with spiritual development and the mystical union of man and God, to the lowest that were tainted with superstition and charlatanism. Likewise, among the sheikhs, or heads, of *zawiyas* there were both genuine saints and bigoted fanatics, with a plentiful succession of ambitious careerists concerned only with their own enrichment. Membership of some brotherhoods was as usual, in Morocco, as is membership of a social club in Great Britain or America. Members of the Makhzen, professors of the Karaouine, professional men, and also men of the poorest classes adhered to

<sup>2</sup> Sufi—lit. "made of wool"; the mystics of Islam, the most distinguished of whom, Ghazzali and Ibn Arabi, greatly influenced Christian scholasticism.

this or that *zawiya*. Inevitably some of these came to exercise great power in state affairs.

At the beginning of the present century considerable political power was wielded by the Darkaouiya, a brotherhood founded late in the eighteenth century. Another brotherhood, born in the same century but more strictly religious in organization and intentions, was the Tijaniya. The Touhamiya of the Ouazzani family originally confined itself to religious activities, but towards the end of the nineteenth century began to dabble in politics. The Kittaniya (of which more will be said later) was founded more recently—in the nineteenth century—and at first was of little significance; but after the establishment of the French régime, its power was enhanced because its opposition to the Sultan made it a factor to be reckoned with.

One of the best-known, not to say notorious, was the brotherhood of the Asissaoua, founded in the sixteenth century by Mohammed ben Asissa, a genuine mystic. Departing from his doctrine, his followers, chiefly members of the poorer classes, adopted dervish-like practices involving dances culminating in self-hypnosis and violent excesses. Educated Moors deplored the retrogression implicit in those practices, and the Sultan Mohammed V prohibited them altogether.

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—Serving as centres of patriotism and national resistance, the brotherhoods were not particularly well disposed towards “infidels” and foreigners. It was their influence that so often prevented the establishment of better relations between the Makhzen and European Powers. In the second half of the nineteenth century, many brotherhoods were in fact turning to politics, their *raison d’être* as preservers of the faith practically forgotten. For the most part uneducated and gullible, the members looked to their senior brethren for political information and directive. If this resulted, as often as not, in the blind leading the blind, it also made for group solidarity.

During their conquest of Algeria, the French realized that it was essential for them to have the brotherhoods on their side. The pitifully low intellectual standards of some of them were, of course, an advantage to the newcomers. It gave them an opportunity to build up an ideology almost from foundation level.

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It may seem surprising that few of the brotherhoods were antagonistic to the French Protectorate and that some of them even became active collaborators. This close alliance between the supposedly

anti-Christian, xenophobe and narrow-minded brotherhoods and the foreign administration grew even closer with the years, and reached its zenith only in 1953 at the time of the deposition of the Sultan, Mohammed V. The situation arose and developed simply because the brotherhoods were grasping at straws to save themselves from extinction as redundant and anachronistic bodies. Isolation and unawareness of modern trends created a climate that suited their growth and favoured their survival. The coming of the French was bound to destroy their type of cobwebbed authority, and their leaders considered that the wisest procedure was to jump on the bandwagon rather than come to grief under its irresistible wheels.

The French had probed the matter of the rôle of the brotherhoods many times in the past. Two little-known documents supply interesting evidence of this. The first is a letter written more than a hundred years ago by Marshal Bugeaud, the first French Governor of Algeria, to the chief of the influential Tijaniya brotherhood. Without its goodwill the French settlement of newly conquered Algeria might have been a much more arduous task than it actually proved. Towards the end of his letter the Marshal promises, "Whenever you may be short of something, or require a service of whatever kind, you have only to write to my A.D.C. who will be only too glad to acquaint me with your wishes".<sup>3</sup> As Paul Odinet, an expert on the North African brotherhoods, remarks, "The chiefs of the brotherhoods are avid for money and power. They know that if they oppose the protecting power, they will have neither the one nor the other."

While thirst for money and power explains why certain "religious" sheikhs so eagerly espoused the French cause, it is still difficult to fathom how these opportunists succeeded in persuading the poorer "brethren" to follow their lead. For the enrichment following that association with France was not spread thinly over all the dedicated: it remained in the coffers of the leaders. Our second document enlightens us as to the nature of this persuasion. It is a proclamation sent by a successor of the recipient of Marshal Bugeaud's letter, the head of the Tijaniya, to his followers, and occasioned by France's war with Abd el Karim in 1925. Enjoining the brethren to side with the Christian Power against their Muslim fellow-countrymen, the Skeikh Tijani Mohammed el Kebir ben el Bashir, says, "The French repay for services rendered . . . France has recently [in the war of 1914-1919] conquered one of the greatest and most powerful nations of Europe. Does not God the All-Highest give victory to those whom He wishes to see victorious?"<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Paul Odinet, *Rôle politique des Confréries Religieuses et des Zaouias au Maroc*, Oran, L. Fouque, 1930, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 34.

Having been won over by the French, the sheikhs knew well how to play on the superstitions of their followers. They explained to them that the fact of France's initial victories in Morocco proved that supernatural powers were on their side. And since those powers acted on Allah's direct command, it was a Muslim's religious duty (and part of his self-interest) to support the French rather than those who deliberately closed their eyes to the evidence of God's purposes. In most cases this technique proved effective. As Odinet observed in 1930, "Certain brotherhoods realize that, while serving the French cause with apparent loyalty, they manage to increase the number of their adherents. One must conclude from this that the chiefs know how to justify their attitude to their followers."<sup>5</sup>

Not all brotherhoods came into the open by making common cause with the French; others, while accepting whatever gifts or "services" were offered them, continued to vacillate, either because they were not quite confident that their hold on the membership was sufficiently strong, or because such vacillation might rise their price in French calculations. A few that were genuinely religious bodies naturally tried to steer clear of political associations.

Paul Odinet, who knew many of the chiefs intimately, was aware of the danger of interpreting the sheikhs' actions too glibly. He wrote, "Though a brotherhood chief knows how to cringe, how to demonstrate his loyalty to us in order to be permitted to collect money from his followers, do we really know what goes on in their innermost hearts?"

On the whole, however, the policy adopted towards the brotherhoods paid handsome dividends. Among the leaders, the Darkaouiya "recommended obedience and submission to the French authorities"; their chief Moulay Abderrahman "did not hesitate, in 1912, to link his fate" with that of the French. This did not prevent the Darkaouiya, at the outbreak of the Second World War, from declaring in favour of Germany. Their head wrote several personal letters to Hitler, and his followers assembled in their various *zawiyas* to give thanks to God for having inspired Hitler to fight the French. "However, as soon as the Allied forces landed in Morocco, the 'head of the Brotherhood' got in touch with U.S. and British agents, asking the U.S. for citizenship, use of a personal seal, a house in Tangier, and authority to appoint his own representatives."<sup>6</sup>

The support of the rather more important Ouazzaniya was

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> F. S. Vidal, *Religious Brotherhoods in Moroccan Politics*, *Middle East Journal*, Washington D.C., October 1950.

secured many years before the Moroccan venture began. In 1883 its head, Abdessalam Ouazzani, found himself in difficulties with the Sultan Moulay Hassan, and applied for British "protection". The British government refused his request, since the alleged "saint" had a reputation that inspired no confidence. France was less squeamish, and granted the desired protection.<sup>7</sup> Ever since that time France could congratulate herself that her support of the Ouazzanis had paid good dividends. It is they who supported French penetration into the Sahara and, later, into Morocco. They rendered the French valuable services in 1912; and they played a by no means insignificant part in the capitulation of Abd el Karim, the Rif leader, in 1926.<sup>8</sup>

Equally rewarding relations with other leading brotherhoods had been established long before the conquest of Morocco. "For the last sixty years," writes Paul Odinet, "the Tijaniya have been constantly rendering us service, and since 1911 we have been using their enormous influence south of Marrakesh, in Mauritania and in the Rif."<sup>9</sup> Prof. Julien summed up the situation thus: "The French government has known how to rally to its cause the maraboutism<sup>10</sup> which it subsidizes and protects."<sup>11</sup>

The Kittaniya (and their head) furnish, perhaps, the best possible illustration of a brotherhood's ability to jettison its spiritual pre-occupations and replace them by a very worldly awareness of politics. Whatever his virtues or defects, the Shereef Abd el Hay Kittani was one of the most spectacular figures in a country by no means deficient in striking personalities. Even if his vast learning, his unequalled collection of Islamic manuscripts, his wealth, and his notoriety, were not enough to assure prominence, his girth alone would place him in the ranks of the immortals. For in all its history Morocco is not likely to have produced many saints or sinners of comparable circumference. As head of the Kittaniya brotherhood, he was a "saint" by profession, and had a right to distribute his *baraqa* freely, that is, at a price which could range from a handful of silver coins, a sheep or a bag of dates, to precious Persian carpets, rare manuscripts, or fat cheques. All, providing the donor was not holding out on him, was grist that came to his mill.

The Kittaniya was founded in the mid-nineteenth century by his

<sup>7</sup> For details on Abdessalam Ouazzani (and his English wife), see Rom Landau, *Moroccan Journal*, London, Robert Hale, 1952, pp. 106-12.

<sup>8</sup> Odinet, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>9</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>10</sup> Maraboutism, or the worship of saints, may be said to be one of the articles of faith of the brotherhoods. In fact "Maraboutism" (from the word "marabout", saint) is often the term used to describe them and their philosophy collectively.

<sup>11</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

grandfather. In the normal course of events Abd el Hay would not have ousted his elder brother from headship. But the latter decided to join the ranks of Morocco's many Roguiss, or would-be sultans, and when he tried to usurp the Shereefian throne, he was captured by Moulay Hafid, and incurred the inevitable penalty of death. It was another of Morocco's time-honoured customs that bloodshed must be avenged. But this was not easy to accomplish where the prospective victim was the country's sovereign. Kittani had to content himself with sworn enmity to the Sultan's successors and their families. And since he was intelligent and astute, and something of a scholar, he realized that his only natural ally would be the Protectorate power. So for a great many years he was pleased to do the bidding of his French masters, and in that obedience he became the leading native propagandist of the anti-Sultan and anti-nationalist cause. Sure of the protection of the French, he could risk pronouncements (and activities) that in any other country would have ranked as treason and been punished accordingly.

The boldness of his opposition was extremely marked in 1953, when, together with Thami el Glaoui, he participated very actively in the campaign against the Sultan Mohammed V which culminated in the latter's exile. (This will be described in detail in its appropriate place.)

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The legitimate guardians of Morocco's religious life, the learned *oulema* of the Karaouine University, were to become the brotherhoods' most outspoken opponents. Their objection was not merely to the barefaced adoption of political rôles. It was based, rather, on a conviction that the general deterioration of standards among the "brethren", the cynical renunciation of avowed function, were a slur on Islam. Spirituality and genuine religious activity had been replaced, within the brotherhoods, by bigotry, reliance on "talismans", "magic", and obscurantism. It was only because of the very debased educational and religious standards of the lowly members that their leaders were able to gull them and use them for any political purpose that seemed expedient. The *oulema* could not possibly countenance the continued existence of the brotherhoods once their decline has begun, for throughout Islam the *oulema* have stood, from early times, for an orthodox interpretation of the creed; and long before the Protectorate was set up their opposition to looser and more opportunist interpretations of Kuranic precept had run like a red thread through the fabric of Morocco's religious history.

In Morocco, the supreme guardian of the faith is the Shereef-el-

baraka, namely the Sultan. Had the brotherhoods retained their spiritual character the Sultan would have been their defender. The question of help from abroad—Kittani himself admitted that he had to turn to the French, to “infidels”, for assistance—could then never have arisen. “We defend ourselves,” Kittani wrote in 1953, “as well as we can, with the measured support of the authorities.”<sup>12</sup> This is rather as though the Jesuits or Benedictines of New York turned to the Jews of that city, rather than to the Pope, in search of “measured support”.

The decline of the brotherhoods was already under way in the second half of the nineteenth century, but was accelerated as soon as the “support” from abroad made their spiritual poverty clear and gave them opportunities for subversive action. By the time Lyautey assumed command in Morocco, the largest of them had already been won over by the French, and Lyautey was saved all the spadework which had of necessity been done by his predecessors in Algeria some eighty years earlier. He could depend upon the brotherhood’s co-operation, which formed an important element in his plans for “pacification”. It also informed his strategy when, on the eve of his departure from the Maghreb, he had to prepare details of the French campaign against Abd el Karim.

<sup>12</sup> *Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc*, in *France Outremer*, No. 286, 1953.

## LYAUTEY'S LAST YEAR—THE RIF WAR

DESPITE his wholehearted devotion to his task, Lyautey could seldom rely on unfailing support from home. Now from politicians on the Right, now from the Left, came remonstrances or attack. In 1924 Edouard Herriot's government came to power, and Lyautey felt that he might be relieved of his Moroccan command with very little warning. He even described those days as having been spent "in expectation of disgrace".<sup>1</sup> The French Left had never been enamoured of him, as it had never had much use for strong generals doing a political job. But so long as the Right was in power, he had little to fear from his left-wing critics. Though he was irritated by them, their criticism remained chiefly platonic. The criticism from the Right was anything but platonic. It was seldom openly expressed, and it was not strictly speaking confined to the Right, for other elements were involved, not necessarily adhering to one party or another. This group cohered and spoke with one voice because its main interest in Morocco was colonial exploitation. Whether styled "Comité du Maroc" or the "North African Lobby", whatever the name it bore, this confederation of persons and bodies whose overriding concern was for profitable and privileged colonial expansion was always the most successful nullifier of some of Lyautey's most far-sighted policies. Since these "colonizers" were entrenched in the Quai d'Orsay and in other spheres of influence in Paris, were infiltrating into the administration in Morocco itself, had gained increasing control of that country's economy, and stood firm behind the mounting numbers of French settlers, their solid opposition was infinitely more effective than the conscientious striving of progressive-minded men in France. The politicians could do little more than make speeches and publish articles in newspapers; the colonialists had no need to waste time on either: they had the power to act, and act they did. (Colonialist tactics will be discussed in a later chapter.)

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Herriot's Cabinet, in spite of pressure, retained the Marshal in his

<sup>1</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 128.



Moroccan appointment. Yet Lyautey was beginning to feel his years. By 1924 he was seventy, and his life had been a strenuous one. His health was deteriorating, and the opposition that he encountered was gradually persuading him that the Morocco of his ideas and ideals was slipping away from him. He contemplated retirement.<sup>2</sup> Yet there was still work to be done, and, in spite of his age, he was called to serve once again—not as an administrator but as a soldier. The war that the Rif leader Abd el Karim had been waging so successfully against the Spanish was threatening to erupt into the French zone, and Lyautey was the man to check it.

Abd el Karim's campaign was surely one of the most amazing in history. It was not a war engaging equals, not a war between two countries. It was a struggle between a powerful European nation and one tribal chieftain with no resources beyond those of the limited area controlled by him. On the one hand we find the armies of Spain, disposing of modern weapons; on the other, primitive Berber tribes from the Rif, depending upon such weapons as chanced to come their way, maybe a few modern guns, certainly many ancient rifles the like of which Abdel Kader's men had used in Algeria ninety years earlier. They were untrained in the arts of modern warfare, and were led by a rugged mountain chieftain who had never in his life darkened the doors of a military academy. "They were deprived of all medicaments and surgical aid; yet the imposition of this unnecessary addition to their sufferings did nothing to shorten the campaign. . . . There was no situation, however desperate, no suffering, however severe, that they did not face without complaint and without hesitation. If their methods and their reprisals were open to criticism, their spirit was above all praise, but the task was too great." It was indeed a war "unparalleled in colonial history".<sup>3</sup>

Muhammad ben Abd el Karim el Khattabi came from the Rifian tribe of the beni Urriaghel. Many Rifians have, like the Irish, red hair, green eyes, snub noses, and freckles. Blond hair and blue eyes are, with them, even more prevalent than with the mass of Berbers, where one in four is thus pigmented. Even more noteworthy than their colouring are their courage and tenacity as warriors. The standard of literacy is higher among them than among Berbers in general. Though their spoken language is naturally their own Berber dialect, they write in Arabic. But it is not the Arabic of the average Moorish Arab; it is the classical Arabic of Syria and Egypt. And each clan prides itself on having its own schoolmaster.

<sup>2</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

<sup>3</sup> Walter B. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, London, Edward Arnold, 1927, pp. vii and 322.

Another surprising attribute of the Rifians is their strong addiction to science, a taste they share with their Arab rather than their Berber brothers. More Arab than Berber, too, is their stricter adherence to the precepts of Islam, which occasionally takes the form of puritanism. Thus the older men do not smoke, and some of them even refuse the national drink of mint tea.<sup>4</sup>

Abd el Karim's father was an influential and greatly respected chieftain with uncommonly progressive ideas. He sent one of his sons to study at the Mining Institute in Madrid; the eldest one, who was to become the national hero, was despatched to the Karaouine at Fez where he studied law. On his return home, he was employed, for a time, in teaching Spanish officials the Berber language. He used his free time to learn both Spanish and French. Strong-willed and hot-headed, he was imprisoned by the Spanish in 1921, after a quarrel with one of their officers. It was immediately after his escape from prison that he organized his military campaign.

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The factor underlying Abd el Karim's rising was native opposition to the establishment of a Spanish zone and to the regime that prevailed there after 1912. In the words of an American author, "incensed by the cruelty, corruption, injustice, and glaring inefficiency which had characterized Spanish rule along the coast", Abd el Karim rallied the Rifians in an armed rising. According to the same author, "Abd el Karim was more than justified in his revolt, for the Spaniards had been guilty in Morocco of exactly the same cruelties and excesses which had caused them to be driven out of South America".<sup>5</sup> He "succeeded in resisting all the forces that the government at Madrid could bring against him". Topography, of course, was in his favour.

By the end of 1924 the situation of the Spanish was becoming desperate, and Abd el Karim was gradually pressing on toward the border of the French zone. In the United States, in Great Britain, as, in fact, in most countries of the world, he was an admired and romantic figure, and his campaign was viewed with the utmost sympathy. This, however, did not mean that he received any help from foreign governments, even though he was given moral and financial support by individual foreigners, who enabled him to secure contraband arms.

On November 23, 1924, Lyautey telegraphed to the French government that the Spanish-controlled areas bordering the French

<sup>4</sup> Carleton S. Coon, *Caravan*, London, J. Cape, 1952.

<sup>5</sup> Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

zone had become centres of dissidence, their people "subservient and attentive to one single chief". The successes of that solitary chief were putting new heart into the yet unconquered tribes in the French zone. They also greatly impressed the more restless elements in the already subjected regions. On 11 December Lyautey despatched another telegram to Paris announcing that "a Muslim State arising out of North African nationalism, is establishing itself north of French Morocco", adding a warning that Abd el Karim was making no secret of his intention to attack the French zone.<sup>6</sup>

Even among the Rif leader's admirers many consider that the extension of the war to the French zone was a great blunder. Had he confined himself to the Spanish zone, he would presumably have broken the back of the Spaniards, and the history of Morocco might have taken an entirely different turn. But encouraged by his series of spectacular successes, and fired by patriotic ardour, he discounted the difference between Spanish and French military might, and took on an opponent that could not possibly allow him to win.

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In mid-December the Cabinet of Herriot approved Lyautey's plans for a campaign against the Rifians. More perspicacious than his critics, Lyautey recognized that what was happening in the Rif was not merely a tribal rising but the emergence of a new Moroccan State. He had no doubt that, should Abd el Karim succeed, he would proclaim himself Sultan. Anyhow, the Rifian leader considered the Sultan Moulay Youssef as little better than a puppet of the French. In the mosques of the Spanish zone, prayers were being said in the name of Abd el Karim and not of the Sultan in Fez. And, in true Moorish tradition, the Rif leader was already preparing a personal genealogy that would establish the spiritual legitimacy of his claim to the Shereefian throne.

French might was not the only threat to the success of the Rifian rising, an upheaval which would not have been characteristically Moroccan if personal jealousies within the ranks had not supervened to weaken the leader's effectiveness. The Djeballa tribes in particular—never over-friendly to the Rifians—were envious of his meteoric rise to power, and resented the strict regime that the war had forced him to impose upon them.

Lyautey was a past master in the diplomatic exploitation of tribal frictions, and lost no time in taking advantage of the situation. He used as his tool the head of the Darkaouiya brotherhood (mentioned in the previous chapter), his method of attack being the levering

<sup>6</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

away of certain hesitant tribes from their allegiance to Abd el Karim.

As Lyautey predicted, the Rifians concentrated their troops near the French border in April 1925. As recently as January they had inflicted another resounding defeat on the Spanish and the tribes fighting with them. (It was during that battle that Abd el Karim captured Raisuli, who had become chief of the Jibala. Soon afterwards the ailing brigand joined his ancestors in heaven, or in such place as had been assigned to him in the hereafter.) The Rifian troops were no longer compelled to make the best of outdated weapons or such as were smuggled in to them from outside; for they had captured a great variety of arms from the Spanish.<sup>7</sup> With the Rifians' innate gift for dealing with things mechanical, they soon learned how to make use of them. (It should perhaps be mentioned that many of the automobile mechanics, machine workers and bus drivers, not only in Morocco but throughout North Africa, are Berbers.) In the last stages of the war, the chief operator of Abd el Karim's telephone system was a boy of fourteen.<sup>8</sup>

Abd el Karim's most recent successes had brought the wavering tribes to his side; thus for once Lyautey's diplomatic campaign failed and France's ally, the Darkaoui chief, found himself utterly discredited. Abd el Karim had even succeeded in winning over the important tribe of the Beni Ouriaghel who had already been reduced to submission by Lyautey. In spite of his disappointments in the diplomatic field, Lyautey tried until the very last to avoid involving France in an armed conflict with Abd el Karim. He realized fully that it was a deep-seated national aspiration that fired the Rifians. In a despatch to Paris he reported that the Moroccans "rejoiced in the defeats suffered by the Spaniards, whom they hate atavistically".<sup>9</sup>

When the Rifian campaign began to explode along the borders of the French zone, Paris was alarmed, and Lyautey's enemies, both at the Quai d'Orsay and in the Ministry of War, accused him of a deliberate policy of refusing to aid the Spanish. He should, they said, have rallied troops to assist them as soon as he perceived their danger. The acrimonious dispute is yet another example of the traditional conflict between a commander in the field and the arm-chair strategists at home. Toward the end of 1924, Lyautey had asked Paris for reinforcements, and these had been only grudgingly

<sup>7</sup> In his book *France, Spain and the Rif*, Walter Harris mentions that when Abd el Karim's surrender came about in 1926, his men were in possession of 135 cannon, over 40,000 rifles, 240 machine guns and large quantities of bombs and ammunition. "All cannon," he states, "the machine guns, and most of the rifles and other material they had captured from the Spanish and French armies."

<sup>8</sup> Coon, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>9</sup> Catroux, op. cit., p. 168.

granted, and in numbers far below his requirements. Even if Lyautey had been able to dispose of large battalions, he could not have put them to good use without crossing into the Spanish zone—an affront to Spanish pride and a breach of diplomatic agreement.

By the middle of May 1925 the situation had become so grave that Lyautey suggested to the French government an agreement with Spain that would enable the two armies to launch a combined offensive. A French emissary was meanwhile despatched to negotiate with the Rifian leader. He returned profoundly impressed by the strength of the latter's military and political position. "Order reigned everywhere, and the emir was blindly obeyed."<sup>10</sup> For a short while Lyautey even agreed with those who advocated a peaceful settlement. This would involve persuading Spain to grant independence to the Rif under Abd el Karim's sovereignty. But soon Lyautey realized that such a step was bound to create a dangerous precedent. Even had Spain, in her hopeless position, agreed to it, France would never afterwards have felt really secure in her zone. Once the inhabitants of that zone had digested the knowledge that a European Power could be defeated by a man whose outlook and mental processes were akin to their own, there was little chance of bringing the still dissident tribes under Protectorate control.

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Meanwhile Herriot's government had fallen, to be replaced by that of Paul Painlevé, the distinguished mathematician who also became Minister of War. Soon after his accession to power, Painlevé came in person to Morocco to see things for himself and to establish contact with Lyautey. After his return to Paris he was subjected to a psychological bombardment from the Marshal's opponents. There followed a series of backstage intrigues, decisions and counter-decisions, the main tenor of which was that in his office of Commander-in-Chief, Lyautey, the Resident General, should be replaced. Lyautey himself realized that it was difficult for him to be both head of the administration and chief commander in the field. Urging the authorities in Paris to dispatch a general to act under him as chief military commander, he suggested Weygand, or, failing him, Gouraud or Guillaumat. All his requests were refused on one pretext or another. In July he received the surprising tidings that Marshal Pétain was to come to Morocco. Pétain, the "Victor of Verdun" and one of France's military heroes, was Inspector General of the French armies. His rôle in Morocco was to draw up

<sup>10</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

strategic plans and to co-ordinate his own and Lyautey's projects for defeating the Rifians.<sup>11</sup>

With Pétain's arrival in Morocco on 17 July, the two most distinguished Marshals of France, together with the Spanish Marshal Primo de Rivera, were on Moorish soil to pool their talents and work out a strategy that would bring one Rifian chieftain to his knees.

Lyautey, soldier and gentleman, was not likely to show any resentment of the presence of an obvious competitor. With the correctness and urbanity of one Marshal co-operating with another on their country's behalf, he did Pétain the honour of trusting him unreservedly. But Pétain had no matching inclination to respect Lyautey's creative efforts, and interpreted his rôle as being that of investigator. He cross-examined the members of Lyautey's staff, evidently looking for chinks in his colleague's armour. "Olympian, icy, often ironic, immobile, marmoreal"; he is thus described by an observer at the time. Moreover, his tone was "mordant and peremptory"; and, while the members of Lyautey's staff sensed the concoction of an intrigue, Lyautey alone remained trustful till the last.<sup>12</sup>

Of course, all the spade-work, diplomatic, military and administrative, had been Lyautey's. And now that his strategy had been planned down to the last detail, he was hoping to put his design to the test of a campaign. But after Pétain's return to Paris, ever more formidable obstacles were set in his path, and on August 18 he received the following order, signed by Premier Painlevé: "Marshal Pétain will take over general command of the troops and military services in Morocco." The Premier's orders withdrew from Lyautey his prerogatives and his fundamental responsibilities as Commander in Chief.<sup>13</sup>

Not surprisingly, he translated the new order as a slight on himself, a "disgrace hardly disguised". In France, in Morocco, and by the men he had commanded, they were indeed interpreted as such. "We felt," one of his collaborators told the author, "that even an unsatisfactory housemaid would have been treated better. At least, she would be given a month's notice." Inured all his life to obedience, Lyautey at first remained at his post, acting merely as Resident General and passing over all his military powers to Pétain.

On 9 September the armies of France and Spain began their combined campaign; six days later the French opened up their

<sup>11</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-93.

<sup>12</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-7.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p. 245.

large-scale offensive, and soon it became obvious that their overwhelming preponderance in manpower and arms made Abd el Karim's collapse only a matter of time.

On 24 September Lyautey sent in his resignation.

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Three Marshals, forty generals, and almost half a million Franco-Spanish troops were required to bring the Rifian warrior to defeat.

A minor but interesting feature of the final campaign is that American air-veterans of the First World War were allowed to enlist for service with the French forces. Let an American give an account of that strange interlude. "As the laws of France do not permit the enlistment of foreigners in any branch of the army, save the Foreign Legion, the difficulty was solved by forming the American volunteers into a unit known as the Shereefian Air Guard. That these young Americans, in their thirst for excitement and adventure, should have seen fit to take service under an African ruler is surprising enough, but that they should have bombed and raked with machine-gun fire the defenceless villages of a people with whom they had no quarrel, people who were fighting for independence, is incomprehensible to those who had been the first to applaud their achievements in the air during the Great War. They claimed to be fighting for France. In effect, they were fighting to perpetuate the rule in the Rif of Spain, a country whom the preceding generation of Americans had driven from her last foothold in the New World because her tyranny and cruelty stank in the nostrils of decent men."<sup>14</sup>

"France and Spain," he continues, "by a lavish expenditure of their resources, had enveloped the Rif in a wall of steel, employing every device of scientific warfare against the embattled tribesmen. Even the Rif recognized that further resistance was futile; the tribal chieftains, either bought up by French and Spanish gold, or to save their skins, began to fall away from Abd el Karim, and before spring had turned to summer, that gallant fighter came riding astride a mule into the French lines. . . . The tyranny of Spain in the Rif had been perpetuated; and France had won what the newspapers in Paris proclaimed as *une victoire glorieuse*. But I imagine that those who viewed it, as I did, at close range and through glasses unclouded by rancour or propaganda, thought it a rather sorry triumph."<sup>15</sup>

Professor Carleton Coon, America's leading expert on the Rif, also believes that "but for the use of aircraft and tanks by his enemy

<sup>14</sup> Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, p. 370.

(Abd el Karim) might have held the French army indefinitely at bay".<sup>16</sup>

A little-known incident that occurred during the latter stage of the Rif campaign throws an interesting light on the attitude of Abd el Karim towards Great Britain. On 22 July, 1925, he approached the London *Times* correspondent, Walter Harris, with a request for the good offices of the British government. Convinced that British intervention "was the only chance for peace", and appealing to "British feelings of humanity and sense of justice", he declared that "he would accept any terms from France and Spain to which Great Britain agreed". When the British government felt compelled to refuse his request, he "was much distressed".<sup>17</sup>

Referring to Abd el Karim's historic ride<sup>18</sup> toward surrender, an eyewitness mentioned the following incident to the author. At one point the Rifian leader was passing a mountain stream in which some French soldiers were bathing. As soon as they realized the identity of the rider, they came rushing towards him. Though naked, they saluted him in correct military fashion, and expressed their great admiration for his qualities as a soldier and leader. Some even assured him of their sympathy in his defeat.

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When, on 27 May, 1926, Abd el Karim capitulated, Lyautey's Moroccan Pro-Consulate was already a thing of the past. His request for the acceptance of his resignation of 24 September 1925 was granted with suspicious celerity only two days later. His successor was to be Theodore Steeg, former Prime Minister of France, and Governor General of Algeria. The French government asked Lyautey to adhere to the usual procedure and to remain in Morocco until Steeg's arrival, so as to be able to introduce him to the Sultan and explain his future work. But Lyautey could not share his beloved Maghreb with another man for a single moment. In a laconic reply he informed the government that he found it "both materially and morally impossible" to await his successor. On 10 October, 1925 he embarked at Casablanca. According to an eyewitness, just as the ship began to move, tears were streaming down the Marshal's face.

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<sup>16</sup> Coon, op. cit., p. 317.

<sup>17</sup> Walter B. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, London, Edward Arnold, 1927, p. 313.

<sup>18</sup> The authorities do not agree as to whether he had chosen a mule or a horse for that occasion. Some speak of the former, others of the latter.



Lyautey's career is the concern of this book only in so far as it forms part of Morocco's history. Though he stayed in France until his death in 1934, Morocco remained the centre of his interests. No one was more certain to receive a warm welcome at his home than friends from the Maghreb, among them the new Sultan, Mohammed V, who visited Lyautey a few weeks before his death.

Those close to the Marshal knew only too well that he left Morocco with feelings of disillusionment amounting to bitterness. He was too big a man to resent the circumstance that final triumph—the victory over Abd el Karim—was snatched from his hands. What was far more painful was the knowledge that his own service, the Army, had borne part of the responsibility for his deprivation.

Lyautey was not alone in foreseeing that his departure from Morocco would mark the end of an era. It was clear to men of experience, in and beyond Morocco, that his fall was symptomatic, "a sign of a change in France's policy". On his arrival at Rabat, Theodore Steeg announced that he would continue the Marshal's policy; but there were few to accept his words at their face value. (The changes brought about by the new regime, and their relevance or irrelevance to Lyautey's ideas, will be discussed in the next chapter.)

In years to come, an odd situation was to develop, for while administrators, soldiers, business men and settlers were to invoke the name of Lyautey with pious fervour, and claim discipleship, most of his principles came to be honoured in the breach rather than the observance. Even while acting in flagrant disregard of the Marshal's precepts, they would pay ceremonial respects to his ashes in the modest mausoleum in Rabat. As Professor Julien was to state in 1953 at a meeting of France-Maghreb in Paris, "Lyautey has become nothing more than a flag, a symbol. For French opinion in Morocco repudiates him to-day."

Lyautey's only concern was the welfare of Morocco; self-interest of later arrivals has all but obliterated recollection of his aspirations. In fact a great deal of Morocco's recent history strikes the historian as a betrayal of Lyautey's policies and ideals. The progressive deterioration in Franco-Moroccan relations was but one affirmative of that betrayal. Lyautey himself lived long enough to witness the earlier stages of that process. "In the last years of his life, he contemplated with sorrow the weakening of the *entente* between France and Morocco."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Catroux, op. cit., p. 313.



*Part Three*

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AFTER LYAUTEY



## LYAUTEY'S SUCCESSORS

IN spite of the assurance he gave upon his arrival in Morocco, Theodore Steeg, Lyautey's successor, soon made it evident that he had a mind and plans of his own. This was natural enough, for a man whose rôle it is to lead seldom takes kindly to being a mere echo. While Lyautey always thought in "Protectorate" terms, Steeg's concepts were "colonial": that is the crucial distinction.

Lyautey had taken great care over training his team of collaborators, accepting only men who knew Morocco well, and who were willing to follow his precepts. Steeg was nurtured in the entirely different traditions of the Algerian Administration (that is, a system of direct rule where the susceptibilities of the natives could be more easily disregarded). One of his first moves was to replace the key man at the Residency, the Director of Native Affairs, by an official from Algeria, a man new to Morocco. Soon afterwards the majority of Lyautey's team were dispersed, and only a few of the new officials had had previous experience of Morocco. This, again, was bound to happen, for any incoming "boss" prefers to choose his own subordinates.

The change of personnel was not the only innovation. Lyautey's principle of solving problems through direct contacts with the people concerned was not to Steeg's taste. Rather than go out and meet the native officials, merchants and farmers, he preferred to shut himself up in his office and study files. Making exception only for the Sultan himself, he limited his human contacts to a minimum.

The Resident General's example was naturally copied by those working under him. Within a short while the links between the Residency and the Moroccan people, both official and private, became so tenuous as to be almost non-existent. There was very little interchange between the French directors of departments and the viziers. Decisions were taken within the Residency, and the Sultan heard of them only when they were placed before him in their final shape, as *dahirs*, ready for his signature and seal. "Under the juridical fiction of a protectorate, the Residency practised the methods of direct administration."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

Even at a much later date the authorities would never admit that direct administration had been introduced. Yet, as we know, even Lyautey had told his compatriots which way the wind was blowing. In 1920 he declared unequivocally: "Our régime in this country is based on the doctrine of a protectorate. We proclaim that doctrine, the government proclaims it on every occasion. But is it really anything but a fiction? We have direct administration in our blood—officials coming from France as well as those coming from Algeria. We move more and more towards direct administration."<sup>2</sup>

The consequences of this fundamental change could be foreseen. With the introduction of direct administration, the control of most spheres of Moroccan life became a monopoly of the Residency.

Senior public servants and even minor officials came flocking in from France, "forming an ever increasing burden on the budget of the Protectorate".<sup>3</sup> Lyautey, as will be remembered, strenuously discouraged an influx of unnecessary French officials. He insisted that even French technical advisers should, as soon as was feasible, make way for natives. Under the Steeg dispensation no effort was made to train natives to become experts; on the contrary, "the multiplication of French officials was pushed to the extreme".<sup>4</sup> Fourteen years had gone by since the introduction of the Protectorate, yet not a single school had been established for the training of native administrators and officials. (Another twenty-three years were to elapse before such a school was founded.) Even on the lower rungs of the ladder, where semi-trained native personnel could have done the jobs, the appointments went to Frenchmen receiving far higher salaries than natives would have been paid. Though more than ninety per cent of the revenues for the national budget were supplied by the natives, this new army of foreign officials was paid from Moroccan revenues and not by remittances from France.

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Saturated with the ideas of the "Algerian school", Steeg believed that a secure basis for foreign rule in an overseas territory could be founded only upon European colonization of the land. Lyautey, as has been emphasized more than once, had foreseen the dangers of such a policy, yet, under pressure from Paris, even he had been obliged to cede a considerable acreage to French settlers. He had, indeed, to go further than this, for as answer to attacks launched

<sup>2</sup> Circular of November 18, 1920, quoted in *Le Drame Marocain devant la conscience chrétienne*, Paris, *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, 1953, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> Catroux, op. cit., p. 287.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

against him by his opponents in France, he felt it prudent to mention the extent of his achievements in the sphere of agricultural colonization. In a speech to the Academy of Agriculture in France, he said: "Please note that during the ten years of the Protectorate . . . we have already established more than 1,000 settlers on over 400,000 hectares of land."<sup>5</sup> His statement was perhaps as much an apology as a boast. And a mere thousand settlers presented no grave problem.

Under Steeg, the number of French land-holders trebled. Unlike Lyautey, he believed in *petite colonisation*, that is, agricultural settlement by small-scale farmers, such as predominated in Algeria. Lyautey had feared that such farmers, lacking adequate capital resources and ignorant of conditions in Morocco, might become a financial burden. But there was a stronger argument against the admission of would-be farmers. Both arable land and water have always been precious in the Maghreb, and all available resources of this kind were in the ownership of native tribes. Only at their expense could French immigrants be settled on the land. So land was either expropriated from the natives<sup>6</sup> or purchased from them at prices determined by the authorities. Used to making his living from the land, but unused to handling money, many a Moorish farmer soon found himself with neither land nor money. Deprived of land by one method or another, these farmers were forced to undertake the familiar trek to the cities, chiefly Casablanca; and it was they who formed the nucleus of the latter-day Moroccan proletariat, a class previously unknown in Morocco. As Lyautey had prophesied, many of the French *petits colons* failed, and the authorities had to come to their assistance, drawing upon budgetary funds that had been provided chiefly by the native tax-payer.

#### LUCIEN SAINT

Lucien Saint, Steeg's successor, was preoccupied, during most of his time in the Maghreb, with the final stages of armed "pacification", that is, the liquidation of the last remaining area of dissidence. As he was both friend and admirer of Lyautey, there were hopes that his régime might favour a revival of the Marshal's policies, a return to the acceptance of limitations inseparable from Protectorate status. There was still a possibility of increased co-operation between French and Moroccans, of checking the influence of a powerful French colony battenning on the natives. But the hope was illusory. Only the District Officers, forced by their duties and

<sup>5</sup> Lyautey, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

<sup>6</sup> Two decrees, one of 1914 and the second of 1927, gave the authorities the right to expropriate land held by the natives.

their mode of living to work closely with and consult the natives, maintained personal and day-to-day contacts. Lucien Saint's good intentions came to little, for the military campaign made heavy demands on him, and "prevented him from reintroducing the policies laid down by Lyautey".<sup>7</sup> Yet he was conscious of the unsatisfactory state of affairs, and ventilated his complaints in 1933, when he was on the point of leaving Morocco to make room for his successor, Henri Ponsot, a career diplomat.

Lucien Saint's years in the Maghreb might be described as an era of unfulfilled good intentions and missed opportunities. For it was in his time that the first important clash between the Moroccans and the French occurred, and that nationalism emerged as a fully fledged movement. Submitting to the counsel of advisers of doubtful value, he made himself responsible for the introduction of the famous Berber Dahir, the starting point of so many unfortunate developments. (The matter of the Berber Dahir will be dealt with in detail in the chapter so named.)

#### HENRI PONSOT

Henri Ponsot, France's future Ambassador to Hitler, and High Commissioner in Federal Germany in the fifties, was a man of great intelligence and diplomatic skill far above the average. Something of a courtier, he was reputed to be at his best in negotiations demanding a penetrating intellect matched by suavity of manner. His diplomatic training had equipped him less amply for taking important decisions on his own authority. The Moroccan situation did not call for an over-subtle diplomacy. The Resident General should be a forceful man, able to impose his views on the French settlers in Morocco and to gain the full support of the government in Paris. The settlers were, by now, a tenacious and well-organized separate interest; their demands were energetically formulated; and the Residency was in danger of becoming their tool rather than the executive instrument of policies laid down by the French government.

The task that awaited Henri Ponsot demanded, first and foremost, strength of character and a will inflexible enough to resist power groups. On the one hand, the new Resident would have to deal drastically with the runaway policy of colonialism as introduced by Steeg (and more or less passively confirmed by Saint), and, on the other, with the emergence of native nationalism. Less than a year after his arrival, Henri Ponsot was confronted with the first clearly formulated demands of the nationalists. Without taking these demands tragically—with his accustomed wit, he described them as

<sup>7</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 291.



"worthy of a thesis for a doctorate in law"—he did not dismiss the document as either completely unjustified or irresponsible, a device much favoured by his successors when faced with similar demands. He expressed his own views on the Moroccan problem in a speech delivered in 1934 at a dinner given in his honour by the Cercle Interallié, in Paris. Marshal Lyautey proposed a toast to Ponsot. In the course of his speech the latter said, "We must offer the Moroccans what is their right. Their confidence in France must be restored." The admission that confidence had been lost came as a surprise to many of his listeners, though not to Lyautey.<sup>8</sup>

Henri Ponsot was to fail in his task of restoring confidence because of his inability to solve the problem of the further entrenchment of "direct administration". Appalled by the increase of French officials—sixty-five per cent of the entire budget had to be earmarked for them—he tried to cut down their numbers and reduce their sometimes extravagant salaries. His resolve showed courage, for the officials had meanwhile become a political bloc, closely related to, and often dominated by, the colonialists and their various lobbies.

Lyautey had succeeded in keeping the Administration detached from politics. Since the arrival of Theodore Steeg, the French personnel had become *une partie politisée*. The same party conflicts that divided people in France were duplicated in the French people settled in the Maghreb. Most of them, especially in the Administration, made common cause with such home parties as had become the spokesmen of the colonialists. Thus they could count on the settlers' support whenever they disagreed with the plans of the Resident General. Henri Ponsot tried to bring his plans to fruition in spite of the opposition, but, like most of his successors, he found that the alliance of officials, *colons* and their supporters in France was too strong for any single man to defeat. In 1936 he was recalled, to become French Ambassador to Turkey. The reforms he had tried to introduce remained on paper, and the problems he had hoped to solve were still fermenting when he left. The Franco-Moroccan *entente* was still only a dream or, in some minds, a fading memory.

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Even if there were no other evidence of malaise, the frequency with which Residents General succeeded one another showed a disconcerting lack of a clearly defined Moroccan policy as governments came and went in France. Lyautey had remained at the helm for thirteen years; during the next eleven years three Residents were

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, p. 299.

sent out to Rabat, and in the course of the single year 1936, Morocco was to have three different "protectors": Henri Ponsot, Marcel Peyrouton, and General Noguès. The unsettling storms disturbing the political life of France were not sparing the Moroccan Protectorate, where there was urgent need of the bracing winds of vigorous and inspired activity. But this kind of refreshment failed to materialize, and the Maghreb stagnated in the same stale air of parliamentary strife and indecision that was breathed in Paris.

The message that these tired winds carried was not lost on the Moroccans. They realized that instability at the Quai d'Orsay was bound to increase indifference to Moroccan dissatisfaction. Even the provision of a less transitory Resident seemed far too much to hope for, yet the perpetual changes of Resident had the effect of placing more and more power in the hands of the civil servants and their colonialist supporters. Residents without clearly defined policies came and went, but the local staffs remained, entrenching themselves ever more firmly in their positions, and, in the absence of positive directives from above, putting into effect their own pet policies. The Franco-Moroccan *entente* was not allowed to develop, and the Protectorate conception was dying of inanition.

#### GENERAL NOGUÈS

Marcel Peyrouton's reign in Rabat was too brief to make a mark in history. His name achieved a greater prominence in Morocco after the Second World War, when he reappeared as one of the press-lords ready to fight the journalistic battles of the colonialists.

General Noguès arrived in September 1936. He was a former Lyautey officer, and was well acquainted with the problems of Morocco. He had, in fact, also served under Lucien Saint, as Director of Political Affairs. The young Sultan Mohammed V, who had come to the throne in 1927, had complete confidence in him, and something like a genuine friendship developed between the young monarch and the Resident General. In his relations with the Sultan, General Noguès tried to adopt some of Lyautey's discarded policies. But he was first and foremost a professional soldier, and did not possess Lyautey's profound human understanding and diplomatic skill. As a soldier, he was convinced that force was the language the natives understood best, and that discussions of possible reforms would be interpreted by them as a desire to conciliate a formidable antagonist.

Almost from the moment of his arrival the well-intentioned general had to pay for the errors committed by his various predecessors. Nationalism was gaining in strength and assertiveness, and, for the first time, was adopting its militant approach. In

October 1936, in a number of public mass meetings, the nationalists demanded restitution of the freedom of the press, of freedom of assembly, and other liberal rights. The reply of General Noguès was to imprison most of their leaders. By the middle of December, he had changed his tactics and made "concessions". He released some of the prisoners, and on December 24 published a decree permitting the establishment of trade unions. But, as if to underline the inconsistency of his policy, he restricted trade unions to Europeans, who formed less than two per cent of the total population. A few weeks later, on January 19, 1937, he authorized the publication of three Moroccan dailies—*L'Atlas*, *El Maghreb* and *El Amal*—and of the weekly *El Ouidad*. At the same time he curbed the freedom of these papers by empowering French heads of departments to act as censors.

Discouraged by an intermittent policy offering now gilded gingerbread and now dry bread, the nationalists were coming to realize the fruitlessness of docility, and on March 18, 1937, Noguès proscribed the nationalist party, which had become more combative than it had ever been. The main result of that measure was to make the party clandestine, and to win for it new adherents. Moreover, to get oneself arrested and imprisoned, in other words, to become a "martyr", had become almost a point of honour with the nationalists. Thus the removal from active life of one "agitator" meant as often as not the recruitment of new members, and enhanced prestige for the prisoner.

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In August 1937, at the height of the torrid season, the unfortunate general had to face one of his most exacting trials. In a healthier political climate, the event would probably have remained a minor incident of purely local interest. But, as the natives were seeing sinister motives behind most actions of the Administration, the storm in a tea cup turned into an important and blood-stained landmark in the history of the Protectorate.

French officials, acceding to the demands of four French settlers farming land in the Meknes area, gave orders that some of the waters of the river Bou Fekrane, that fed both Meknes and the surrounding district, should be diverted to their farms. Undoubtedly "assisted" by nationalist propaganda, native resentment ran high, and the Moorish farmers came to believe that the French had decided to "dry them out", and that native agriculture in the area was doomed to extinction while the foreign farms would be lush and green. A flood of petitions poured into Rabat. After much

procrastination, the authorities proposed a plan that, in the end, would have increased the water supply for Moorish farmers. But too much time had elapsed and tempers had been tried too long. On September 1 some five hundred farmers staged a demonstration outside the French administrative offices, shouting "Not a drop of water for the French!" and "Water or death!"<sup>9</sup> All local shops closed, and, after the demonstrations, the crowds went to pray in the mosques.

On the following day, the authorities decided to retrieve their prestige by arresting the "five ringleaders". These were brought to trial forthwith, and condemned to three months' imprisonment. The crowd waiting outside tried to storm the court building. When the French police attempted to intervene, they were heavily stoned, and retaliated by firing into the crowd. There were many killed and wounded. More arrests of natives and further demonstrations followed. Finally, General Noguès had to appear in person on the scene of trouble, so as to quell a movement that threatened to spread over the entire country. He gave definite assurances about the water supplies, but refrained from "taking disciplinary action against any of the officials, even though the origins of the drama were due to an error on the part of the Administration".<sup>10</sup>

The general's apparent failure to punish the true instigators of these events reinforced suspicions that the Administration's aim was to oppress the native population. So even after settlement of the local trouble, protest meetings were staged all over the country, and the prisons received batch after batch of demonstrators. The most redoubtable nationalist leader, Allal el Fassi, was arrested and sent by Noguès into exile. Only at the end of the year was order restored.<sup>11</sup> But order in a police sense was one thing, and a climate favourable for Franco-Moroccan co-operation another. Peace on the surface merely meant that the forces of opposition had been driven underground.

#### CONCLUSION

Lyautéy's structure was too solid to be destroyed in a year or two, but every departure from Protectorate entitlement undermined its foundations a little. In some departments his successors dealt worthily enough with the fabric. For instance, they continued his work of pacification and unification, and both were achievements of the most far-reaching significance. Under purely native rule, pacification of the entire country had never been accomplished.

<sup>9</sup> L. Voinot, *Chronique Marocaine*, in *Questions Africaines*, January 15, 1928. p. 50.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>11</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

Nationalists are apt to forget that this work of breaking down dissidence cost many French lives, and that the soil of the Maghreb is drenched with French blood. It would have redounded to the credit of the nationalists if they had acknowledged the extent of these sacrifices.

They might also have recognized that without foreign assistance, their country would have found it difficult to build up a modern administration and a modern economic system, or to provide all the techniques and expert knowledge without which Morocco could hardly have enjoyed its rapid transformation from an essentially medieval into a comparatively modern state. All the Residents General, whatever their motives or their failings, have furthered this colossal work of modernization.

Where Lyautey's successors appear to have failed was in their stubborn refusal to acknowledge that however important economic and allied problems might be, these cannot be solved satisfactorily if spiritual and human elements are disregarded. They insisted upon treating Morocco as a predominantly economic entity, and forgot that more than ninety per cent of the population of Morocco ordered their entire lives in accordance with certain spiritual concepts, and cherished certain ideas and ambitions that could not be written off.

Lyautey never forgot these all-important imponderabilia. But "After his departure his conceptions and methods were little by little given up; his counsels were forgotten. The edifice that he had founded was strengthened in a material sense but it was disregarded in a spiritual sense. There was more concern for goods and riches than for human beings. Morocco continued to take shape . . . but without the participation of the Moroccans. France failed to grasp the opportunity for calming the discontent or for returning to the Protectorate régime that Lyautey had conceived and so beneficially applied. . . . Had the French done so, perhaps France might have saved herself the vicissitudes that were to follow."<sup>12</sup>

Even a Lyautey might not have been able to prevent the birth, and halt the advance, of Moroccan nationalism. But there can be no doubt that he would have faced it squarely. His successors tried to disregard and minimize it, and finally to crush it. Herein lies the mainspring of most of the griefs and disasters that have marked recent Moroccan history. Nationalism could not possibly have failed to come into question as the present century wore on. It was inevitable and to oppose it was not to solve the problems it raised, but to inspire its adherents to still more passionate loyalty to their cause.

<sup>12</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

## THE BERBER DAHIR

NATIONAL destinies, like those of individuals, seem often to conform, as we review them, to a specific pattern. The wise statesman will take care not to do violence to that pattern, but rather to shape his policies to harmonize with what has gone before and what must almost inevitably come after. However confused the pattern of Moroccan history might be, one element in it was always clearly visible and shaped events throughout its history: it was the religious dynamism that instigated most revolts and occasioned most reforms. A sultan, a vizier, a pasha might with impunity violate almost any sensibility of the people; but he must not offend against their religious susceptibilities, unless, in so doing, he could convince them that desperate situations were exacting desperate remedies.

Had the French statesmen whose ideas ousted Lyautey's single-minded policies comprehended Morocco's pattern, they would probably have hesitated before introducing a "reform" which, while in appearance administrative, and in its true purpose political, must in the circumstances have religious implications. But if any doubt assailed them, it was soon dismissed, and a decree was issued that set in motion a series of events whose full course had not been run even by the mid-fifties.

This decree was the Berber Dahir. On the face of it this was a purely judicial-administrative measure. Its avowed aim was to introduce order into the complex machinery of tribal law. This was to be done by secularizing the law and by placing it in the hands of the *djemaas* rather than those of the pashas and caids who had until then administered it in the name of the Sultan.

Whatever the officially declared purpose of the new measure, it was held by the Moroccans to be just another step towards implementing the so-called "Berber policy". As General Catroux puts it, "It seems that Lucien Saint [the Resident General] went beyond the advice of his real political counsellors trained in Lyautey's school, and listened instead to that of a legal adviser who had become the convinced and chimerical champion of a certain policy sponsored by the so-called 'Berber bloc'." The object of that policy was to set

the mass of Berber tribes against the Sultan and the Makhzen, so as to neutralize them. "It was effected by giving every encouragement to the Berbers' tendency to rotate only within their own closed circle."<sup>1</sup>

The Berber Dahir was but the first published announcement of that policy, but others were to come. Before long, special Berber schools were established, a sure means of propagating Berber exclusiveness. "It is dangerous to allow the formation of a united phalanx of Moroccans having one language. We must utilize to our advantage the old dictum 'divide and rule'. The presence of the Berber race is a useful instrument for counteracting the Arab race; we may even use it against the Makhzen itself." (M. R. Gaudefroy-Demombynes.) "These Berber schools should be organisms of French policy and instruments of propaganda rather than pedagogical centres properly so-called. . . . That is why the teachers have been invited to consider themselves agents and collaborators of the commandants." (Colonel Marty, in *Le Maroc de demain*. Both quoted in *The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa*, by Allal el Fassi, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington D.C., 1954, p. 119.) The nationalists later interpreted this move as proof of French determination to persuade the world that the descent of Berber tribes on the capital during the crisis of 1951, and, finally, the deposition of the Sultan in 1953, were both unsponsored manifestations of Berber opposition to the Arabs.

It must be assumed that Lucien Saint and his advisers were not fully aware of all implications of what they were doing, or of what the repercussion of their measure might be. It is far easier for us to be wise after the events. The Resident obviously hoped to disarm criticism by adding to his own decisions the weight of Shereefian authority. For naturally there could be no Berber decree so long as the Sultan had not signed it and sealed it with his imperial seal. At the time, Sultan Mohammed V was seventeen years old, and had been on the throne less than thirty months. His father Moulay Youssef, practically the whole of whose reign had fallen within the Lyautey era, had taught his son to regard the Resident General as his and his country's most trustworthy counsellor. Accordingly, the young man believed that he was signing a document not only innocuous but positively beneficial.

"Now it may be that Lucien Saint had been persuaded that the seal of the Sultan, *guardian of the faith*, placed at the foot of the dahir, would guarantee its orthodoxy and legitimize the French initiative."<sup>2</sup> He was, of course, entitled to think so. Maybe the

<sup>1</sup> Catroux, op. cit., p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 293.

real villains of this first act were the shadowy but powerful advisers of the Resident.

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The problem of jurisdiction in Muslim countries has never been simple, and its reform was essential. The *sharia*, or Islamic law, is based on the Kuran, the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet's actions and sayings), and the interpretation of these two by the four acknowledged Islamic schools of law. The *sharia* governed every department of a Muslim's life, for as it derived from the Kuran—regarded by Muslims as representing God's direct word—it possessed truly supernatural sanction. Often the *sharia* would be supplemented by what was called "customary law", evolved from *ijma*, or the consensus of opinion of the Islamic community. But such Berber law could not contradict the *sharia*, and had to conform to its spirit. Hence it was secondary.

Now by the twentieth century this body of laws was seriously outdated in various respects. Many Muslims realized that their ancient beliefs had to be brought more into line with modern thought. But being imposed on the natives from outside by "infidels", the Berber Dahir was, to put it mildly, a blunder on the part of the authorities. "Lyautey would never have let himself be pushed into such an adventure. He would have foreseen the moral harm that France would suffer from this action."<sup>3</sup>

In a number of Berber districts tribal laws had been in force for a long time. In 1915 the French had introduced judicial *djemaas*, but these did not rank as legal tribunals. They were merely courts of arbitration, and the tribal law would be applied side by side with the *sharia*. Moreover, tribal laws were used in the casual way established by custom, just as were certain ancient magical practices, such as maraboutism or the veneration of rocks and springs. Together with the exercise of tribal law, these practices had become part of native observance, although some were a little shamefaced about it. These laws and rituals, it must be stressed, enjoyed no religious sanction. And they did nothing to invalidate the far more binding *sharia*. It is one thing to condone what the law does not sanction—e.g. adultery and drunkenness—but quite another to declare that such misdeeds, though not illegal, must incur certain penalties because custom says so. The *djemaas*, which "never had the prerogative of acting as judges",<sup>4</sup> were to some extent a protec-

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 293.

<sup>4</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 146.



tion against victimization. The Berber Dahir enlarged their powers enormously by "transforming them into a real jurisdiction".<sup>5</sup>

By imposing the Dahir upon a large section of the native population, the authorities gave official sanction to something that was regarded as a source of weakness rather than of strength in national life. The impression was created that the purpose of the imposition of the Dahir was to weaken the nation by driving a wedge between its two main components. Furthermore, the Dahir "took away part of the Sultan's prerogatives from him".<sup>6</sup> This was bound to occur ultimately, if the sultanate was to approximate to a monarchy within a democracy. But the means employed, in this instance, were too cavalier.

From the minutes of one of the meetings held by the French experts entrusted with drafting the Berber Dahir we know that the purpose was not solely, as was officially stated, to show respect for Berber tribal tradition. For we read therein, "There is no objection to breaking up the uniformity of the judicial organization of the French zone, when it is a question of strengthening the Berber faction, in view of the part which it may be called upon to play as a counterpoise. On the contrary, there is even an unquestionable advantage from the political point of view, in causing a split."<sup>7</sup> Not surprisingly, the Moroccan people, both Arab and Berber, interpreted the introduction of the Dahir as French "interference with dictates of Islam, and as French determination to divide the Muslims and to separate the Moroccans of Berber blood from those of Arab race".<sup>8</sup>

The Berber Dahir recognized the judicial competence of the *djemaas*, and established tribunals for dealing, according to local custom, with all civil cases without exception. Now from time immemorial such cases had been governed by the religious law, in so far as this was a uniform system.

Equally far-reaching was the substitution of French criminal law for the Shereefian law where criminal and not civil cases were concerned. Formerly, Berbers involved in such a case appeared before a court presided over by a pasha or caid, sitting "in the name of the Sultan". The Dahir removed these juridical powers from the sovereign and his legal representatives. These powers had always constituted, for good or ill, one of his "essential prerogatives". In the words of Prof. Julien, the French measure was "more even than a legal abuse, it was a political error".<sup>9</sup> It put an utterly

<sup>5</sup> A. de Laubadère, *Reforme judiciaire*, 1948, p. 456.

<sup>6</sup> André Adam, in *Ecrits de Paris*, June 1953.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in a letter to the *New York Times*, 13 August, 1953.

<sup>8</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

<sup>9</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 146.

unexpected weapon into the hands of the nationalists. "They engaged in a campaign directed against a measure that removed the faithful from God's justice. Thus they appeared as the champions of Islam, even to those older people in whose eyes they had been suspect on account of their Western education."<sup>10</sup> One might even say, "especially" to those older people, for the educated nationalists were aware of Morocco's need for a modern legislature.

The nationalists chose to disregard the fact that a certain Berber minority welcomed the new measure. It included those uncompromising particularists who had formed the hard core of the *bled es siba*, and who had always been opposed to the authority of the Makhzen. But the French themselves acknowledged that this type of dissidence, part feudal, part tribal, was a danger to unity and progress. "It helped to retard political unification . . . and, hence, the reforms aiming at centralization."<sup>11</sup> Thus, from the point of view of the country's general well-being, that minority might well have been disregarded.

As it happened, in the spring of 1930 Morocco saw an unexpected revival of Catholic missionary activities. This gave the nationalists an easy excuse for representing the Berber Dahir as the latest measure in France's fight against Islam.

The alarm occasioned by the Dahir and a clever nationalist campaign filled the mosques with apprehensive crowds which, after the ritual prayer, heard a special invocation "For the time of peril". It ended with the words, "O merciful Lord, save us from Destiny's evil ways, and do not separate us from our Berber brethren". In Fez the crowd made a pilgrimage to the shrine of Moulay Idris, founder and patron-saint of the city, invoking his help and protection.

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Protests against the Dahir resounded far beyond the confines of the Maghreb. Suddenly the entire Islamic world became aware of the existence of a Moroccan "problem". From Tunis to Cairo and Baghdad angry voices were raised. Sheikh Shekib Arslan, the Syrian publicist whom the Arab world acknowledged as one of its spiritual "directors", advised his fellow-Muslims "to busy themselves no longer with protestations to their own newspapers and governments, but to protest to the League of Nations, to the great Powers, and to the French Government, its Senate and Parliament", and to "stop all sales to, and purchases from, France", since such a boycott "is

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>11</sup> *News from France*, publ. by the French Embassy, New York, December 1951.

one of the weapons the Europeans, who adore money more than God, fear most".<sup>12</sup>

In the time-honoured fashion of the Middle East, reports of Moroccan events were greatly exaggerated, and the affair of the Dahir was blown up to monumental proportions. Emotions conquered sober thought and the cry arose: "France, the eldest daughter of the Church, is trying to force seven million Muslims to adopt the Catholic religion!"

Shekib Arslan's advice was followed, at least in part. Committees for the defence of the Muslims of Morocco were established in Cairo, in Berlin, even in distant Java. National and international organizations were flooded with protests and petitions. In France, some newspapers of the Left protested against the Dahir, but the majority of the press dismissed the disturbances in Morocco as the work of "a small clique of gangsters with doubtful primary school certificates, who try to pretend that they are Gandhis and Zaghlouls".<sup>13</sup>

The police on the spot had no difficulty in keeping the popular outbreaks in check, and the French authorities dismissed them as the "hooliganism of irresponsible elements". But this was an underestimation, for the reaction to the Berber Dahir was effective in strengthening the arm of the nationalists and in focusing attention on Morocco. Until that moment, nationalism had indeed been the minority movement of a few intellectuals, students and a sprinkling of urban merchants, mainly in Fez, Meknes and Casablanca. The masses, practically unaware of its existence, had contributed next to nothing. The more responsible religious elements could not but view it with grave suspicion; but the Dahir, directed as it was against a religious principle, automatically made allies of the nationalists and the rigidly religious, and attracted the sympathies of the masses. Thus the nationalist claim that their movement came fully to life as a result of the Berber Dahir is essentially true. France has indeed "played a fundamental rôle in the birth of Moroccan nationalism".<sup>14</sup>

Repercussions of the Dahir were felt far beyond Morocco, and this fact was brought home to the author at the United Nations Assembly in New York in 1952 and 1953, when delegations from Middle Eastern countries voiced their governments' support of the Moroccan cause. On both occasions, some of the leading Muslim delegates assured him that they became aware of the existence of a Moroccan problem for the first time in 1930. Until that moment

<sup>12</sup> *Al Fath*, Cairo, November, 1930.

<sup>13</sup> *L'Afrique Française*, the newspaper of the North African Lobby and the settlers from France. Zaghloul, the founder of the Wafd party, was the leading nationalist of Egypt.

<sup>14</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 145.

they had believed that their Moroccan brothers had nothing to complain of. It was the Berber Dahir that had awakened suspicion and commanded interest. The reason is, of course, that the Moroccans had on this occasion felt themselves attacked as Muslims, and Muslim solidarity demanded redress. That solidarity grew even more closely knit during the years that followed until in the early fifties its defenders called attention to it in the counsels of the United Nations.

## NATIONALISM

MOROCCAN nationalism came to birth under the boughs of a mulberry tree in the evening of the first of August, 1926. Theodore Steeg was Resident General, and the country still resounded with the echoes of Abd el Karim's war.

The dozen or so young men who gathered together in a private garden in Rabat were speaking of their country's loss of independence and of the days of freedom that had preceded that event. Morocco's vicissitudes during the years of their own childhood could hardly have proved inspiring to young patriots. But there had been other, longer periods in Moorish history that were well worth dwelling on—periods when their kings were really independent, and when the rest of the world respected and even feared their country.

On this August evening, discussion turned to those Arab nations that had but recently gained their independence; and, in the heat of their enthusiasm, the young men saw the independence of Morocco awaiting fulfilment almost at once. The host alone was not carried away by the wave of easy patriotism that was engulfing his friends. His name was Ahmed Balafrej; his background was middle-class. Having lost both his parents in early childhood, he was being brought up by a maternal uncle, and it was in the latter's garden that the meeting was taking place.

Many speeches were delivered, some less wise than others, but all informed with the same ardour. The last to take the "floor" was the host. Even at the early age of eighteen he had an authoritative bearing that compelled respect. Some of his friends might undertake to change overnight the very course of the stars; but he never for a moment lost sight of the possibilities and limitations of any given situation.

In a country in which learning commands great respect, his scholastic record alone assured him renown among a wide circle. He had received his primary education in a traditional Kuranic school; but his intellectual gifts enabled him to obtain the much-coveted admission into the French Lycée Gouraud at Rabat, from which he graduated with the highest honours. In the years to come

he was to study at the Fuad University in Cairo under such famous Arab teachers at Taha Hussein and Mustafa Abdelrazek; and in Paris, where he studied at the Faculté des Lettres et de Droit at the Sorbonne, from which he obtained the *diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures*. When still no more than eighteen, he felt at home with the poets and philosophers of France, the writers of classical antiquity, and Western culture generally. Self-effacing by nature, endowed with a clear and judicial mind, he was not given to oratory, and would compress into a few words ideas on which others expended as many sentences.

Yet when, on this occasion, Ahmed Balafrej reached the end of his speech, for a brief moment he let his words escape from their usual sober restraint. "Without freedom and independence," he concluded, "the darkness of a grave is more comforting to one's spirit than the light of the sun."<sup>1</sup>

The outcome of this gathering was the founding of a society. Its official name was to be "Supporters of Truth", a name that even a chief of police could find no quarrel with. The society's secret designation, to be known only to its founder members, was "The Moroccan League". Though most of those present were in their twenties, and one was even thirty-six, the youngest of them, their host, was unanimously elected president of the new movement.

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By the twenties of this century Rabat, chosen by Lyautey as Morocco's new capital, was the seat of the French Administration and of most French cultural activities. Casablanca was still awaiting its meteoric rise, and Rabat was the most advanced city within the Shereefian Empire. It seemed quite appropriate that most of the founders of the Moroccan League should have had a modern education, and should think in terms of twentieth-century political ideas. But, as events were to prove, they were not the only begetters of the new nationalism.

In the same summer, another group of young Moors had met to discuss the future of their country. Their meeting took place in the country's old capital, Fez, a city more mysterious than Peking. Tightly packed with ancient mosques and palaces, with the grey-white, cube-like houses of merchants, officials and scholars, Fez turned its gaze towards the past of the Almohades and Merinides rather than towards the blessings that modern civilization might

<sup>1</sup> The early parts of this chapter are based on material provided by the main protagonists in the described events. Additional material can be found in *Our Morocco*, by Mahdi A. Bennouna, printed in Morocco, November 1951.

have to offer. Yet politically it was extraordinarily awake and aware.

The place in which the young men came together was one of the old medersas. Some of its woodwork and plaster was crumbling but the fountain for ablutions in the courtyard was of exquisite proportions, and its carved doors, arabesque-covered ceilings and mosaics still proclaimed the Merinide builders' love of beauty. The medersa served as a dormitory for the students of the Karaouine University (see page 47). The whitewashed room, with its bare mattresses and straw mats on the floor for beds, its hooks in the walls to serve as clothes hangers, was more primitive than an anchorite's dwelling. Dampness rose from the ground in both summer and winter, and even in daytime little enough light filtered through the narrow window.

The Fez meeting, too, had been summoned for the late evening, and once again it was a young man of eighteen who was the leading spirit. With his reddish hair and white complexion, he might have been a North-European rather than a Moor. This impression was enhanced by his sapphire blue eyes. Allal el Fassi was his name, and he came from a distinguished family of Fez. Besides being a brilliant student, he was also a poet, and an effective orator.

The meeting's purpose was to devise means for countering the allegedly subversive doctrines of one of the Karaouine professors, Abd el Hay Kittani. All passionately devoted to learning, the young men acknowledged the professor's erudition as being second to none, but they believed that this counted for little when set against his grave defects. They accused him first of being party to the degradation of Islam through lending his support to superstition and obscurantism, and second, of active assistance given to the French police. "But before reforming others," their fiery young leader told them, "we must reform ourselves. Our belief in God is not so strong as it should be," he concluded. "If we cleanse our spirits, if we propagate the true faith of Islam, we can lead this country to a brilliant future. Let us liberate our souls in order to liberate our bodies."

Here was the true voice of a Jamal el Din Afghani, a Mohammed Abdou,<sup>2</sup> the voice of the Muslim reformer who believed that no physical regeneration was possible unless preceded by a rebirth of the spirit. The young man's voice was typically the voice of a *Moroccan* reformer who, however unconsciously, becomes the spokesman of inherited Sufi doctrines with their tenet of salvation through the spirit.

<sup>2</sup> Leading Muslim thinkers and religious and social reformers of the nineteenth century.

The meeting resolved to found a secret movement. Its aim was to help Morocco by preaching Islam in all its purity, and fighting any transgression against its original precepts. One of its principal targets would obviously be the brotherhoods that in recent years had brought such discredit on Islam in Morocco. Within a relatively short time the newly founded "Students' Union" was establishing local groups in various towns.



By April 1927 the founders of the Rabat movement and the Fez founders had heard of one another's programmes. When, as was inevitable, they met, they decided to merge their parties into the Moroccan League, the ancestor of Moroccan nationalism, and more especially of the Istiqlal party. From the late twenties onward it was the spirit of its founders that determined the character of Moorish nationalism. While the same passion for reform and progress had animated both Balafrej and Fassi, the intellectual garments in which they clothed their aspirations differed. Balafrej and his friends infused into the movement its progressive and democratic character; thanks to the group in Fez it was never divorced from the spiritual tenets of Islam. There seemed nothing accidental in this "dual" character—if such it can be called—of the movement. Without either its progressive or its spiritual tendency it would hardly have been likely to survive. In fact its dual character was very much in keeping with the tendencies that animated most modern reform movements in the world of Islam.

Within the first few years of its existence the party, while still limited in numbers, had nevertheless become nation-wide, with branches in most towns and even in some country districts. But before the founders were able to formulate a clear programme of action, they had to consider and digest innumerable religious and secular factors inherent in the life and history of their country.

Looking back upon the birth of Moroccan nationalism from the perspective of several decades, it becomes clear that the event was precipitated by the Rif war which ended only in 1926. Abd el Karim's fight against enormous odds had fired the imagination of Moorish patriots. In spite of its ultimate failure, his campaign came to represent, for his fellow-countrymen, far more than a military rising. It symbolized the protest of Islam against Western materialism. The Rif leader himself has not merely had these fundamental motives imputed to him by others. To him they were real enough; for when he was finally forced into submission, "he denounced with vehemence the *horrible civilization of iron* of the



West that made of him a barbarian simply because he was weak and badly armed".<sup>3</sup> For many years the Muslim peoples had been belittled and despised by the Western world; their voice no longer counted in international councils. Abd el Karim had raised that voice again, and he had compelled the world to listen to it. In the eyes of the Moroccans he was champion of both Islam and national independence, the two ideals nearest to their hearts. To the young nationalists it was obvious that the health of one set of ideas was dependent on the soundness of the other.

In building up their programme, the nationalists had to consider other than purely Moroccan factors. From his Swiss retreat, Shekib Arslan, the Syrian political theorist, directed and inspired the thoughts of youth throughout the Arab world, giving precise instructions on their plans of action, and providing them with the ideology of a new Arab nationalism. The young Moroccans were fully aware of the fact that they were not building in isolation, and, whenever possible, tried to cultivate relations with the rest of the Arab world, and to learn from their brothers engaged in the struggle elsewhere.

By 1932 the movement had found sufficient numbers of supporters in France to be able to publish there a French review, *Maghreb*, edited by Ahmed Balafrej. It was mainly the Left wing in France that sympathized with the young Moorish patriots. In consequence, these added to their storehouse of political concepts the newer notions of trade unionism and socialism. However, as we know already, the decisive event in the evolution of Moroccan nationalism had taken place in 1930 when on May 16 the French promulgated the Berber Dahir. Here it may suffice to repeat that the Dahir "offered the nationalist movement a favourable occasion to denounce French interference with Islamic affairs and French intentions to divide the Muslims".<sup>4</sup>

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The full story of Moroccan nationalism would require a volume to itself. Here, only the main outlines can be given. In spite of its trials and tribulations, the frequent imprisonment of its leaders—Allal el Fassi was exiled in October 1937 to Gabon in the heart of Africa where he was to spend nine years; Ahmed Balafrej, arrested on January 19, 1944, was kept for several years in a Corsican exile—nationalism continued to advance. In spite of the inevitable appearance of personal jealousies within the movement, and the

<sup>3</sup> Robert Montagne, *Abd el Krim*, 1951, p. 313.

<sup>4</sup> Catroux, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

establishment of splinter parties under such local leaders as Mohammed ben Hassan Ouazzani and Nakri Naciri, nationalism had come not only to stay but to develop into the decisive factor in Morocco's modern history. Perhaps its tenacity was partly attributable to the fact that throughout the long years of struggle the leaders remained the same: Fassi, Haj Omar Abdeljalil, the brothers Lyazidi, and Balafrej, as Secretary General, that is, as executive head. While the splinter parties remained of minor significance, the original party, which in December 1943 assumed the name of Istiqlal (independence), became the chief instrument of Moroccan nationalism.

The nationalists had many sympathizers in France. But both colonialists and official France were vehemently opposed to them, accusing them, one day of religious fanaticism, and the following day of anti-Islamic tendencies. They claimed that nationalism was a negligible minority movement opposed by the overwhelming majority of the population. According to them, the nationalists used methods of intimidation and violence, and thus were a danger to peace. They described the nationalist leaders as either disgruntled intellectuals or rich merchants who derived personal financial benefit from the movement. At the same time they accused those leaders of communist sympathies and collusion with the communists. They denied them any political experience, and claimed that the Istiqlal indulged only in cheap oratory but was incapable of making any constructive proposals. They attributed to the Istiqlal (somewhat naïvely) anti-French sentiments, and maintained that the Istiqlal's ultimate goal was to get rid of the French altogether.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Typical views are outlined in the following quotations:

"We [the French] are hated by a small number of intellectuals, well-to-do bourgeois brought up in the Western tradition, who are further removed from the fellahs or the elders of their own country than are most Frenchmen. . . . Some, of the communist fraternity, incite to revolt uprooted proletarians, fanatical xenophobes, and conscript manual workers. This violent minority is augmented from time to time by non-militant supporters—financial backers who are not necessarily partisans. But the overwhelming majority of Muslims, even in Casablanca, to-day take no interest in nationalist propaganda. . . . For the moment, one Moroccan in a thousand is authentically nationalist. In the name of an outworn nationalism, these would-be-modernists refuse to face the realities of their own age, and intoxicate themselves on the deadly liquors of the nineteenth century. The spirit of the new era hides from them any new fact." (Paul Creyssel, member of the Chamber of Deputies, Paris, 1932-1940; Vice President of the Federation of the French and the Friends of France, in Morocco.)

"The ultra-nationalists and their allies have imposed on the Moroccan people a régime which bears a strange resemblance to that of the Gestapo, with the evil deeds of which we are only too familiar. Owing to their cells, freedom of thought has become impossible. Watched over and denounced, the people no longer dare to give expression to their feelings for France. The ultra-nationalists and their Parisian allies have subjected Morocco to truly Hitlerian constraints. . . . We must, therefore, put public opinion on its guard against the lapses of those who believe in the exist-

Identifying itself with the above opinions, the French Administration refused to investigate the possibility of coming to terms with the nationalists. Instead, it fought a relentless war against them, intent on wiping them out altogether.<sup>6</sup> The lessons provided by Great Britain in her dealings with the Congress Party in India and the Wafd in Egypt appeared to be disregarded.<sup>7</sup> Yet every new police repression was instantly followed by a new wave of nationalist enthusiasm and an increase in party membership. Any student of nationalist movements, particularly Arab, could have foreseen this. For the party embodied not some sectarian ideology but the formulated aspirations of most politically conscious Moroccans. It was for that reason that the Sultan, Mohammed V, while officially identifying himself with no single party, was to acknowledge that the Istiqlal spoke with the true voice of the nation.

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During the early years, the demands of the nationalists were modest, and they did not ask for complete autonomy. Indeed it would have been unrealistic of them to ask for any such thing. Neither politically nor economically was the country ready for self-government. All they demanded was a strict implementation of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912, and the introduction of certain reforms that the Administration had been promising for years. Gradually, however, they came to believe that little could be achieved by piecemeal demands, and that the basic relationship between their country and France must be altered. By 1945 they decided that only complete independence would assure Morocco its rights, and enable it to develop along the democratic lines that they

ence of a ditch between Moroccans and Frenchmen, those who persevere in the error of allowing themselves to be deceived by the ultra-nationalists, those who refuse to admit that the Moroccan people are heart and soul with us." (Pierre Lyautey, President of the Association Alsace-Lorraine, in Morocco.)

Both quotations from *Ecrits de Paris*, April, 1953.

<sup>6</sup> Dealing with nationalist youth, Paul Buttin wrote: "In spite of official affirmations, our policy up to the present day has been one of neglecting and rejecting these young people. This is a grave mistake that may cause us some rude awakenings." (*Le Drame du Maroc*, p. 77.)

"In spite of its official declarations, the Administration fights and persecutes the nationalists not solely because they employ violence [1954] but because it withholds the right of existence to nationalism as such. The French have managed to convince themselves that all nationalists are 'assassins in power' and have to be combated as such. All nationalists are the victims of a common suppression." (Ignace Lepp, *Midi sonne au Maroc*, Paris, Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1954, p. 175.)

In a famous speech, General Guillaume, Resident General, threatened that he would "crush" the nationalists, and make them "eat the dust".

<sup>7</sup> "All nations seek their independence. Morocco is no exception. It wants its independence. Is it wise, does it serve our interests, to oppose ourselves to this law of history?" (Paul Buttin, op. cit., p. 156.)

considered as essential if their country was to play its rightful rôle in the modern world.<sup>8</sup>

The French were fully justified in retorting that, in the past, Moroccan governments were anything but democratic. But the early days of the Protectorate provided the ideal opportunity for France to clarify her intentions for the ensuing quarter of a century and for training the natives in democratic methods. That chance was not taken.<sup>9</sup> While the French grudgingly conceded that in Tunisia there were considerable numbers of men with the training and ability for self-government, the Moroccan nationalists were accused of being immature and of not knowing what they wanted. These accusations were reiterated right up to the mid-fifties. While there might be some truth in them, on the whole, the realism and competence of the Moroccan leaders were of no mean order, and not inferior to the attainments of their Tunisian colleagues. The Moroccan nationalists were the first to acknowledge that a few swallows do not make a summer. That is why they persistently demanded that opportunities for democratic education should be offered to their compatriots.

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A frequent charge of the French has been that the nationalists, adept as they were at maligning the French Administration, have never succeeded in producing a set of constructive proposals. This accusation is easily refuted. Even the early proposals of the nationalists, those of 1934 and 1936, submitted to both the Sultan and the French government, contained a detailed plan of reforms, covering

<sup>8</sup> Even in its earliest days, Moroccan nationalism strove towards democratic reforms. *Lisan al Maghrib* wrote: "It is therefore imperative that His Majesty should grant his people the blessings of a constitutional government, including a chamber of deputies, and the freedom to work and think for the good of the country, such as are enjoyed in the Muslim and Christian states of the modern world." Quoted by Allal el Fassi, in *The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa*, p. 89.

<sup>9</sup> "The idea of training the natives [for administrative functions] never even entered the minds of successive Residents General. It was so much simpler to surround themselves by French officials. Direct administration by French officials was entrenched already in 1930, and has not ceased gaining in strength ever since." (Ignace Lepp, *Midi sonore au Maroc*, p. 192.)

A somewhat different view is expressed by official French spokesmen: "For France, the reformation of a state could only mean the setting up of a democratic form of government, but apprenticeship in democracy required prudent adaptation in a country which was clannish and attached to religious fanaticism. The people have been led patiently toward the conception of public spirit and wider participation in communal affairs." Publ. by Service Général de l'Information, Residence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, in the *New York Times*, January 4, 1955.

every sphere of native life. It might be useful to examine some of these proposals, and assess their merit or otherwise.<sup>10</sup>

After denouncing the Administration for its "obscurantism, colonialism, racial discrimination and reaction", the plans suggested a strict application of the Protectorate terms and the abolition of all direct administration. Natives must be employed in all administrative departments; there must be equal status for Moroccan and French officials; a national council formed by both Muslims and Jews must be established; proper modern municipalities and economic chambers should be created; and the rôle of the Protectorate authorities should be limited to that foreseen in the Protectorate agreement, namely of advisers.

A demand was made for the introduction of elementary democratic freedoms—these being freedom of the press, of association, education, travel within Morocco and abroad. (These freedoms were alleged to exist in theory but not in practice.<sup>11</sup>) Another claim was for the recognition of native trade unions. In the field of education, proposals were made for a unification of instruction throughout the country, which would mean doing away with the Berber schools, founded, as has been shown already, chiefly for political reasons; building up both primary and secondary education, and establishing scholarships (for studies in France as well as in countries of the Middle East), teachers' training schools and certain technical schools, particularly agricultural. The nationalists saw the point of insisting particularly on the base of this pyramid rather than the peak.

The proposed legal reforms were to bring about a codification of the law itself and of legal procedure (something that Morocco was still awaiting in 1955). Juridical office was to be granted only on a basis of professional competition, and there was to be strict separation of administrative or executive powers on the one hand, and juridical on the other—yet another elementary measure that the country was still awaiting in the fifties.

Many Frenchmen maintained, quite rightly, that in the independent Morocco of the past, Kuranic notions of justice had often been grossly distorted by the dispensers of justice. They deemed, therefore, that if respect for the true principles of justice had been delayed

<sup>10</sup> *Le Mouvement National Marocain*, Bureau de Documentation et d'Information du Parti de l'Istiqlal, Paris, November 1946.

<sup>11</sup> "By and by, the Residency deprived the Moroccans of all the liberties that had not yet been taken away from them completely: foremost among these was the freedom of expression. Political changes which the Moroccans request, are refused them. So long as this refusal persists, all their activities will be directed towards politics, towards politics, that is, hostile to the Residency. The Administration will reply—as it has already done—by even more ruthless proscriptions and by increased police action." (Paul Buttin, *op. cit.*, p. 127.)

for a matter of centuries, the need was not as pressing as the nationalists were claiming. The reply of the nationalists was that one of the fundamental *raisons d'être* of the Protectorate was that it was in a position to modernize and improve a system generally acknowledged to be out-dated or imperfectly applied.

Agriculture is Morocco's primary source of wealth at present, whatever the future may hold. This is why the nationalists were so strenuously opposed to "official colonization", that is, expropriation of land belonging to native farmers for the benefit of French settlers brought in from outside, and to any form, however disguised, of exploitation of the native agricultural labourer by the settler. The native farmer's rights were to be protected by the abolition of the existing system of usury, of which he was the chief victim. This last demand was as much a criticism of Morocco's own past misdeeds as of its present discontents, for some of the worst offenders were Moroccans themselves, both Muslims and Jews.

Another nationalist demand concerned the protection of the labourer, especially the highly skilled craftsman in traditional native crafts, notably through abolition of certain taxes that fell heavily upon native shoulders while by-passing the foreign resident. Altogether, it may be said that "the proposals revealed an assured comprehension of the weaknesses of the Administration".<sup>12</sup>

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The further development and manifestations of the nationalist spirit will be dealt with in their proper chronological sequence. But this is perhaps the moment for a brief recapitulation.

Both the French and foreign press have often represented Moroccan nationalism as a movement either offensive to the native spirit because of its "purely secular" character, or as the embodiment of all that is worst in "Muslim fanaticism". We have already discussed this allegation that nationalism is a "misfit", but might again insist that the better-educated Moors realized the danger of attempting to wean the mass of people away from certain erroneous interpretations of Kuranic precepts, even though those might contribute to their backwardness. In certain matters religious considerations had to be given priority, for they had the sanction of centuries behind them.

Most of the nationalist leaders, progressive-minded and fervently democratic, were and are of very much the same political complexion (*mutatis mutandis*) as the British Liberal and Labour Parties. They were not inspired by Marxist ideas, and made no

<sup>12</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 154.

common cause with communism. Though the movement began as the creed of an intellectually advanced minority, in common with most political and social reform movements throughout the world, its numbers grew surprisingly quickly, and its membership was no longer confined to scholars and the comfortably off. At first, it was supported by the not very considerable intelligentsia and the middle classes, and later, by the urban proletariat and farmers as well. On the whole, men of the younger age groups predominated.

The colonialists maintained that nationalism was anti-French and that it aimed at a root-and-branch expulsion of the French from Morocco.<sup>13</sup> But, as we have seen, many of the nationalist leaders received their higher education in France; some of them had served as officers in the French army; most of them admired, and had absorbed some measure of, French culture, and felt a profound respect for French civilization. But they were determined to combat the refusal of an influential French bloc to admit that a protectorate is not a colony. In the thirties, they were prepared to grant France all the rights to which she was entitled by the Protectorate Treaty, but they claimed to be entitled to mastery in their own household.

In their impatience for recognition of their right to protest, the nationalists were apt to forget that France had restored order in Morocco and built up a governmental structure that compared favourably, for all its flaws, with the one it had replaced. It was neither completely true nor yet completely false to claim that they had been robbed of a rich and deeply appreciated inheritance. Mismanagement due to incompetence and to suspicion of the foreigner, had brought Morocco to a desperate pass. France had built on the ruins and was self-righteously exacting proprietorial rights. The crying need was for an equitable *modus vivendi*.

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One of the tasks of Moorish nationalists was to create a synthesis between the religious principles of Islam and the secular demands of modern civilization. This task was the more difficult since they realized that, in the opinion of Moroccans belonging to the older

<sup>13</sup> "It would be dishonest to describe the Moroccan nationalists as our enemies, as is being done nowadays by Frenchmen in Morocco and by the metropolitan papers that support them. . . . Without any doubt, the nationalist élite is closest to ourselves, both intellectually and morally. . . . Suspicious of both [native] youth and intellectuals, the French Administration treated the growing nationalism with a sovereign disdain. . . . Held in contempt and persecuted by the French, the nationalists became anti-French and xenophobe. Whose fault was it? Too weak to fight alone, they were bound to turn towards the Arab east." (Ignace Lepp, *Midi sonne au Maroc*, pp. 162 and 178.)

generation, "progress" could be purchased only at the cost of "secularization". So their first job was to convince their elders that "modernism" and Islam were by no means incompatible, and that "secularization" was not necessarily retrograde.

In complete agreement with the Sultan, they aimed at the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, somewhat on the British example. In this, they saw eye to eye with the founders of the small splinter parties who, on the whole, were wont to change their policies according to the prevailing wind, and who were sometimes seduced by considerations of personal prestige. In consequence, not much love was lost between these groups and the Istiqlal leaders with their clearly defined and, in many respects, uncompromising programme.

The only party that was sufficiently large and influential to be able to claim that it spoke for the nation was indeed the Istiqlal. The only other considerable party, operating in the Spanish zone, was the Islah Party (Party of Moroccan Unity) headed by Abdel Khalek Torres.

After the crisis of 1951, all these Parties formed a united front; but the leaders of the Istiqlal were chosen to represent the entire movement both inside and outside Morocco, and to negotiate with Morocco's supporters in the United Nations Assembly. As it was in Morocco, so it was in New York and in Cairo; the voice that spoke for Moorish nationalism was the voice of the Istiqlal.



*Part Four*

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THE "OTHER" MOROCCO



## THE SPANISH ZONE

SPAIN could claim that her stake in the Maghreb was planted long before France came on the scene. Some of her Moroccan Presidios—Melilla, Ceuta, Alhucemas, Peñon de Velez and the Zaffarine islands—have been in Spanish hands since the late fifteenth century. Although representing an area of not more than about a hundred square miles, with a total population of less than 200,000, they have always been a source of pride to Spain. They are not colonies, but are actually regarded as outposts of metropolitan Spain. Thus Melilla is administered by Malaga, Ceuta by Cadiz, and Peñon de Velez by Villa Sanjurjo. Their customs and laws differ from those in force in Spanish Morocco. Since all Presidios are situated on the coast, they act chiefly as transit ports for goods going to, or coming from, Spanish Morocco, a circumstance which gives them a certain perennial importance.

Ex-Spanish Morocco, outside the Presidios, extends over 8,000 square miles. It forms a long narrow strip along the Mediterranean coast. The zone might be divided into a western area, with Laraiche as its main town and a coastline along the Atlantic. This part has always been a thorn in the flesh of the French, for it drove a wedge between their zone and Tangier. North-east of the western area lies the Jeballa district with Tetuan, a picturesque old town, and capital of the northern zone. The Sultan's representative and the Spanish High Commissioner had their palaces and administrative headquarters in Tetuan. To the south lies the district of Gomera with the enchanting townlet of Xauen. The area farther east forms but a narrow coastal strip. It is separated from Algeria by nine miles of land belonging to ex-French Morocco.

Ifni, separated from ex-Spanish Morocco by several hundred miles, lies on the Atlantic coast. It is a small enclave of just over one thousand square miles, with a population of under 30,000. Spanish rights to Ifni date from the fifteenth century. Though Spain lost Ifni to the Moors on several occasions, she assured its possession by the Spanish-Moroccan treaty of 1860. But it was not until 1934, after the French had pacified the southern areas, that Spain was able to reoccupy Ifni.

Morocco's proximity was not Spain's only reason for setting out, in the twentieth century, upon a new colonial adventure. The loss of all American possessions was a still more compelling incentive. Spanish governments at the beginning of the twentieth century were notoriously weak. The only institutions that were strong and sure of their aims were the Church and the army. The Spanish Church had never forgotten that in her will Isabella la Catolica, who in 1492 expelled the Moors from Spain, had left the priests an exhortation to work zealously to propagate the "true faith" among the infidels of North Africa. The army, for its part, had returned in 1899 from its last engagements in Cuba and the Philippines, licking sore wounds and steeped in the humiliation of defeat. The loss of these colonies had deprived the army of a last chance of covering itself with glory. In the past, colonial adventures meant promotion and even wealth. Without colonies all prospects for the speedy acquisition of either ceased. Morocco offered an opportunity for both Church and army, an opportunity, moreover, lying on their very doorstep, and in the immediate vicinity of the Presidios of Ceuta and Melilla. Though the government and many Spaniards did not relish the prospect of another colonial adventure, the Church and the army between them saw to it that before long the whole country had come to believe that an occupation of Morocco was imperative for the security of Spain. Church and army were aided and abetted by certain sections of "big business" visualizing wonderful fortunes from the exploitation of the mines they suspected to exist.

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In 1912 the "plum" of North Morocco fell into the Spanish lap. (Her diplomats had, of course, been shaking the tree for some time.) Spain found herself in much the same position as France. She had initiated her military campaign even before 1912, for a year before then her troops had landed in Larache, and occupied Ksar el Kebir (Alcazar). But the Spanish efforts were not very strenuous, and continued to be half-hearted for several years. Tetuan, which was to become the capital, was not occupied until 1913. The troops from Spain lacked the high standards of conduct upon which Lyautey insisted. "Angered by the behaviour of Spanish officers, and by the looting propensities of the soldiery, the tribesmen were only waiting for a word of command."<sup>1</sup> When that word was given—by our old friend Raisuli who had become chief of the important Jibala tribe—a local rising in the vicinity of Tetuan inflicted heavy losses on the Spanish.

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

Nothing equivalent to Lyautey's vigorous planning followed the Spanish conquest. During the First World War, the Spaniards made little effort to gain a foothold outside the towns, and their zone became a happy hunting ground for German agents, trying to rouse the natives against France and selling them arms. The natives, some attracted by Spanish money, but many more quite indifferent to the new régime which was still too distant from them to make itself felt, were at first neither resentful nor welcoming. But when the invader showed signs of an intention to occupy the whole of their country, strong resistance to further advance was organized, and in July 1921 the Spaniards suffered their first great defeat. From that date onward, for five long years, they suffered check upon check. At the beginning of the campaign their commanders in the field had had some 63,000 troops at their disposal, and the Moroccans only a couple of thousand; yet numbers were not enough. "The organization [of the Spanish troops] was defective in every particular. There was little or no discipline amongst the officers and no efficiency among the men. . . . The Spanish soldiers in Morocco previous to the introduction of the Directorate in September 1923, were the victims of every kind of incompetence and corruption. . . . The whole Spanish army, in a state of panic, fled. . . . Artillery, transport, entire camps, stores of arms and ammunition, were abandoned, and the Spanish soldiers, young, mostly untrained, underfed and ill-clothed, fled to seek a place of safety."<sup>2</sup>

The Moroccan war was costing Spain far more than such an impoverished country could afford. In 1923, the finance minister, Señor Villanueva, published the figures for the Moroccan venture, and a startled Spain learned that two years of war had made them the poorer by over £43 million. The campaign in the Maghreb had become Spain's chief preoccupation. Successive governments rose and fell on issues related to it, and Morocco was described as "the grave of Spanish youth, and the bottomless pit of Spanish wealth".

In September 1923 Primo de Rivera came to power as a dictator, setting the pattern for his latter-day successor, General Franco. In one of his first public pronouncements General de Rivera described the methods of his predecessors as "the most expensive, the most protracted, the most useless and the most unworthy".<sup>3</sup> Though he succeeded in introducing improvements that ensured greater efficiency, even his efforts could not entirely stop the rot. After he had been in power for fifteen months, he made the shattering pro-

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 69-71.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 121.

clamation that: "I am every day more convinced that the surprise attacks on the part of the enemy are due much less to his competence than to our own incapacity and negligence. Often the soldiers march in close order, half asleep, their ears covered by the collars of their cloaks, and their rifles unprepared."<sup>4</sup>

After such a diagnosis, it caused amusement to his Rif opponents to hear a few months later, on the occasion of one of the rare Spanish victories, Rivera's address to the army, an address embellished with this flourish: "We can be proud of being of a superior race; of coming of a strong people; and of belonging to an organized and well-governed nation." A comment on that "superiority" was provided a short while later when, after a local engagement, the Spanish Legion marched past their commander-in-chief bearing human trophies on their bayonets. Such practices were routine occurrences of tribal warfare, but an unconventional procedure for a modern European army. It must, however, be added that the dictator issued a severe reprimand to the troops for their barbarity, and ordered a cessation of similar acts. It was much to his credit that he insisted upon more humane treatment of natives by Spanish soldiers and officials. After the end of the war, in 1926, relations between the conquerors and the natives improved. Deprived of their own leaders, and trained to no other profession than the warrior's, many Rifians and Jibalis, took up military service under the Spaniards.

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The treaty which finally established Spanish rule over her zone of Morocco was negotiated by France and Spain *after* the establishment of the French Protectorate, and signed on November 27, 1912. There is no Hispano-Moroccan treaty corresponding to the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912; in other words, no direct agreement between Spain and the Shereefian authority. Though on May 4, 1913, the Sultan Moulay Youssef published a decree approving the Franco-Spanish Treaty of the previous year, Moroccans generally denied that the decree was valid so far as they were concerned, alleging that since Morocco itself never signed a treaty with Spain, the Spanish in Morocco enjoyed merely the rights of "sub tenants" under the French, themselves only "tenants" on Moorish soil. The Moroccan argument involved the rider that if France were compelled to renounce her Moroccan Protectorate, the Spanish would have to give up their claims automatically, because the main "tenancy" agreement would be void. A foreign tourist sipping his drink in a café in Tangier could often hear the popular quip: "On the day

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 148.

when the last Frenchman leaves Morocco, the last Spaniard will have left the day before."

The office of the High Commissioner corresponded to that of the Resident General in the French zone. The High Commissioner was usually a soldier, and his office was a post of high honour. The pomp and circumstance surrounding the French Resident were semi-regal, but those of the High Commissioner at Tetuan surpassed them in royal splendour; particularly impressive were the Moorish guards in tight-fitting white tunics (enlivened by a jade-green sash), baggy white trousers, spurred boots, rakish little white turbans and white gloves. They might indeed have stepped from a full-dress rehearsal of the Russian ballet. These men are among the finest specimens of Moorish manhood, such physical excellence being one of the few commodities that the northern zone exported to Spain. It was Moorish troops on whom General Franco had to rely when in the thirties he defeated the Republicans in the Spanish civil war. Fighters by nature, and usually kept in ignorance of the issue involved, they will do battle wherever so ordered by those in authority.

The High Commissioner's opposite number was the Khalifa or representative of the Sultan. Officially the Sultan appointed the Khalifa, but the Sultan's choice could be rejected by the Spanish authorities. During the early days of the Spanish Protectorate, Raisuli hoped to become the first Khalifa. The commander of the Spanish troops, Colonel Silvestre, supported his candidacy. But though for a time the Spanish government leant heavily on Raisuli—its only ally among the natives—his record made it impossible for Madrid to appoint him. The choice of the government fell on a cousin of the Sultan, Moulay el Mehdi; he was succeeded in 1925 by his son, Moulay el Hassan el Mehdi, a boy of fourteen. The new Khalifa—still in office in the mid-fifties—was a ruler very much in the "Oriental" tradition. He lived in a palace more sumptuous than the Sultan's at Rabat, surrounded by overdressed courtiers, and blessed with many of the material joys of life. Completely pliable to Spanish wishes, he gave the authorities little cause to complain, and conflicts between him and the High Commissioner were rare, and usually concerned with private financial matters. He gladly left effective government in the hands of his foreign overlords, and his own government had even less power than the Makhzen in the French zone.

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In more senses than one Northern Morocco is the poor relation of the more affluent ex-French zone. Except for narrow stretches of arable land in the south, most of the area is mountainous. Even in

regions favoured by Nature, agriculture is under-developed.<sup>5</sup> So there is little to export except cork, some iron ore, and small quantities of lead. The native industries, however, such as leather-work, pottery and metal crafts, are as highly developed as in the other zone, and the Spanish authorities were making efforts to maintain them at their high level.

The people are poor, the Spanish were unenterprising, so progressive measures were lacking. Educational and hygienic standards were low. Police, police informers and prisons played, for a number of years, a larger part in the life of the natives than wiser policies would have warranted. At the same time, the Moors of the zone knew from experience that periods of rigorous repression would be followed by times of comparative liberty, these again to be eclipsed by a new tightening of the screw. In more recent years, these differences in political temperature usually reflected phases of General Franco's Arab policy. Yet for all that, the High Commissioner at Tetuan had usually enjoyed a great measure of freedom. As has been suggested elsewhere, many of the Residents in the French zone were unwilling to inherit a hidebound policy. In Spanish Morocco, the advent of a new High Commissioner usually meant a change of policy. In fact on many occasions events seemed to confirm that besides the Moroccan policy of Madrid there also existed a Moroccan policy settled in Tetuan.

Conditions of native life in the Spanish zone have seldom been ideal; but the Moors have at least had the satisfaction of not being regarded as members of an inferior species. The attitude of racial superiority maintained by all too many Frenchmen in their zone<sup>6</sup> was rare in Spanish Morocco. In fact many of the Spanish residents pride themselves on their distant Moorish ancestry. But as the Spanish zone has never seen a great influx of land-hungry settlers, concession-hunters, or members of the professional classes, questions of privilege arose far less frequently. Most immigrants from Spain are workers, artisans, minor officials, or soldiers. The middle class

<sup>5</sup> "The poor physical resources of the Spanish zone and the excessive density of the population (reaching 1,300-1,800 per square mile of cultivated land in some *cabilas* of Kert and Rif) means that the peasant there faces the threat of constant famine. Even in favourable years the Spanish authorities had to import some 33 per cent of the cereal requirements of their zone." ("The Significance of Irrigation in Morocco's Economic Development", by J. M. Houston, Lecturer on Geography in the University of Oxford, in *The Geographical Journal*, London, John Murray, September 1954, p. 319.)

<sup>6</sup> "Some of the young [French people] have unconsciously let themselves be influenced by the racism in which they lived. They share the prejudices of their milieu, and have not the slightest wish to know the Muslims more intimately." (Ignace Lepp, *Midi sonne au Maroc*, p. 146.)

"Frenchmen who receive Moroccans in their homes are extremely rare. At Casablanca, the rift between the two is complete." (Paul Buttin, op. cit., p. 139.)



between them and the top hierarchy (represented by the High Commissioner, his entourage and the higher officials) was very small. In the French zone even immigrants on the lowest rung of the social and economic ladder are comparatively affluent and consider themselves superior to the natives. In the Spanish zone, poverty was not an exclusive Moorish monopoly, and racial distinctions played a very subordinate part.

There has always been a tendency for the French to ridicule the Spaniards' want of success in their zone, and to point out the difference in hard cash between the results of French and Spanish administration. The Spanish zone has also suffered from the criticisms of foreign visitors who objected to the existing régime in Spain and concluded that its illiberality was exported. Thus the curious situation arose that whereas declarations and descriptions emanating from the French zone were acceptable to most readers and listeners, it was fashionable to take it for granted that the Spanish claims were bound to be highly coloured. And the Spanish residents took no trouble to put up any sort of case to foreign investigators. Because of General Franco's name and record, even the few commendable features in the Spanish zone would be overlooked. It must also be remembered that the Moors not only overran Spain, but gave it a civilization that put the rest of Europe to shame. Such a link, whatever the respective reverses of fortune over hundreds of years, is indissoluble. The very language of Spain is a living monument to the closeness of Spaniard and Moor.

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Spain's more recent actions in Morocco can be understood only within the wider framework of General Franco's Muslim policy. In 1939, to show his recognition of the enforced Moorish support in his fight against Spain's republicans, he instituted in Tetuan a native Ministry of the Habous (*Consejo superior del Habus*), and provided funds for the building of a new mosque in Ceuta. A little later he founded in Cairo the Beit el Maghreb, the Moroccan House, a centre for Moorish students studying in the Egyptian capital.

In 1946 a mob of some 15,000 people demonstrated in Tetuan against the suppression of the Arab press. During the following year or two there were widespread outbreaks, provoked chiefly by poverty and insufficiency of food due to a disastrous harvest and administrative incompetence in dealing with the food shortage. There followed waves of imprisonments, very much on the model of similar measures in the French zone. But whereas in the French zone at least a certain small percentage of the natives enjoyed

adequate living standards, in the Spanish zone poverty, often verging on starvation, was the rule rather than the exception. In Madrid, beautiful speeches were made on Hispano-Moorish brotherhood and on the glorious future awaiting Spanish Morocco; but decisive action was lacking; and there were no plans for prompt alleviation of want. Such leading nationalists as managed to stay out of prison preferred to seek the comparative safety of Tangier rather than remain uneasily in Tetuan awaiting a visit from the police. Among them was Abdel Khalek Torres, founder of the Moroccan Front of Freedom, and the outstanding nationalist of the Spanish zone.

In December 1946 the Spanish government approached the Arab League to propose a cultural agreement with the League in the name of Spanish Morocco. The League considered that cultural relations were not enough and that the Spanish zone should be given independence. In his oft-repeated efforts to gain the friendship of the Arab world, General Franco made various approaches, implying that autonomy in the Spanish zone was a thing of the near future. These promises, never very concrete and never supported by mention of a definite date, were the *leitmotif* of his Arab policy.

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An event that was planned to highlight the more liberal aspects of that policy was the despatch of Spain's Foreign Minister, Alberte Martin Artajo, in April 1952, to the countries of the Middle East. The mission figured in the Spanish press as an "historic event". To show how great was the importance he attached to it, Franco delegated his own daughter, the Marquesa Villaverde, thereto, and assigned an important position within the mission to the only Moorish general in the Spanish army, General Ben Mizzian.<sup>7</sup>

Why should General Franco have been so eager for amicable relations with the Muslim world, its territories separated from Spain by the entire length of Europe? His reasons, complex as they were, were explained by the motives governing his entire foreign policy. From 1945 till 1952 Spain found herself in almost complete diplomatic isolation. Her record in the war and her totalitarian régime did not endear her to the Powers of the West. The Arab countries were her only possible potential allies. An agreement with them, not necessarily political but perhaps merely economic and cultural, would strengthen Franco's position with the Western Powers now

<sup>7</sup> In the French army a Moroccan did not attain the rank of general until the autumn of 1954. It was only then that Colonel Kettani ben Hammou, a former pupil at the military college in Meknes, was promoted to Brigadier General. During the Second World War he had fought in all the major campaigns of North Africa and Europe. In 1952 he joined the staff of Marshal Juin.

tending to dismiss Spain as of little consequence in international affairs.

General Franco pursued his Arab policy with utmost caution and skill. Even the timing of the Artajo mission was carefully planned. Ever since the summer of 1951, the U.S. had been eager to enter into negotiations with Spain that would culminate in permission for American forces to utilize Spanish ports and air bases. The negotiations were to begin in the spring of 1952, and it was precisely at that moment that the Spanish dictator chose to remove his foreign minister from Madrid and send him to the Middle East—a gesture designed to show that he was not particularly eager to discuss the proposed pact. As Rodrigo Royce, the Washington correspondent of the Spanish press agency E.F.E., wrote, "Spain is not asking the U.S.A. for anything; it is the U.S.A. that has officially come to seek out Spain." Gomez Aparicio, a member of Artajo's mission to the Arab countries, succinctly summarized conditions for the proposed pact with the U.S. as "direct and intimate co-operation, or nothing". Spain was able to assume this haughty tone only because of the increasing success of her Arab diplomacy. In a recent meeting with Premier Salazar of Portugal, Franco had strengthened his alliance with that country. That association and the likelihood of the friendship of the Middle Eastern countries, were the two trumps that he meant to play when the Americans put their own cards on the table.

The Arab countries, for their part, were making conditions in Morocco one of the talking points in their dealings with Spain. They had demanded that the stern measures taken against Moorish nationalists by the High Commissioner in Tetuan, General Varela, should be revoked. In consequence, on the eve of Artajo's departure for the Middle East, police measures in Spanish Morocco were relaxed.

If Spain needed the Arab States, they, in their turn, needed Spain. Spain still enjoyed great prestige in Latin-American countries, and the support of those countries in the United Nations was of great importance to Arab governments.

Artajo's mission was received everywhere with royal honours. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud, came specially to Jidda to receive them, and to escort them personally on their flight to the capital Riyadh (on their visit to King Ibn Saud). There were ceremonial visits to King Farouk of Egypt and all the other heads of Arab States: there were exchanges of costly presents and decorations; and it was obvious that both sides were aware of the importance of the occasion. An agreement was signed with Egypt according to which the language and literature of Spain were to be

included in the curriculum of Egyptian higher education, and new chairs of Arab studies were to be created at Spanish universities. In Amman, the capital of Jordan, Señor Artajo inaugurated a Spanish Institute; and in Damascus he signed a pact of Hispano-Syrian friendship. On his visit to the Hebron camp of Arab refugees from Israel, he offered scholarships in Moroccan schools for a number of refugee children. Economic agreements provided for an exchange of such Middle Eastern products as Egyptian cotton or Saudi Arabian oil with goods manufactured by Catalan industry. Though these various agreements bore little fruit, they nevertheless brought prestige to the Spanish mission.

Señor Artajo's summary, announcing "a new era in the friendship and the close relations between Spain and the Arab world", was echoed by Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, the Secretary of the Arab League, who stated that "the Spaniards and the Arabs are like brothers".<sup>8</sup> General Franco's envoy may not have succeeded in bringing about the Mediterranean pact that had been one of his master's ambitions, but he had laid the foundations for a Hispano-Arabic policy. Even the left-wing *Tribune* in London, a strongly anti-Franco organ, recorded that the Artajo mission had enabled Spain to "develop a common strategy in international affairs". The Catholic *Tablet* (London) declared that as a result of the Artajo mission, Spain had "emerged as a most important element in international negotiations". The leading Egyptian paper *Al Ahram* looked even further. "Without doubt," it wrote, "once Spain is admitted into the U.N., it will be able to depend upon the six Arab votes and upon the influence of the Arab League on the entire Muslim bloc in Asia. It will be thus assured of a strong international position."

In their negotiations with Señor Artajo the Arab leaders kept the problem of Spanish Morocco in the centre of the picture. Particularly watchful was the Arab League's Secretary, Azzam Pasha, at that time the most influential political personality in the Arab world. Though a warm supporter of the new Hispano-Arab alliance, he refused General Franco's invitation to be his guest in Madrid so long as the status of Spanish Morocco was in doubt.<sup>9</sup> He had in fact, and for that same reason, refused an earlier invitation from the Spanish government. Artajo's mission made every possible effort to convince its hosts of Spain's pro-Arab sentiments. It stressed particularly the fact that only "under Spain" could a Muslim native, in the person of General Ben Mizzian, reach the high rank of Military Governor of a Spanish province, i.e. Ceuta.

<sup>8</sup> Elena de la Souchère, in *Al Istiqlal*, May 10, 1952.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

But Azzam Pasha and his friends demanded more than one man's elevation; their objective, as always, was autonomy for Spanish Morocco. It was undoubtedly Franco's unwillingness to make unequivocal commitments on that subject that prevented Artajo from concluding the hoped-for Mediterranean pact. The successes and failures of the Artajo mission proved that Morocco had indeed, so far as its Spanish zone was concerned, become an important factor for negotiators to employ.

The mission completed, the negotiators back in their normal spheres, Spain was ready to talk with America, and the Spanish dictator's hand was considerably strengthened. He could now point out that his influence might be of assistance to the Americans in their strategic plans involving the Middle East. This was not disputed by Mr. Stanton Griffiths, former American Ambassador in Madrid, who had expressed the view that Spain was destined to act as mediator between the Arab world and the West.<sup>10</sup> The Spanish paper *Arriba* even went so far as to speak of a "Hispano-American community of action in the Arab world".

If the Hispano-Arab alliance proved not quite as effective as it might have been, this was due chiefly to the unsolved matter of Moroccan independence. For the Arab countries this was almost a *conditio sine qua non*, and it may seem surprising that Franco was not prepared to write off the Spanish zone altogether for the sake of even stronger support from the Arab countries. But even without making that sacrifice, he had obviously gained a great deal. Questions of prestige count for much in Spanish affairs, and as long as the French remained in their zone, it was a matter of pride for Spain to refuse to be dislodged from hers. Even if no point of pride had been involved, Spain's foothold in the Maghreb provided a most useful bargaining weapon in her dealings with both Arab and non-Arab governments. This circumstance, more than any other, explains the vagueness of General Franco's declarations and promises regarding Morocco, the procrastinations, the failures to speed up promised reforms, the apparent vacillations which were, in fact, dictated by shrewd awareness that as long as the Moroccan question lay open he had a useful bargaining weapon within easy grasp.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, May 24, 1954.

## TANGIER

WITH Shanghai's integration into Communist China, Tangier remained the only truly "international" city in the world. Historically, Tangier is as Moroccan as any city of the Shereefian Empire, but for all that, it has in many periods led a life distinct from that of the rest of Morocco. Its history reaches further back than that of any other part of the Maghreb. After its domination by Phoenicians and Carthaginians, it was raised in 38 B.C. to the status of an Imperial city, its citizens enjoying the rights of *cives Romani*. In A.D. 42 the Emperor Claudius proclaimed Tingis the capital of Rome's North African colonies, to which he gave the name of Mauretania Tingitana.

For many centuries Tangier shared the fate of Muslim Morocco. In 1471 the city was occupied by the Spaniards, and in 1580 it came into the possession of Portugal. When, in 1661, Charles II of England married the Portuguese princess, Catherine of Braganza, Tangier formed part of his bride's dowry, and England set foot on African territory. The city was to become the nucleus of a new English Empire on the dark continent; it was to unlock the doors to wide-scale African commerce; it was to form a bastion against the dreaded Barbary pirates. King Charles called Tangier the "brightest jewel" of his crown. Yet with each successive year the lustre of the Tangier "jewel" grew dimmer, and its setting within that crown less firm. On every possible occasion Moulay Ismail's henchmen attacked the narrow perimeter of the inadequately defended city; each year it grew more difficult to supply the English troops with sufficient provisions; and as the rift between Charles and Parliament widened, the latter reduced the grants without which the maintenance of Tangier could not be properly financed or assured. In 1684 England had to abandon the "jewel", and Moulay Ismail's representative restored it triumphantly to the Shereefian Empire.

Yet somehow its "foreign" character still clung to Tangier. It was Morocco's main harbour; the ground of its winding alleys was trodden by a larger number of Dutch and Spanish sailors, French and English merchants, Jewish moneylenders, and heterogeneous

crowds of foreign artisans, tradesmen and labourers, than the pavements of any other Moorish city. It was here that foreign diplomatic missions first landed on Moroccan soil. Tangier became the chief junction for all manner of traffic between the Maghreb and the outside world.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Tangier was established as the diplomatic capital of Morocco. The representatives of foreign Powers accredited to the Shereefian Empire resided there both by choice and necessity. Foreigners were not welcome in the capital, Fez; and even if they had been, they would still have preferred the relatively abundant amenities of Tangier, and its proximity to Europe, to the medieval isolation of Fez. A special representative of the Moorish Foreign Minister resided in Tangier to act as go-between from his chief to the foreign diplomats. As the centre of diplomacy and the main clearing house of Morocco's foreign trade, Tangier also became the centre of political and several other kinds of intrigue. Thus the foundations for its future destiny were well and truly laid.

It is this dubious character of the city that gave it its chief distinguishing mark or, to put it differently, its notoriety as a hide-out of spies, foreign agents, smugglers, gun-runners and all manner of adventurers. As such, it was looked at askance by the rest of Morocco. Moroccans took a certain masochistic pleasure in pointing out that Tangier was their only city not to have produced one single example of distinguished native architecture, nor, in a country of the highest culinary standards, a single local dish. And, unlike most of the other old cities of the Maghreb, Tangier can boast only one native son who has achieved world-wide repute—the fourteenth-century traveller Ibn Batuta.<sup>1</sup>



Tangier's ultimate internationalization was inevitable, for practically every great European Power longed to possess the place. But since no single Power could have it, one solution was to allow them to share in its possession. Tangier's foreign residents already enjoyed the privileges of extraterritorial rights. The origins of such rights, known as Capitulations, date from 1358 when a Merinid Sultan granted these to the citizens of Pisa. During the nineteenth century most foreign Powers represented in Tangier acquired such privileges. Those entitled to extraterritorial rights stayed outside Shereefian jurisdiction and paid no taxes. These indulgences might have been justified in the case of foreigners, but such exemption

<sup>1</sup> For further details of Tangier's history, see Rom Landau, *Portrait of Tangier*, London, Robert Hale, 1953.

could also be acquired by natives who asked for "consular protection". At first, this was readily granted to consular employees; but ere long, any merchant, tradesman, or fugitive from the law could come under the same umbrella, provided he had the wherewithal to grease the palms of his foreign "protector". Thus many of the most active Moroccan merchants, both Muslim and Jewish, sought the "safety" of Tangier, where they could evade the payment of taxes and transgress against Shereefian law with impunity. According to Graham Stuart, among the foreign Powers, "the outstanding offenders" against the privileges bestowed by Capitulations, were "France, Spain and Germany".<sup>2</sup>

In spite of much that was unsavoury in the dealings and methods of Tangier's foreign residents, the legal basis of its international status was a body of practical measures that were to prove of benefit not only to the foreign communities but to all connected with the city. Early in the nineteenth century, the Sultan passed over control of Tangier's maritime interests to the foreign consuls, who in 1840 were authorized by Moulay Abderrahman to concern themselves with public health as well. It might thus be said that the executive power of foreign consuls was established as far back as 1840. In 1864 the foreign Powers built an "international" lighthouse at Cape Spartel outside Tangier, and in the following year responsibility for its running was vested legally in the consular corps.

The sanitary council gradually assumed greater powers, and became an unofficial local government. The jurisdiction of the consular body was further increased by the establishment of separate "national" postal services. The first such service was founded in 1857 by Great Britain; France followed in 1860, Spain a year later, and, for a time, even the Germans maintained their own post office in Tangier. To the present day the city can pride itself on having a French postal service (combined with that of the Shereefian authorities), a British, and a Spanish. Each of these is a replica of the service as organized by the respective countries at home. This means that letters posted in Tangier may be stamped with French-Moroccan, French, Spanish, Spanish-Moroccan, or British stamps, according to the office patronized by the transmitter.

Summing up we can say that the eventual internationalization of Tangier was the logical outcome of the city's character as the most convenient centre, of the mutual distrust of the great Powers interested in Morocco, and of the overwhelming influence of the foreign consuls upon the running of the city's affairs.

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<sup>2</sup> Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 30.



Tangier's special status as an international city was mentioned for the first time officially in a treaty between Spain and France of 1902, when the two signatories declared their readiness to see "the eventual neutralization of the city". In a note to France of November 14, 1911, Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, made this aim specific. "The government of His Majesty," he declared, "is convinced that the French government will agree to participate in the making of agreements which shall be directed to placing the city and the municipal districts ultimately under international supervision."<sup>3</sup> When, in 1912, France proclaimed her protectorate over Morocco, the various Powers appointed a commission to work out an agreed status for an *international* Tangier. The new status was approved in 1914, but the First World War prevented its implementation.

After the war, the two chief opponents of the internationalization were Spain and France. The former claimed that Tangier should belong to her; and the latter made "every effort to incorporate Tangier in her protectorate".<sup>4</sup> Finally, on the initiative of Lord Curzon, Britain's Foreign Secretary, a conference was held in London in 1923 to draft a statute for Tangier. On December 18 of the same year, a Convention was signed, and on May 14, 1924, the new statute of the Tangier zone—the city itself and a narrow strip of surrounding country—became legal. The U.S.A., without wishing to obstruct further progress in the matter of giving Tangier its constitution, refused to participate officially.

Tangier's new international status dates formally from June 1925. The city was to remain permanently neutral, and to have no military establishments or forces of any kind. The conduct of foreign affairs was to be in the hands of the French Resident General at Rabat. So far as internal affairs were concerned, the zone became autonomous and independent. The new statute represented a victory for France, and, as Prof. Stuart observes, "the heirs of Talleyrand had not entirely lost their cunning".<sup>5</sup> In comparison with the statute planned in 1914, the new Convention gave far more power to the Sultan, power which passed, in the circumstances, automatically to France through her Resident General.

The statute remained in force till 1939. On June 14th, 1940, at a time when Great Britain and France were preoccupied elsewhere, General Franco's troops made a "triumphant" entry into Tangier. The Caudillo expelled the various foreign administrators from their offices, abolished the Port Commission, took over the city's funds,

<sup>3</sup> *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1871-1914, 3rd series, vol. 1, No. 348.

<sup>4</sup> Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 130.

and replaced the international régime by a national and dictatorial one. Under the Spanish dispensation, Tangier became a paradise for Nazi agents, helped by Vichyite and other foreign residents only too eager to be on the right side when the confidently envisaged German victory should be won.

When, on May 8, 1945, Germany made her unconditional surrender, Spain realized that the days of her rule in Tangier were numbered. In the summer of the same year a conference, held in Paris, deliberated on the city's future. The U.S.A., having meanwhile gained first-hand experience of the imperative necessity of holding control of the western Mediterranean, joined Great Britain and France in their negotiations. Within a few weeks it was decided to revive Tangier's former statute, but with one considerable difference. Both the U.S. and Soviet Russia were to participate in the city's administration. (While the U.S. actually did so, Russia sent no diplomatic representative to Tangier, and asked for no rôle in any of its governing bodies.)

With the end of the Spanish régime and the withdrawal of Spanish troops, on October 11, 1945, the Mendoub, the Sultan's representative, returned to Tangier, and the various international authorities resumed their pre-war functions.

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Tangier's Muslim population, which by the fifties had reached almost 100,000, forms its largest and most closely knit contingent. Officially, it was governed by the Mendoub who, as the Sultan's representative, symbolized Shereefian sovereignty. In such surroundings he had just as slim a chance as had his master at Rabat of being more than a figurehead. For as France had become the factual ruler in French Morocco, the Mendoub in Tangier was therefore just another French-controlled official.

The 15,000 or so Tangierine Jews are mostly the Sultan's subjects, and as such find themselves in a situation very similar to that of their Muslim compatriots. But the city has a large number of wealthy Jews—in fact Morocco's Jewish "aristocracy" is centred almost exclusively there—who do a great deal to alleviate the wretchedness of poorer co-religionists. Excellently organized, the Jewish community administers its own schools and health services, and all its charitable organizations are most efficiently run.

Of the foreign population of some 30,000, about two-thirds are Spanish. In fact Tangier's *European* character is determined entirely by the Spanish colony. Spanish is the main foreign

language, the only local paper of any standing is the *España*; the currency is Spanish. But since the majority of the town's Spaniards belong to the poorer classes—labourers, artisans, small shopkeepers—it is the American, British and French communities that dominate social life.

The British form one of Tangier's oldest foreign communities, certain British families having lived there through many generations. At one time the British colony was considered the most public-spirited, and socially the most active of all, but since the Second World War, the much smaller American colony has assumed that rôle. This colony is recruited chiefly among diplomats, the employees of the three large American radio stations erected in the city's vicinity, and a sprinkling of business men. In spite of its very recent birth and its smallness, it has established an excellent school, open to children of all races and nationalities, and a well-patronized public library run by the U.S.I.S.

With the exception of the Spanish and the fairly large and prosperous French colony, the most highly integrated foreign group is the Italian, having its own hospital and school, and various cultural, social and charitable organizations.

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At the head of the administration stands the Administrator, elected from among the Dutch, Belgian, Swedish or Portuguese communities in rotation. He is helped by assistant administrators and the Chief of Police. While officially the head of the zone's government, the Administrator is really the chief executive officer of the Legislative Assembly, over whose meetings he presides. Its foreign members are not elected by general franchise but appointed by their respective consuls. Of the Assembly's foreign members four are Spanish, four French, three British, three American, three Russian (not-participating), three Italian (only one before 1952), one Dutch, one Belgian, one Portuguese. The three Jewish members are chosen from a list submitted by the Jewish community. The six Muslim delegates are "appointed by the Mendoub", a euphemistic phrase which should be interpreted "appointed by the French". Since most of the delegates are leading business men, the interlocking between business and government is probably more inevitable here than anywhere else in the world. Though this has obvious disadvantages, it makes for a certain realism and efficiency. It goes almost without saying that the interests of the foreign community are nearer to the heart of most of the delegates than pressing native problems. Sectarian interests are not likely to carry the day, for

they must contend with the reciprocal jealousies of all the national groups within the Assembly.

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Tangier's régime is not untypical in its failure to show Moroccan representation on its highest governing body. For the true government of the zone is neither the Mendoub nor the Administrator but the Committee of Control. Since a Moroccan representative would inevitably be a French appointee, his absence tends to minimize French influence over the Committee. Originally "neither France nor Spain was really interested in obtaining a successful international administration",<sup>6</sup> each of these Powers hoping to become, as already shown, the sole master of Tangier. Finally the Consuls of all the signatory Powers to the Act of Algeciras (with the exception of Germany and Austria) found representation on the Committee. They were the U.S., Great Britain, France, Spain, Holland, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, and Russia (which, as we have seen, never claimed its seat). The office of president rotates annually in alphabetical order of countries. Each member has one vote, and in theory all Consuls (who by courtesy are referred to as Ministers) have the same status. But the fact that the French Consul represented the Power that controlled Morocco gave him, unofficially, powers far in excess of those enjoyed by any of his colleagues.

The Committee has the right to veto any law of the Legislative Assembly. In fact almost any measure of that body must receive the Committee's approval. It also determines the rules governing the Assembly's procedure, and has final control over the budget. The appointment of important officials, too, is among the Committee's rights. Practically all political measures, such as press censorship, admission or eviction of foreigners, prosecution of political "criminals", which usually meant nationalists, have to be taken by the Committee in order to be valid.

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The administration of the city's justice, too, is an international concern. Crimes and disputes concerning natives are judged by the Mendoub's court, which, however, functions under (unofficial) French control. Though the international statute of Tangier does not provide for a French adviser to the Mendoub, a Contrôleur des Autorités Chérifiennes was appointed, to become one of the key personalities in the Administration. He had "jurisdiction over the

<sup>6</sup> Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

administrative and judicial Moroccan agencies of government. . . . He serves as government commissioner at the court of the Mendoub and supervises the administration of justice."<sup>7</sup>

Conflicts between non-Muslims or between these and foreigners are judged by the Mixed Tribunal which originally had seven judges, of whom two were French, two Spanish, one British, one Italian, and one Belgian. In accordance with the statute as reformed in July 1952, one French, one Spanish, one Portuguese, one Dutch and one American judge were added. An innovation was also provided by the appointment of the first Muslim judge.

Among the other reforms of 1952—accepted somewhat reluctantly by the Sultan—was the addition of several new higher officials in the Administration; the creation of a special police force under Spanish control in addition to the regular police force which is commanded by an officer of one of the "smaller" Powers; and the appointment of a British Security Commissioner. A further innovation was the establishment of a special control committee for financial matters. By and large, it was Spain that gained most from the reforms of 1952.

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The Tangier experiment suggests that, at least within a restricted area, international government is feasible. In view of the specific doctrines and conditions prevailing in the French and Spanish zones it was perhaps inevitable that this international government should pay more attention to the well-being of the foreign communities than to that of the Muslim inhabitants who form the majority of the population. Practically all the efforts of the Administration are directed towards enhancing the city's economic interests. In itself this should be an excellent thing, but, as it happens, these interests form an almost exclusive foreign monopoly. Tangier's economy is not a productive one in the true sense of the term. There are next to no industries, and almost all economic activity is based on export and import or on trade in money. This latter is encouraged by the absence of an income tax or of the monetary controls which dominate the financial life of most countries. Export and import flourish on account of Tangier's status as a free port and the exceedingly low rate of customs dues.<sup>8</sup>

Both export-import transactions and dealings in money—chiefly speculation in foreign exchange—depend upon connections with the

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>8</sup> There is a flat 12½ per cent *ad valorem* duty on all imported commodities, except gold, silk, precious stones and some other luxury goods for which, significantly, the rate is only 7½ per cent.

outside world, and the possession of initial capital. Because of conditions inherited from the past, and the various restrictions imposed upon them in more recent years, the natives commanded neither foreign contacts nor capital. As a result, they found themselves cut off from the main trend of the city's economic activities. Moreover, whereas in case of need a foreign merchant or banker can seek the aid of his Consul, his Moroccan would-be competitor stood little chance of securing any similar assistance. His protector was the Mendoub. But the Mendoub was only an instrument in French hands, and so any special concessions which a native merchant might require were very unlikely to be granted.

This situation is perceptible almost everywhere in Tangier. With the exception of the Spanish community, the foreign colonies enjoy a high standard of living, have handsome houses scattered over the town's various picturesque hills, set up their country clubs, patronize glittering shops displaying the latest novelties from London, Paris, New York or Madrid. The majority of the Muslims live in overcrowded, unhygienic quarters; find it hard to eke out even a subsistence-level existence; and have to content themselves with an officially decreed wage of 30 pesetas (about 5 shillings or 70 American cents) per day, so are strangers to peace of mind as well as to luxury.

The facilities (almost a misnomer) for native schooling, hospitalization, social or cultural advancement can only be described as less than adequate, and as yet the social consciousness of the prosperous has not inspired them to improve these wretched conditions.

On various occasions, some of the more altruistic Tangierines have suggested the introduction of a small income tax. Such a tax should of course have been levied years ago on those whose high incomes are almost entirely dependent on the favourable conditions that Tangier's exceptional status offers. The revenue from such a tax, if used entirely for the benefit of Moroccans—the legitimate owners of Tangier—could have provided all the requisite hospitals, schools, welfare centres, and means for fighting tuberculosis which the natives now lack on any scale worthy of consideration. Instead of investigating the possibility of imposing such a tax or of initiating some other measure with a like aim, in 1951 the Legislative Assembly voted 500 million francs (or the best part of 1 ½ million dollars) for a new building for itself and another one for the Administration, both luxuries in a city having so many unrelieved poor.

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Tangier is principally, for most of its foreign residents, an escape

from income tax and other restrictions, and an excellent field for enrichment and speculation. With its handsome surroundings, its favourable climate, it is also a pleasant refuge for those having to live on a comparatively small income. For non-resident foreigners it is the "promised land" of smuggling and similar shady ventures. Though in most cases the "promise" remains unfulfilled, fortune hunters, lured by the city's legend rather than by its reality, flock in from every corner of the globe.

Even for the Moroccans of the French and Spanish zones, Tangier represented something unique, for it was the one region of their own land in which they could still breathe comparatively free air. Until the fifties of the present century, Tangier offered a certain measure of political freedom. Thus it became a meeting place for nationalists and their foreign friends; it was also a refuge for political "criminals" on the run from the French or Spanish zones. Before his escape to Egypt in 1951, Allal el Fassi, the nationalist leader, lived for several years in Tangier, and it was there that in April 1951 the various nationalist parties came together to establish a united front. But, while the foreign agent who used Tangier as a watching and listening post was more or less free to do as he pleased, the Moorish politician knew that the local police had their eyes on him all the time.

With all its cosmopolitan crowd, its modernism, its bustling activity, Tangier has the appearance of a Mediterranean rather than a Moroccan town. Its heart, which only a few foreigners come to investigate, is nevertheless as Moorish as that of Fez or Rabat. Seldom has the Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef received a more fervent welcome than the one that awaited him on his state visit to Tangier in 1947. The population of other Moroccan towns is not of entirely unmixed allegiance, but in Tangier it would have been hard to find a Moor who could conceive of being anything but "nationalist" in aspiration.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Conditions in Tangier, as described in the present chapter, existed right up to 1956. With the advent of Morocco's independence, Tangier's international régime gradually made room for a native one.

## MOROCCO AND THE U.S.A.

ON December 1, 1789, the first President of the United States of America, George Washington, dispatched the following letter to His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Abdellah, Sultan of Morocco:

City of New York, December 1, 1789

GREAT AND MAGNANIMOUS FRIEND:

Since the date of the letter which the late Congress, by their president, addressed to Your Imperial Majesty, the United States of America have thought proper to change their government and to institute a new one, agreeable to the Constitution, of which I have the honor of, herewith, enclosing a copy. The time necessarily employed in the arduous task, and the derangements occasioned by so great, though peaceable a revolution, will apologize, and account for your Majesty's not having received those regular advices and marks of attention from the United States which the friendship and magnanimity of your conduct toward them afforded reason to expect.

The United States, having unanimously appointed me to the supreme executive authority in this Nation, your Majesty's letter of the 17th August, 1788, which by reason of the dissolution of the late government, remained unanswered, has been delivered to me. I have also received the letters which your Imperial Majesty has been so kind as to write, in favor of the United States, to the Bashaws of Tunis and Tripoli, and I present to you the sincere acknowledgments and thanks of the United States for this important mark of your friendship for them.

We greatly regret that the hostile disposition of those regencies toward this nation, who have never injured them, is not to be removed, on terms in our power to comply with. Within our territories there are no mines, either of gold or silver, and this young nation, just recovering from the waste and desolation of a long war, have not, as yet, had time to acquire riches by agriculture and commerce. But our soil is bountiful, and our people



industrious, and we have reason to flatter ourselves that we shall gradually become useful to our friends.

The encouragement which your Majesty has been pleased, generously, to give to our commerce with your dominions, the punctuality with which you have caused the Treaty with us to be observed, and the just and generous measures taken in the case of Captain Proctor, make a deep impression on the United States and confirm their respect for, and attachment to your Imperial Majesty.

It gives me pleasure to have this opportunity of assuring your Majesty that, while I remain at the head of this nation, I shall not cease to promote every measure that may conduce to the friendship and harmony which so happily subsist between your Empire and them, and shall esteem myself happy in every occasion of convincing your Majesty of the high sense (which in common with the whole Nation) I entertain of the magnanimity, wisdom and benevolence of your Majesty. In the course of the approaching winter, the national legislature, which is called by the former name of Congress, will assemble, and I shall take care that nothing be omitted that may be necessary to cause the correspondence between our countries to be maintained and conducted in a manner agreeable to your Majesty and giving satisfaction to all the parties concerned in it.

May the Almighty bless your Imperial Majesty, our Great and Magnanimous friend with His constant guidance and protection.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.<sup>1</sup>

The first thing that springs to the eye from a study of Washington's letter is that, towards the close of the eighteenth century, Morocco was still a Power to be reckoned with, one, moreover, that could be trusted to fulfil its obligations. It also shows that while the still-feeble American Republic—greatly in need of friends—found itself in difficulties with other North African territories, such as Tunisia and Tripolitania, it could count upon the support of Morocco. Morocco was, in fact, one of the very first countries to recognize the newly established United States, and to sign a treaty

<sup>1</sup> The "thanks of the United States", as expressed in George Washington's letter, were in response to an earlier request made by Congress to the Sultan for his intervention on America's behalf with the hostile Bashaws of Tripoli and Tunis. In that request we read:

"Should your Majesty's mediation be the means of putting the U.S. at peace with their only remaining enemies, it would be an event so glorious and memorable, that your Majesty's reign would thence derive additional lustre, and your name become not only more and more dear to our citizens, but more and more celebrated in our histories." (*Secret Journals of Congress*, Vol. IV, pp. 365-6.)

with it. The 1786 treaty between the two countries was the work of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams.

When on the death of the Sultan Mohammed ben Abdellah, in 1791, that treaty had to be renewed, the new Moroccan sovereign made the following statement: "The Americans, I find, are the Christian nation my father most esteemed. I am the same with them as my father was and I trust they will be with me."<sup>2</sup>

Relations between the two countries are as old as is the Union itself. To mark his regard for the new Republic, the Sultan presented it, in 1820, with a palace in Tangier—the only foreign Power thus honoured—which even to the present houses the American Legation in Morocco.<sup>3</sup> During the subsequent years there were many *rapprochements* that confirmed the cordiality of relations between the U.S.A. and successive Sultans. In an earlier chapter mention was made of the fact that the Sultan Moulay Hassan turned to the U.S. when he contemplated putting his country under a foreign protectorate—plain evidence of the confidence he felt in America's respect for a "fair deal".

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Maghreb was of little interest to the U.S. American strategic concerns had not begun yet to embrace the western Mediterranean, and trade between the two countries was insignificant. President Theodore Roosevelt's interest in the Algeiras Conference was motivated by the threat of a Franco-German war rather than by direct concern for Morocco itself. Yet in 1912 the U.S. refused to recognize the establishment of the French Protectorate, and it retained its special rights (Capitulations), confirmed as far back as by the treaty of 1837 (which was itself a reconfirmation of the treaty of 1786). These special rights have, in fact, informed American relations with Morocco since 1912, and have provided most of the occasions for communication.

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Until the Second World War and the occupation of French North Africa by American troops in 1942, American interests in Morocco were almost exclusively economic. Even the ubiquitous American tourist did not really discover Morocco until after the end of the Second World War. While British literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth century is fairly rich in books on Morocco, America produced hardly any. Edith Wharton's *de luxe tour* through the

<sup>2</sup> R. W. Irwin, *Diplomatic Relations of the U.S. with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816* Chapel Hill Press, 1931.

<sup>3</sup> This palace was the Republic's "first real estate on foreign soil".

Maghreb under the aegis of Marshal Lyautey produced a surprisingly uninspired book,<sup>4</sup> and several more years were to elapse before one or two American writers (and painters) thought of turning a casual enough glance upon the Maghreb.

After the Second World War there was a marked expansion in U.S. business interests in Morocco. A number of Americans who had gained some knowledge of that country during the North African expedition, after the war, either invested money in Moroccan enterprises or settled down to live in the Maghreb—chiefly in Casablanca. Most of them went into the import-or-export trade. Earlier international treaties, confirmed by the Act of Algeciras, established free competition in Morocco, and gave American enterprises equality with those of France.

In spite of these favourable conditions, U.S. business men found themselves gravely handicapped. The French authorities set up a system of customs discrimination, restrictive licensing, quotas and embargoes which made the initial freedom somewhat theoretical. As a result, French business was able to preserve domination over Moroccan economy, and within a few years, France had doubled her pre-war share of Moroccan trade, while the American share had increased but little. U.S. business men and the American Chamber of Commerce at Casablanca made strong representations to the State Department in Washington, but their protests seemed of little avail. Senator Wiley—in 1953 to become head of the Senate's all-important Foreign Relations Committee—complained that the State Department's promises to safeguard American rights were "not worth the paper they were written on". Advocating that financial aid be withheld from France in retaliation for her alleged treaty violations in regard to Morocco, Senator Wiley declared that the French had succeeded in invalidating all State Department protests, and that "not one tangible result has come from all this State Department shilly-shallying . . . Moroccan laws limiting American business activities still are in force . . . I think this farce has continued long enough".<sup>5</sup>

In 1950 Congress was prevailed upon to pass the "Connolly Amendment" to the E.C.A. Authorization Act. This was to give the Administration the power to end foreign discrimination against American trading rights. When the State Department failed to act upon it Senator Hickenlooper proposed the "Moroccan Amendment" which was passed by Congress in the "1951 General Appropriation Act". The object of this Act was to withhold economic aid from France, so long as Morocco "in the opinion of

<sup>4</sup> *In Morocco*, London, Appleton, 1920.

<sup>5</sup> *Congressional Record*, 28 July, 1950, p. 11491.

the President" fails to comply with the terms of treaties with America.

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Meanwhile France took her dispute with U.S. business interests in Morocco to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. She sued the U.S.A. ostensibly to prove that she was complying with the conditions imposed upon her by various international treaties, and was thus entitled to financial aid which Congress had made conditional upon such compliance. She even succeeded in inducing Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, to continue the payment of Marshall Aid, after the dispute had been taken to the Hague. Her second purpose in bringing the conflict before the International Court was to obtain a juridical declaration by the world's highest authority that the Protectorate Agreement of 1912 and the changed conditions of the post-war era had invalidated Morocco's international treaty status.

After long and thorough deliberations, the Court made known its verdict on August 27, 1952. Its rulings were: 1. that the establishment of the French Protectorate did not modify the Act of Algieras requirements of "economic liberty without any inequality"; 2. that France enjoyed no "privileged position" in Morocco's economic life; 3. that the U.S. was entitled to be treated on a footing of equality with France "so far as economic matters in Morocco were concerned". The Court also found that, since 1948, France had violated the treaties in question, and had, in consequence, lost her entitlement to the Marshall Aid she had been receiving.<sup>6</sup>

The verdict of the Court meant that American trading rights in Morocco were precisely the same as they had been prior to 1912. From this it followed that an American firm trading in Morocco should enjoy precisely the same privileges as would be accorded to a firm operating from France. In all economic matters the Court supported the American thesis, dismissing French counter-arguments. Only in regard to juridical privileges enjoyed by Americans in Morocco, privileges stemming from their Capitulation rights, did the verdict go in favour of France. As a result of this proviso U.S. citizens involved in litigation on Moorish soil would have thenceforward to be tried by Moroccan (that is, French) courts and no longer by courts under the jurisdiction of their own Consuls.

France solemnly promised to abide by the decision of the Court, and, in exchange for that promise, received a further half-billion

<sup>6</sup> International Court of Justice. *Case Concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco*. August 27, 1952.

dollars in aid from the U.S. "In most American opinion, the least France should have done under any circumstances was to apply the verdict promptly and fairly, and to reimburse losses caused to Americans by legislation which the Court found to be in violation of treaties."<sup>7</sup> Instead, according to Mr. Rodes, the chief spokesman for American business interests in Morocco, France refused to honour the stipulations imposed upon her by the Court's verdict.<sup>8</sup> In a letter of November 17, 1953, to the Assistant Secretary of State, Henry H. Byroade, Mr. Rodes formulated the U.S. dissatisfaction: "That part of the verdict which was favourable to France was immediately implemented. The major portion, favouring the United States, is not implemented although international law requires that this be done at once. . . . Treaty violations [by France] are more flagrant than ever and more than ever are accomplished in a manner designed to humiliate Americans and to discredit the United States. These violations are given widest publicity, and the Moroccan press has repeatedly stated, without contradiction, that the Department of State has not requested treaty compliance . . . and supports the French position."

As can be seen, the spokesman of the American business community in Morocco was tending, by 1953, to blame the State Department even more bitterly than the French. In their name he accused his own authorities in Washington of sacrificing legitimate American interests in Morocco to the cause of appeasing France elsewhere. These complaints were remarkably similar to those levelled at the Administration by Morocco's Arab-Asian supporters in the United Nations Assembly.<sup>9</sup> According to the former, "French officials, apparently with U.S. diplomatic encouragement, are now proposing that the matter be arranged by modifying the treaties to legitimize their current treaty violations".<sup>10</sup> In the name of American business interests and of the American Legion in Morocco, of which Mr.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Emmet Rodes, *Comments on Current French Press Statements about Withholding U.S. Aid Payments from France in Reprisal for Treaty Violations in French Morocco*, Washington, D.C., November 20, 1953.

<sup>8</sup> A few weeks after the International Court had made its verdict known, the French authorities in Morocco published a new decree, dated October 1, 1952, according to which restrictions on trade between Morocco and countries other than France and the French Union were retained. On January 12, 1953, the State Department sent a protest to the French Resident General at Rabat, in which it stated that "the Decree of October 1, 1952, fails to implement fully the decision of the International Court of Justice of August 27, 1952, regarding the economic rights of United States citizens in the French zone of Morocco". It also pointed out that the U.S. does not consider that "the new régime of imports without allocation of exchange fully carries out the principle of 'economic liberty without any inequality' established by the Act of Algieras and reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice".

<sup>9</sup> See chapter on "Morocco in the U.N."

<sup>10</sup> R. E. Rodes, *Violations of U.S. Treaties in Morocco, 1953*. (Privately circulated.)

Rodes was the Commander, he requested the State Department, on November 17, 1953, "publicly and unequivocally to inform France and its own officers that the International Court restored free competition in Morocco, and that the United States will effectively oppose measures inconsistent with it".

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Apart from its trading interests, America's most important post-war venture in Morocco was the building of air bases. The choice of Morocco for those bases was obvious. Guarding the passage between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and thus commanding sea-traffic to the Suez Canal and, ultimately, into the Indian Ocean and towards South-East Asia, Morocco occupies a crucial position in Western strategy. As many U.S. strategists expressed the matter, Morocco "forms the front line of American defence".

Immediately after the end of the war, the U.S. developed a naval base at Port Lyautey, a short distance from Rabat. Soon afterwards, Washington decided to supplement the naval base by air bases. To quote from *Life* of May 4, 1953: "In both military and monetary terms the U.S. stake in French Morocco—little more than two years in the making—is vast. Facing defeat in Korea in December 1950 . . . the U.S. negotiated a hurried agreement with France permitting construction of five mammoth air bases in the Protectorate. . . . By land, the bases are almost unreachable from Soviet Russia. . . . One air force officer summed up their worth to the U.S. and its allies thus: 'European bases may give us ten per cent more hitting power, but Morocco gives us ninety per cent more staying power.'"

The two largest bases, at Sidi Slimane and Nouasseur, were put into operation early in 1953; a third was ready some months later. In Congress, many speakers criticized "the waste and faulty construction", details of which came to light as the scheme progressed, and they complained that the originally estimated cost of \$300 million was likely to rise to \$450 million.

Whatever the facts upon which such criticisms are based, the political implications of the scheme have been summed up as follows by Dr. Benjamin Rivlin, professor in the Department of Political Science at Brooklyn College (during a conference held on May 25, 1952, at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York): "The U.S. negotiated the agreement for the Moroccan bases with France. . . . No recognition was taken of the fact that Morocco . . . possessed a sovereignty separate and distinct from France. . . . The U.S. would have been wiser to consult with the Sultan, the legitimate sovereign of Morocco. . . . Instead the Sultan heard of the decision

through the press. The undermining effect that these developments had on U.S. prestige among native leaders throughout French North Africa cannot be overestimated. . . . The decision was a deliberate and calculated one. It has been justified as a matter of expediency and as part of a policy of 'first things first'. . . . As an American who was on the scene, I want to register my most emphatic disagreement with this conclusion. . . . If the U.S. does not heed and take notice, it will come out with the short end of the stick."<sup>11</sup>

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The U.S. obviously hoped to keep its Moroccan enterprises—trading and air-base construction—remote from politics. A pious hope indeed. As one Moorish wit said, "In present-day Morocco everything is political, even the water", implying that every aspect of the country's economic, social or cultural life was dominated by exponents of warring ideologies.

There were many Americans, both within and outside Congress, who acknowledged the fact that in a world of interlocked, "global" politics, the U.S. could not afford to forget that Morocco still had a voice of its own. A few quotations may suffice to reveal their concern with the Moroccan dilemma. Mr. Adrian Fisher, formerly Chief Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and the latter's representative during the dispute with France before the International Court of Justice at the Hague, wrote: "The Moroccan situation . . . involves a question of the U.S. living up to its own treaty obligations. . . . The Act of Algeciras . . . represents a real commitment to Morocco to support the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of his domains . . . Under modern conditions good-faith compliance at least requires the U.S. to do all within its diplomatic power to ensure for the Moroccans the hearing they are entitled to under the Charter of the United Nations."<sup>12</sup> Representative Lawrence H. Smith, of Wisconsin, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, referring to the Moroccan problem said in the House of Representatives: "Are we immune to the plea of human beings who insist that they be granted their inalienable rights, as we do?"<sup>13</sup> After the U.S. had led the opposition against the U.N. resolution on behalf of Morocco, President George Meany, of the American Federation of Labor, issued a statement, part of which read: "The unfortunate position taken by our government in the recent U.N. debate on the national independence crisis in

<sup>11</sup> *Free Morocco*, Washington, D.C., May 25, 1953.

<sup>12</sup> *Washington Post*, September 4, 1953.

<sup>13</sup> *Congressional Record*, January 29, 1951, p. 756.

North Africa has made it most urgent for our country to repair the resulting damage to our national prestige, especially among the peoples of Asia and Africa. The best way to achieve this worthy goal is for our government to champion consistently and energetically the aspirations of the Tunisian, Moroccan and all other colonial peoples seeking national independence and freedom. Only such a positive democratic course . . . will enable our country to fulfil its great historic mission of protecting and promoting human freedom, well-being and world peace."<sup>14</sup> At its National Convention in Cleveland, in November 1953, the Congress of Industrial Organizations approved the following declaration: "The CIO views with growing alarm the deterioration of the situation in French North Africa. . . . In Tunisia and Morocco workers' rights are trampled on, trade union leaders are assassinated, and the liberties of the native populations are abridged."<sup>15</sup>

It was to be expected that anti-colonialist opinion in the U.S. should find emphatic exponents. But for all that, French colonialism in North Africa found many American defenders, and the claims of Moroccan nationalists, to the effect that American public opinion was *unanimously* opposed to the French régime in Morocco, must be discounted as propaganda. To begin with, few Americans gave a thought to North Africa, of which they knew very little. Official Washington was on the whole inclined to support the Protectorate régime, for the liveliest fears were entertained that should Morocco shake off the French, an unstemmable flood of communists would take their place. French rule was the sole bulwark against such a disaster. There were also certain business concerns combining French and American capital in Morocco whose American partners seconded the ideas of their French colleagues as a matter of sound business principle. On the whole, however, American anti-colonialist ideology, rooted in tradition, could never approve unconditionally a degree of colonization that was so persistent, so anachronistic; and many Americans who had been to Morocco on diplomatic, military or business errands fully prepared to smile on all they encountered there, returned highly critical of the Protectorate régime.

Typical of the differing American assessments of the Moroccan situation are the following two pronouncements. The first was made by Justice William Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court, who visited Morocco during the summer of 1954. In an article he published, on his return, in the magazine *Look*,<sup>16</sup> he wrote: "The

<sup>14</sup> *The United States and the French-Moroccan Problem—"The Other Side"* Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor, New York, 1954, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> October 19, 1954.



lash is indeed the symbol of French rule in Morocco. The French know how to use terror in Morocco. Torture of prisoners is a common practice. Unless French policy is reversed and drastic reforms introduced, Morocco will explode with a violence that only Africa knows. If the explosion occurs, the management of the revolutionary forces in Morocco may have passed into the hands of communists." He was vigorously contradicted by the New York *Herald Tribune*. "Mr. Douglas says absolutely nothing," the paper suggested, "about the great diversity of opinions among Arabs, Berbers and Jews, creating the impression that almost all Moroccans wish to see the French leave their country. After the troubles of last summer the Mendès-France government acknowledged past mistakes and the danger of communism taking over control of the nationalist movement. France is the only country capable of leading and guiding Morocco towards its autonomy. She has begun to do so, and we must give her the chance which she deserves."<sup>17</sup>

Such examples of diversity of view could be multiplied; but not very usefully, for the point of interest is surely that "the Moroccan problem" was no longer local, no longer exclusively European, and the most influential country in the modern world was profoundly interested in its solution.

<sup>17</sup> October 21, 1954.

North Africa has made it most urgent for our country to repair the resulting damage to our national prestige, especially among the peoples of Asia and Africa. The best way to achieve this worthy goal is for our government to champion consistently and energetically the aspirations of the Tunisian, Moroccan and all other colonial peoples seeking national independence and freedom. Only such a positive democratic course . . . will enable our country to fulfil its great historic mission of protecting and promoting human freedom, well-being and world peace."<sup>14</sup> At its National Convention in Cleveland, in November 1953, the Congress of Industrial Organizations approved the following declaration: "The CIO views with growing alarm the deterioration of the situation in French North Africa. . . . In Tunisia and Morocco workers' rights are trampled on, trade union leaders are assassinated, and the liberties of the native populations are abridged."<sup>15</sup>

It was to be expected that anti-colonialist opinion in the U.S. should find emphatic exponents. But for all that, French colonialism in North Africa found many American defenders, and the claims of Moroccan nationalists, to the effect that American public opinion was *unanimously* opposed to the French régime in Morocco, must be discounted as propaganda. To begin with, few Americans gave a thought to North Africa, of which they knew very little. Official Washington was on the whole inclined to support the Protectorate régime, for the liveliest fears were entertained that should Morocco shake off the French, an unstemmable flood of communists would take their place. French rule was the sole bulwark against such a disaster. There were also certain business concerns combining French and American capital in Morocco whose American partners seconded the ideas of their French colleagues as a matter of sound business principle. On the whole, however, American anti-colonialist ideology, rooted in tradition, could never approve unconditionally a degree of colonization that was so persistent, so anachronistic; and many Americans who had been to Morocco on diplomatic, military or business errands fully prepared to smile on all they encountered there, returned highly critical of the Protectorate régime.

Typical of the differing American assessments of the Moroccan situation are the following two pronouncements. The first was made by Justice William Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court, who visited Morocco during the summer of 1954. In an article he published, on his return, in the magazine *Look*,<sup>16</sup> he wrote: "The

<sup>14</sup> *The United States and the French-Moroccan Problem—"The Other Side"* Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor, New York, 1954, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14.

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<sup>17</sup> October 21, 1954.



*Part Five*

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THE RÔLE OF MOHAMMED V



## THE SULTAN MOHAMMED V

FOR all the great prestige of his Shereefian authority, the Sultan Mohammed V (in publications usually referred to as Mohammed ben Youssef; by the natives as Sidi Mohammed; and by those in closer touch with him as Sidna, or master) has always been less free than the nationalists to voice his opinions, for freedom of expression is almost invariably severely curtailed by kingship. With utmost care he had to weigh not only his policies, but also every phrase in which these were formulated. Unlike his uncle, Moulay Abd el Aziz, he did not disregard the opinion of his own people; and he knew only too well that he was the "prisoner in a gilded cage" whose every move, whether public or private, was watched and carefully interpreted by the French.

When his father Moulay Youssef died in 1927, the new Sultan was only sixteen. The young prince himself was surprised at his election, which must have been decided upon somewhat hastily. His father died on the 17th November, and on the next day, a grey and rainy one, the country's great dignitaries assembled at Fez, according to custom, to deliberate behind closed doors over the succession.

From early morning the *oulema* of the Karaouine, the viziers, the cadis from Fez, and those *shorfa*<sup>1</sup> who were members of the imperial family were engaged on their traditional task. In the vast courtyard of the *makhzeniya*<sup>2</sup> a group of French officials and army men were sheltering from the rain under a long line of arcades. Further away the members of the brass band of the 3rd Regiment of the Foreign Legion stood shivering, their conductor darting expectant glances towards the main building, and awaiting the signal for striking the first notes of the national anthem. Those unacquainted with the ways of the Protectorate régime imagined that the Moorish dignitaries—not unlike cardinals locked up within the Vatican for the election of a new Pontiff—were wrangling over the claims of rival candidates, for rumour had it that the ex-Sultan Abd el Aziz, living in retirement in Tangier, had a strong body of supporters.

<sup>1</sup> *Shorfa*—pl. of *shereef*.

<sup>2</sup> Offices of the government.

In actual fact, nothing very dramatic was happening behind the closed doors. The choice of the new sovereign had been determined prior to the meeting at the Makhzeniya. The only concern of the elderly gentlemen closeted within was the wording of the new *beia*, the document of investiture, that would legalize the position of the new monarch.<sup>3</sup>

"There had been no kind of any discussion." When all was over and the dignitaries appeared in the open, "the Grand Vizier, Mohammed el Mokri, merely said in the quiet voice of an acknowledged patriarch: 'The candidate of the Makhzen is Sidi Mohammed, third son of the departed one.'"<sup>4</sup> That was all. But though it was all he said, it was not the full story. For, possibly without realizing the full implications of his laconic statement, the Grand Vizier had admitted that there had been no election, and that the new monarch was not necessarily the candidate of the *oulema*, by tradition the only authority that had the right to choose a new ruler. Since the Makhzen had no power of its own—we must remember how impotent it had become even under Lyautey, who complained so bitterly of that fact—it was obviously not in a position to decide so important a matter as the choice of a new monarch. To state that Sidi Mohammed was the "candidate of the Makhzen" was to admit that the Residency had made the choice.

Yet no protest was made, and those who are apt to dwell on the "infamy" of this departure from old tradition, should ask themselves to account honestly for this apathy. It would be unfair to pretend that the natives were deeply interested in the person of their new Sultan. Little in their history led them to expect that the eldest son would automatically inherit. Little in their history led them to expect to do much beyond acclaiming a *fait accompli*. For centuries they had been inured to high-handedness of those in power. Once again, then, the accomplished fact passed muster. Nobody spoke, all bowed reverently. The numb-fingered band struck up the Shereefian anthem, and their rendering of the "Marseillaise" closed that stage of the proceedings.

A few hours later, a far larger throng assembled in the Makhzeniya. Native dignitaries, French generals and officials, and the

<sup>3</sup> The *beia*, or *baia*, is almost as old as the Muslim Khalifate. According to Ibn Khaldun, the greatest Arab historian, the *beia* is an "oath of allegiance tendered in the name of the Muslim people. He who makes the *beia* recognizes the rights of the Caliph over the Muslims, and undertakes to obey all his orders whether they are agreeable to his own interests or not". (*Muqaddima*, in the translation of Prof. Alfred Guillaume, in *The Traditions of Islam*, Oxford University Press, 1924, p. 164.) In Morocco the *beia* is the document by which the *oulema* legalize a new Sultan's accession to the throne.

<sup>4</sup> From an article by Michel Kamm, an eyewitness of the events, in *Courier du Maroc*, November 18, 1952.



Ministers and Consuls of foreign Powers represented in Morocco, had come to meet the new sovereign, who awaited them, cushioned at his ease, yet wearing an apprehensive expression. His ceremonial burnous enwrapped him in its folds and dwarfed him. Some of the eyewitnesses have remarked that his expression was "inscrutable". The more emotional propaganda of recent years has even interpreted his inscrutability as a mask for thoughts lying "too deep for tears" or a prophetic vision of years ahead. Yet all we are entitled to assume is suspicion of motives, delayed shock of surprise.

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As a younger son, Sidi Mohammed had not expected to attain the throne, and his early education was not geared for kingship. Of a pensive and retiring disposition, a listener rather than a talker, attentive to religious duties, he appeared to the French an ideal choice as his father's successor. To all appearances unlikely to strike out any emphatic line in politics; brought up in the rigid court discipline of Moulay Youssef; taught from infancy to have high regard for France and to consider her representative on Moorish soil the greatest friend his family possessed, he showed all the malleability that was essential in a nominal head of state whose mind might often have to be made up for him.

One thing is certain. If Sidi Mohammed was chosen for his docility, it should have been realized that this amiable quality was four-fifths immaturity. The young Sultan's apparent indifference to politics was but his realization that as yet he knew little about them; his reticence and dislike of self-assertion were rooted in his recognition of his limitations, but also in his natural caution. At all events, his early practice was to keep in the background, never to contradict the Resident General, to appear at public functions only when duty demanded it, and all the time to learn, perhaps to watch and wait. He attended meticulously to his duties, personally reading every document placed before him, and usually discussing its contents with his viziers.

"The outbreak of the war in 1939 heralded the beginning of a new era in the Sultan's reign. The moment France entered the war, he placed himself and his country unreservedly at the service of France. When, in 1940, France capitulated, he again proclaimed his loyalty to that stricken country."<sup>5</sup> Even if this should have been largely a matter of form, it must be borne in mind that he could have done otherwise. For by that time he was twenty-eight, and no longer the biddable youth of sixteen. And, however loyal to France,

<sup>5</sup> Rom Landau, *The Sultan of Morocco*, London, Robert Hale, 1951, p. 25.

he asserted his will uncompromisingly when the French Resident General Noguès requested him to put into effect the anti-Jewish Nüremberg laws accepted by the Vichy régime. Though the general was something of a personal friend of his, the Sultan refused to comply.

His first appearance in the full limelight of world affairs came in 1943, when, during the Conference of Casablanca, he met President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the two men of the moment. "For the first time in his reign Mohammed V conversed on equal terms, and without French supervision, with a leading foreign statesman [Roosevelt]. Such meetings with representative foreigners as he may have had in the past were infrequent and French-sponsored. Though everything he knew about Roosevelt caused him to look forward to the meeting with optimism, his expectations were surpassed. The Sultan naturally considered his meeting with the American President as an event of great moment in the life of his country."<sup>6</sup> And, it must be added, in his own life as well. Since his accession he had had many years in which to brood over questions that he could now, for the first time, discuss freely. In its earlier years, his sultanate had begun to take on a pattern entirely suitable to the protecting Power's plans: his people could venerate him as their spiritual head, but, in most other spheres, the Residency manoeuvred him into a strictly nominal rulership. In his progress from youth to manhood he grew increasingly critical of such restrictions.

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A pious Muslim, and very proud of the past achievements of his country, Sidi Mohammed was not blind to the fact that Western progress had left Morocco far behind. He knew that his people could never play the part to which he believed them entitled unless they exerted prodigious energy in order to make up for lost time. He, and the nationalists who were to become his friends, recognized that education was the first step towards progress, and without progress there could be no hope of independence.

It is hard for any member of a more highly evolved community to grasp the magnitude of the undertaking. It was not only necessary to provide the facilities for education; it was essential first to make the future beneficiaries thereof aware that Christian lands had anything to offer; essential to persuade the horses to drink once the fountains were provided. As a first step, Sidi Mohammed began to

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 27-8. (The Casablanca meeting is treated in greater detail in the chapter "Second World War".)

found schools at his own expense, and to encourage other Moroccans to do likewise. The great caids, sheltering behind the protestation that modern education might easily prove dangerous to the teachings of Islam, or that it might encourage dabbling in politics, did little to follow the monarch's example. His most eager disciples were the nationalists. While their schools had the usual scholastic aims and followed the generally accepted curriculum, there was some justice in the contention of their enemies that these schools were "breeding places" of nationalist ideas.<sup>7</sup> Of course every school must be a "breeding place" of one set of ideas or another, and no man will venture to inculcate ideas he despises. The schools of the nationalists emphasized Moroccan history and successive civilizations—subjects completely neglected in the schools run by the Administration—and included courses on current affairs or citizenship, in the hope of developing a sense of national self-awareness. In most countries such courses are taken for granted, education for patriotism and citizenship being considered a legitimate and desirable process. With conditions as they were, the dividing line between national self-awareness (patriotism) and nationalism was so tenuous as to be almost non-existent. Having to start from scratch, the nationalists were not trying to restore a system which the coming of the Protectorate banished for the time being. In this sense their problem was three-fold. They had to educate the young into national awareness and pride, at the same time acquainting them with certain evils of their undemocratic past; and they had to keep the education undiluted by alien ideologies of unscrupulous opportunists.

Some aspects of this problem have faced all Muslim countries. Most of them have had to relate Islamic precepts—so many of which have in the course of time become fossilized or distorted by sectarianism, obscurantism or political considerations—to the demands of modern times. The two principal spheres in which such a reconciliation was imperative were those of law and education. Neither traditional Kuranic education, as given to children, nor the antiquated curriculum of the Karaouine University, could measure up to modern standards. But a strictly secular education, or one stemming from the Christian inheritance, was obviously unsuitable for a people whose lives were based on Islamic precepts taking precedence of every other compulsion.

The Sultan formulated his solution of the dilemma in the course

<sup>7</sup> The author has visited many of these schools unannounced, has attended innumerable classes, and is acquainted with a number of directors and teachers of the schools. He can thus claim to have a first-hand knowledge of their ways and methods.

of a conversation with the author. During their early formative years, he explained, Moorish children should receive an Arab, Islamic education that would shape their moral and ethical precepts. Once these were firmly instilled, they should benefit from some elements of modern Western education, and acquire the knowledge and techniques indispensable for life in a modern community. This may not have been a perfectly sound doctrine, for it cut at the roots of the accepted notions of an integrated education. But for all that, it obviously was a step in the right direction. It acknowledged the dilemma and it attempted a compromise.

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Sidi Mohammed brought up his own children according to his educational principles. Sons and daughters alike received first an Islamic religious training and then a modern education based on the curriculum of French schools. His eldest son, Prince Moulay Hassan, obtained a degree in French law. His daughters discarded the veil and came out of the seclusion which would have been their portion a few years earlier. They took part in sport and various "Western" pastimes; they wore European-type clothing; they opened bazaars, made occasional speeches, distributed prizes at schools.

Such innovations displeased many. Some of the great caïds and certain members of influential brotherhoods initiated whispering campaigns alleging that Islam was being betrayed.

Some of the fears may have been genuine, but much of the resentment was rooted in antagonism to a ruler whose progressive methods were a danger to all classes deriving benefit from the backwardness of their followers. Once these were brought in touch with modern ideas, had become literate, and could judge matters for themselves, they were bound to turn away from the precepts of feudalism and superstition that formed the main weapons in the armoury of their masters.

This clandestine campaign against the monarch became particularly virulent in 1948, when anonymous tracts vilifying him were distributed secretly. "An investigation . . . led to the founder of a 'religious brotherhood', Abd el Hay Kittani, and Col. Lecomte, in the service of the Residency," the Paris periodical *Temps Modernes*<sup>8</sup> revealed. And Professor Julien states that it was "at the Residency itself that, in 1948, one of the most influential personalities had a filthy tract in Arabic prepared and distributed".<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> July 1953, p. 131.

<sup>9</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 369.

Sidi Mohammed emphasized, whenever possible, his unswerving loyalty to the unvitiated core of Islamic tradition. His personal piety was unquestioned, and whenever he embraced modernism in one or another of his official capacities, he tried to assess the validity of his deeds in the light of his inherited beliefs. He performed punctiliously the many religious functions demanded of an Imam; always paid his official visit to the mosque on Fridays; kept the fast of the Ramadhan as strictly as the least of his subjects; never appeared in public save in traditional native robes.

In his private life, however, he did the hundred and one things that any Western monarch might do: drove his own car, played tennis, and enjoyed such pastimes as riding and shooting. He had his own farm run according to up-to-date Western methods; had his own gymnasium and swimming pool; collected books, and on suitable occasions wore Western dress. But born into, and brought up in, the ancient ways of his country, he also maintained some of the older customs. Thus he retained the tradition of an elaborate procedure at court, and did not do away with the habit of accepting lavish presents from native dignitaries on certain holidays. So as not to offend too much against the susceptibilities of his more conservative subjects, he kept his two wives in seclusion,<sup>10</sup> and would let them take no part in public life. In accordance with established etiquette, he would take luncheon by himself. Only on Fridays, when his viziers accompanied him to the mosque, would some of them be invited to share his midday meal. But even some of the most intimate aspects of his life would show a blend of tradition and modernism. Thus, while his evening meal would be Moorish, luncheon was often "European". While that meal was partaken of in traditional solitude, he might share his dinner with some of his children, preferably with his eldest son; or he might even dine at the latter's house at Suissi, a few miles outside Rabat. He would never omit his evening prayers, but these might be preceded by a game of tennis, and the Moorish dinner might be followed by a film show in his private quarters. Unlike some of the great caids, he abided strictly by the Muslim injunction proscribing the drinking of alcohol. It is not the historian's task to say whether all these practices add up to a canny determination to make the best of both worlds or to a less egotistic effort towards a reconciliation of inherited and modern ways. What matters is that many of his more enlightened subjects were aware of his dilemma and knew that there was no generally acceptable solution.

Sidi Mohammed adopted the Moorish part of royal etiquette with natural ease, but often chafed under the restrictions placed upon him

<sup>10</sup> Islamic law permits a man to have four wives.

by the routines worked out for him by the Residency. According to these, he was not to receive foreign visitors unless they were sponsored by the Residency. Thus, while he was brought in contact with people from abroad whom he was not particularly anxious to meet, those he was eager to converse with would be withheld from him. Even when permitted to receive foreigners, he had to endure the presence of the *conseiller chérifien*, a French official—"our private Gestapo supervisor"—an incautious member of the Makhzen once called him—and had to weigh every word. Under the pressure of events following the crisis of 1951, he managed to see a few foreigners not hand-picked by the authorities.

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As Sidi Mohammed gained in experience, his attitude became more assertive and his words more outspoken. Always careful not to act until he was convinced that he would have the majority of his politically conscious people behind him, he kept his ear very closely attuned to the rhythm of their thoughts and sentiments. Likewise, he would not make an important decision without first ascertaining the opinions of those who, either by office or by virtue of his past appreciation of their advice, were to be relied upon for wise counsel. He would listen patiently to his viziers, to members of his court, and to personal friends, and ponder their views. Yet, when he at last acted, his decision would often prove a very unexpected one. It seemed that by some intuitive faculty he was able to discern the will of the people in spite of the advice of counsellors who might have been, ostensibly, in closer touch with the masses. In the fifties he shared problems more and more often with his eldest son, who even at the early age of twenty revealed a surprising grasp of affairs.

Both in his public pronouncements and in notes to the French government, his wording would invariably show a courtesy that gave it an irreproachable correctness. Not conspicuously intellectual, not exceptionally well educated, Sidi Mohammed yet possessed a remarkable flair for affairs of state. His years of religious training, observation and contemplation had given his mind both range and depth; a more thorough modern education might easily have blunted some of his perceptions.

In such diplomatic negotiations as were allowed him he was greatly assisted by a charm that often disarmed even those who had come in a spirit of hostility. Not strikingly handsome, he impressed by the dignity of his appearance—especially if dressed in native clothes—and by a manner in which the traditional "royal" aloof-

ness was counterbalanced by exemplary courtesy. A faint hint of shyness was anything but a drawback.

In his early years Sidi Mohammed knew himself to be mistrusted by his people, who saw in him a willing tool of the Residency; in his later years he became their idol. There could be no doubt that high hopes were centred in him as not only their legitimate spokesman and Imam but also as symbol of their aspirations.

In the Muslim world in general, he was, at first, almost unknown. From the moment of his proving that he really spoke for his people, his renown in the Middle East began to grow. Such Arab statesmen as had a chance of visiting him, brought back enthusiastic accounts of the Sultan's wisdom, of his popularity with his own people and of his increasing unpopularity with the Protectorate authorities and the colonialists. This last circumstance alone sufficed to enlist Muslim sympathies for him. Suspicions of colonial Powers were still too acute for objectivity and a right sense of proportion on the part of Middle Eastern observers. So it was only to be expected that the events of 1951 and 1953 established Sidi Mohammed as a hero and a martyr in the eyes of the Arab world.

## THE SECOND WORLD WAR

THE outbreak of the Second World War might well have provided an occasion for the nationalists to press their claims or to cause major troubles which would have proved embarrassing to the French. Instead they made it known that the words of the Sultan's proclamation, published on September 3, 1939, should be loyally implemented by everyone. The crucial passage of the proclamation was as follows: "From to-day and until such time as the efforts of France and her Allies are crowned with victory, we must render her every help without reserve. We will not stint any of our resources and will not hesitate before any sacrifice." France was thus at liberty to send immediately 20,000 Moroccan troops into battle.

So far as Moroccan interests were concerned, the war of the Allies was not their war. In fact, ever since the day in 1905 when the German Kaiser had declared himself a (self-appointed) guardian of Moroccan independence, the Moors had tended to regard Germany with sympathy. And since Germany as a colonizing power had perforce been inactive since 1919, she was felt to be innocent of at least one kind of oppression.

When France collapsed in the spring of 1940, the nationalists might again have seized the opportunity to stab her in the back. As it was, most of the troops that were to fight under the French flag in the Libyan desert were Moroccans. Later still, Moroccan troops distinguished themselves in many of the bloodiest battles fought in North Africa. They lent support to General Anderson's armies in the battles of Kromire and Bizerte; General Patton asked that Moroccan soldiers should join the expedition against Sicily; in September 1943 they had a rôle to play in the conquest of Corsica, and, a few months later, in that of Elba. In Italy they proved their mettle in the campaigns of the Abruzzi, of Garighano and Petralla. They fought at the foot of Monte Cassino; they took part in the march on Rome; they helped to clear the Seine of Nazis; and, when the Allies landed on France's Mediterranean coast in August 1944, they bore the main responsibility for liberating Marseilles. Finally, after crossing the Siegfried Line, they pushed on to Stuttgart, and reached the banks of the Danube when Germany capitulated.



lated. The soil of North Africa, Corsica, Elba and Sicily, of France, Italy and Germany, is well drenched with Moorish blood. "The Moroccan volunteers who helped to liberate France, and who at the same time served the cause of the United Nations, made up a total of 300,000 men."<sup>1</sup> When the war was over, General de Gaulle, in the name of France, bestowed the Cross of Liberation upon the Sultan in recognition of the latter's great war efforts on behalf of France.

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As things were, Morocco had to sink or swim with France; but the attitude of the Sultan and the nationalists—the only native movement with a political consciousness and organization—to the Allied cause was a matter of some significance to the Western Powers. They had chosen Morocco as the first substantial springboard for their offensive against the Nazis, and had to count on native co-operation if they were not to fail. The Moroccans, like all Arabs, admired force and success, and many of them were impressed by German might and German victories on various battlefields. But, following the lead of the Sultan—a firm believer in Allied victory—they remained loyal to the cause of the Western Powers. Before the arrival of the allied troops, many expected that memories of 1905 and the money so freely distributed by German agents on the spot would turn the Moroccans against the Allies. Yet even before 1942, one of the agents of the State Department stationed in Morocco, could write, "it seems astonishing that the majority of the Arabs were on our side".<sup>2</sup>

There were, of course, good reasons why the Moroccans should have been on the side of the U.S. Relations between the two countries had never been clouded by any conflicts. The U.S. was regarded as the land of freedom and anti-colonialism, and was too young a country ever to have ruled over an Islamic people. President Theodore Roosevelt's interest in the Conference of Algeciras had not been forgotten, and the Atlantic Charter, signed by another Roosevelt, made a profound impression upon the Moors. It must also be added that when, in 1941, American "observers" had established themselves in the Maghreb, American milk and cotton goods came promptly in their wake to relieve some of the misery that war had brought about.

Great Britain, too, was judged to be a friend worthy of support. Before 1912, Britain had been the chief importer of Moroccan pro-

<sup>1</sup> M. A. Bennouna, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Kenneth Pendar, *Le Dilemme France-Etats Unis*, Paris, Editions Self, 1948, p. 110.

ducts and the chief exporter of goods the natives needed. Bedsteads made of gilded iron or brass, English grandfather clocks and teapots and other utensils for the making of mint tea, all of English make, were among the most cherished possessions of self-respecting Moorish families. Throughout most of the nineteenth century Great Britain had had the good fortune to be represented in Morocco by diplomats who had gained the confidence of successive Sultans and the respect of the population. The goodwill Britain had accumulated in the course of years was sufficiently strong to minimize the effects of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, by which Britain was alleged to have "sold Morocco to the French".

In 1940 and 1941 German propagandists were extremely active in Morocco, and made prodigious efforts to win over the native population. According to Admiral Leahy, U.S. Ambassador to Vichy, "some 3,000 German 'scientists and tourists' were visiting Morocco and spreading propaganda among the Arabs".<sup>3</sup> What was the effect of all this propaganda? The Moroccans "listened anxiously to the speeches of German agents, discussed them endlessly, and, finally, did not believe in them".<sup>4</sup> At one moment a secret report by Germany's chief agent, Theodor Auer, to his government in Berlin, found its way into Moroccan papers, with disastrous effects for the German cause. For in the report its author observed that the Moroccans were a "degenerate people", unworthy of the Herrenvolk's consideration.

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General Noguès, the Resident General, together with practically all the officials of the French Administration, were passionately Pétainist. When Mr. Robert Murphy, President Roosevelt's chief civilian adviser in North Africa, reported on the various French personalities to be taken into account in view of the forthcoming French landing, he stated: "Noguès, Gener., Resident of Morocco, not expected to be of any use and is expected to comply, in so far as he finds it possible, with orders received from Vichy."<sup>5</sup> Not surprisingly, all those Frenchmen "who were close to the Residency became more and more openly anti-American".<sup>6</sup> Noguès remained strongly anti-American throughout the period preceding the Allied invasion and even during it.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, London, Gollancz, 1950, p. 90.

<sup>4</sup> Pendar, op. cit., p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> Admiral Leahy, op. cit., p. 139.

<sup>6</sup> Pendar, op. cit., p. 108.

<sup>7</sup> After meeting Noguès during President Roosevelt's visit to Casablanca, Mr. Harry Hopkins, the President's close friend and adviser, wrote: "At dinner I sat next to General Noguès. I wouldn't trust him as far as I could spit." (*The White House Papers of Harry Hopkins*, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949, vol. II, p. 687.)

In his book, *Crusade in Europe*, General Eisenhower referred to Noguès as "untrustworthy and worse", and as "notorious".<sup>8</sup>

But there were other Frenchmen in Morocco, especially in the army, who were anti-Pétain and pro-Ally. Most of them worked devotedly for the Allied cause, often at the greatest risk to themselves. But in the prevailing atmosphere, they could not come out into the open when the Administration and the French civilian colony were only too eager to follow Vichy.

When the Allied landing in Morocco began, Noguès "informed Darlan in Algiers that he had rejected the United States ultimatum".<sup>9</sup> He gave orders that the Americans were to be resisted, and, as a result, many American lives were lost. "It was not until the morning of November 11th [that is, three days after the landing had begun] that Noguès, under Darlan's orders, surrendered."<sup>10</sup>

When Pétain accepted the Nuremburg anti-Jewish laws and transmitted them to Morocco, General Noguès, as we have observed, was unable to persuade the Sultan to promulgate them.<sup>11</sup> The Sultan went further, and issued a proclamation that stated: "Moroccan Jews are my subjects, and my duty is to protect them against any aggression." When the war was over, M. René Cassin, President of the French *Alliance Israélite*, sent the Sultan a letter in which, in the name of all French Jews, he thanked him for having saved the lives of so many of their race. For indeed "the life and property of many thousands of Jews were saved thanks to the Sultan's courage and to the support he received from the entire Muslim community in Morocco. Nevertheless, there were many instances when the Sultan's efforts failed, and when French administrators eagerly followed their Vichy masters, sequestering Jewish enterprises, imposing heavy fines on their owners, and even sending numbers of Jews to concentration camps."<sup>12</sup>

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For two years, under Vichy orders, the French authorities kept in close contact with members of the German commission stationed in Morocco. The Sultan, however, refused to see them. At the time of the American landing, he completely dissociated himself from Noguès' decision to resist the Allies, "affirming his solidarity with the Americans".<sup>13</sup> He ordered Noguès to cease fighting, told

<sup>8</sup> London, Heinemann, 1948, pp. 141 and 143.

<sup>9</sup> Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, London, Cassell, 1951, vol. IV, p. 554.

<sup>10</sup> Churchill, *ibid.*, p. 556.

<sup>11</sup> There always has been a strong anti-Jewish element in France, and it was this element that was speaking for France in those tragic years.

<sup>12</sup> *Moroccan News Bulletin*, Washington, D.C., No. 5, November 28, 1952.

<sup>13</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

him that "the French army can wade the waters and fight outside of our territories", and reminded him that Morocco had declared war against Germany "in defence of the Allied cause, and had never signed an armistice".<sup>14</sup>

Hitler's racial "philosophies" did not endear the Nazis to the Moroccans, who knew quite well that Germany was not interested in Moroccan independence, and was merely "bargaining for Morocco" (with General Franco), "besides exploiting its resources for war purposes".<sup>15</sup> The Germans were led to believe, by French denigrations, that the nationalists were a meaningless clique. In consequence, they made no effort to get in touch with nationalist leaders, but thought their best move was to contact Thami el Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh. But even there, their efforts failed.

The nationalists were hoping that their country's contribution to the Allied war effort would earn some recognition. When, in 1941, prior to the American landing, General de Gaulle "initiated negotiations with Allal el Fassi in exile in Gabon . . . with the aim of starting a movement to liberate Morocco from the Vichy rule", hopes ran high. Allal el Fassi "agreed to collaborate on condition that 'General de Gaulle comprehends the aspirations of the Moroccan people'",<sup>16</sup> and he believed he might reach some agreement with de Gaulle in July 1941, when the General sent the following cable to Brazzaville: "I have studied the problem of El Fassi and Morocco and shall bring the relevant file with me to Brazzaville."<sup>17</sup> But the negotiations came to nothing, and de Gaulle's representative informed el Fassi, who was still in exile in Gabon, that "General de Gaulle is just as angry as you are. He wished to reach a solution of the Moroccan question with you. But Great Britain and the United States demanded that he should let you go and declare the independence of Morocco. This created many suspicions in the mind of the General who refuses to act under any kind of pressure."<sup>18</sup> Whether it was a result of the General's being "angry" or because of some other circumstance, el Fassi remained in exile for another three years.

The American landing soon enough altered the situation completely, as Morocco was automatically liberated from Vichy, without

<sup>14</sup> Bennouna, op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>15</sup> Bennouna, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>16</sup> Bennouna, op. cit., p. 58.

<sup>17</sup> Allal el Fassi, *The History of North African Independence Movements* (in Arabic), Cairo, 1949. The title of the American edition published in 1954 by the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D.C., is *The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa*.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 271-280.

either French or nationalist intervention. But the liberation was destined to be as short-lived as Vichy dominance.

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There is one event in modern Moroccan affairs that seemed very significant at the time, and the lustre of which is still only partially dimmed. It was the meeting between the Sultan and President Roosevelt during the Casablanca Conference.

By the time that meeting came about, the Moroccan nation looked upon the American President as the greatest man of his period. It was a tonic to their self-esteem that this leader of the Western Alliance should not only wish to meet their sovereign but should treat him as a ruler whose point of view and plans for the future were of personal concern to him.

It might almost be said that the meeting between Sultan and President initiated a new era in Moroccan affairs: putting Morocco on the American or, at least, presidential map (where it figured already, of course, but in a purely strategic connotation); and it gave the Sultan (and his people) the hope that they had secured an ally whose power would at long last enable their country to come into its own.

Several authors have described in detail the famous dinner party of January 22, 1943, when the Sultan was the President's guest. Among others were Prince Moulay Hassan, the Sultan's eldest son—"a kid about thirteen and quite bright" in Harry Hopkins' words—Winston Churchill, General Noguès—"not in a very easy frame of mind because I imagine that he knows perfectly well that we may throw him out any minute"<sup>19</sup>—the President's son, Elliott, who acted as his A.D.C., and who wrote the most comprehensive report of the party.

The British Prime Minister was not exactly on top of the world, since, in deference to the Sultan's religion, no alcohol was served, a circumstance that had already, a day earlier, filled him with dark forebodings. In a note he sent to Harry Hopkins to inform him of his programme for the following evening, he wrote, "Dinner. At the White House (Dry, alas!) with the Sultan. After dinner, recovery from the effects of the above."<sup>20</sup> Whatever the cause, when the great evening came the British Premier was "glum, and seemed to be real bored".<sup>21</sup>

Not so the host and the guest of honour. The President showed the liveliest interest in Morocco's past and present, and made numerous suggestions regarding its future. The Sultan, impressed

<sup>19</sup> Harry Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 687.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*

and delighted by his host's interest, supplied all the information required, and repeatedly asked the President's advice. At the same time Roosevelt was very favourably impressed by the Sultan's keen interest in America. Mr. Pendar, who a few days later acted as the President's host in Marrakesh, reports, "The President spoke to me of his conversation with the Sultan, and of the extraordinary interest the sovereign had shown in America and all things American."<sup>22</sup> It was obvious to everyone that both Sultan and President were having a really good time. The tenor of the President's remarks was that Morocco should not permit foreigners to drain her wealth, that she should develop her vast economic potential for her own benefit, and that a "sovereign government should retain considerable control over its own resources". Altogether, "it was a delightful dinner, everybody, with one exception, enjoying himself completely". No one was more elated than the Sultan. "His face glowed. 'A new future for my country.'"<sup>23</sup> And the guest who was not enjoying himself might possibly have felt entitled to his bilious humour, for the President's words, he might well have been reflecting, were fine ones that butter no parsnips. Perhaps he remembered that the "vast economic potential" had remained untapped before the opportunist French came to the scene, and, for various mixed motives, sank vast sums of their own capital in Moroccan ventures. French critics have indeed pointed out that, at this particular moment, it was easy enough to talk of large slices of cake for all but the Germans. Even the staunchest supporter of Moroccan demands for independence had to remember that Great Britain and the U.S. were not at war with France, and, for better or worse, had been given no mandate to settle the Moroccan question. Nevertheless, it is perhaps understandable that at the time of the meeting such considerations did not weigh too heavily with those taking part in it. And it seemed only natural that the Sultan should gather the impression that the President had as good as guaranteed to Morocco the regaining of her full political and economic sovereignty. That impression gained weight from numerous statements made by Roosevelt in the course of other conversations on the same topic. For instance, a few months later he met King Ibn Saud's Foreign Minister, and repeated his views of "Morocco's entitlement to benefit from what was hers by right".

His son Elliott made prompt notes of talks he had with his father, and one of his observations was to the effect that the Allies would "have to maintain military control of French colonies here in North

<sup>22</sup> Pendar, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>23</sup> Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946, pp. III-12.

Africa".<sup>24</sup> This, however, may have been merely the remark of a strategist, and bereft of political implications. But there was no ambiguity in the President's following remarks: "Why does Morocco, inhabited by Moroccans, belong to France? . . . Anything must be better than to live under French colonial rule! . . . When we've won the war, I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will further France's imperialistic ambitions."<sup>25</sup>

The Sultan received two letters from the President, later on, and from both he derived the same comfort as before. It was believed generally that in those letters Roosevelt "promised to act personally at the end of the war to hasten the coming of Morocco's independence".<sup>26</sup> It may be, as French observers are wont to point out, that had the President lived longer, he might not have been able to keep his promises. In view of the hideously exacting times that lay ahead, this may be so. But we are equally justified in assuming that his hopes were genuine, and that the complications occasioned by the later air-base negotiations were as yet unsuspected.

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Even after the arrival of the Americans, the greater part of the French population in Morocco remained pro-Vichy. Those among them who supported the *Résistance*, who had often risked their positions and their very lives in the Allied cause, were cold-shouldered by their compatriots. The American military authorities, ignorant of local conditions, fraternized with French colleagues who had been in power under Vichy rather than with the men who had been their true allies.<sup>27</sup> This state of affairs continued even after June 5, 1943, when General Noguès was removed from office.

The Moroccans viewed these surprising developments with increasing anxiety. Even the Gaullists seemed to them a doubtful quantity. "Brought in to defend the patrimony and the independence of France against the appetites or compromises of the Allies, they [the Gaullists] came to believe that any concession to the natives would be a sign of weakness and would ruin the prestige of the protecting nation. They stuck to their intransigence, let suitable opportunities for action slip, and appeared to the Moroccans quite as sectarian as their predecessors had been."<sup>28</sup>

The appointment of Gabriel Puaux as new Resident General did

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 115-16.

<sup>26</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

<sup>27</sup> Pendar, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

<sup>28</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

nothing to relieve the gloom. His record as French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon at the beginning of the war was not such as to inspire confidence. For it was he who had been responsible for the dissolution of the Syrian Parliament, the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of the Lebanese Parliament, and the forced dismissal of the Lebanese government. As Secretary General in Tunisia from 1919 till 1922, he had introduced some very reactionary measures, and in his new rôle in Morocco he regarded himself as a "pro-Consul in the Roman manner".<sup>29</sup> His "conservative spirit made it impossible for him to understand national and popular aspirations",<sup>30</sup> and rather than seeing in Morocco a country whose sovereignty and independence had been guaranteed by the twelve chief Powers of the world, he thought of it "as a sort of repository of French greatness". His formula for action was that the Sultan must be made to realize that "independence was not a concept that was compatible with the existing commitments".<sup>31</sup>

The Moroccans still relied on the probability of American assistance, but the French authorities made contacts between them and the Americans well-nigh impossible. "In Marrakesh, the French command even requested that Americans should have no conversations with the local Pasha except through an official French interpreter."<sup>32</sup>

The disappointment of politically conscious Moroccans grew ever more bitter as they perceived the unlikelihood of the Administration's acknowledging that conditions had changed since 1912. As General Catroux wrote in his book *Dans la Bataille de la Méditerranée*, "To my great regret, in Morocco nothing really concrete was done, on the political plane, to modify the former [Vichy] Protectorate régime."

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"Disillusioned at length by the failure of the Allies to relax the French grip, Moroccan nationalists took matters into their own hands, and on January 11, 1944, presented the French Resident General with a declaration of Moroccan independence."<sup>33</sup> The

<sup>29</sup> "The unintelligent dictatorship of the Resident General Gabriel Puaux was disastrous. Having already rendered very bad services to France's true interests in Tunisia, he tried to re-establish French authority in Morocco by arresting the militant nationalists, and by depriving the sultan of all real authority. . . . As a result of that policy, the sultan no longer felt himself to be under any moral obligation towards France." (Ignace Lepp, *Midi sonne au Maroc*, p. 200.)

<sup>30</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 343.

<sup>31</sup> *Conférence de presse de G. Puaux*, Paris, December 23, 1944.

<sup>32</sup> Walter B. Cline, *Nationalism in Morocco*, *Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C., January 1947, p. 25.

<sup>33</sup> Cline, op. cit., p. 25.



essence of the document is contained in its last four paragraphs, which embody: 1. a demand for complete independence and unification of the country's four zones; 2. a demand that independence be guaranteed by all "interested Powers"; 3. a request for acceptance of Morocco as a signatory to the Atlantic Charter, and finally; 4. a request for immediate introduction of a democratic constitution.<sup>34</sup> The document for the first time referred to the Sultan as "king". This was done deliberately, for there was little in Morocco's past monarchy of a democratic character, and the Istiqlal wished to stress the difference between the absolute sultans of the past and the constitutional king of the future.

"The French authorities at first played down the declaration while reaffirming the mutual love, loyalty and dependence of Morocco and France." But as realization grew that "the Sultan, many pashas and tribal leaders had indicated their support of the independence movement",<sup>35</sup> the French "Government" in Algiers hastily dispatched its *Commissaire aux affaires étrangères*, M. René Massigli (later French Ambassador in London), to Morocco, and on January 28, he gave the Sultan to understand that by its military contribution to the war, Morocco had merely "*rendu à la France ce que la France lui avait donné*".<sup>36</sup>

General de Gaulle's reaction was to "brush aside any suggestion of independence", and to declare that since Morocco was "indissolubly united to France", political reforms "could not be envisaged, Morocco's status being fixed once and for all by the Protectorate Treaty".<sup>37</sup>

On the day after M. Massigli's speech, the authorities "discovered" that some of the leading Moroccan nationalists were "guilty of intelligence with the enemy [the Germans]", and arrested them. Among the arrested were the two leaders, Balafrej and Mohammed Lyazidi. (Allal el Fassi was still in his Gabon exile.) The arrest of men whom many regarded as national heroes provoked a violent reaction. "Thousands of Moroccans massed between the Medina and the European quarter of Rabat to voice their disapproval. . . . The largest demonstration took place in Fez, where at least thirty Moroccans were killed by Senegalese troops, and where several thousand others were herded into prison camps." According to an eyewitness of the event, Walter B. Cline, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, "the French deliberately incited the uprising in order to bring the nationalists

<sup>34</sup> *Documents du Parti de l'Istiqlal*, 1944-46, pp. 1-4.

<sup>35</sup> Cline, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>36</sup> Quoted by F. Taillard, in *Le Nationalisme Marocain*, 1947, p. 24.

<sup>37</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 347.

into the open before they were dangerously powerful. . . . The uprising gave the French the opportunity to remove the nationalist leaders from the scene."<sup>38</sup> But whether or not this was the case, "the French scored these successes at a high cost. The arrest and prolonged detention of well-known nationalist leaders and the rigorous questioning of lesser individuals created popular heroes and aroused the sympathy of Moroccans at large. . . . Even the Berbers were affected . . . the students of the Berber College at Azrou joined in the demonstration."<sup>39</sup> And Prof. Julien expresses the view that "the policies of an authoritarian Protectorate, as pursued by M. Puaux, have extended Moroccan nationalism and have given it unity and inspiration".<sup>40</sup>

These 1944 events, as one now realizes, fixed the main trend of the policies that the Sultan was to follow during the subsequent nine years of his reign. Both the Istiqlal manifesto and the popular reaction to the persecution of its authors strengthened his own conviction that nothing less than independence would satisfy his country. But he had been taught in childhood to admire and trust the protecting Power, and still relied upon its "good sense". He still hoped that serious friction between the two nations could be prevented. He waited for three years for some sort of renunciation by France. Finally, in 1947, he made a diplomatically worded protest in an official declaration at Tangier, and his demands were those of the nationalist manifesto, expressed with a little more circumlocution.



The end of the war meant comparatively little to the Moroccans. More fortunate in this respect than many European nations, they had seen the last of the battles in 1942. Unmolested by the nightmare of enemy air raids and by other afflictions from which Europe was still suffering, they concentrated on wringing from the French recognition of the fact that a protectorate is not a colony. When M. Auriol, the new President of France, paid an official visit to the Shereefian Empire, the Sultan addressed him in the following words: "Morocco has offered her men, her riches, and the advantages of her geographical position. We have all participated, from the first to the last Moroccan, in the liberation of France at a time when France was in need . . . Morocco hopes that the Fourth Republic will fulfil its obligations toward all peoples who live under

<sup>38</sup> Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>40</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

conditions similar to those prevailing in our own country, by granting them their political and social liberties, and giving them justice and equality. Such action will help to strengthen the relations between France and the Muslim world and reaffirm the ties of sympathy between her and the Arab peoples. France must always bear in mind that Morocco, which knew how to accept sacrifices, also wishes to realize her ambitions."



*Part Six*

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FRENCH ACHIEVEMENTS



## FRENCH VERSION

THE time has come to assess the extent and worth of the French contribution to Morocco's material prosperity. That contribution is too spectacular to be dismissed even by the enemies of France. Few countries of the world have made greater strides forward in the last forty years than has Morocco. The official figures and statistics make an impressive showing. But statistics by themselves are notoriously misleading. Moreover, figures concerned with Morocco have to be treated with even greater caution than usual. No outside observer, however painstaking, can hope to arrive at all the correct figures and to unravel their essential meaning. The French records are not disinterested and the pre-Protectorate ones were casual to the point of uselessness. For a great many years both the French authorities and the nationalists have been waging an acrimonious war of figures. If their computations agreed, the case was exceptional. The interpretation of given figures depended entirely upon the affinities of the interpreter. It must also be borne in mind that most economic transactions in Morocco had some political motive behind them, so that relevant statistics are apt to be selective.

It seems therefore that the least unsatisfactory way to review Moroccan progress since 1912 is to present both French and Moroccan versions. In the present chapter Moroccan achievements are described on the basis of French official statements and figures. In the next chapter the process will be reversed, and the Moroccan version of the same circumstances will be given. The material contained in the present account is taken from three official publications: *L'Œuvre de la France au Maroc de 1912 à 1947* and *Morocco 1950*, both published for the Protectorate authorities by Editions Africaines Perceval, Rabat, in 1948 and 1950 respectively, and from *News from France*, published by the French Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York, Nos. 9 and 10, November 15 and December 15, 1951.

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According to French official spokesmen, "material changes,

improvement in the standard of living, and permanent contact with modern civilization have transformed Moroccan society". This transformation is said to be based upon reforms "which France initiates and puts into effect. The Protectorate decides on the reform policy and controls its execution."<sup>1</sup>

In the economic sphere, the chief instruments for putting the reform policy into effect were the Government Council and the Chambers of Agriculture, of Commerce and of Industry. In creating them, "the Protectorate's objective was to limit the sovereignty firmly concentrated in the Makhzen by means of consultative organs destined to evolve proportionately to the political development of the people. . . . The agricultural representatives are now elected by farmers using modern methods, and by the members of the councils of the Moroccan Provident Society. . . . The electoral college of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry has been broadened to include all classes of licensed business men, industrialists and artisans.

"After forty years of French technical assistance, there is economic security even in the most remote areas. Morocco is becoming part of the modern world. . . . The Protectorate laid the foundations of a modern infrastructure which would make it possible to organize rapidly an economy designed, on the one hand, to fulfil the aspirations of a predominantly agricultural population and, on the other, to develop the country's natural, hydraulic, and mining resources for the dual purpose of providing work for a constantly growing population and of increasing Morocco's participation in world trade."

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We might wind up these introductory remarks of our French spokesman by some quotations from an essay by Marcel Rouffie. Since that essay has been much quoted by the Protectorate authorities, it may be regarded as semi-official. "Altogether," the author writes, "it is undeniable that the Moroccan population owes to the Protectorate a general improvement in its living standards. Certain of its classes can thank the Protectorate for a comfort and well-being that were inconceivable before the French arrival. . . . It may be true that the inequality in the distribution of wealth among the Moroccan people has been even more pronounced [since]. But

<sup>1</sup> "While the sovereign's power was restored to him, France introduced reforms in all spheres of the country in order to make it into a modern State in conformity with the Protectorate Treaty's terms. . . . At the same time [the Protectorate] modernized the old forms of local power and justice, for in the Protectorate Treaty France had undertaken to respect tradition and the Muslim religion." (Service Général de l'Information, Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, in the *N.Y. Times*, January 4, 1955.)



France is not responsible for this: the culprit is the Moroccan social order which it is difficult to change."<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \*

Let us now follow our official guide through the different spheres of Moroccan economy. "One of the factors that has contributed most to the improved nutrition of the rural people is the increase in the land area cultivated by the Moroccan peasants. There are in Morocco about 46 million acres of productive land. Of this amount, the area cultivated was:

	1919	1939
By Europeans	74,000	988,000
By Moroccans	4,940,000	10,868,000

"Morocco's agricultural potentialities raise great hopes if one considers the fact that there are still approximately 7,410,000 acres of unploughed land, 19,760,000 acres of pasture land and 247,000 acres of recoverable swamp land.

"From 1931 to 1940, Morocco's cereal requirements amounted to a yearly average of 2 million tons, including 500,000 tons of bread cereals and 1.46 million tons of secondary cereals. During the same period the average production was 740,000 tons of bread cereals and 1,558,000 tons of secondary cereals. Morocco could thus export an average surplus of approx. 300,000 tons. The situation has changed since 1940 because of the increase in Morocco's population, the changes in food habits of the increasing urban population, and the lack of security reserves due to the disastrous drought of 1945. The production of cereals in 1949-50 totalled 1.8 million tons. Morocco now imports soft wheat and exports barley and corn."<sup>3</sup>

Increase in other cultivated areas is shown in the following table:

	1939 (hectare <sup>4</sup> )	1949 (hectare)
Vines	23,800	29,500
Various fruit trees	28,000	99,900
Olive trees	82,000	103,000
Almond trees	33,400	56,000
Citrus fruit	10,800	23,800
Palm trees	21,500	59,200
Market gardening	25,000	52,000

<sup>2</sup> Marcel Rouffie, *Le Protectorat a-t-il fait faillite? Un chapitre de la crise marocaine*, Casablanca, Editions de la S.I.P.E.F., 1951.

<sup>3</sup> "In 1954 the cereal crop was 3,300,000 tons." (*Newsletter*, Moroccan Studies and Surveys, Rabat, No. 16, December 1954.)

<sup>4</sup> 1 hectare—2.47 acres.

	Average output under Moroccan methods	Average output under European methods
Hard wheat	5.87 quintals per hectare	7.69 quintals per hectare
Soft wheat	5.47	9.75

"Before the Protectorate was established, agriculture in Morocco suffered from the greatest insecurity of proprietary rights. In order to put an end to this situation, the Administration of the Protectorate instituted, in 1913, the registration of property, in accordance with the principles of the Torrens Act." The number of estates registered between the introduction of this system and 1949 is as follows:

French	
Town property	12,323
Rural property	11,050
Moroccan	
Town property	9,696
Rural property	31,487

"The ownership of farm land in Morocco is almost entirely in the hands of the Moroccans. Europeans hold only 2.47 million acres.

"Moroccan farmers are about 850,000 in number. There are some 6,000 European farmers, 4,300 of whom settled independently on land which they had bought from the preceding owners in the ordinary way, while 1,700 took up allotments between 1918 and 1935 on property officially colonized, by setting aside State lands or purchasing estates from collective or individual owners.

"These colonists, nine-tenths of whom are French, play an important part in the economic and technical development of the country. It has always been noticed that in regions where colonists have been settled for some length of time, Moroccan farmers make the most appreciable progress.

"'Sectors for Modernization of the Peasantry' (S.M.P.) carry on the work of modernization and development. They were created in 1945, and their aim is to: bring under cultivation fresh areas of arable land; to get the Moroccan farmer to carry out this development by setting at his disposal an extensive range of agricultural equipment, and to initiate him into modern methods of farming; to ensure the productivity of the Moroccan farmer's labours by carrying out collectively, with scientific organization, the conditioning and marketing of his produce.

"The creation of a 'Livestock Service' in 1914 resulted not only in a rapid increase in Moroccan livestock, but also in its improve-

ment, which made possible the expansion of the frozen and canned meat industry.

"The Water and Forestry Service has endeavoured to preserve the Moroccan forests, in danger of destruction, by launching a reforestation programme and regulating the utilization of forest products.<sup>5</sup> Over 14,820 acres of drifting sands have been stabilized by means of beach grass (marram) and castor-oil plants. Moreover, a forest servicing programme has been gradually carried out, through the construction of 1,860 miles of forest roads (against 139.5 in 1920)."

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As has been stated in an earlier chapter, one of the crying needs of Moroccan agriculture was large-scale irrigation.<sup>6</sup> "It was only in 1929," our French guide informs us, "that hydraulic development was begun. Its dual purpose was to increase the areas of cultivatable land by means of irrigation, and to meet the country's increasing need of electric power. The hydraulic possibilities in Morocco allow of the irrigation of at least 2,471,000 acres. In 1935 only 37,000 acres were irrigated. To-day [1950] the total area of cultivated land 'submitted to irrigation' is 540,000 acres. Whereas in 1915 there was not a single reservoir with dams, in 1949 there were four.<sup>7</sup>

"Production of hydro-electric power, begun in 1929, amounted to 110 million kwh. in 1938. The large plants of Im'Fout and Daourat, in service since the end of the war, total an average annual production of 220 million kwh. The Afouer and Bin el Ouidane works should produce an additional 460 million kwh. by 1956. Parallel with the construction of transformer stations and with the extension of the already existing network of 22,000 and 60,000 volt

<sup>5</sup> The Four Year Plan 1954-7 earmarked 360 million francs for the reforestation of additional 12,000 hectares with eucalyptus trees. (*Rapport Général de la Commission d'Étude*, etc., June 1954, p. 33.)

<sup>6</sup> Moroccan soils vary widely. There are at least twenty-four basic types. "In the lowland areas of the irrigation perimeters these may be grouped broadly into three classes: *tirs*, *hamri* and *r'mel*. *Tirs* comprise a wide range of black soils, formed originally under marshy conditions. . . . *Hamri* are a diverse series of red soils with a calcareous crust and an upper granular structure. *R'mel* are red sandy soils." (J. M. Houston, *The Significance of Irrigation in Morocco's Economic Development*, *The Geographical Journal*, London, September 1954, p. 318.)

<sup>7</sup> "The most spectacular development has been the construction of eight great barrage dams and ten large diversion dams in new irrigation schemes." (*ibid.*, p. 323.) Describing these various dams in some detail, J. M. Houston remarks: "The mistake of embarking on too many ambitious projects at once has been realized. . . . Although the scheme (of the El-Kansera dam) was commenced in 1935, only 50 per cent of the perimeter had been put under irrigation in 1951, and the cost of the dam has been five times the estimated cost. The disproportionate benefit of irrigation to the European settlers in such costly schemes is also subject to criticism."

lines, the construction of a 150,000 volt system, which will make it possible to connect the Moroccan and Algerian networks, has been undertaken."

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Before the arrival of the French, mining was practically non-existent. "In 1920 the *Office Chérifien des Phosphates* was set up, with the State as sole shareholder. The principal phosphate centres are Khouribga and Louis-Gentil, which employ 10,000 workers. Production of phosphates rose from 1.720 million tons in 1938 to 3.870 million in 1950.<sup>8</sup>

"Mining of manganese was begun in 1919. Production increased from 80,000 tons in 1938 to 258,000 tons in 1950.<sup>9</sup> Total production of lead ore increased from 26,000 tons in 1938 to 66,000 tons in 1950 and 110,000 in 1952. The anthracite deposits at Djerada, discovered in 1928, have been exploited since 1931. Three thousand workers are employed. Production rose from 141,000 tons in 1938 to 258,000 in 1950."

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Perhaps the most spectacular advance has been in the sphere of industry. "In 1912 the Grand Socco Flour Mill in Casablanca was the only industrial establishment in Morocco. To-day there are countless food industries—flour mills, paste, biscuit and chocolate factories, dairies, cheese factories, distilleries, vinegar factories, breweries, oil mills, sugar refineries, fish canneries, fruits and fruit juices. Forty-one factories and workshops are now making soaps for both household and toilet use. The textile industry is constantly growing.

"The development of the building industries dates from 1938, when 27 construction companies, employing 40,000 workers, were already registered. Then came the chemical, machine and metallurgical industries. Almost a hundred new regular machine shops were installed at Casablanca after 1939. Six hundred railroad cars per year can be made in Morocco. There are 6 great shipyards capable of repairing all kinds of ships. Three factories can produce 38,000 accumulators a year as well as 75 tons of plates. Industrialization has given work to 120,000 persons, 100,000 of whom are Moroccans."

The record of French economic development on Moroccan soil is

<sup>8</sup> "In 1953, 4 million tons of phosphates were produced." (I. Lepp, op. cit., p. 15.)

<sup>9</sup> "500,000 tons in 1954." (I. Lepp, op. cit., p. 15.)

equally impressive in the fields of transport, telephone and telegraphic communication, radio, and so on.

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Let us now follow our French guides into a domain in which the average Moroccan is more personally affected. Jobs have obviously been created for him, but what of his housing, medical care, and education?

"The establishment of the Protectorate led inevitably to an influx of country people into the cities. The Housing Bureau built 3,240 dwellings in two years and the Department of Public Works, which succeeded it, is at present [1951] completing 1,270 units while construction is being started on 1,000 more. Finally, a French company with considerable capital has recently been established to finance the construction of low-cost Moroccan dwellings, especially in Casablanca where there is at present a shortage of 35,000 houses, calling for an expenditure of 20 billion francs."<sup>10</sup>

Turning to public health, we find that "a great network of health facilities exists to-day, from which no region is excluded. Between 1930 and 1950 the number of big hospitals rose from 12 to 37; rural infirmaries increased from 35 to 74, clinics from 21 to 207, mobile health units from 15 to 25.<sup>11</sup> The regular personnel of the health services rose from 346 in 1928 to 1,070 in 1949. Medical care given to the Moroccan people may be summarized in the following figures: 13 million consultations were given in 1950, compared with 2.63 million in 1930; there were 104,000 hospitalizations in 1950 against 40,000 in 1930; 950,000 anti-smallpox vaccinations were administered in 1949 against 300,000 in 1920. The result of the health services' work can be seen in the increase in the Muslim and Jewish populations, which rose from 3,453,100 in 1921 to 8,292,400 in 1947.<sup>12</sup> Among the projects under way may be counted improved housing, nutrition and public hygiene; the construction of modern baths; drainage in rural areas to exterminate parasites and

<sup>10</sup> "Between January 1 and December 1954, a total of 2,000 houses has been built by the State for Moroccans and 5,000 were under construction to which may be added 268 built and 114 under construction for Jews." (*Newsletter*, Moroccan Studies & Surveys, Rabat, December 1954.)

<sup>11</sup> In the Four Year Plan 1954-7 it was provided that the "number of hospital beds should increase from 12,600 in 1953 to 17,000 in 1957". During the same four-year period 8 billion francs were earmarked for the building of new hospitals, the construction of which had either already begun or was to be taken in hand. (*Rapport Général de la Commission d'Étude et de Coordination des plans de Modernisation et d'Équipement du Maroc*, publ. by Commissariat Général du Plan de Modernisation et d'Équipement, Présidence du Conseil, Paris, June 1954.)

<sup>12</sup> "In 1914, general mortality was 93 per thousand; in 1952, it was only 17.1 per thousand." (Ignace Lepp, op. cit., p. 31.)

mosquitoes; cleaner drinking water; and organization of health propaganda."

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According to our official spokesmen, "before the establishment of the Protectorate, no official school system existed for the Muslims. The first care of the Protectorate was to develop an administration capable of educating all Moroccan children and of giving them from the beginning, through the teaching of French, contacts with the technical civilization of the West. The principle of freedom of education, based on respect for Moroccan institutions, led the Protectorate to organize, on the primary level, European schools, Franco-Moroccan schools, and private Muslim schools. These last were controlled by Moroccans, but aided by State subsidies.

	1912	1931	1950
Muslims	794	10,289	117,656
Jews	3,742	10,935	31,421

"Taking into consideration that in 1950 there were 1,826,253 Muslims and 39,392 Jews of school age, and that the Muslim population of 8 millions has until the present day, even with State aid, financed the opening of only 7 private schools, whereas the Jewish population of 200,000 supports 63 private schools, it can be seen how much persuasion and education of the public still is necessary to bring the Muslim masses into school. It is for this purpose that schools have been introduced from the outside into the remotest villages.<sup>13</sup> On the secondary level, in accordance with the principle of freedom of education, Moroccans can choose between modern public schools and the traditional education. Six secondary schools are exclusively for Muslim boys. Furthermore, young Moroccans can enter the French secondary schools on the basis of the same age and aptitude requirements as their European fellows. Higher education is available for Moroccans at the "lycées" in Rabat and Casablanca and at the universities in France. In 1949-50, 186 Muslims were studying in France. In Morocco itself, 148 Muslims were taking advanced courses. Finally, the establishment of a Moroccan School of Administration paves the way for a new public

<sup>13</sup> "To-day 250,000 young Moroccans attend Protectorate schools." (Service Général de l'Information, Résidence Général, in the *N.Y. Times*, January 4, 1955.) According to a more factual official source, op. cit., *Rapport Général* etc., the number of Moroccan children attending school was 190,493 in 1953. Since the yearly increase between 1950 and 1955 was only in the region of over 20,000 per year, the figure from the end of 1953 to the end of 1954 is unlikely to have jumped by 60,000.

administration statute in Morocco. This school is intended to give the young Moroccans who wish to follow administrative careers an indispensable general education in the field of history, as well as in the field of administration and the judicial, economic and financial organization of the modern states. Sixty-one students were admitted to this school in 1949."

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Some of the problems concerning the administration of law have been mentioned already in earlier chapters. According to official statements, "France has sought to improve the administration of native justice and customary law. The Pashas and Caids ceased to have complete jurisdiction in criminal matters in the year following the establishment of the Protectorate, while one of the first French reforms was the creation of a Council for Criminal Affairs. On each level of the civil and criminal law courts, the Moroccan magistrate or judge is assisted by a French Government Commissioner who acts as Public Prosecutor in criminal cases, intervenes in civil and commercial cases if public order is involved, and is entitled to appeal against any verdict handed down."

Mention is also made of proposed reforms. These "are designed to end the confusion of power to the greatest degree allowed by the present political and social structure of Morocco, by creating a real body of Moroccan judges independent of the administration; to establish a modern system of law courts on different levels; to modernize the Shereefian High Tribunal, which is now the only body with appellate jurisdiction, by transforming it into a real Court of Appeal".

"An outstanding French achievement in Morocco has been to verify, collate and codify the customary laws that had previously been passed on by word of mouth."

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The above account of what has been achieved by the Protectorate does not pretend to be complete. Its purpose is to show how far progress has been made in the most important spheres of national life. Thus it must suffice merely to add that the French have also established technical and agricultural schools and Pilot Workshops for training in native crafts. Moreover, they have introduced Provident Societies catering for native farmers, and have encouraged and modernized the Co-operative movement which has always existed in Morocco. These, then, are the reforms to which the French lay claim.

## MOROCCAN VERSION

IT would be pointless to allege that the Moroccans are less likely than the French to colour their statistics with propaganda. As suggested earlier, we must try to decide for ourselves where the grossest discrepancies are to be found.

The main source of our present survey is a publication which nationalists of all denominations regard as authoritative, namely *Morocco under the Protectorate, An Analysis of Facts and Figures*, prepared by the office of the Istiqlal Party in New York, and published in February 1953. Unless otherwise stated, its figures are based either on official French sources or on publications of the U.N. Secretariat, considered to provide the most trustworthy documentation.

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French official publications tend to neglect the subjects of native wages and native standards of living—undoubtedly an additional reason why Moroccan statements dwell in great detail thereupon. The following table is given by the nationalists to show the relation between cost of living and wages paid to native workers in commerce and industry.

“The Index is based on the figure 100 for the year 1938

	Cost of Living	Wages	Per cent 1938 Purchasing Power
1945	398	370	93
1950	1,825	870	45
1952 (March)	2,786	1,478	52

These data reveal that while the cost of living has risen twenty-two times, wages have increased only eleven times.

Agricultural Worker's Daily Wages (including payment in produce)

1945	20- 25 francs
1949	35-100 „
1950-51	35-150 „ <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In English money this corresponds to between 7 pence and 3 shillings, in American money to 7½ cents—42 cents. It would, however, be misleading to compare cost-of-living figure and wage ratios of Moroccan workers with the corresponding ones in Great Britain or the U.S., which are incomparably higher. French wage standards, on the other hand, were notoriously illiberal.



"The agricultural worker earns on the average one-third of that earned by the poorly paid worker in industry and commerce."<sup>2</sup>

In view of the low wages,<sup>3</sup> family allowances are of great significance to the Moroccan workman. According to our Moroccan spokesmen, "Discrimination between European and Moroccan workers exists in the payment of family allowances."

Family allowances paid to bus conductors per month:

No. of children	European	Moroccan
1	5,790 francs	364 francs
2	11,031 "	1,404 "
4	21,543 "	2,808 "
6	31,963 "	4,212 "
8	41,963 "	5,612 "

"The Rabat Omnibus Company, a municipally subsidized line, grants the European employees with one child a family allowance sixteen times greater than that of his Moroccan colleague performing the same work."

Sugar is one of the staples of Moroccan dietary, and not a luxury as in some other countries. "Its consumption has dropped from 24.4 kg. per head in the period 1934-38 to an average of 16.7 kg. in the period 1948-50. (Source: *Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)*. Commodity Series, "Sugar", September 1952)."

\* \* \* \*

One of the nationalists' perennial complaints was that landholdings had changed hands illicitly, and that "out of a total of 5 million hectares under cultivation, over 1 million, consisting of some of the most fertile land, passed over to European settlers by expropriation". Thus, native farmers, of whom there were said to be 1 million, had less than 4 million hectares left to cultivate. In consequence, "the average Moroccan holding is about 3 hectares. One vicious aspect of this fragmentation of land is that its uneconomic character leads to poverty, indebtedness and accelerated expropriation by more opulent European settlers." On the other hand, "the average holding of a French settler amounts to 200 hectares. A direct con-

<sup>2</sup> On 1 October, 1954, the daily wage of an agricultural labourer in Morocco was raised from 182 francs to 230 francs, or about 4/7, or 64 American cents, "but it is rare for an agricultural labourer to earn more than 150 francs per day". (Ignace Lepp, op. cit., p. 23.)

<sup>3</sup> "At Casablanca, according to statistics emanating from employers, 80 per cent of native labour [employed in industry] earn less than 400 francs per day. Only 8 per cent earn more than 600 francs." (Ignace Lepp, op. cit., p. 19.)

sequence of this disparity is the wide divergence in harvest yield per hectare. The favoured position of the French *colon* has resulted in a far greater return per hectare.

“Crops Yields per hectare, 1949-50

(in quintals<sup>4</sup>)

	European farms	Moroccan farms
Wheat, hard	10.4	5
Wheat, soft	11.3	4.2
Rye	7.3	2.7
Maize	4.1	2.6
Tobacco	10.3	5.3

(Source: *La Conjecture Economique Marocaine*, 1950, p. 6.)

“It cannot be said that harder work produced greater yields on European farms for the labour on such farms is carried out by Moroccans.”

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In their analysis of the economic situation in Morocco, the nationalists point out that, by making no provision for heavy industry, the French have followed a “typically colonialist” policy. As a result of it, “Morocco is being drained of its natural resources while virtually all the benefits flow to French colonists and the economy of France. The development of mining, communications and commerce has not benefited the Moroccans, who gain their livelihood from the land.”<sup>5</sup> Neither has it benefited the 100,000 native industrial workers who work for extremely low wages. It was, in fact, the co-existence of rich natural resources and low-cost labour which served to attract the French to North Africa. The average Moroccan miner receives 38 francs (or 11 U.S. cents) per hour. Consequently mechanization of most mines has been retarded.”

By and large, the nationalists attack the French for having concentrated on the development of only such industries as would benefit the foreign settler, and for having neglected those that would mean profit for the natives.<sup>6</sup> “The French economic policies have retarded, for example, the development of textile output, so that it lags far behind that of a great number of underdeveloped countries.

<sup>4</sup> A quintal—100 kilograms.

<sup>5</sup> This is, of course, an odd complaint: an attack on the French for supplying basic essentials. Moreover, the nationalists are bound to realize that a modern State cannot live by agriculture alone; that agriculturalists do not make the best recruits to “heavy industry”.

<sup>6</sup> The question arises: Are there really any such industries? It is at the administrative stage that the question of “cui bono” rears its head.

This industry has usually been one of the first to be organized because of the 'relative ease with which the textile industry can be developed. Textiles require relatively little capital, labour is more easily trained, and local availability of raw materials is less essential to economic production.' " (*U.N., Recent Change in Production*, Supplement to the *World Economic Report*, 1950-51, p. 47.) Thus, the nationalists point out, the Moroccans, instead of producing their own cheap cotton goods, are forced to import far more expensive ones from France. They apply the same criticism to other industries that are essential to the natives, and that a modern régime should have concentrated on. "As for basic industry, so vital for economic development and so necessary for raising the standard of living of the Moroccan population, the picture is indeed black." (Most nationalists were impatient when it was pointed out to them that hydraulic development should naturally precede expansion of textile mills; or that heavy industry must follow light; and that forty years, broken into by two exhausting wars, offer insufficient time for transforming a medieval economy into a modern industrial one.)

The nationalists try to substantiate their condemnation of the unexpressed aims of French economic policy in Morocco by quoting from official French sources. In its introduction to the Four-Year Plan of 1949-52, the Residency stated: "Morocco will take an active part in the recovery of France by . . . supplying manganese, cobalt and lead ore, canned goods and agricultural produce, to enable the French Union to subsist on its own resources as much as possible. France will find in Morocco a market for the products of its recovering industries, particularly as regards textiles and the products of the steel industry." This bald statement of economic realism would hardly shock the hard-headed. France was not in Morocco for the sake of losing money and ignoring promising opportunities for trade. But though the *scheme* may have been sound, its *working details* certainly called for close examination. They also quote from a statement by the French Resident General in 1952 in which he explained that the Moroccan economic objectives must be to obtain "foreign currencies by means of increased exports" to be made "available to the French community". "All the foreign exchange earned" through these exports of Moroccan commodities, they add, "was, and is, used to augment France's depleted coffers".

The nationalists blamed France's monopolistic methods in foreign trade for Morocco's deficit. The Moroccans were compelled to buy almost exclusively from France, even though "the average price of imports from France was almost invariably higher than that of goods imported from other countries". Thus "Moroccan trade

with France was responsible for over 95 per cent of the unfavourable trade balance experienced in 1950".

Turning to the problem of native craftsmen, the nationalists say "such solicitude as has been expressed for the lot of the skilled artisans, has been of an academic character. The 1951 budget appropriated 106 million francs for arts-and-crafts social work. One half of this amount, however, was allocated for the construction of living quarters for the French officials who run the model workshops." This complaint seemed the more justified since it was the native craftsman rather than the French official who was in need of living quarters.

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While admitting that a great deal had been done for the irrigation of Moroccan land, the nationalists stress that most of the new irrigation schemes have been designed to revitalize land held by French settlers, while lands belonging to natives remained parched. The Foreign Minister of Iraq mentioned in the speech he made on December 19, 1952, in the U.N. Assembly, that an American combine had been willing to spend 60 million dollars on large-scale irrigation plants in southern Morocco, thanks to which some 360 thousand acres of new land could be brought under cultivation. He claimed that "the French had pretended to be in favour of the scheme", but, after years of negotiations, had made its execution impossible, "their true reason being that the land in question was chiefly in the hands of Moroccans". It was, therefore, hardly surprising that the Iraqi spokesman finally reached his conclusion that the French were not eager for "Moroccan peasants to enrich themselves".<sup>7</sup>

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In the sphere of public health the Moroccans tried to refute French claims by pointing to the very much higher death rate of Moroccans when compared with that of Europeans living in the Maghreb. Basing their allegations on official French figures they produced the following table:

	Europeans	Moroccans
Death Rate	8.52 per 1,000	15.08 per 1,000
Infant Mortality	84.1 per 1,000	283.6 per 1,000

"The figure for infant mortality is among the highest in the world. One can only conclude that in medical attention . . . the Moroccan is sorely discriminated against."

<sup>7</sup> U.N. General Assembly, First Committee, Five Hundred and Fiftieth Meeting.

"The French," our Moroccan informants continue, "are fond of quoting innumerable statistics on the increase in the number of consultations per year, etc. They are strangely silent, however, with regard to the really significant health data, such as infant mortality rate, trends in tuberculosis, extent of malnutrition. There were, in 1950, 6,984 hospital beds in Morocco, and of this total approximately one-third was reserved for Europeans. The rate of one bed for 1,720 Moroccans compares with one per 215 Europeans." Here, however, we may ask a number of pertinent questions while still appreciating the disparity. What, for instance, was the attitude of the average Moor (if he exists) to French "hospitalization"?

"U.N. statistical reports show that there were a total of 185 public health physicians available to minister to the needs of the Moroccan population in 1949. Thus, there was an average of only one physician per 43,240 Moroccans. On the other hand, there were, in 1949, 436 physicians operating as private medical practitioners in the large cities who were available primarily to the European colony."<sup>8</sup>

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Dealing with education, the Moroccan spokesmen observe that "after forty years of French 'enlightened' cultural leadership, in 1950, 94 per cent of Muslim Moroccan children of school age were not able to attend public schools, while 94 per cent of all European children residing in Morocco were able to enjoy this privilege".<sup>9</sup>

	School-age population	Children in school
Muslim	1,940,000	117,523 or 6 per cent
European	66,700	62,844 or 94 per cent

"These figures," say our informants, "taken from official French sources, reveal the extremes to which discrimination in education has deprived Muslim children." But let us not forget that the French had an ages-old inclination to send both boy and girl children to school in spite of difficulties. The Moroccans had not.

"The discrepancy in educational advantages enjoyed by Muslim and European children is further manifested by the difference in funds expended by the Protectorate. During 1951, 1.92 billion francs were appropriated in the ordinary budget for the education of

<sup>8</sup> A truly comprehensive picture would, of course, have to include a reference to the fact that some natives would still prefer death to a European doctor's ministrations; that the native tradition does not include sterile methods of midwifery; and that many who now die in middle age may have received the seeds of ill health before the French health services got under way.

<sup>9</sup> By 1954 the percentage of native children of school age receiving education rose to just over 10 per cent.

Muslim children and 2.29 billions for European children. Altogether, 17,270 francs were appropriated per European school-age child whereas only 731 francs were made available for the education of Muslim children—or 23 times less.

"The preponderance of French teachers in the public educational system is in part a direct consequence of the fact that after forty years of the Protectorate there is not one school for the training of primary school teachers in Morocco."<sup>10</sup>

On a number of occasions the Moroccans have also pointed out that, while the Protectorate treaty imposed upon France the obligation to train the natives in modern methods of administration, the first school for native administrators was not founded until 1950, or thirty-eight years after the establishment of French rule. Even then it provided only for fewer than 60 students. As a result, the Moroccans assert, it would take twelve hundred years to train the requisite numbers of Moorish administrators—even if some were immortal. This is, of course, one of the most striking points in the nationalists' indictment.

On private schools run by themselves, the nationalists say: "Although most of the funds for these schools are raised by voluntary contributions, the French interfere in the internal affairs of the schools, and attempt, by intimidating the staff, to restrict their activities. In 1951, for example, ten schools were arbitrarily closed down at Bou Arfa, three at Shtouka, and so on. . . . The past forty years have witnessed a systematic attempt to substitute French for Moroccan culture in the schools."

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In airing their grievances about the admittedly chaotic state of the administration of justice, the nationalists have often quoted the words of a great French Judge, Maître Bonnet, President of the Casablanca Bar, who complained, on February 10, 1950, at the General Assembly of Lawyers in Casablanca: "No Palace of Justice, no magistrates, no law. Right of defence non-existent. Individual liberty—none. Abuse of authority impossible to check. . . . Imprisonment is immediate, examination secret, defence a mockery, and codes non-existent. . . . Defendants are the victims of arbitrary treatment, without any possible remedy."

Another leading French jurist, Maître Neigel, said in May 1949,

<sup>10</sup> "In the primary schools, from the very beginning, Moroccan children have to learn all their subjects in French—a language which most of them do not know. . . . It is distinctly French culture that is disseminated in Moroccan schools." (I. Lepp, *op. cit.*, p. 35.)

at the Congress of Lawyers at Rabat: "Among those who dispense justice there are many dissenters who do what they can to delay or render ineffectual the rare attempts at partial reorganization. The efficiency of Makhzen justice is greatly impaired by an inadequate administrative organization. The pashas and caids do not refer to the law but simply condemn. Examination in criminal proceedings is secret. These practices have lasted only too long, and it is inadmissible that they should continue any longer." One wonders how this deplorable state of affairs could have been tolerated for so long. The nationalists' claim is that the "traditional dispensers of justice, the caids and pashas, go through the motions of administering justice. But this is no more than a façade behind which the local French official exerts the real power, for the Moroccan tribunals are mere instruments in the hands of the French authorities. The system of justice has in effect been integrated into the French administrative system, and forms part of the machinery through which political control is maintained. No separation of powers between the administrative and legislative branches, on the one hand, and the judicial branch on the other, exists. All these powers are exercised by the same French authorities." So much the worse, one might think, for the reputation of caids and pashas in general and their French masters in particular.

The nationalists added that in rural districts—inhabited by the majority of the population—a defendant was not permitted to be represented in court by a lawyer even if he could afford the expense. "While no Frenchman or other European can be arrested without an order to appear, or a warrant of arrest, a Moroccan is liable to be arrested, without such a warrant, merely on the verbal order of the French authorities or their [native] assistants."

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As we should expect, the nationalists' most passionately worded criticisms were levelled at denial of "human right", and in this realm their charges are explicit and worthy of the most serious attention. From 1914 onwards Morocco has lived in an official "state of siege". The nationalists, however, maintain that "the suppression of human and civil rights in Morocco is not an extraordinary measure, but the normal state of affairs under the Protectorate. "No association," they continue, "could be formed without prior authorization of French control authorities. All sorts of organizations, from student associations to political parties, from athletic clubs to labour unions, have been suppressed. Even the Moroccan Boy Scouts movement has been denied legal sanction." They quote

from the official Order of April 26, 1947, according to which "no private or public meeting may be held without previous authorization. Only French citizens will be allowed to speak at private or public meetings, and only the French language is to be used."

As to the sore problem of native trade unions, they describe the situation as follows: "Present regulations categorically deny the Moroccan workers the right to organize trade unions. Only European residents have the right to establish unions." They then point out that while Moroccan unions were proscribed, the only trade union permitted in Morocco was the French C.G.T. dominated by the communists. Thus a native workman wishing to join a union had to seek membership of one in which the bosses were communists. Claude Bourdet explained the reasons for this strange situation as follows: "These Moorish labourers are forced by administrative legislation, not only to keep in step with the [French] communist union-leaders . . . but also to hide behind them at union headquarters and in all official contacts between the authorities and the trade unions, in which only Europeans are allowed to participate directly. This gives the Administration the right to say, 'The unions are in communist hands'. When the time is ripe they will be able to assail trade-unionism with all the weight of the anti-communist measures now in active preparation, with a ready-made excuse directed toward the United States and Great Britain."<sup>11</sup>

Turning, finally, to the citizens' right to circulate freely, our spokesmen inform us that "to move from one Moroccan zone to another, Moroccans must have a special visa, in addition to the usual passport. Within the French zone itself, they must have a special permit entitling them to travel from one region to another. Europeans are not required to produce any such visas and permits."

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And so we see from this section and the preceding one, that beauty, and its converse, are in the eye of the beholder. But, close as we are to these events and the cases for and against them, two conclusions seem undeniable. While the nationalists discount too ingenuously so much that is harmful in their own inheritance, and underrate the sheer practical difficulty of condensing into half a century developments requiring five hundred years, the French case appears to be a denial of the avowed Protectorate régime, and a factual (though not verbal) admission of colonialism pure and simple.

<sup>11</sup> Claude Bourdet, *Le Maroc a deux visages*, Paris, *L'Observateur*, October 12, 1950.



## LOBBY AND SETTLERS

THE reader may now wish to know something about the occult-seeming organization, the "lobby" and its upholders, to whom repeated reference has been made. He may still remember the name of the Comité du Maroc, referred to in an earlier chapter. It was this Comité which formed the nucleus of the North African Lobby and its various offshoots in more recent years.<sup>1</sup>

In France, it was colonialism that offered lobbyism its most remunerative field. Colonialism and heavy capital investment were always closely interlocked. (We need only spare a thought for African gold and diamonds for a useful reminder.) As soon as Tunisia was occupied, this type of capitalism established itself firmly in the Tunisian Protectorate. In Morocco, one of the first large-scale investors was the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas.

It may be asked why lobbying in France should be particularly closely associated with colonialism, for lobbying can have other functions besides that of influencing the Administration. In France the lobby-tacticians aim also at control over certain newspapers—often secured by the simple device of buying them outright—and at profitable distribution of favours to members of Parliament. In consequence, lobbying was, and is, very costly. No single branch of the French economy is wealthy enough to run a successful lobby; and seldom do the interests of different business enterprises coincide sufficiently to warrant the founding of a single joint lobby. "Only in the colonial possessions do industry and agriculture, commerce and finance, pursue identical aims. They all derive the same profit from employing underpaid native labour and from receiving preferential treatment from the Administration."<sup>2</sup>

Morocco before 1912 was virgin land, economically considered, and, potentially, infinitely richer than either Tunisia or Algeria: thus, it was a very tempting proposition for exploiters depending

<sup>1</sup> Much of the material in this chapter is derived from Claude Bourdet's study *The Masters of North Africa*, published in *L'Observateur*.

<sup>2</sup> Rom Landau, *The Lobby that runs North Africa*, in *America* (National Catholic Weekly Review), New York, January 3, 1953.

upon the support of a lobby. There were other circumstances in their favour. Except for newspapers controlled by the lobbyists, there was practically no free press in Morocco that could either criticize or expose misuse of capital, appropriation, and so on. In France, the freedom of action of an employer was limited by the existence of trade unions jealously watching the interests of their members. In Morocco, native trade unions did not exist, and the employer, always aware that he had the Administration on his side, could do as he pleased, and make his own set of rules. Colonial powers everywhere and at all times have exploited this circumstance to the full.

The power of the lobbyists would hardly have reached such vast proportions if they had had to confine themselves to Morocco. But the whole of French North Africa was open to them. By the time Morocco was occupied in 1912, the lobbyists were already firmly entrenched in Algeria and Tunisia, and did not have to start from scratch. Thus, while certain large-scale investors in capital enterprises might confine their interests to one or another of the three countries, most of the more considerable organizations have inter-related interests throughout French North Africa.

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In a predominantly agricultural country such as Morocco, the land itself is the most attractive proposition for seekers after new spheres of investment. Through the special advantages accorded by the Administration, the settler from France became a small-scale investor in a profitable market, but, save in some individual cases, was not sufficiently rich or influential to become a lobbyist. A vast acreage of land was secured by French settlers in a manner that even Lyautey had described as highly questionable. This, again, is colonialism at its most characteristic, but not accepted Protectorate procedure. Following upon the example established in Algeria, the settler-farmer would acquire, against a minute payment, co-ownership of a certain area of native-owned land, and then, seeking support in French law, would claim his right to buy out the original owner for a paltry sum.<sup>3</sup> Thus the bare prospect of ultimate Moroccan independence was bound to be alarming to him. For under Moroccan rule he could expect to lose land to which his title was so easily discredited. Moreover, like his fellow-*colon* in Algeria, as often as not, he made no genuine effort to establish a proper human relationship with the native farmers who were his neighbours; and so he could not count on the understanding and support which

<sup>3</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 29.

members of a rural community normally find indispensable.<sup>4</sup> Holding firmly to the dictum (proclaimed in 1892 by the Conseil Supérieur in Algeria) that "the Arab race is inferior and cannot be educated", he had to look for such support elsewhere, and he found it among his compatriots who were powerful enough to pull the requisite strings through the help of the lobby. As Claude Bourdet points out, in Morocco the "little Frenchman" always votes for the "big" one because he himself is the beneficiary of the system.

The large-scale agricultural speculators did not confine their interests to the land, but had a finger in many another lucrative pie.<sup>5</sup> The economic power of the "big" men was assured by the support they received from the Administration, an Administration which, in turn, depended upon them at practically every turn. Their procedures were exposed in the famous (and already mentioned) article in *Semaines* by the former Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, in which he complained that the "pressure of certain financial groups [on officials in the Administration] was a threat to France's future in Morocco and Tunisia". He also pointed out that the Resident General himself had no power to check the interference of men in high places who were dominated by those "groups". As Claude Bourdet puts it, the Residents General "either behave as good servants of their North African masters or they try to defend the general interest, and are shown the door by the real masters of the Administration".

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The hold of the lobbyists over the Residency could not have become a stranglehold had they received no support from Paris. That is why they had to build up a strong lobby in France. Having been established long before the actual conquest of Morocco, the lobby had had ample time to grow in strength and efficiency. Its mainstay consisted of men who wielded power both in French politics and in North African economy.<sup>6</sup> The great lobbyists were

<sup>4</sup> J. Ferry, *Le Gouvernement de l'Algérie*, 1892, pp. 80-81.

<sup>5</sup> An outstanding example of such multiplicity of interests was M. Aucouturier, one of the leaders in the lobby camp. Besides being President of Agricultural Chambers of Morocco, he was a member of the Government Council, an administrator of the Commercial Bank of Morocco which, in turn, was affiliated with the Crédit Industriel et Commercial. Other large-scale colonialists, such as MM. Epinat, Mourgnot, Schiaffino, dominated many important spheres of Moroccan economy, including agriculture, shipping, banking, mining, and their equivalents in Tunisia and Algeria.

<sup>6</sup> A prominent member after the Second World War was M. Marcel Peyrouton who, after having been Governor General of Algeria and Resident General in both Tunisia and Morocco, became one of the press lords in the last-mentioned country, with interests in the Epinat group and the Walter zinc and lead trust. Another "politician-economist" was M. Jacques Bardoux who, besides being administrator

not at all necessarily members of the same political party. Their bond was North African economy. In political terms—according to Claude Bourdet—the Moroccan lobbyists were mostly “Vichy-ites”, their guiding ideology outlasting the Vichy domination; in Algeria their sympathies lay with the “radicals”; and in Tunisia they were known as “Gaullists”.<sup>7</sup> Whatever their party affiliations, they shared the same headquarters in Paris, at 5 Avenue de l’Opera where “their committees organize strategy”. Such centralization was essential, for “united they stood”.

The deputies and senators with economic interests in North Africa were said to control some thirty votes in the Assembly. Considering the great number of splinter parties and the precarious party-balance in the French Assembly, a steady, solid bloc of thirty votes represented a force that no government could afford to disregard. The bloc would support the government, whatever its composition, on most issues, provided that its views on North African matters were listened to.

Many, if not most, of the lobbyists derived additional strength from the fact of being Freemasons. Now Freemasonry in France differs in some of its essential aspects from Freemasonry in Great Britain and the U.S., both of which are strongly imbued by a religious spirit, and among whose chief preoccupations are humanitarian and social issues. Freemasonry in France is not only distinctly secular, but also anti-clerical, and is in the hands chiefly of “free-thinking” politicians and business men. In Morocco, even more than in France, politics and business were the special preserve of Freemasons. “No official could hope to advance [in his career] without satisfying his Masonic chiefs . . . 80 per cent of the French in Morocco enjoying political or economic power were Freemasons. . . . With the exception of (a single paper) all the French newspapers of the country were more or less directly in the hands of Freemasons.”<sup>8</sup>

Since most of the major economic enterprises in France—financial, mining, industrial, commercial, shipping—had interests in North Africa, the influence of the lobby was reflected ultimately in most fields of French economic life. And their control—direct or indirect

of the *Compagnie Générale du Maroc* and the *Mines de Bouskoura*, held the highly important post of deputy president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Assembly. A third was M. Henri Borgeaud, “grand master of Algerian agriculture”, formerly administrator of the *Cie Nord-Africaine des Ciments Lafarge*, and a member of the French Senate.

<sup>7</sup> “All (French) newspapers and weeklies [in Morocco] indulge in anti-parliamentarian and anti-republican demagoguery. They all have to profess, as an intangible dogma, the exclusively beneficent character of French colonialism.” (I. Lepp, *op. cit.*, p. 98.)

<sup>8</sup> Ignace Lepp, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

—of a number of newspapers enabled them to influence public opinion. During every Moroccan crisis of recent years the names of the same “big” lobbyists have figured, identifying the *dei ex machinâ*. It was no exaggeration to describe these tycoons as the true rulers of the Maghreb—if all thought of spiritual issues is at once, and firmly, set aside.

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One of the perennial weaknesses of nationalist propaganda has been a tendency to exaggerate, a typical example being the allegation that every Frenchman in Morocco was a lobbyist and therefore rich. The weight and unanimity of French public opinion in the Maghreb undoubtedly suggest that the majority of French residents supported the policies of the lobby, and were jealous for the preservation of the preferential treatment they enjoyed. But it would be safer to say that they condoned injustices which they were not sufficiently powerful to initiate, and that the average Frenchman in Morocco was far more comfortable, and earned much more money, than a native of approximately the same status. This applied to every social level and every occupation in which comparison is possible. It would, however, be untrue to say that all French in the Maghreb were rich. Many a small-scale settler had to fight for his living, even though his struggle was less fierce than that of all but the best-situated native farmer. But because his standard of living was higher than it would have been had he remained in France, it does not necessarily follow that his lot was enviable.

It is also an injustice to French individualism to maintain that all French people supported the lobbyists unquestioningly and were motivated by nothing but self-interest. Those opposed to the lobby may have been a very small minority, but they cannot be dismissed as non-existent. In practically every class—with the possible exception of “big business”—individual French people could be found who were making a valiant effort to demonstrate that there was another standpoint and that they supported it. They took a genuine interest in the natives, tried to improve their lot, and had a sympathetic awareness of their troubles. Certain French people—District Officers, clergymen, ordinary folk—did admirable social and charitable work, and were ever ready to condemn the suggestion that the natives are an inferior race. The nationalists pointed out that the natives would prefer to enjoy what is their own and dispense with charity. But charity will always flourish where the social and economic fabric is threadbare. There are other French inhabitants intent upon the preservation of Moorish architecture, art and native crafts, or who

devote themselves to the study and interpretation of various aspects of Moroccan culture. To a great extent it is thanks to them that we now know so much about Moroccan civilization. Whereas in recent years some French scholars and historians had become colonialist propagandists, many more have done admirable work in the noblest traditions of disinterested scholarship. As a rule, you did not find these genuine lovers of Morocco in the social world of which the Residency was the centre, nor did you meet them at the parties of officials or business men who "count". They had little use for either of these worlds which were too busy elsewhere to bother with spiritual or intellectual values. But though they may be unknown—except to small circles—they were worthy examples of those liberal-minded Frenchmen on Moorish soil whose disinterestedness helped to keep the good name of France alive, and to prevent Moroccan sentiments towards their country from deteriorating into uncompromising hatred.

It is unfortunate that these genuine patriots had no lobby, no power, and little money to make themselves better known. Ever since Lyautey's departure, this small minority had been mistrusted by the adherents of the "sales arabes" school of thought. After the crisis of 1951, they were called traitors and even, occasionally, thrown into prison. The most famous case was that of M. Pierre Parent, a hero of the First World War, in which war he had lost an arm. He was a former member of the French Assembly, and President of the War Veterans Organization. His outspoken criticism of the Administration was resented by high and lowlier members of the French community, and after the tragic events in Casablanca in 1952, he was dragged away from his farm in the Meknes area, handcuffed<sup>9</sup> and expelled from the country that had been his for thirty-six years, and in which he had succeeded admirably in gaining the confidence and love of the natives.<sup>10</sup>

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Any admirer of France who was able, through long acquaintance

<sup>9</sup> "My left arm having been amputated in the First World War, I was handcuffed by the right wrist to the left wrist of a professor at the Lycée Lyautey." (Pierre Parent, *The Truth about Morocco*, Moroccan Office of Information and Documentation, New York, 1953, p. 74.)

<sup>10</sup> This is how the correspondent of the London *Times* described M. Parent, who acted as the chief link between the French and Abd el Karim prior to the latter's submission in 1926: "Here at last was an intermediary whose intervention in the interests of peace had no connection with mining concessions or personal benefits. His mission, undertaken solely for the purpose of bringing hope and relief to the ill-treated prisoners, was admirable and led to results beyond expectation." (Walter Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, op. cit., p. 308.) In 1926 the French government gave official thanks to M. Parent for his rôle in bringing about peace in the Rif.

and investigation, to perceive the depths of discontent in Morocco, usually found it difficult to co-ordinate his Moroccan experiences with his knowledge of France, the country associated with the "Rights of Man", the country whose genius has been an inspiration to the rest of the world. He recalled the noble preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 which states that "the French Union is founded upon the equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion" and that "France intends to lead the peoples of whom she has taken charge towards freedom to administer themselves and their own affairs in a spirit of democracy". Yet so much of what was to be seen in Morocco appeared not only to contradict these principles, but to have made their realization impossible.

He would find the first explanation in the fact that colonialism is apt to transform people, seldom to their advantage. Great strength of character is required to resist the temptations attaching to the status of master and member of a privileged race. Wealth that would be quite beyond the reach of the settler or the speculator, had he remained in his home-land, beckons alluringly. By trading on his "superior" status and on his right to develop resources, he finds it comparatively easy to acquire the riches that demoralize.

And let this pondering observer be not too much amazed that the policies which he deplores emanated from so liberal and enlightened a country as France. Such policies, in nine cases out of ten, were prepared by *sous-directeurs* at the Quai d'Orsay who themselves were *vieux Algériens* or *vieux Marocains*, permeated with the colonial spirit. Moreover, the suggestions they placed before their chiefs were usually inspired by members of the Administration in Morocco.<sup>11</sup> A man or a woman who on French soil was a genuinely progressive-minded democrat, in Morocco was all too apt to turn into a reactionary with a strongly developed racial superiority complex. "They may not dare to say that democracy is of no value outside France, but most of them think so."<sup>12</sup> And once they had accepted the dichotomy, it was natural for them to support, in Morocco, "native" reaction as embodied in the brotherhoods or some of the caids, and to condemn as mere hotheads the progressive-minded Moorish elements. As Prof. Julien remarks, the average Frenchman in Morocco "considers himself organically different from the native . . . whereas for the official that which we call an abuse becomes an act of protection".<sup>13</sup>

As far back as 1920 Lyautey declared, "Practically everyone within the French Administration succumbs to the tendency to regard the native as belonging to an inferior race, as of being of no

<sup>11</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

<sup>12</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p. 397.

account".<sup>14</sup> More than thirty years later, these views were confirmed in even more comprehensive terms by the Superior of "Les petits frères de Foucauld" in Morocco, the Rev. R. P. Vouillaume. "I believe," he wrote, "that we are all the exponents of a certain racialism, conscious or unconscious, in regard to non-European races. We cultivate an unjustified consciousness of the superiority of a civilization whose materialism and purely technical character we do not consider sufficiently. Why do we, as French, believe that we have inalienable rights and that the smallest infringement of these rights is a graver offence than so many unjust deeds for which we ourselves are responsible? We are often the prisoners of a conception of patriotism that is an offence to the honour of other races."<sup>15</sup>

Speaking for the minority of Frenchmen opposed to the lobbyists, Mgr. Lefèvre, head of the Catholic hierarchy in Morocco, published an appeal to his compatriots, pointing out their shortcomings and their duties. In this long document he stated: "We have no right to defraud the native owners of the materials of production. If it is physically impossible to restore these to them, we should, at least, enable them to regain the capacity to produce their equivalent. If industrial and commercial capitals double or treble within a couple of years thanks to . . . the work of labourers who are insufficiently paid, these latter have the right to participate in the enrichment obtained, partly through the privations that have been imposed upon them. Our first duty as Christians should be the acknowledgment of our gratitude towards those among whom we live (as guests). In exchange for their hospitality, we should give them what is best in us."<sup>16</sup>

None of these critics had anything but praise for the industry and ingenuity of the French settlers. What they castigated was the fundamental ethos looming behind all those admirable qualities, and the contemptuous attitude towards the Moroccans—in fact, the spirit of a selfish colonialism which was strong enough to cause finer sentiments to wither and die.

<sup>14</sup> Circular of November 18, 1920, quoted in *Le Drame Marocain, Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, Paris, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*



*Part Seven*

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TOWARDS A CRISIS



## THE LABONNE EXPERIMENT

WHEN, in February 1945, Sidi Mohammed paid a visit to Marrakesh, the stronghold of his most dangerous adversary, Thami el Glaoui, the Pasha of that city, the crowds greeted him with cries of "Long live the king!" During the preceding night, buildings along the route had been covered with such inscriptions as "We don't want the foreign Protectorate", "We want to be an independent country", "By the will of Allah, Morocco claims its independence". It is more than likely that the painters of these slogans were nationalists, for the average Marrakshi would have been too much afraid of Glaoui's wrath to permit himself such patriotic licence. But whoever was responsible for the inscriptions, they revealed that nationalism was not without a voice even in the abode of its most strenuous opponent.

To the authorities it was a foregone conclusion that the Sultan would condemn the slogans, by speech and written word, as unseemly attacks on the Protectorate which deserved full co-operation. But the Sultan disappointed this hope; indeed, in his speech to the people he approved them obliquely by saying: "Be assured that everything that saddens you saddens me; and that everything that you hope for, I hope for, too."<sup>1</sup> These words may not seem to mean a great deal; but coming, as they did, from a sovereign who had never uttered a word that might, even by implication, suggest his support of nationalist views, they sounded revolutionary to the Moors. And to the French, it goes without saying. Nevertheless, Sidi Mohammed allowed another two years to elapse before he again spoke publicly in a similar vein.

While the Sultan's position compelled him to weigh his words with utmost care, the nationalists were not similarly hampered. Many of their leaders were still in prison or in exile, but on March 8, 1945, Mohammed Lyazidi, one of the members of the central committee of the Istiqlal, sent a message (in the name of the Party) to the President of the newly founded United Nations in San Francisco, asking that Morocco be admitted into the new organization. Individual letters, repeating that request, were sent to all the govern-

<sup>1</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

ments of the war-time Allies, that is, the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Russia and China.<sup>2</sup> The Istiqlal knew, of course, that their request was a mere gesture without substance, since no private citizen is in a position to speak for his country in such connections. But what mattered to the nationalists was this opportunity to call the world's attention to the fact that, according to an influential section of the populace, the Protectorate had worn out its welcome. It was an oblique method of demanding independence.

The birth of the United Nations coincided with the birth of the Arab League, an organization with aims far closer to the heart of the nationalists. By October 1945, the Secretary of the League, Azzam Pasha, had become sufficiently persuaded of the justice of the nationalist cause to make a declaration in which he demanded for both Morocco and Tunisia "the right to attach themselves to the Arab League", and "freedom to express their own views on the subject of their future status".<sup>3</sup> That request, too, because of its provenance, was only a gesture; but it stated the protest, and left the world to decide whether the protest was justified.

Meanwhile, the Istiqlal proceeded energetically to strengthen its organization. The central committee enlarged its membership from twelve to twenty-five, and established special study groups. It also founded new local branches throughout the country. Only the better-off members were asked to pay contributions. For the first time the party succeeded in gaining a foothold, however precarious, in the heart of the Berber country in the mountains. Particular stress was laid on activities among fellow-Muslims in the Arab countries of the Middle East where small offices were opened.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, as Sidi Mohammed and the nationalists gave more and more evidence of similarity of purpose, relations between the Palace and the Residency showed marked deterioration. The Sultan blamed M. Gabriel Puaux for the large-scale imprisonments of nationalists, and for the allegedly authoritarian methods which offended the Makhzen. In Paris, a group of experts presented the government with proposals for improvement of Franco-Moroccan relations. Among the fourteen signatories were some of the most distinguished orientologists of France: Professors Levy-Provençal, Brunschwig, Blachère, Massignon, Sauvaget, Roussy, Julien, Monseigneur Beaupin and Rabbi Liber. Recognizing that the existing régime "no longer meets the deeply felt aspirations of the Moroccan

<sup>2</sup> *Istiqlal Party Documents*, Documentation and Information Office of the Istiqlal Party (English Edition), Paris, September 1946.

<sup>3</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

<sup>4</sup> Bennouna, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-70.

people, which looks for political emancipation in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the U.N., the signatories request a number of reforms, particularly such elementary rights as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom to set up native trade unions".<sup>5</sup>

This *démarche* of the professors achieved nothing concrete. It had, however, one definite effect, for it underlined the fact that M. Puaux's continuance in office might contribute to a further worsening of Franco-Moroccan relations.

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In March 1946 Gabriel Puaux was recalled, to be replaced by Eiric Labonne, a career diplomat; he had previously served as Secretary General at the Residency at Rabat, and so was fully aware of the nature of the task awaiting him. Gabriel Puaux was essentially a civil servant, and a stickler for routine and precedent. His successor, on the other hand, was liberal-minded, imaginative, and brimming with ideas of his own. Both the Moroccans and the more progressive elements in France believed that in the new Resident General Morocco had at last found a man who would be able to solve the most pressing problems bequeathed by his predecessors. M. Labonne's first measures seemed to justify the trust placed in him, for he freed most of the political prisoners and brought Allal el Fassi back from his nine years' exile in Gabon.

Looking back upon M. Labonne's reign in Morocco, it seems tragic indeed that a venture begun under such favourable auspices should have ended in failure. Some critics blamed the personality of the new Resident, others blamed the nationalists and the Sultan; others still, the colonialists. All such attributions are idle and partisan. The truth is that M. Labonne inherited a structure that patching and piecemeal repairs could not possibly save. There was no genuine *entente* left, whatever official speeches alleged to the contrary. Very few Moroccans retained, by now, any firm belief in the good faith of France. The ulterior motive, the deceptive twist, the ambiguous phrase were all the majority expected to encounter. Nothing but fundamental change could convince them that the French had wholly honourable intentions. Fundamental change, however, was not on the new Resident's programme nor yet on that of the government he represented.

Some nationalists accused M. Labonne of thinking only in economic terms, and of neglecting the political and human aspects of the problems facing him. There is a lack of realism in this

<sup>5</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 354.

criticism, of course. The new Resident believed, as many do, that the amelioration of a man's economic situation is basic and preliminary to all other reforms. He considered it as more important for the natives to be housed and fed than to be politically conscious. The ideal, enlightened observers maintain, is that they should be all three, but the question of priority still arises. He was almost equally insistent on the need for improved educational facilities. So there is reason, here, to think that the most poverty-stricken Moors might have preferred his schemes to the nationalists' more comprehensive plans with their slighter insistence on immediate material benefits.

M. Labonne must have given much thought to the improvements he was hoping to introduce, since only four months after his arrival he put before the country a very detailed programme of prospective reforms; and on July 22, during a meeting of the Government Council, he said: "What matters is to give the Moroccan people, all classes thereof, the young men and women, the feeling, indeed the certainty, that no sphere of endeavour is closed to them, and that they will be given every opportunity to turn to good account their intellectual and other faculties."<sup>6</sup> Then he mapped out his plans for bringing that situation about. There was to be an intensive war against illiteracy. "The budgetary resources must be strained to the utmost limit", in order to provide new schools. A large number of houses must be built for native workers employed either in commerce and industry or in agriculture. The workers should be given trade union rights. The uncultivated areas must be brought under the plough, and the methods of the native farmer must be modernized so as to permit him to be as productive as the French farmer on Moorish soil. Political and administrative bodies must be created that would enable the Moroccans to take a greater part in the running of their own country.<sup>7</sup>

M. Labonne's proposals did not meet with the approval of his compatriots. In the Government Council, his programme evoked the unanimous opposition of the French representatives of the First Chamber (Agricultural) and the Second Chamber (Commerce and Industry). Both these Chambers ceased to co-operate with the Residence.<sup>8</sup> The wrath of the French community was even fiercer when they heard that the new Resident intended to enter into negotiations with the nationalist leaders whom he had only just freed from prison. Worst of all, M. Labonne had indicated that

<sup>6</sup> H. Bénazet, *L'Afrique française en danger*, 1947, p. 202.

<sup>7</sup> Secrétariat d'Etat à l'Information, *Notes documentaires et études*, No. 357, Série textes et documents, XX, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

he would defend the interests of the great State enterprises, such as the Société des Charbonnages de Djerada, the Compagnie Franco-Marocaine de l'Air and the Compagnie Franco-Marocaine de Navigation, against private vested interests. In a word, he proposed to protect the economic interests of the Shereefian State. "Socialism, communism, betrayal of France," cried the colonialist press. It was evident that M. Labonne would have to display courage of heroic proportions if he wished to put his plans into effect. Even his statements that the Protectorate's chief concern must be to "raise the standards of the whole population" and to "create a social solidarity" were condemned as threats to the "legitimate interests of France".

The reaction of the French community was a refutation of official propaganda which proclaimed that the sole aim of the *Présence Française* was to benefit the natives. "In most cases very rich, the [French] agricultural exploiters of the land and the industrial exploiters of the towns live in extraordinarily privileged conditions," wrote a French observer. "They command very cheap labour. They try to retain an amazingly lenient fiscal system in which income tax is unknown. So every measure likely to bring about a decrease in their profits is condemned by them without appeal."<sup>9</sup> In their opposition to M. Labonne's proposals, the colonialists were supported by practically all the higher officials in the Administration.<sup>10</sup> Besides being averse to innovation on principle, they, too, had their vested interests to guard. Many of them had acquired landed property or had made industrial investments in Morocco.

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The Resident General did not fare much better at the hands of the nationalists, who were as critical, for different reasons, as his own compatriots. However beneficial many of his plans might prove to the natives, they left untouched that which had become, for the nationalists, the crux of the Moroccan problem, namely the overriding question of national sovereignty. Had his plans been proposed in the 'thirties, the nationalists would probably have accepted them with enthusiasm. But events had outstripped their usefulness. For the nationalists they implied a confirmation of the existing paternalist colonialism. They preferred to repudiate graciously bestowed benefits as prejudicing the country's right to insist on regaining possession of its own. They also criticized M. Labonne's concern for safeguarding the privileges of the State enterprises.

<sup>9</sup> Bénazet, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

Nominally these were "Moroccan" and "Shereefian"; in practice, however, they served the interests of the protecting Power, even though not necessarily those of *individual* French exploiters.

In the name of the Istiqlal, Ahmed Balafrej, its Secretary General, addressed a letter to the Sultan, protesting against "the violation of Morocco's international status by granting, directly or indirectly, the monopoly for the exploitation of the country's wealth to French capitalism".<sup>11</sup> (Here we come back, of course, to an earlier contention that without French capital these sources of wealth might easily have remained unexploited. France was entitled to protect French capital.) The nationalists were equally sceptical of the value of M. Labonne's educational plans. According to them, if put into effect these plans would merely increase facilities for *French* education and disregard the type of *modern* Arab education that the nationalists wished to see expanded. In their view, the Labonne scheme promised to invest too much power in the tribal assemblies, thus weakening the Makhzen. They also protested against certain purely administrative reforms proposed by the Resident.<sup>12</sup>

The opposition of the nationalists which has been criticized as unrealistic, can be understood only within the wider framework of their fundamental policies and in the psychological climate prevailing at the time. Having reached the conclusion that the country's rights could not be assured under the existing régime, they regarded individual reforms as palliatives.<sup>13</sup> They also feared that the French settlers would always be sufficiently strong to water down all such reforms to the point of ineffectualness.

The Sultan shared their apprehension, and showed no haste to sign the six relevant *dahirs* that M. Labonne had placed before him. The decrees never, in fact, became law. For both M. Labonne's good intentions and his career in Morocco suffered defeat as swift as it was unexpected. This was a result of Sidi Mohammed's state visit to Tangier, a milestone in modern Moroccan history.



No ruling Moroccan Sultan had visited Tangier since the visit of Moulay Hassan in 1899, and the world had almost forgotten that the international city formed part of the Shereefian Empire. Towards the end of 1946 Sidi Mohammed decided to reaffirm the Shereefian rule over the city by paying it an official visit. At first the Residency did not seem to relish his suggestion. The visit might

<sup>11</sup> *Istiqlal Party Documents*, op. cit., p. 46.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*



increase Sidi Mohammed's popularity not only in Tangier, but also in Spanish Morocco, a territory which he would have to cross on his way. Finally, however, the Quai d'Orsay came to view "without displeasure an undertaking that would displease the Spanish",<sup>14</sup> and agreed to the project. But several months went by before the requisite agreements from the British, U.S. and Spanish governments were obtained.

Since the Sultan's Khalifa in Tetuan was very jealous of his prerogatives, and, for a number of years, had acted more or less independently of his cousin at Rabat, the French authorities may have believed that the latter's visit to the Spanish zone might emphasize such differences as existed between the Sultan and the Khalifa. These expectations, if they existed, were not fulfilled. The native population of the Spanish zone received Sidi Mohammed with great enthusiasm, and no one showed his delight more openly than the Khalifa. In fact, the journey across the Spanish zone was triumphal.<sup>15</sup> No doubt part of the good feeling had been generated by the events that preceded Sidi Mohammed's departure from Rabat.

On April 7, 1947, Casablanca experienced a particularly bloody riot. Whether the spark that set the succeeding events in motion was accidental or had been struck deliberately, history has not so far revealed. Some observers claim that the rising was provoked deliberately by "a high French official antagonistic to the Sultan", and that "police machinations" served his purpose<sup>16</sup> of attempting to make Sidi Mohammed give up his proposed journey at the last minute. Whatever the truth, the original incident was trivial. Outside an army barracks an Arab woman was molested by a Senegalese soldier. A fight ensued between natives who came to her assistance and the soldier's supporters. For some unexplained reason the authorities did not dispatch the police until some time had elapsed. When the incident was over, eighty-three men, women and children had been killed and several hundred wounded.

As soon as news of the disaster became known, natives throughout the country declared, evidence or no evidence, that the trouble had been engineered by the authorities. Sidi Mohammed shared the prevailing opinion. Even though the pretext for the fighting might have been accidental, people still could not help wondering why the police, contrary to custom, had appeared so late on the scene, thus permitting a minor incident to swell into a massacre. Sidi Mohammed's protest took the form of a determination to refrain

<sup>14</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, p. 362.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*

from any favourable reference to France in the course of his forthcoming speech at Tangier. The Residency had already foisted upon him a peroration eulogizing the Protectorate achievements. This original version of the speech had been delivered to the press in advance. Great, therefore, was the consternation of both Rabat and Paris when they discovered that the sovereign had omitted the peroration which, from their point of view, was the only part of the speech worth reporting.

This was not Sidi Mohammed's only misdemeanour, for he also permitted himself to speak of the "legitimate rights of the Moroccan people" and of a future in store for them that would reinvigorate their hearts. In French ears such words were subversive. But even worse was to follow. On the 12th, before leaving Tangier, Sidi Mohammed issued a declaration to the representatives of the world's leading newspapers who had sent special correspondents for the occasion. "It goes without saying," he told them, "that Morocco—being a country attached by solid bonds to the Arab countries of the East—desires to strengthen those bonds ever more resolutely, especially since the Arab League has now become an important factor in world affairs."<sup>17</sup>

This was the Sultan's first public declaration that his country's Arab affinities were real and the bonds with France only temporary. He had taken twenty years to come to the point of laying claim openly to "legitimate rights" denied to Morocco. There was consternation in France; there were bitter accusations of ingratitude and disloyalty. Even some of his own supporters maintained that he had shown his hand too soon, and that by jeopardizing M. Labonne's position, he was inviting the French to produce a less liberal-minded Resident General forthwith. But the nature of the speech was not accidental: it was an announcement of the line along which Sidi Mohammed meant to plan his over-all strategy, the final aim of which was Morocco's independence. Some styled him a patient diplomat; others accused him of lethargy and an inclination to take the narrow view. In either case, he would hardly have spoken in these terms without weighing carefully the possible effect of his words. His speech was applauded heartily by the natives, and Sidi Mohammed found himself established firmly as their champion: a rôle to which most of his forebears could seldom have aspired.

The only jubilant French were the colonialists who, having no means of attacking the monarch openly, were expending their wrath upon the unfortunate M. Labonne, a thorn in their flesh from the moment of his arrival. Assisted by certain French army circles, they launched attacks on the government, amounting to "insurrection

<sup>17</sup> Bennouna, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

and blackmail".<sup>18</sup> However, they did not have to waste much of their ammunition, since "in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Bidault, they found a willing listener".<sup>19</sup>

M. Labonne, a diplomat of the older school, and too proud and honourable a man to seek for scapegoats, assumed full responsibility for what had happened, and made no attempt to minimize its gravity. Within a month of the Sultan's return from Tangier, he was relieved of his post, and left Morocco.

<sup>18</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

## THE ERA OF GENERAL JUIN

THE arrival of M. Labonne's successor on May 14, 1947, initiated the acute stage of the Moroccan crisis. The forceful character and dynamism of the new Resident General, allied with the qualities and defects which his background and training inevitably produced, were such as to make the crisis inescapable.

The campaign waged by the lobbyists in Paris had succeeded in persuading the government that what was required in Morocco was not more liberal action but force—"the only language the natives understand". The symbol and tool of force was naturally the army, and so a military leader was chosen. This new Resident was General Juin, one of his country's most distinguished soldiers. Far more typically than Steeg or any of his other predecessors, Alphonse Juin represented the "Algerian spirit".

Born in 1889 at Bone, in Algeria, Juin was the son of a French policeman and a Corsican mother of a French immigrant family. He made the army his career, and left St. Cyr in 1912 with the rank of major. In the First World War he proved himself a brilliant and courageous soldier. Severely wounded, he lost the partial use of his right hand. After the war he served for some time in Morocco, becoming, with rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, *chef du cabinet militaire* of the Resident General, Lucien Saint. In the early days of the Second World War he commanded the Fifteenth motorized division which defended Lille. Captured by the Germans, he spent one year at Koenigstein, together with General Giraud. He returned from captivity in 1941 when his attitude to the Allies was illustrated in a conversation quoted in the memoirs of the French Ambassador, Fernand de Brinon.<sup>1</sup> "In the course of the conversation," wrote the Ambassador, describing a luncheon party with Marshal Pétain and General Juin, the latter "said more than once that he was very happy to have occasion to fight the British, and that he would defend Africa against any allied enterprise. Should he be placed under General Rommel, he would be very proud to be Rommel's subordinate. 'There is not a soldier,' he said, 'who would not be proud to serve under such a chief.'" This statement must, of course, be

<sup>1</sup> F. de Brinon, *Memoirs*, Paris, Chaix, 1950.

studied in relation to the situation prevailing in France at the time and to the entire Darlan affair. To be anti-British or anti-Ally was not necessarily a crime.

Soon afterwards General Juin was entrusted by Pétain with a mission to Marshal Goering, head of the German Luftwaffe, to discuss Franco-German co-operation in North Africa. In November 1941, the Germans demanded that General Weygand, Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in North Africa, a man whom they suspected of pro-Allied sentiments, should be relieved of his command; Pétain appointed General Juin as his successor.<sup>2</sup> On the day of the Allied invasion of North Africa, General Juin, who was in Algeria, gave the following order to the French armies: "The invasion troops must be fought with energy."<sup>3</sup> But within twenty-four hours he decided to make common cause with the Allies. From then on, he proved himself one of their best commanders in the field. He led French and Moroccan troops in the Tunisian, Italian, French and German campaigns, and gained the respect of his British and American colleagues. On August 12, 1944, he was appointed *chef d'état major de la Défense nationale*.

"Juin was of slight build but impressive presence; his firm, thin lips betokened the military leader accustomed to command, and the incessant working of the nerves in his tight-kneaded face, together with the occasional jerking of his semi-crippled right arm, revealed the highly strung nature which he had learned to discipline."<sup>4</sup> His character strongly reflected his Algerian-Corsican origins. It was probably from his mother that he derived his great belief in himself. In common with most Frenchmen from Algeria, he was extremely sensitive to everything concerning the prestige of France, and shared their tendency to consider themselves far more French than their compatriots in metropolitan France. Like so many colonials in Algeria, he regarded the French in North Africa not merely as pioneers but as veritable missionaries selected by divine ordinance to raise the "lesser breeds" to a level more nearly approaching French civilization. His chief deities were *la Victoire et la Gloire*, but somehow it was always Alphonse Juin who was revered in these two personifications.

While the colonialists welcomed the arrival of the new Resident, and were convinced that he was the man to solve all Moroccan problems once and for all, there were others in France who doubted the wisdom of his appointment. "Notwithstanding the fact that he

<sup>2</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

<sup>3</sup> A. Kammerer, *Du Débarquement africain au meurtre de Darlan*, Paris, Flammarion.

<sup>4</sup> Rom Landau, *The Sultan of Morocco*, London, Robert Hale, 1951.

could boast fine qualities as a soldier in face of the enemy, he was little suited to direct the destinies of Morocco in an hour of political problems the solution of which called for civil talent of a high order," wrote Prof. Julien.<sup>5</sup> As a Frenchman from Algeria, the general appeared to believe in the "congenital incapacity" of the Arabs, with whom authoritarian methods alone could produce good results.<sup>6</sup>

On his arrival in Morocco, General Juin's position was stronger than that of any of his predecessors with the exception of Lyautey. He was assured of the unreserved support of the French Administration and the lobbyists. Moreover, he had been given almost unlimited powers by the government, and *carte blanche* "to deal with the Sultan as he saw fit".<sup>7</sup> Soon after his coming he announced the outlines of his policy. "My first duty," he stated, "is to re-establish order, without brutality, without compulsion, but with energy . . . I shall permit no one to indulge in demagogic *sur-enchère*." And then, referring obliquely to Sidi Mohammed's recent pro-Arab declaration, he added, "Morocco, which France has united, must be a Western country, and turn away from oriental alliances (*combinaisons*)."<sup>8</sup> Not long afterwards he declared that Morocco would never stand on her own, but would "remain linked to France".<sup>9</sup>

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In the economic sphere, General Juin intended to put M. Labonne's proposals into effect. But "the private interests upon which he leaned prevented him from doing so".<sup>10</sup> When he left five years later, none of the Labonne reforms had been introduced.

In his very first year the new Resident made one sweeping administrative change that revealed the policy he intended to follow. At the time of his arrival the Makhzen consisted of the Grand Vizier,

<sup>5</sup> op. cit., p. 365.

<sup>6</sup> Some French observers lay the blame for the general's attitude on his wife. Thus M. Ignace Lepp writes: "A daughter of a rich Algerian settler, immeasurably ambitious, and sharing all the prejudices of her original milieu in regard to 'natives', she saw to it that her husband's *debonair* character should not induce him to commit any 'errors'. It was because of her that the Resident General was surrounded by courtiers almost exclusively of Algerian or Corsican origins. It was in their company that he dined and wine, played bridge, danced and hunted. . . . Juin's principal weakness was that he would not tolerate any person of value in his immediate entourage." op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Notes documentaires et études*, No. 688, Série textes et documents, CXLIX. Services Français d'Information.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 365.

three other viziers, a *chef de protocole*, and an Educational Delegate. General Juin enlarged that body by adding to it five Moorish *delegates of the Grand Vizier* attached to the departments of Finance, Agriculture, Commerce, Public Works, and Health. He also brought in a new Moroccan juridical counsellor attached to the corresponding French department. The avowed purpose of this new measure was to establish a closer liaison between the Residency and the Makhzen. In the past, the meetings of the Makhzen had been held under the presidency of the Sultan who could convene them whenever he felt it necessary to do so. Now, under the new dispensation, the Makhzen lost both its independence and its privacy, for it had to hold joint meetings with not only the new native officials, but also with their French colleagues and the French Secretary General, the key personality in the Administration. Thus the "reform" imposed French powers of supervision that were tantamount to control. It also deprived the sovereign of his right to preside over the meetings of his own government.<sup>11</sup> To peoples with a democratic tradition this must appear utterly desirable. The long struggles of parliaments to curb royal prerogative provide some of the most stirring events in constitutional history. But Morocco was not a modern democracy, and it is open to question whether it was ready for such a step, so suddenly taken and so obviously open to more than one interpretation.

General Juin's next reorganization involved the Government Council which, as will be remembered, consisted of one French and one Moroccan chamber, each deliberating separately. In the past, all the Moroccan delegates had been appointed by the Resident. These were now supplemented by others elected by their own community. The new Council's sole function remained limited to discussing the yearly budget. It had neither legislative nor executive power, but its elected members were certainly an innovation of some moment.

The general's next reform aimed at establishing municipal councils. Sidi Mohammed had always been eager for such councils to come into being, for the necessary ballots and the opportunity for learning the ins and outs of local government would give the natives a training in one of the procedures of democracy. But when the Sultan reviewed the details of the proposals, he found that not only were French inhabitants of his country to be given the vote: they were also to be represented by the same number of delegates as the Moroccans. In other words, two hundred and seventy thousand Frenchmen were to have as many municipal representatives as more than eight million natives. This meant that each French voter

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, p. 367.

would have a voting strength thirty times as great as any Moroccan's.<sup>12</sup> Sidi Mohammed refused to consider the proposals, for they violated some of the fundamental principles that governed French rule in the Maghreb. His opposition to the reform was interpreted by the colonialist press as a proof of Sidi Mohammed's "anti-democratic" tendencies and of his determination to relinquish none of his own "autocratic powers".

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General Juin had full support from Paris. Having been given a free hand, he expected nothing less. On July 24, 1947, M. Ramadier, the French Premier, described the Resident's measures as "real progress along the road to democracy". In contradiction, Sidi Mohammed pointed out officially that the aim and object of all this "new deal" was the establishment of French "co-sovereignty", thus violating the Treaty of Fez. Apart from the colonialists, those who profited most markedly from the affair were the communists who, in spite of their understandable antagonism to the Sultan, suddenly raised the banner of Moroccan independence. General Juin's attempted "legalization" of the principle of co-sovereignty, which in spite of French inroads had enjoyed no legal sanction, was a revolutionary change that demanded a counter-revolution, and it was characteristic of the communists to take opportunistic advantage of the prevailing native resentment.

Submitting to the Sultan's strict injunctions that all political action should remain non-violent and be conducted along peaceable lines, the Istiqlal limited itself to protests in its press. But even their newly gained journalistic freedom did not take them very far. Press regulations introduced by General Juin enabled the censor to proscribe the publication of any article or piece of news considered undesirable. As a result, each day the nationalist newspapers were disfigured by numerous blank spaces from which censored material had been eliminated. Sometimes entire columns or even pages might be blank.<sup>13</sup>

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For the nationalists, the only cheering news came from Cairo. Within a single week two occurrences in the Egyptian capital were sufficiently consoling to them to lighten their gloom. Allal el Fassi,

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>13</sup> The censor's blue-pencilling was applied not only to articles written by the Istiqlal, but with equal effect to many selected from such foreign papers as the *London* or *New York Times*, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Christian Science Monitor*.



who had been forbidden to return to his own home in Fez, was living in Tangier where the police kept a none-too-loving but all-too-watchful eye on him, in an effort to prevent him from leaving his Tangierine exile. In spite of such vigilance, on May 25, 1947, he suddenly appeared in Cairo, to be greeted enthusiastically both by his compatriots who were running the Moroccan Office in Cairo, and by Egyptian sympathizers.

His arrival was, however, completely overshadowed by the appearance, six days later, of the old hero of Moroccan struggles, Abd el Karim. Having for over twenty years been contained by the French in the island of Réunion, the Rifian leader was now being taken back to Marseilles, to end his days under surveillance in the South of France. Rumour had it that the authorities wished to use him as a possible counter-force to Sidi Mohammed; but whatever their intentions, they never materialized. When the ship that carried him reached Port Said, the old warrior went ashore, never to return on board. Whether there was some connection between Allal el Fassi's arrival in Cairo and Abd el Karim's sudden decision to seek refuge in Egypt, is left to our conjecture. It would certainly not be beyond the ingenuity of the nationalists and the effectiveness of their various "secret" services to have prepared and co-ordinated the venture beforehand, once the French decision to make Abd el Karim mobile once more became known. Some Moroccan spokesmen claim that it was only at the last moment that Abd el Karim decided to seek sanctuary in Egypt. According to them it was Allal el Fassi who, having gone to greet him on board his ship in Port Said, persuaded him to disembark, together with his family. Since the ship in which he was travelling was Australian, he had no difficulty in leaving it.<sup>14</sup>

The long-remembered personality of Abd el Karim—a hero to Muslims throughout the world—and the circumstances of his escape

<sup>14</sup> According to Allal el Fassi, as soon as Abd el Karim had set foot on Egyptian soil (at Port Said), he called on the governor of the city who "conveyed to him the greetings of King Farouk". Thereupon the Moroccan exile informed the governor of "his desire to seek the sanctuary of the King, in order to escape from French captivity and afford his children education in the Arabic language. The governor promised to convey his request to the King and the Egyptian government." When, on the following morning, Abd el Karim again called on the governor, the "latter informed him in the name of the King of the granting of his request for sanctuary". The governor then "kissed him in the name of the King and asked him to regard himself and his family as royal guests". In the evening, Abd el Karim, "his brother, and a number of his relatives, arrived in the Egyptian capital in a royal car. He called at the palace to register his name. . . . He then proceeded to Inshas palace to stay as the guest of the King." On the following day Abd el Karim "was guest of King Farouk for lunch. The King listened attentively to [his guest's] description of the Rif war . . . and expressed his profound respect for the Sultan of Morocco." (*The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa*, American edition, pp. 304-5.)

fulfilled oriental expectations of what romantic adventure should be; and enthusiasm for him ran high in all Arab countries. Though the Quai d'Orsay tried to obtain from the Egyptian government the usual promise that the Rifian veteran would be made to refrain from "all political action", the demand was refused, and the refusal was underlined when King Farouk declared that Abd el Karim was his guest.

In spite of his age and his wearing experiences, Abd el Karim had retained much of his earlier vigour and fighting spirit. French hopes that the man who at one time might so easily have claimed the Shereefian throne would make haste to discredit, and dissociate himself from, the reigning Sultan, remained unfulfilled. They were, indeed, brusquely frustrated when he declared his loyalty to Sidi Mohammed and his support of the latter's efforts to secure Moroccan independence. In public statements, he "advised" the French to open negotiations for an annulment of the Protectorate. "If you depart," he stated, "as good friends, realizing that this is the only thing left to you, you will retain all your interests. But if you depart in enmity, you will lose everything. We have fought two wars at your side to preserve your independence at risk of our lives. So why do you refuse us our independence? You have removed M. Labonne because he was too considerate of our claims. You have replaced him by General Juin because you think that a soldier will terrify us. We are not afraid of him. But it is a serious matter that he should be working against the Sultan."<sup>15</sup>

Abd el Karim's support for Sidi Mohammed's policies did not imply that he saw eye to eye with the members of the Maghreb Office in Cairo. Primarily a soldier, impatient of involved diplomacy and clandestine methods, he believed in a straight fight and direct negotiation. The nationalists at the Cairo office were more subtle in method, with their long experience of walking over thin ice and living on the rim of a precipice. Abd el Karim had little use for their propaganda work. Some of the nationalists' representatives abroad were self-centred young men with inflated ambitions and with little training for anything beyond the details of their own equivocal work. Not without some justice Abd el Karim taxed them with "each one attributing to himself the rôle of a leader". Yet, however much some of these young Moroccans may have deserved the old man's censure, their work could not be dismissed as valueless. Unlike Abd el Karim, a hero of established reputation and an honoured guest of the country whose hospitality he enjoyed, these young Moroccans were mere refugees, more often than not depending upon the charity and goodwill of their hosts. Their

<sup>15</sup> *Le Figaro*, June 22-23, 1947.

position would not have been easy in any foreign country. It was particularly irksome in the midst of the tangle of Mid-Eastern politics, inevitably complicated by traditional clashes and personal jealousies. Often, too, their patriotic fervour existed in a kind of vacuum, for their knowledge and experience were shallow, their sense of frustration deep. Such "political immigrants" are much the same the world over—eager but impetuous, earnest but often ill-informed, courageous but so sensitive as to be almost morbid.

One rôle these young nationalists could and did fulfil: they managed to enlighten their fellow-Muslims throughout the Middle East as to the seriousness of the Moroccan dilemma; they published a number of pamphlets and books; and they provided a useful, if not perfect, liaison between the nationalists at home and their potential allies in the Arab League. For there is no doubt that the Maghreb Office in Cairo contributed its share to the League's decision of 1951 to sponsor Moroccan demands at the United Nations Assembly. The outcome may have been disappointing to them, but the sponsorship represented a very real victory of the nationalists. (Of this U.N. representation more will be said in a later chapter.)



After two years in Rabat, and in spite of his determination, General Juin did not succeed in bringing the Moroccan *malaise*, as the French called it, closer to cure. Yet the colonialists still saw in him "the inevitable architect of the restoration of an authoritarian policy which they were ready to support without reserve".<sup>16</sup> But the architect had one major obstacle to clear away before his edifice could begin to rise—and the major obstacle was the Sultan. Shorn of many of his privileges, and occasionally treated by the general with a soldierly "candour" that to its recipient was indistinguishable from rudeness, he still had the power to sign or refuse to sign decrees presented to him. Since most of these decrees, or *dahirs*, were framed with the object of enlarging the sphere of co-sovereignty, Sidi Mohammed showed in their regard a stubbornness surpassing that of the proverbial mule, but informed by a livelier sense of foreboding. Dozens of *dahirs* lay incomplete on his desk, signatureless and unsealed. Each one of them was designed to enhance France's control and to centralize wider powers in the French Administration. Even in France, statesmen and others by no means favourably disposed to Sidi Mohammed, criticized this narrowing down of responsibility, and pointed out its dangers. Prof. Robert Montagne, one of the leading theorists in the colonialists' camp,

<sup>16</sup> *Le Monde*, February 14, 1951.

described the tendency to centralization as "disastrous" and as "literally suffocating the country". "We sterilize its life," he wrote, "by applying our minutely prepared decrees and regulations. . . . One imagines that it must all be a dream when one hears that certain [French] delegates of a regional assembly are refusing to deliberate with their Moroccan colleagues. . . . One expects from us, after years of a possibly explicable torpor, a greater utilization of Muslim youth, a considerable intensification of educational efforts."<sup>17</sup>

Had General Juin shown some of the goodwill of M. Labonne, or some of the diplomatic finesse of M. Ponsot, who knows whether some way might not have been found to win over Sidi Mohammed at last? But the general "had none of the qualities that distinguish the successful diplomat or administrator, and was not capable of creating an atmosphere favourable to a *rapprochement*"<sup>18</sup>; accordingly, the gulf between Residency and Sultan grew wider day by day.

The first rumblings of the approaching storm could be heard on November 18, 1949, when General Juin delivered an important speech at the Academy of Colonial Sciences in Paris. His admission of the existence of co-sovereignty in Morocco was in the nature of a confession by a tenant that he has made of himself co-owner of his landlord's house. During the following December session of the Government Council at Rabat, Moroccan delegates, without mincing their words, accused the authorities of hypocrisy: while the latter were busily proclaiming to the world that the modernization of the country was a *fait accompli*, the process of assimilation was going on apace. "Modernization", the nationalists claimed, was a euphemism for outlawing native culture and discouraging the use of the native tongue.

The warning implied in the criticism went unheeded, and the delegates decided to supplement their words by deeds; such deeds, that is, as were possible within the narrow confines of their freedom of action. The next session of the Council was to take place on July 20, 1950. Its most important members were those who represented the various Moroccan chambers of commerce, since the leading merchants were usually also the wealthiest, most influential, and best-educated members of the community. Shrewd business men, they could not be accused of sharing the chimerical political notions of some of the nationalist hotheads. To mark their disapproval of General Juin's three years' administration, they decided to boycott the summer session of the Council. Though the general tried to dismiss their boycott as a meaningless gesture by irresponsible

<sup>17</sup> *Le dialogue entre Paris et Rabat*, in *Le Monde*, June 10, 1953.

<sup>18</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 373.

nationalists, those close to him were aware of his deep anger. For the "meaningless gesture" was sufficiently spectacular to be remarked in Paris. Members of the newly formed Cabinet of M. Pleven were said to be worried by the situation in Morocco, and by the Resident's apparent inability either to introduce the much-publicized reforms or to establish friendlier relations with the Sultan.<sup>19</sup>

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The storm clouds grew heavier, but the climax was delayed by an event from which both Morocco and France expected a great deal. M. Vincent Auriol, the French President, invited Sidi Mohammed to make a state visit to Paris, his invitation embracing the sovereign's entire family, Cabinet and court. It was to be a festive occasion, with all the resources of French hospitality utilized to do honour to a foreign potentate. The chief object of the visit was to provide a spectacular affirmation of Franco-Moroccan unity.

At first, Sidi Mohammed was reluctant to accept the invitation. When he did so, he added a notification to his prospective host that he intended to open conversations on the political and domestic problems vexing Morocco. Even so, the visit was not universally approved by his people.<sup>20</sup> On his way to Paris, Sidi Mohammed broke his journey at Bordeaux where he was given an impressive reception. But on his ceremonial entry into the town, Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian students and workmen broke the police barriers, rushed up to the visitor's car, and protested against his stay in the country of the "eternal enemy". Blood flowed pretty freely, and there were many arrests.

Paris in autumn can claim to be one of the most beautiful cities in the world. In the festive garb provided for the occasion by the authorities, it formed an incomparable background for the Shereefian visit. On October 11, the Parisians turned out in their hundreds of thousands to cheer Sidi Mohammed and Prince Moulay Hassan, both of whom were lodged at the Elysée Palace. President Auriol conferred on the prince the highest insignia of the Legion of Honour; magnificent presents were exchanged by Sultan and President; one sumptuous reception followed another, and no trouble or expense were spared. Only the most churlish could doubt France's goodwill towards Morocco.

Nevertheless Sidi Mohammed was intent on practical considera-

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, p. 374.

<sup>20</sup> Most of the material concerning the Sultan's visit to France is based on first-hand information supplied by the chief protagonists in both camps, including the Sultan himself, Prince Moulay Hassan, and members of the Imperial Cabinet and the Residency.

tions, anxious to enjoy the reality of power and not its trappings. A gilded cage, however magnificent, was nothing but a cage. Immediately after his arrival, he had handed President Auriol a memorandum containing his observations on the Moroccan *malaise*. He gave a further verbal explanation of his point of view in a meeting with the President, Premier Pleven, and M. Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister. The impression he gained from the French statesmen's replies was that they showed a greater comprehension of, and sympathy with, Morocco's problem than the attitude of General Juin during the preceding weeks had allowed him to hope. On October 31 Sidi Mohammed's proposals were discussed in a special meeting of the French Cabinet. On the following day the Sultan received a reply to his original memorandum, embodying promises of a lessening of press censorship, establishment of trade unions, and improved legal procedure; but it made no mention of the Sultan's crucial demand concerning Shereefian sovereignty and the basis of Franco-Moroccan relations. Sidi Mohammed and the advisers who had come with him regarded the French reply as disappointing. Sidi Mohammed at once despatched a second note that framed his observations more precisely. The first memorandum had been couched in an orientally ambiguous, diplomatic language that implied a great deal without dotting the i's and crossing the t's. The second note left little room for guesswork. It stated clearly that only a fundamental change of the basic relationship between the two countries, with proposals for progress towards abolition of the Protectorate, could improve mutual relations and place them on a foundation both solid and acceptable to both parties.

Even such mild reforms as those promised in the French reply to the first memorandum were enough to appal the colonialists in Morocco. Industrialists, financiers, business men and agricultural settlers sent representatives to Paris forthwith, and floods of telegrams descended upon M. Auriol and the French government. The argument put forward by the colonialists was that any change of the *status quo* would seal off for ever France's openings for investments, and would bring ruin to the thriving French community. General Juin, too, was inundated with telegrams in which he was assured of the loyalty of the French inhabitants of Morocco, and of support for his policies.

Sidi Mohammed waited for a reply to his second note; but no reply came. So he decided to leave Paris on November the fifth. He had failed to obtain satisfaction; yet Moroccan public opinion was enthusiastic over the stand he had taken in the French capital. His visit was deemed to have been an event of primary significance, for

he had given formal expression to long-unheeded ambitions. His Tangier declarations in 1947 had merely indicated the direction in which he appeared to be moving; his unequivocal stand in Paris was stronger proof of his dependability as both symbol and champion of Moroccan rights.

When, on his return, Sidi Mohammed landed at Casablanca, he was received with a welcome whose warmth exceeded anything he had experienced in the twenty-three years of his reign. The crowds that cheered him were not only citizens of Casablanca or visitors from other towns who had come specially to swell the throng. Countless Berbers had ridden on horseback all the way from the Atlas mountains to be present at the monarch's arrival. In their long cloaks falling over ornate blue, yellow, peach-coloured and crimson saddles, and with their superb bearing, they transformed Morocco's modern, hectic economic metropolis into a city of romance. Similar scenes of enthusiasm, marked by an almost religious fervour, were repeated on the following day when Sidi Mohammed returned to Rabat.<sup>21</sup>

Instead of sending the Sultan a reply to his second note, the government in Paris, in accordance with classical precedent of a powerless executive, announced that it proposed to appoint a committee to study the problem. The study was never to prove onerous since the committee was not even appointed. The impression grew that there had never been any intention of appointing one, and that the "powerless executive" merely wished to postpone the necessity for giving any definite reply to the Sultan's demands. The only word that Sidi Mohammed received was provided by the colonialist press. It denounced his attitude in Paris as "megalomania", and accused him of wishing to replace the Protectorate by his own "medieval despotism". A few days later Sidi Mohammed gave the lie to these accusations in his speech from the throne on November 18. "Not for a single moment," he said, "have we lost sight of the fact that the best régime under which a sovereign and self-administered country can live is the democratic, such as we know it in the world to-day. A régime of that kind does not contradict the principles of Islam."<sup>22</sup>

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Sidi Mohammed's demands in Paris were generally interpreted as an indictment of General Juin's policies. Extremely proud and sensitive, and conscious of the immense power he represented, the

<sup>21</sup> The author witnessed the scenes of welcome on both occasions.

<sup>22</sup> *La Vigie Marocaine*, November 19, 1950.

Resident General considered neither Sidi Mohammed by himself nor nationalism by itself as insuperable obstacles. But the combination of the two was a threat that could not be disregarded. The close association of an inviolable sovereign with the Istiqlal imparted to that movement some of the sovereign's own prestige. And after Sidi Mohammed's return from France the Istiqlal was becoming far more vocal and active.

The Sultan had little to show for his costly trip. General Juin, for his part, had nothing to show for his strenuous campaigning in an unaccustomed sphere. It began to look as though only a showdown could resolve the situation. As Prof. Julien put the matter, "Force would permit the Resident and those who stood behind him to crush the Istiqlal, and, if need be, the sovereign, and to open the field to reforms desired by the Administration."<sup>23</sup>

Once General Juin had made up his mind, actions were bound to follow with inevitable logic, actions culminating in what has come to be styled "the crisis of 1951".

<sup>23</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 376.



## THE CRISIS OF 1951

**B**EFORE we follow the development of the crisis step by step, let us pause for a moment to gain a closer view of the political and psychological situation in which the crisis developed. We need not deal with Morocco's economic progress. This continued unabated, and its success was a credit to French enterprise and efficiency. But economic considerations *per se* played next to no part in the crisis. They were relevant to it only in so far as they dominated, or were dominated by, politics, for the native rôle in economic development was only a minor one.

To summarize the main aspects of the situation as seen by a French observer, in a special number of *Témoignage Chrétien*: it was pointed out that the settlers in Morocco, allegedly their "second fatherland", seldom bothered to learn the language of the country that had made their fortunes. "Indeed," the newspaper declared, "there was no need to speak Arabic in order to make one's living, to drink one's apéritif, or to exchange praises of French virtues with friends. . . . One cannot speak of racial segregation. Yet it exists in numerous guises." M. Vallat, Director of the Interior, generally regarded as one of the most prominent figures in the colonialist bloc, stated in a conversation with a correspondent of the paper, "Certainly many bad Frenchmen have come to this country, animated by a complex of racial superiority."<sup>1</sup> The same may, of course, be said of almost any centre of colonial settlement, at almost any stage of its history.

*Témoignage Chrétien* continued: "Every day Moroccan confidence in France is undermined by new misdeeds. Mistrust of France is not limited to the élite of modern schooling or to conscientious nationalists. It has enveloped the masses. People of no matter what condition are profoundly sceptical about the virtues of Pax Gallica. The Shereefian State, of which Moroccans are the citizens, has no real power whatever. The powers of the Sultan have been diminished more and more seriously by the encroachments of a direct administration. The authority of the viziers is kept within narrow limits

<sup>1</sup> September 4, 1953.

under the control of French civil servants. Surveying one by one the various facets of Moroccan life, one seeks in vain for evidence that the Moroccans take any part in the management of public affairs. They are subjects rather than citizens. It is quite certain that every one of them, even if he has only just begun to develop a political consciousness, is a nationalist. All that France's policy of repression can achieve is to spur the movement on to strengthen the political unity of the Moroccan people." Speaking of the authorities' conception of Islam, *Témoignage* goes on to say: "Islam is generally treated as though it were a [political] party. Nothing but its bearing on political matters is taken into consideration, and it is being combated with the weapons of politics. France is trying to utilize the power of Islam to her own advantage, but nothing is further from her intentions than to help Islam to preserve its spiritual integrity. Thus the proletarianization of the masses and the macchiavellianism of certain governmental methods hasten the drift of Islam [in Morocco] towards materialism."<sup>2</sup>

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To return to the events leading to the crisis, we find that the nationalists, taking their cue from the Sultan, became more outspoken in their criticism of the authorities. Having boycotted the 1950 summer session of the Government Council, the native delegates representing Morocco's economic interests, decided to participate in the December meeting. The disappointing result of their abstention in the summer had convinced them that dignified silence was less effective than vigorous criticism. The first warning note was sounded on December 6 by the chief Moroccan *rapporteur* of the budget. This was Ahmed Lyazidi, President of the Federation of Moroccan Chambers of Commerce, and a former officer in the French army. Both the French and Moroccan sections of the Council were presided over by the Resident General in person. While making his report, Ahmed Lyazidi claimed that the financial policy of the Protectorate served only French interests. General Juin instantly requested the speaker never again to express such views in the Council.

The debate that followed revealed the deep gulf that separated

<sup>2</sup> April 10, 1953. *Témoignage Chrétien* has been chosen for the lengthy quotation just given because that paper was particularly concerned with Morocco, and received reports therefrom from some of the most reputable reporters, known both for their objectivity and for their sincere Christian convictions. Their regard for ethical considerations urged them to look beyond the political and kindred implications. They saw that the situation presented a spiritual problem that no genuine Christian had a right to ignore or to dismiss as "none of his business".

the delegates elected by their compatriots from those appointed by the Residency. From among these latter, Abderrahman Tajhi instantly came forward to defend the Protectorate authorities. "*Mon Général,*" he exclaimed heatedly, "the report of Si Ahmed Lyazidi was exaggerated. We do not agree with him at all." He was assisted by several other French-appointed delegates. One of them, Mohammed ben Lashmi, declared, "Lyazidi wishes to act as a dictator. We do not agree with him. We have a sovereign, and the French nation to protect us. If our fate depended upon Mr. Lyazidi, we should be slaves!" A third member of the same group wound up his speech with the words, "We are for France, because France is for us." One delegate tried to bridge the chasm separating the two factions by declaring, "We haven't come here in order to quarrel or to say unpleasant things about France. We are not ungrateful, and we recognize what France has done for us. But we have also fought in the war, some of our officers have died for France, and we have sacrificed our own sons. We are here to defend the common interest."<sup>3</sup>

On the 8th and 9th, the two *rapporteurs* on finance and education respectively, followed the line taken by Ahmed Lyazidi. But the storm within the Council did not reach its climax until the meeting of the 12th, when the *rapporteur* was Mohammed Laghzaoui, a self-made business man from Fez, as well known for his financial genius as for his strong nationalist sympathies. His criticism was even more outspoken than his colleagues', and General Juin's patience was evidently at an end. "Monsieur Laghzaoui," he shouted across the Council chamber, "your insults are so far-reaching that I refuse to listen to them. You have nothing further to do in this Chamber, because in every assembly there is a limit to insolence and provocation. I ask you to leave the Chamber." When the *rapporteur* complied, the nine leading delegates—all of them members of the Istiqlal—followed him. They were the only ones who had been properly elected by their fellow-Moroccans; the remaining fifty had all been nominated by the Resident General. "Thus a high official of the French Republic judged himself vested with the authority to expel properly elected councillors and to deprive them of their mandates because they expressed criticism that seemed to him excessive."<sup>4</sup> (Some foreign newspapers expressed the view that Laghzaoui should have taken no notice of the general's order, and refused to leave the Chamber. But, taught by personal experience, Laghzaoui knew that such a refusal would merely pro-

<sup>3</sup> Marcel Rouffie, *Le Protectorat a-t-il fait faillite?* pp. 50-51. Editions de la S.I.P.E.F., Casablanca, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

voke his eviction by force.) An hour or so later the nine delegates were, at their request, received by the Sultan in his palace.

Sidi Mohammed's gesture of giving the banished delegates an immediate hearing was not lost on General Juin. The cleavage between Palace and Residency, having become visible, he decided to act more emphatically. In the first attack upon the sovereign, the instrument was to be the old native stand-by of successive Residents, Thami el Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakesh. (A detailed account of Glaoui is given in the chapter "The Feudal Conspiracy".) The attack was carefully prepared, and the Pasha was specially primed for his part in the impending events.<sup>5</sup> In October of the previous year, he had accompanied Sidi Mohammed to Paris, but he stayed on in France, and after the sovereign's departure was consulted by various members of the government and by M. Auriol, President of the Republic. On his return to Morocco he was received by the French authorities with honours normally accorded only to the monarch. All the leading members of the Administration, headed by General Juin, were there to greet him, as if to demonstrate to the Moroccans that in the eyes of the authorities, he was quite as important as the Sultan himself.

On December 21 Glaoui delivered his frontal attack. In the course of an audience with Sidi Mohammed, he adopted a haughty tone, and finally cried out, "You are not the Sultan of Morocco, you are the Sultan of the Istiqlal." Sidi Mohammed told him to leave the palace, and never to return thither unless summoned.<sup>6</sup> Once the attack had been delivered, *contrôleurs civils* (local French governors) throughout the country summoned the tribal caids and enjoined them to support Glaoui. The Pasha was sent on a tour of the various districts, and in each place the Administration saw to it that spectacular festivities were arranged. The caids of each district were made to assure Glaoui of their solidarity in his fight against the Sultan and the nationalists.<sup>7</sup>

In the last week of January 1951 General Juin had to accompany the French Premier to Washington. On the 26th he called on Sidi Mohammed, first demanding that Sidi Mohammed should sign all outstanding decrees, next delivering a violent tirade against the Istiqlal, and finally declaring that the Sultan must either denounce the Party or abdicate.<sup>8</sup> In reply Sidi Mohammed explained that he could not possibly denounce any single party: as king, he stood above all parties. If the Istiqlal had committed any offence, he added, there were courts to deal with these.<sup>9</sup> The general brushed

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 378.

<sup>7</sup> *Témoignage Chrétien*, April 10, 1953.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Bennouna, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

this suggestion aside with an ultimatum. "Your Majesty's reply is unacceptable," he said. "You either condemn the Istiqlal or you renounce your throne. Otherwise I shall depose you myself. I am now leaving for Washington. You have time enough to think over my request. We shall see, on my return, what is to be done."<sup>10</sup>

The ultimatum startled not only Morocco and France, but the entire Arab world was shocked. On February 26, members of the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly in Paris asked M. Robert Schuman, the Foreign Secretary, for an explanation of General Juin's action. Avoiding a direct reply, M. Schuman explained that Franco-Moroccan discussions would continue with the only Moroccan representative recognized by France, namely the Sultan. He also laid stress on the services rendered to France by Sidi Mohammed, and added that the campaign against his person must cease.<sup>11</sup> M. Schuman's grasp of the details and implications of the crisis in Morocco was far less unsure than that of most of his colleagues. He was known to disagree with the policies of the colonialists, and to disapprove of General Juin's methods. But his views were not shared by the majority of the Cabinet.<sup>12</sup> Rumour, however, had it that he found support in Washington, and that the State Department had intervened on behalf of the Sultan, advising General Juin to call off his campaign against the Moroccan sovereign. The U.S.A. had only just begun to embark on its large-scale project of building air bases in the Maghreb, and it was understandable that the American authorities would not wish to see trouble coming to a head in that country.

When General Juin returned from the U.S., many believed that he was in a chastened mood. On his arrival at Rabat, on February 11, he even asked Prince Moulay Hassan, on whom he usually wasted little courtesy, to call on him at the Residency. According to the Prince's own statement, he assured him, "with captivating charm" that he had never threatened his father with the loss of his throne. Only his obligations as a guest (and the exalted standards of Moorish good manners by which he abided) prevented the Prince from confronting the Resident with the Sultan's personal

<sup>10</sup> This translation is from the verbatim report received by the author from the palace. The French version is: "Votre réponse est inacceptable. Ou vous désavouez ouvertement le parti de l'Istiqlal, ou vous abdiquez le Trône. Autrement, je vous déposerai moi-même. Je pars maintenant pour Washington. Vous avez le temps de méditer sur ce que je viens de vous demander. Nous verrons, à mon retour, ce que nous devons faire."

<sup>11</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

<sup>12</sup> "General Juin knew that, though his policy was gravely mistrusted by his two chiefs, MM. Schuman and Jules Moch, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence respectively, it was defended in the Cabinet by the Prime Minister, M. Plevin, and by M. Queuille, Minister of the Interior." (Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 379.)

evidence and with that of other witnesses who, with their own ears, had heard the general's words.<sup>13</sup>

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Events were soon to prove that the visit to Washington had only strengthened General Juin's resolve to act, and to act quickly. According to some commentators, the general, who had never been particularly enamoured of the Americans, considered the U.S. intervention in "his own affair" an affront he was not willing to forgive.<sup>14</sup> On February 12, he again called on Sidi Mohammed, repeating and enlarging his demands of January 26. Besides uttering a public condemnation of the Istiqlal, the Sultan was to eliminate from his entourage all persons of nationalist sympathies; to nominate a large number of French candidates for posts of pashas and caids; and to punish all those who had shown opposition to Glaoui.<sup>15</sup>

General Juin's attitude and methods are less incomprehensible if we remember that nothing in his training or experience had equipped him with understanding of the force of modern nationalism or with ability to read the lessons of history in the light of new world conditions (and of conditions in the Muslim world in particular). For the general, the Moroccan problem was a colonial problem, and the only brand of colonialism he knew was of nineteenth-century vintage, dating back to colonialism's heyday, when France conquered Algeria. He reduced the Moroccan question to the simple formula that French paternal colonialism was the ideal régime for Morocco; since Sidi Mohammed interfered with it, he must be eliminated. According to Claude Bourdet, "General Juin, like the world of the settlers of which he is a product, could envisage only one policy: that of force, employed either directly or camouflaged under cover of people used as tools."<sup>16</sup> It must nevertheless be stressed that however questionable the general's approach might appear to people less hemmed in by prejudice, it does not necessarily follow that his motives were base.

As an earnest of his willingness to meet Juin half-way, and there can be no doubt that this concession was anything but a minor one,

<sup>13</sup> M. Charles d'Aragon, deputy for the Hautes Pyrénées in the French Assembly, who had visited Morocco during the days of the crisis, wrote on February 1, 1951, in *L'Observateur*, "Friday last, January 26th, was a day of dire significance in Franco-Moroccan history. The interview between General Juin and the Sultan was protracted . . . threatening terms were employed . . . abdication and deposition. The raised voice could be heard through the walls of the room. Its threatening terms have reached Paris from many different sources."

<sup>14</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *L'Observateur*, February 1, 1951.

Sidi Mohammed agreed to dismiss not only the officials at his court known to be nationalists, but also the entire Makhzen. However, General Juin was not satisfied. He reiterated his main demand that the Sultan should condemn and outlaw the Istiqlal. Sidi Mohammed thereupon summoned the Makhzen, together with some leading *oulema* whose concurrence was essential for an act of such far-reaching legal and religious implications as would be the official condemnation of the largest political party in the country. The viziers and *oulema* reached the unanimous decision that nothing either in Muslim law or in Morocco's treaty with France entitled the monarch to issue the statement which the Resident demanded. The viziers even prepared a special manifesto enjoining the Moroccan people to continue their collaboration with the protecting Power and confirming the Sultan's attachment to France. But the general was still not appeased. Moreover, he presented Sidi Mohammed with an extension of his earlier stipulation; the Grand Vizier must publish a denunciation of the members of the Istiqlal, stigmatizing them as atheists and expelling them from the community of the faithful. This latest demand suggested that the general was ignorant of fundamental Islamic precepts. No Muslim Prime Minister could take such a measure, unless he himself wished to be expelled from the Muslim community. In Muslim eyes few acts could be more sacrilegious than a condemnation of Muslims on religious grounds on the command of Christians. The Makhzen refused the general's request.<sup>17</sup>

On the following day, January 20, General Juin summoned all the members of the Makhzen to the Residency. They were headed by the Grand Vizier, Haj Mohammed el Mokhri, who was over a hundred years old. "He received them at the door of his office, after keeping them waiting for an hour and a half. Then he addressed them *avec véhémence*. When one of the viziers observed that the general's tone was unsuited to the occasion, the latter cut him short and said that unless the ministers condemned the Istiqlal, Berber tribes that were only waiting for a word of command would descend upon the cities."<sup>18</sup> "You will then come to me," he added, "to ask for my protection. You need not expect it, gentlemen. All we are called upon to protect is the person of the Sultan, and I have already made this clear to the sovereign."<sup>19</sup>

Sidi Mohammed had meanwhile telegraphed to President Auriol, asking him to arbitrate between him and the Resident. The President appeared to accept the advice of the ministerial group headed

<sup>17</sup> Julien, *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Julien, *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Bennouna, *op. cit.*, p. 100, and from personal statements by those present.

by M. Pleven and M. Queuille rather than that of M. Schuman, and made common cause with General Juin. In his reply he advised the Sultan to accept a compromise.<sup>20</sup> But Sidi Mohammed could see no way to further compromise without violating the precepts of his faith and his convictions. In a word, it was not within his power to "excommunicate" the Istiqlal.

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The last act in the crisis was a combined effort of the Resident and Glaoui. For weeks past, Glaoui had circulated petitions throughout the tribes. These were directed against Sidi Mohammed and the nationalists. Tribal leaders and officials, down to the lower grades, had to sign them. "The majority of the signatories did not know what the petitions contained" (many of them being illiterate); "a certain number refused."<sup>21</sup> At the same time "the *contrôleurs civils* received orders to requisition all tribal horsemen under different pretexts, and to despatch them towards Fez and Rabat".<sup>22</sup> These pretexts were of different import. "Some were ordered to submit themselves to an anti-tuberculosis vaccination, others to take part in a grand feast. Others were even promised a gift of sugar."<sup>23</sup> It was this mobilization, "staged entirely by the Administration" that General Juin was to describe as "a spontaneous rising of all the regions of Morocco to manifest the deeply felt views of the noble Moroccan people".<sup>24</sup> The Sultan's palace at Rabat, and Prince Moulay Hassan's villa in near-by Souissi, were surrounded by armed troops with tanks and guns in order "to protect their inmates against the Berber revolt". It was at that point, on January 25, that the Sultan received M. Auriol's reply, a reply that destroyed his last hope.<sup>25</sup>

In the meantime General Juin had dissolved the Sultan's private *Cabinet Impérial*, a small body of personal advisers, and removed from his post Mohammed el Fassi, Rector of the Karaouine University, and one of his country's most distinguished scholars. None of the deposed personalities had made any secret of his nationalist sympathies.

It was in this atmosphere that Sidi Mohammed was given an unvarnished alternative in a communication from General Juin. Either he would sign his acceptance of the general's demands or he would lose his throne: this was its essence. It was made plain to him that he must include with the earlier paragraphs a new one

<sup>20</sup> Julien, *ibid.*, p. 380.

<sup>21</sup> *Les Temps Modernes*, July 1953, p. 134.

<sup>22</sup> Julien, *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Temps Modernes*, *ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Julien, *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*



in which he was to recognize the "generous action by the French Republic". The Grand Vizier, for his part, was to sign "an official condemnation of a certain party".<sup>26</sup> The documents for Sidi Mohammed's signature were to be transmitted after he had made his final decision.

Once again the Sultan called the viziers to a meeting. Everyone present was aware that armed troops were surrounding the building, and that tribesmen were camping at the gates of the city. They also might reasonably expect that if they persisted in refusing the demands of the Residency, there would be much bloodshed at Rabat and Fez. Rightly or wrongly they saw no alternative to surrender, but history may well wonder whether the Resident's entire campaign was not a colossal bluff, and that this was the moment to call it.

That same evening Si Mammeri, the Sultan's Algerian-born Chef du Protocole, and the only one of his advisers whom the French thought trustworthy, was summoned to the Residency. He was given a document containing a list of General Juin's demands, and told that if the Sultan still refused to sign, two hours later he would no longer occupy the throne.

At 8 p.m., that is exactly two hours later, M. Ghislain Clauzel, the French Conseiller des Affaires Chérifiennes, presented himself at the palace, accompanied by several officers carrying their swords. While the army men remained in an anteroom, M. Clauzel was at once received by the monarch. M. Clauzel, not a colonialist, but a *diplomate de carrière* and very much a gentleman, was the permanent link between the Resident and the Sultan. The Sultan had "always liked the handsome and cheerful Conseiller Chérifien, always immaculately turned out, and never for a moment forgetful of his exquisite manners. He handed him General Juin's document to which the royal signature was now appended. In a few words he explained that he had signed the paper in order to prevent bloodshed; but as he had signed under duress, he did not consider the document to possess legal value."<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Texts quoted in *Le Monde*, February 28, 1951.

<sup>27</sup> Rom Landau, *The Sultan of Morocco*, op. cit., p. 97. In a statement he made a few weeks later to the Egyptian paper *Al Ahram*, Sidi Mohammed said, "I signed the protocol of February 25, 1951, as a result of the threats made during the negotiations between the Palace and the Residency by some officials of the Residency . . . and as a result of the movement of a certain number of tribes coming from various directions, tribes which were ignorant of the true object of their displacement, and which installed themselves at the gates of Fez, Rabat and Salé. To avoid the deplorable consequences that might have accrued from the two situations thus created, I felt forced to sign."

On the face of it the events of February 1951 might appear to have brought to an end the situation that had become intolerable.<sup>28</sup> But, as it turned out, the crisis solved nothing, merely serving to deepen the gulf between Morocco and France. For even if General Juin's demands had been legal, it is not easy to explain away "the brutality of the proceedings for which there was no precedent in the history of the Moroccan Protectorate".<sup>29</sup> Another dangerous precedent had been created by the officially organized march of the tribes. For it might easily open the doors to a renewal of the tribal dissidence that for centuries had impeded Morocco's unification and progress. Finally, since France had pledged herself, by the Protectorate Treaty, to render the Sultan "constant assistance against any danger", the measures taken by the Resident were regarded by the Moroccans as the danger itself, and hence a violation of that treaty.

Even the apparent victor had little cause to congratulate himself on his triumph. As practically all officials with nationalist leanings had been removed from office, and as many of Istiqlal leaders—Mohammed Lyazidi, Omar Abdeljalil, Abdelkrim Bendjelloun, Mehdi Ben Barka—were arrested, the nationalists were now more or less impotent. They realized that any attempt to make their presence felt would be followed by a new wave of arrests. But in threatening the person of the Sultan, General Juin had, within a few days, achieved what the nationalists had failed to accomplish in as many years. Whatever the Berbers might think of Sidi Mohammed, their secular head, they venerated him in his capacity of Imam. After their return from Fez and Rabat, many of the tribesmen realized that they had been duped and that their supreme Imam had been menaced, and almost with their connivance. Suddenly religion impinged upon politics, and Sidi Mohammed began to gain

<sup>28</sup> General Juin gave his version of the events in a letter published by *Le Monde* on June 9, 1953. In it he stated: "The origin of the affair was the *malaise* provoked by the scandalous provocations by the people of the Istiqlal. . . . As a result of the clash between the Pasha of Marrakesh and a Sultan viewed with suspicion on account of his docility towards the Istiqlal, there was a surge of disapproval among the rural populations. In consequence, I advised the Palace to make a declaration that would disarm the growing opposition. I did not request the condemnation of nationalism—a proceeding that could not be contemplated—but the castigation of the methods that were at the bottom of the violence and the systematic obstruction employed by a certain political party [Istiqlal]. In spite of my pleadings, the Sultan refused to follow my advice. So I let him know that my position as Resident General forbade me to play the game of the enemies of my country. . . . In the message sent to the Palace by the President of the Republic, the Sultan was courteously enjoined to follow the counsels that I had permitted myself to give him with a view to rallying the population around him. I imagine that, assisted by circumstances, the message produced the desired effect, for, the same evening, the sultan signed a protocol containing all the points in conformity with my suggestions. This brought about the final appeasement."

<sup>29</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 381.

in popularity among the Berbers, to attract an adherence which in the past had eluded him. Their protest against having been thus misled took a curious form. This is how *Le Monde* described it on April 3, 1951: "We are witnessing an inverse and new phase of the Moroccan crisis. Since the middle of last week, groups of natives have been assembling quietly at the borders of the Berber country, south of Meknes. Without any noise or any kind of disturbance they are spending long hours outside the French administrative offices. When asked what their purpose is, they say that they want their pasha and caids to be dismissed, since these recently set themselves to oppose the Sultan. All this is done with such calm, such politeness, that the authorities are at a loss to know how to intervene."

There was yet another outcome that the Resident General cannot have foreseen. For several years past there had been personal jealousies and conflicts among the three minor political parties, and between two of them and the Istiqlal. Under the impact of recent events, they all got together, and on April 10 formed a united front. This was an important milestone in the political progress of the country. For in the past some of the minor parties had advocated compromise with the French, a suggestion that was bound to weaken the Istiqlal's claim that the entire country approved their uncompromising stand. Once unity was achieved, the whole membership adopted the programme of the Istiqlal, and pledged themselves to "fight for Morocco's complete independence"; not to join the French Union; to refuse all negotiations with France before independence was obtained; to abstain from all connection with the communists; and to co-operate as much as possible with the Arab League. The new pact was sealed in Tangier, in the presence of Saleh Abou Riakik, a specially despatched delegate of the Arab League.<sup>30</sup>

As was inevitable, the Arab countries reacted with violence at every stage of the crisis, and their emotions were inflamed to even greater ardency by the spate of exaggerated news that descended upon them. Their susceptibilities, both as Arabs and Muslims, were deeply offended, since they regarded the attack upon Sidi Mohammed as an affront to Islam. Prepared to believe anything about "French crimes", they readily swallowed the rumours that the French had bombarded Fez, desecrated mosques, and committed any number of unspeakable outrages.

Who was it who went to such trouble to launch these fantastic news items? For some time to come there were heated arguments on that subject. The colonialists claimed that Allal el Fassi and

<sup>30</sup> Bennouna, op. cit., p. 69, and Julien, op. cit., p. 383.

other nationalists were the culprits; the Moroccans accused French *agents provocateurs* of having spread the false news, so that its ultimate discrediting might reflect upon Arab veracity. This practice of setting up Aunt Sallies that are bound to be knocked down is, of course, a time-honoured method of avoiding the discussion of real issues. At one moment the colonialists even accused a blameless British Consul in Morocco of having launched the campaign of lies! It was never found out who was responsible, even if the mischief could be brought home to any person or group. In the psychological atmosphere prevailing in the Arab capitals at the time, it would not have been beyond the ingenuity of some editor or journalist to invent the atrocity stories on the spur of the moment. And the man in the street would usually be too unsophisticated to realize that the French were not as unsubtle as the tales made them out to be.

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For a time French public opinion, ignorant of the true facts, fully approved General Juin's action. Only a few of the more serious political reviews—with a readership made up almost entirely of intellectuals—printed the unadorned story. More than another year slipped by before the more startling of Moroccan events began to awaken metropolitan France to awareness of danger, and before various religious, cultural and political organizations sent out their own observers to report on the real state of affairs. But this did not happen until December 1952, after the "blood bath" of Casablanca.

Nevertheless, on August 28, 1951, the French government decided to replace General Juin by a new Resident at Rabat. Evidently, and in spite of his "success" in February, it was not considered that the Moroccan situation had improved sufficiently to warrant the appointment of a civilian. Another soldier, General Guillaume, was chosen.

Before leaving Morocco, General Juin undertook a farewell tour of the country. Everywhere the French communities assured him of their loyalty, their gratitude, their unswerving support. On September 14, he appeared in state at the imperial palace to take official farewell of the Sultan, and concluded his speech with the words, "I am conscious of having done everything within my power and within the framework of the treaty to give satisfaction to legitimate aspirations of your Majesty's people—particularly in so far as their accession to the management of their own affairs is concerned."

## CASABLANCA, 1952

THE arrival of a new Resident General always raised hopes that "things were bound to improve". But those intimately acquainted with the workings of the régime welcomed the new arrival without much optimism. They knew that the change of personalities was but a secondary matter. New lines of policy decided upon at Paris, a new determination not to be browbeaten by the colonialists—these were the novelties the Moroccans were hoping for. But a new Resident had no power to make such fundamental changes. In view of the gulf that separated a policy of direct administration from concurrence with native demands, his office had become practically untenable.

From the very beginning it was obvious that General Guillaume's position, as well as his intentions, were somewhat ambiguous. He was a "*vieux Marocain*", that is, one of the "old soldiers" who had taken part in Lyautey's Moroccan campaigns. He knew every corner of the Maghreb, and, unlike his predecessor, was an administrator as well as a soldier. Far from being a "one-language" man, like Juin, he knew both Berber and Arabic; and his interest in Morocco was genuine. Soon after his arrival he announced that he expected his subordinates to learn Arabic, and to work not eight, but sixteen, hours per day. Rather than shut himself up in his magnificent Residency, he visited area after area of the country, and tried to make as many personal contacts as possible. He encouraged the propagandists who depicted him as an easily approachable man of "direct speech", and he was particularly concerned to cultivate relations with journalists from abroad. In one of his first public speeches he declared that the Protectorate régime had nothing to hide and that he would welcome any foreigner wishing to study the situation on the spot.

During the week following that invitation, General Guillaume expelled the correspondent of an Australian paper who had written unfavourably about the Protectorate régime; ordered the arrest of the French newspaper correspondent who had sought information from nationalists; and refused a visa to a British writer who had committed a similar crime. His very first public speeches on Moorish

soil abounded with strongly worded threats against nationalist critics of his policies. These "fanatics", he said, would "bite the dust" and could also expect to be "crushed" under his heel. After a number of such announcements, the Quai d'Orsay was said to have taken fright, and the Resident's eloquence came to an abrupt end, though it was to be resumed later. But even if his speeches had been conciliatory, and if he had wished to meet the nationalists half-way, those responsible for France's Moroccan policy would hardly have permitted him to do so. The *cognoscenti* both in Paris and in Rabat maintained that that policy was still dominated by General Juin, who had meanwhile received his Marshal's baton, and whose influence over Moroccan affairs had not diminished.<sup>1</sup> In short, General Guillaume's policy showed no noticeable change, and consequently produced no efficacious results.<sup>2</sup> Unlike M. Labonne, General Guillaume took the utmost care to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the colonialists, who soon came to regard him as their main spokesman. "He was surrounded by the wrong people, and was badly advised," wrote a French author.<sup>3</sup>

In his speech from the throne, on November 18, 1951, the Sultan expressed the hope that new negotiations with the French government might lead to the establishment of "a convention that would guarantee Morocco its full sovereignty and that would place its relations with France on new foundations".<sup>4</sup> He envisaged, perhaps, the possibility of France agreeing to the appointment of the mixed commission promised during his recent visit to Paris, or opening new negotiations. But nothing so positive occurred, since the French government, evidently committed to a policy of *immobilisme*, found inaction the least compromising response. Sidi Mohammed waited for several months, and on March 20, 1952, asked the Resident to transmit a new note to M. Auriol, the French President. This note outlined a precise and coherent programme; the proposals were that:

France should accept the principle of discussing the status of the

<sup>1</sup> Claude Bourdet wrote in the summer of 1953: "Though he is no longer Resident, Marshal Juin continues to take the liveliest interest in everything concerning Morocco. He is in constant touch with the great colonialists, for whom he still is *l'homme providentiel*; his own henchmen, especially Boniface, prefect of Casablanca, Brunel, prefect of Oujda, and General d'Hauteville [Governor of Marrakesh], still hold their old offices, and the weak General Guillaume, theoretically the Resident General, has been promptly 'called to order' by all this gang." (*Temps Modernes*, July 1953.)

Marshal Juin's great influence on Moroccan affairs was confirmed even under M. Mendès-France. *Le Monde* reported, on October 28, 1954, that when the latter, as Prime Minister, discussed a new policy for Morocco with M. Francis Lacoste (the new Resident General) Marshal Juin was present. Obviously, there is everything to be said for pooling knowledge and opinions, provided that willingness to adapt these to the most recent trends and events is not lacking.

<sup>2</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 388.

<sup>3</sup> Paul Buttin, *Le Drame du Maroc*, p. 210.

<sup>4</sup> *Maroc politique*, November 25, 1951.

Protectorate, after first abolishing the "state of siege" that was the main cause of the existing tension in Morocco; the Sultan should be empowered to form a government of persons competent to negotiate, in his name, with France; and, lastly, the negotiations should be concerned with a revision of Franco-Moroccan relations on the basis of the Sultan's memorandum of October 1950.<sup>5</sup>

The nationalists, in a corollary statement, made one important clarification. For many years it was an axiom of colonialist propaganda that Sultan and nationalists were aiming at "kicking the French out", and at taking possession of French economic interests in the Maghreb. In their new declaration the nationalists stated: "France has interests and rights the legality of which is recognized by the Moroccans. These rights can be safeguarded and guaranteed in a new convention. Even so, there is no question of a complete break with France. On the contrary our aim is to assure the continuation of Franco-Moroccan relations, but within a framework that gives satisfactory scope to the aspirations of the Moroccan people."<sup>6</sup>

Sidi Mohammed's aim (fully acceptable to the nationalists) was to "permit the Moroccan people to manage the country's affairs by means of a representative parliament and a constitutional government of a modern democratic character, the establishment of such institutions not being incompatible with the continuation of a Franco-Moroccan co-operation".<sup>7</sup> While eager to retain the links that united Morocco and France, Sidi Mohammed therefore sought agreement for the introduction of a constitutional monarchy with genuine powers of self-government.

Six months later, Paris made a reply. According to Prof. Julien, "the composition of the French government, in which the traditional 'colonialists' predominated, precluded a reply in favour of the Sultan's proposals".<sup>8</sup> The French once again produced a set of "reforms", most of which envisaged a reaffirmation of French co-sovereignty.

After stressing the magnitude of French achievements in Morocco, the Quai d'Orsay proposed the following innovations: the establishment of administrative *djemaas* elected in rural districts; the creation of mixed [Franco-Moroccan] municipal commissions in the cities and in rural centres; and a speedy presentation of proposals regulating the administration of justice. Finally, the French note pointed out that "the administration in Morocco has a mixed character,

<sup>5</sup> *L'Echo du Maroc*, March 29, 1952.

<sup>6</sup> *Al Istiqlal*, March 29, 1952.

<sup>7</sup> *Communiqué du Palais Impérial du 8 Octobre, 1952.*

<sup>8</sup> Julien, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

that is, Franco-Moroccan under the control of French authorities".<sup>9</sup> Yet the very existence of a "mixed administration" was juridically indefensible, for it represented a violation of the Treaty of 1912. "Never would Lyautey have admitted such a text [as contained in the French reply] for its interpretation of the Protectorate and its political implications would have revolted him."<sup>10</sup>

In his answer of October 3, Sidi Mohammed expressed his profound regret at the nature of the French note, and dwelt upon the inadmissible implications of its contents. His own legal position had been strengthened only a few weeks earlier when, on August 27, the International Court of Justice at the Hague had reaffirmed the sovereign and independent character of Morocco and its ruler. However, in practical terms this was of little use to him, for those who wielded effective power in Morocco received the pronouncement with the same nonchalance that resolutions of the U.N. Assembly were later to be accorded.<sup>11</sup> Many thoughtful people in France were growing increasingly apprehensive over the progressive deterioration in Franco-Moroccan relations. But they still represented too small a minority to exert a decisive influence. Public opinion in France, fed by officially inspired pronouncements, was almost wholly ignorant of the situation, accepting unquestioningly these assurances that all was or would be well in the *Empire fortuné*.

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At the beginning of December 1952 French public opinion received its first real shock. The starting point of a dramatic chain of events was the murder of the Tunisian trade union leader, Ferhat Hashed, on December the sixth. Hashed was among the most highly esteemed nationalists of French North Africa. His assassination and its circumstances caused profound resentment throughout the Muslim world. As he was under the constant supervision of the French police, the Tunisians were convinced that his assassins must be French, a conviction strengthened, in the course of time, by the authorities' failure to find the culprits.<sup>12</sup>

As a result of Hashed's death, a sympathy strike was proclaimed by Moroccan workmen, a strike culminating, between December 7 and 8, in clashes in Casablanca between the police and the natives.

<sup>9</sup> *Communiqué du Palais Impérial du 8 Octobre, 1952.*

<sup>10</sup> Julien, op. cit., p. 393.

<sup>11</sup> See chapters "Morocco and the U.S.A." and "Morocco in the U.N."

<sup>12</sup> As late as November 1954, that is almost two years after the event, Habib Bourguiba, the nationalist leader of Tunisia, declared: "I have no confidence whatever in an administration that has not arrested the assassins of Ferhat Hashed." (*Le Petit Matin de Tunis*, November 22, 1954.)



There is no need to repeat the story of those events—floods of ink have flowed in justification and condemnation. France's first impression was that the troubles were the usual regrettable outrages of the more violent among the disgruntled workers, and it accepted, more or less indifferently, the official casualties figure of thirty-three Moroccans, two policemen and four Europeans killed. But about a week after the events an open letter to General Guillaume, signed by thirteen French professors of the Lycée Lyautey at Casablanca, appeared in the press of metropolitan France. Its signatories denounced the official version of the bloodshed, implying that the police, not the natives, were responsible for it. Already the truth was beginning to leak out; accompanied by the realization that not thirty-three but at least ten, if not twenty times as many had been killed. The correct figure will never be known; for as well as the determination of those on the spot to minimize the catastrophe, the natives' insistence on bearing away their co-religionists' corpses for secret burial rendered accuracy impossible.

While the colonialists and their press proclaimed that a number of Europeans had had their throats cut, the non-colonialist press in France was flooded with harrowing eyewitness reports. Typical of these was an account that appeared in *La Revue Socialiste*, with the claim that "the police delivered native prisoners to be lynched by the [French] crowd".<sup>13</sup> On December 10, the *New York Post* wrote: "Morocco seems well on the way to becoming another French Indo-China. This time the Kremlin didn't even have to start it." A week later the *New York Times* reported: "The Arab States are again ablaze with protests, the press is raging and anti-Western feeling is running high. Religious leaders, sitting in formal session, issued a summons to the Muslim world to boycott France commercially, industrially, politically and culturally." America's leading periodical dealing with Arab affairs, the *Middle East Journal*, gave the following résumé of day-to-day events: "Dec. 7, 8: Open rebellion broke out against French rule in Morocco. French troops and policemen laid siege to 2,000 Moroccan workers who barricaded themselves in the Casablanca headquarters of the Moroccan General Labor Confederation. . . . Dec. 9: One thousand people demonstrated against French rule in Beni Mellal, 100 miles south-east of Casablanca. . . . Five hundred people were arrested for demonstrating against the government. Dec. 11: It was reported that 100 Moroccans had been arrested for demonstrating against the government. Dec. 12: The government sentenced 167 Moroccans to 1 year prison terms for demonstrating against French rule. Dec. 13: French authorities stated that all leaders, as well as most of the

<sup>13</sup> No. 69, p. 120.

educated members of the Istiqlal Party, had been arrested and sent to internment camps in Southern Morocco."<sup>14</sup>

In France, the right-wing *Figaro* and the non-political *Témoignage Chrétien*, sent out special correspondents to investigate the Casablanca affair on the spot. The latter even brought out a seventy-page supplement containing the whole story. The gist of these reports was that no credence could be given to official statements as to the origin and nature of the events and the number of victims involved.

In the forefront of the "fighters for truth" stood the Circle of Catholic Intellectuals, supported by some leading exponents of Christian thought, and a number of the better-known experts on North African affairs. Their moving spirit, François Mauriac, in his preface to *Le Drame Marocain devant la Conscience Chrétienne*,<sup>15</sup> explained why French Christians were making it their business to seek out the truth of the drama of Casablanca. "This is not a matter of polemics," he wrote. "We publish the documents that have moved us to intervene in the debate concerning North Africa. We have intervened as Christians because we could not remain silent. We were not at liberty to dismiss so grave a witness which appeals to our personal responsibility as Frenchmen and Catholics. . . . Had there not been a few amongst us to raise a voice in protest at a time when Mussolini could count on so many passionate admirers among us, there would have been an irreparable breakdown in the protest which should resound without intermission from the Christian conscience in the face of History's crimes. Our silence to-day would be infinitely more serious—the North African drama involves the honour of France and its spiritual salvation. . . . The weakness of the French State places in the hands of the North African oligarchies the monstrous power that is of such service to the police, and before which the Residents General tremble. It is left to us to create in France that public opinion which can buttress effectually the authority of the State and can give confidence to the peoples so wantonly oppressed. . . . It is to be hoped that the unfortunate victims of Casablanca will not have died in vain."

Under the impact of the Casablanca events, various groups in Paris founded the *Association France-Maghreb* which became a kind of clearing house for reliable information concerning Morocco and a centre for efforts towards securing justice for the Moroccan people. As was to be expected, the colonialists turned their full wrath upon all connected with the new movement. Since the Christian convic-

<sup>14</sup> *MEJ*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> In *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, XXXV, Paris, 1953.

tions of many of the Society's members, and the unassailable right-wing sympathies of others, were thoroughly well known, they could not be labelled as communists—an attacking device particularly popular with the colonialists. So, if not communists paid with Red gold, these people were simpletons and dupes “taken in by nationalist propaganda”. Above all: they were “anti-French”.<sup>16</sup> Yet there were too many distinguished figures among the dupes—besides Mauriac, Catroux, Mitterand, Duhamel, de Peretti, Corval, Massignon—for impartial public opinion to be fobbed off with the attacks of these interested parties. The colonialists accordingly mobilized a group of Catholics of their own persuasion who, disassociating themselves politically from their better-known co-religionists in France, condemned the latter, and expressed their full confidence in the official statements.<sup>17</sup>

But public conscience had been awakened in France, and important personalities outside the France-Maghreb group began to see the danger of the policies pursued in Morocco. M. Pierre Brisson, the publisher of *Le Figaro*, declared in a personal statement, “Unlike certain higher French officials and oligarchs, we believe that the Moroccan crisis cannot be solved with truncheons and machine guns”.<sup>18</sup> Mauriac was not the only French Christian to realize that the cause of Morocco had become a test case for the Christian conscience, and that more was at stake than France's relations with Morocco. For instance, a priest and missionary in the Maghreb wrote: “This deep Franco-Moroccan rift threatens to cause a decisive split between Christianity and Islam. The representatives of Christendom [in Morocco] must not become emissaries of imperialism.” And he added: “That which makes France contemptible in Morocco is the establishment of police repression, the régime of denunciation, of suspicion, of terror. This has elevated the spy to the rank of a power in the land, and has given eminence to the rabble.”<sup>19</sup>

In spite of passionate pleas in newspapers, of demands by organizations and individuals that an official investigation should undertake

<sup>16</sup> *La Vie Marocaine* carried this criticism on January 28, 1953: “M. Mauriac's action is bad for France. . . . It is upsetting and deplorable that he should again be lending his support to such anti-French calumnies.”

<sup>17</sup> “Leadership of Catholicism in Morocco was the exclusive monopoly of some wealthy settlers, retired army men, and, above all at Casablanca, of a group of business men. They alone spoke in the name of the Catholics, and put the Catholic viewpoint in their dealings with the Resident General. . . . Yet these Catholic leaders did not hesitate to enter into electoral alliances with radical Freemasons, especially when it was a matter of preventing the election of a Christian of social and democratic tendencies.” (I. Lepp, *op. cit.*, p. 115.)

<sup>18</sup> *Le Figaro*, February 9, 1953.

<sup>19</sup> *Le Drame Marocain devant la Conscience Chrétienne, Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, 1953, p. 70.

to bring into the light of day every single aspect of the Casablanca events, "General Guillaume declared that he would never accept an official commission of enquiry, and would rather resign".<sup>20</sup> However, he did not resign, and his uncompromising stand was generally interpreted as a declaration of identity of interest with the colonialists. He abided by the official version of the events: that these had been provoked by the nationalists, that the original figure of casualties was correct, and that natives had been responsible for the murder of Frenchmen.

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The Casablanca disturbance was followed by one of the most rigorous man-hunts in modern Moroccan history. Hundreds of nationalists were imprisoned; probably not the 10,000 claimed by Moroccan sources, but the numbers must have been considerable, since the overcrowding of prisons forced the authorities to establish a number of "concentration camps" in various areas to the south.

It took twenty-two months for the official allegations that Istiqlal leaders were responsible for the riots to be refuted. It must be borne in mind that in December 1952 General Guillaume "publicly attributed the riots to the Istiqlal". Yet on September 27, 1954, the *Manchester Guardian* reported, "Fifty-one Moroccans, mainly leaders of the banned Istiqlal party and of the C.T.G., who have been awaiting trial for a year and ten months on charges of having instigated the Casablanca riots of December 7 and 8, 1952, are to be released to-morrow. The military investigating magistrate charged with their case has recognized that there is no ground for prosecution. . . . The withdrawal of the charges against the 51 men released is by implication a denial of the statements on the causes of the riots solemnly made by General Guillaume."

*Le Monde* of the same day recalled that in December 1952 the authorities had claimed that the nationalists had plotted "against the internal and external security of the State", whereas in September 1954 "that accusation could not be maintained any longer". The same paper's editorial comment pointed out that on numerous occasions the authorities had spoken of "collusion between the Istiqlal and the communists", and had announced that the background thereto and to the plot to which it had led would be thoroughly investigated, so that the culprits might be brought to trial. "To-day's decision," wrote the paper, "shows that proof of such a 'collusion' and of such a plot could not be established. Thus

<sup>20</sup> Robert Barrat, *Justice pour le Maroc*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1953, p. 38.

the thesis of the accused and of their legal defenders has been shown to be valid."

That the seeds of the evil that poisoned Morocco's atmosphere at the time of the Casablanca events had not been sown by the nationalists was further confirmed in an editorial of the French paper, *Maroc-Presse* of October 11, 1954. "The discharged persons," wrote Commandant Henri Sartout, the editor, "were accused, after the Casablanca troubles, of aiming a blow at the security of the State, in accordance with a theory formulated soon after the events—a theory which broke down in the course of a scrupulous investigation made by the military court. Nothing came to light which could justify the version of a nationalist plot. The 'plot of the Moorish cut-throats', as its inventors styled it, envenomed the European attitude to the Muslims."

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The natives were not the only ones to find themselves, in December 1952, behind iron bars or barbed wire. A number of Frenchmen and Frenchwomen known for their pro-nationalist sympathies were arrested and exiled to France. Among them was M. Pierre Parent.<sup>21</sup> "Most of them were arrested under conditions worthy of the Gestapo. They were not given time to say good-bye to their near ones nor to take their belongings with them."<sup>22</sup> "But no measures were taken against the editors or journalists of French papers who during the bloody days published false news or launched veritable incitements to murder."<sup>23</sup>

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At the end of General Guillaume's first year at the Residency, Morocco's economic progress continued in full gear: new industries were being established; new dams were opened; ever more striking skyscrapers rose heavenwards at Casablanca; new fortunes were being made. But the tenseness in the atmosphere grew daily more apparent, and sceptics pointed out that their forecasts had proved right, for, politically, nothing had changed for the better. Before the year was out, Moroccan hopes were centred on New York where the U.N. Assembly was for the first time debating the Moroccan question. Though the optimists tried to detect a ray of promise in the Assembly's resolution, they could not fail to note how pale that ray

<sup>21</sup> See p. 244.

<sup>22</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*

was, how inadequate to penetrate the growing darkness that was descending upon their country.

In his speech from the throne the Sultan tried to put new heart into the people by reaffirming their rights. It could hardly have been accidental that he laid special stress on spiritual values, evidently trying to make their material burdens appear less heavy. But he could promise them nothing tangible, and the people greeted the new year with no pabulum upon which hope might feed.

*Part Eight*

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THE DEPOSITION OF THE SULTAN





## THE FEUDAL CONSPIRACY

AFTER the crisis of 1951 and the riots in Casablanca, the pattern of Moroccan events emerged quite clearly, however confused the picture of the forces that determined it. It would be unfair to describe it as a clear-cut conflict between "French reaction and the Sultan's progressiveness". This nationalist formula is over-simplified, incomplete and only partly true. We know that there were French elements fighting only for their own vested interests. To label the entire French colony in Morocco as "reactionary" is to state the verdict before assembling the evidence. It is likewise perilous to accept unquestioningly the Sultan's claim to "progressiveness". His retention of certain traditions inherited from the past may have been inevitable, yet it somewhat weakened that claim.

The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, was eager to introduce genuine reforms. It was unfortunate that he had little support from his colleagues in the Cabinet. They were said to listen to the lobbyists rather than to disinterested advisers eager to see a permanent improvement in Moroccan affairs. But if there was an extremely powerful lobby, there were also plenty of people who took the view that crises do not arise without very good causes.

Even more complex was the picture on the Moorish side. Sidi Mohammed no doubt personified the will of the majority of the nation. What is equally certain is that after 1951, his views were such that the Istiqlal could reasonably claim him as their proper spokesman. However, the gulf between the nationalists and those who allowed the settlers' claims to count above all others, had become so deep that no compromise seemed possible. Both factions had become increasingly embittered and intransigent, and both gave evidence that their sense of proportion was less acute than formerly. Even the settlers' own journal, *Maroc-Presse*, recognized how unhealthy the atmosphere had become. "The French feel injured," ran a report of December 12, 1952, "on account of what they consider to be the ingratitude of the Moroccans. The Moroccans feel injured on account of the disdain in which they believe themselves to be held. They collect grievances and then call the expression

thereof 'patriotism'. They make wisdom out of suspicion, and turn anger into a virtue. Relations between French and Moroccans are unhealthy, and often dangerously strained."

There is no justification for ascribing "nationalist" outlook and motive to all disgruntled natives. There were those who, as genuine patriots, wished to see their country independent, and who had blind trust in Sidi Mohammed, but without having clear political ideas or any active interest in politics. There were others, presumably the majority, who thought only in terms of their own lives and jobs, caring little about political issues so long as they were permitted to live and work in peace. Then there was a comparatively small number of natives deriving direct benefit from the French occupation: minor officials in the Administration, the railways or the post office, workmen in French industry and commerce. Some of these were nationalists, a minority was passionately anti-nationalist. The fact of having a French employer was no guarantee of adherence to French colonialist ideas. France's most dependable native allies were usually influenced by the opportunities for less reputable gains that they enjoyed. Such opportunities were to be found chiefly in the rural areas, among the caids and their various underlings holding official or semi-official positions under French patronage. Of course there were the few great caids who, according to their fellow-citizens, had "sold themselves to the French", and whose careers depended upon French support. To that class also belonged the army of native police-informers, an army recruited from caids, heads of "religious brotherhoods", beggars, touts, and plain crooks. Since many of these were known for what they were by their fellow-citizens, they had to rely on the authorities for protection of life and limb.

Setting aside for a moment minor divergences, the opposing camps were, for all practical purposes, the camp of Sultan, nationalists and supporters of nationalism, and the camp of the colonialists, in which Marshal Juin, the lobbyists, their native henchmen and certain brotherhoods were incongruously assembled. Both groups comprised men and factions knowing exactly what they wanted, but one side only had the power and resources that make effective action possible.

After the failure of the 1951 coup, the removal of Sidi Mohammed seemed inevitable. The nationalists claimed that his progressive notions and support of their cause made it clear to the French that he must be replaced by a more tractable figurehead. The French explained the necessity for deposition in this way: Sidi Mohammed's identification with the nationalists was resented by the Berbers, and, thus, was threatening to split the nation in two. His refusal to sign and seal the proposals for various decrees that were to introduce

what were claimed to be democratic reforms, delayed the progress and democratization of Morocco. His refusal was based on his reluctance to renounce any of his "autocratic" powers. His sympathy with the Istiqlal was an offence to the brotherhoods which were the custodians of Islam in Morocco. His record for the last few years had shown that he was anti-French, and that it was impossible for a French Administration to co-operate with him. Only his removal would assure peace, unity and progress. Such was the gist of their indictment.

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The leading native opponents of Sidi Mohammed were Glaoui and Kittani, each with his own by no means inconsiderable following. Both had been made use of by the French on many earlier occasions, and both were extremely eager to be used again. Under Sidi Mohammed, they were treated by the Palace and, to some extent, by the Makhzen as outcasts. Under a Sultan of their own choice, they would become the main power behind the throne. They had little to lose and everything to gain if the Sultan were to be replaced.

Much has been written in the Western press about Glaoui. He has been depicted as some kind of practically independent "Sultan" of the Berbers, infinitely powerful, wealthy and shrewd, the epitome of bravery, the symbol of feudal lordship, and the incarnation of the Berber spirit. On a number of occasions, he has been host to Winston Churchill, a circumstance of great publicity value to himself and his adherents. Many of the popular Glaoui legends are based on fact. Even the French, who helped his legend to become so golden, came to respect it. His wealth was of the order that used to be innocently described as "beyond the dreams of avarice". In Marrakesh and its hinterland his word was law.

The nationalists—Glaoui's fiercest opponents—have tried to minimize his importance by writing him off as an upstart owing everything to the French. According to them, before 1912 the Glaoui family was completely unknown. This is not true. For the caid of the Glaoui country, occupying Marrakesh and the areas north of it, was a power even under Moulay Hassan who died in 1894. But his influence extended only over the northern parts of that territory. The southern slopes were held by dissident tribes acknowledging neither him nor the Sultan. Thus, while the Glaoui had for some time enjoyed a certain eminence, it was nothing like as considerable as that of such caids as the Goundafi. Their moment of opportunity came in 1908 when Moulay Hafid, with his headquarters in Marrakesh, began his campaign against his brother Moulay Abd

el Aziz. Madani el Glaoui, elder brother of Thami, was head of the district at the time, and his very active support was of considerable help to Moulay Hafid in his progress to the throne. His reward was assured when Moulay Hafid became Sultan. Madani and Thami instantly joined the French, and in 1913, Thami actually gave protection to a group of French officers whose lives were endangered by the usurper El Hiba. Lyautey was not ungrateful. And since it was part of his policy to bolster up the authority of the "great" caids, there was nothing remarkable about his enhancement of Glaoui prestige and property. But it was the elder brother Madani, and not the younger, Thami, whose services were so munificently recognized. After the former's death, the latter came into possession of all his brother's lands and property, and these he greatly enlarged by raiding the territories of various neighbours. For, like so many "great" caids before him, he found that wealth bred wealth.

Many observers and commentators have had a word or two to say on the building-up of Thami Glaoui's fortune. Robert Barrat writes thus of the pasha's coffers: "He has built up a colossal fortune which runs into billions, by raids and pillage, and by depriving his relations of their inheritance."<sup>1</sup> Claude Bourdet gives us further details: "Every inhabitant of the Moroccan South has to supplement his regulation taxes by providing presents for Glaoui's journeys, whether he goes to Mecca or takes the waters in Vichy. He has to furnish presents each time one of his numerous progeny celebrates a marriage; each time a Resident General pays a visit; not to speak of all the payments required when an official document is needed, or a judgment; when one wishes to leave prison or to avoid entering it. Glaoui has the monopoly of the trade in almonds, saffron and olives. He is the only buyer of these products, paying, at the most, half of their open-market value. He proscribes the sale of mint until the moment when he has sold his own mint harvest. He requisitions labourers to cultivate his lands, and does not pay them; he has also, by various means, appropriated an appreciable part of the good land throughout Southern Morocco. It is literally true that he is the largest exploiter in North Africa. He is hated by the entire population of the South, save by those who derive benefit from his depredations. Contrary to Shereefian laws [the authorities] decreed that the subsoil of Southern Morocco belonged to the tribes. That subsoil was thereupon 'graciously' given to their chief, the Pasha of Marrakesh."<sup>2</sup>

But even these miscellaneous sources of revenue were not enough

<sup>1</sup> Robert Barrat, *Justice pour le Maroc*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1953, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> *El Glaoui ou le Féodal-Capitalisme*, in *Temps Modernes*, Paris, July 1953, pp. 132-3.

to balance the pasha's budget. "A spender of fabulous sums, on many occasions he found himself in debt. 'Loans' granted him by France permitted him to extricate himself from these."<sup>3</sup> In fact "France lent him 78 million francs, a sum on which he paid no interest, and which he has not repaid".<sup>4</sup>

There was yet another important source of revenue at his disposal. "Glaoui is one of the greatest patrons of brothels in Morocco," writes Robert Barrat.<sup>5</sup> "Every year he claims so many young women from the tribes under his authority to provide his houses with fresh white cargo. The number of prostitutes installed in his 'houses' is estimated at 4,000. He receives 100 francs per day and per head from the commerce in their charms." It is, I think, idle to expect Western readers to view this situation with the horror it deserves. It is quite true that what might be called individual prostitution has always existed in Morocco. But organized, large-scale prostitution was an innovation introduced by the pasha. Of the many responsible French authors who have dealt with this aspect of the pasha's wealth, only one other need be quoted: Prof. Louis Massignon. In an article written in 1953, Prof. Massignon speaks at some length of the methods by which Glaoui has "improved the payment of taxes which he receives from the prostitutes of Marrakesh".<sup>6</sup> M. Jean Scelles, *Ancien Conseiller de l'Union Française*, in the name of French women's organizations united in the *Conseil National des Femmes*, sent a detailed document to the Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, to record a protest against prostitution and the white-slave traffic in the Maghreb. The only native mentioned by name in connection with "the scandal in Marrakesh" was Glaoui. Though it might be unrealistic of us to apply our standards to the more backward regions of the Maghreb, what matters is that the majority of Moroccans viewed Glaoui's position as chief organizer of that trade with horror. They did not criticize his private life, but the degrading manner in which he misused his enormous power.

Robert Barrat adds the following details to the pasha's biography: "In Marrakesh no one can lift his little finger against the pasha. In fact it is he who dispenses justice. All inhabitants suspected of sympathies for the Sultan or the Istiqlal are arrested by his men, beaten up, or thrown into prison."<sup>7</sup> And one of Lyautey's ex-officers, part-author of an article published in *Esprit*, writes: "Glaoui is the most hated man in Morocco, because he 'eats the people under him',

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *L'Histoire du Complot, Documentaire*, in *Esprit*, Paris, No. 9, 1953, p. 360.

<sup>5</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Islam et le témoignage du croyant*, in *Esprit*, Paris, No. 9, 1953, p. 383.

<sup>7</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

as the saying goes."<sup>8</sup> An attempt has been made to propagate the notion that Glaoui personified the "pure Berber type": a contention hard to maintain since his pigmentation was negro-dark, whereas the "pure Berber type" is white-skinned.

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Glaoui's fellow-king-maker was the Shereef Abd el Hay Kittani, already mentioned on various occasions. It will be remembered that the brotherhoods, Kittani's sphere, had fallen into disrepute. According to Prof. Massignon, the brotherhoods "replaced the adoration of the true God by that of the golden calf". He also states that "the God who inspires Abd el Hay Kittani is not the God of Abraham, the God of pity and self-sacrifice; it is the god of personal vengeance".<sup>9</sup>

In the 'twenties Kittani had been removed from his post as professor at the Karaouine University. The students' opposition to his allegedly heretical views and their other complaints against him, forced the religious authorities to take that decision.

Glaoui and Kittani were equally active in preparing the ground for the events of August 1953. They divided their field of activity according to their respective positions in native life: while Kittani was to mobilize the brotherhoods, Glaoui was to prepare the campaign of the tribal caids, and of the unruly elements that, in the past, had formed the core of the *bled es siba*.

In April, Kittani convened at Fez a Congress of North African brotherhoods. The aim of the Congress was to unite all the brotherhoods in a protest against Sidi Mohammed, and, subsequently, to force his deposition for "religious" reasons. However, the Quai d'Orsay, better versed in such procedures, became alarmed, and prevailed upon Kittani to limit the Congress to accusations against the Istiqlal. As soon as news of the Congress became known, the *ouelma* of Morocco, as official guardians of Islam, denounced it, asserting that the brotherhoods had no right to make official pronouncements on matters of religion. So long as Muslim Morocco has existed, such pronouncements have been the province of none but the *oulema*.

Meanwhile Glaoui, accompanied by high French officials, made a tour through the various Berber districts. During his tour he won the adherence of a number of pashas and caids, and finally prevailed upon them to sign a declaration attacking both Sultan and Istiqlal. The number of the signatories was given as 250, then as 276, and

<sup>8</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 360.

<sup>9</sup> *Esprit*, September 1953, p. 385.

then again as 287. General Guillaume was to transmit the declaration to the French government. But Glaoui, suspicious as all Berber warriors have had to be throughout their stormy history, preferred to go personally to France in order to secure support for his impending action. In Paris, he was received by various members of the government and by President Auriol himself. We do not know, of course, what the topic of his conversation was; we can only surmise on the basis of later events.

There was one event during his visit to Paris that overshadowed all others in the publicity it received and the sensation it created. General Juin, who had meanwhile returned to his purely military duties, had been raised to the rank of Marshal. But his chief interest still appeared to be Morocco, and the colonialists still regarded him as their main spokesman and patron. His elevation to the rank of Marshal was soon followed by his election to the *Académie*, an honour regarded in France as second in importance only to the receiving of the Nobel Prize. The most spectacular event in the career of a new *académicien* is his first ceremonial appearance "*sous la coupole*", and the delivery of his introductory speech. In the social life of Paris, the speech of a newly elected "immortal" is an outstanding event, and it was only to be expected that its newest member should, in his address, eulogize French achievements in Morocco and attack such Frenchmen as were critical of the French régime in the Maghreb. One such critic, the distinguished novelist and Nobel Prize winner François Mauriac, was a fellow-academician, and head of the newly founded *Association France-Maghreb* (see page 288). Several prominent personalities were members of the group: Georges Duhamel, of established literary reputation; General Catroux, a former High Commissioner in Indo-china and Syria, Ambassador in Moscow, and intimate collaborator of Marshal Lyautey; Régis Blanchère and André Julien, professors at the Sorbonne, and Louis Massignon. These had the rough edge of Juin's tongue, Glaoui the smooth. In fact, he highlighted in this maiden speech a handsome tribute to El Glaoui, who had received his personal invitation to be present. It was not the moment, of course, for acrimonious comment on the past deeds or misdeeds of a notorious guest; but neither was it seemly to enhance the value of a foreign observer, however spectacular, at the expense of a fellow-academician.

Both attack and eulogy created an enormous sensation. Not surprisingly, the pasha saw himself elevated to the status of a hero. But on the following day *Le Figaro* published on its front page an article by Mauriac which exposed both the hero and the hero-worshipper. "If it is the Moroccan nationalists who benefit from

our efforts," wrote Mauriac, "it is because it is they who to-day are suffering imprisonment, torture and exile. To-morrow it might be another Glaoui, if, by an unforeseen reversal of fortune and for a similar offence, he were to undergo in his turn torture by thirst and be reduced thereby to drinking the water from latrines. . . . The police repressions, cruel as they are, are not the worst: we have humiliated and insulted the noble Arab race. . . . This session of the Academy was unworthy of a great nation: the ovations for a mortal enemy and a rebellious subject of the Sultan . . . this scandalous scene could only have taken place on this drifting vessel of ours which has become a metropolis without a government."<sup>10</sup>

During his June visit to Europe Glaoui visited London to attend, as a spectator, the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, and perpetrated a *gaffe* that delighted his enemies. For his luggage included an extravagantly expensive crown of gold studded with emeralds, his present for the Queen. History does not relate what happened to the crown when the pasha was informed that the Queen was unable to accept it.

To return to Glaoui's famous petition, the most important pashas—those of Fez, Casablanca, Rabat and Sefrou—were not among its signatories. In fact they published a declaration of strong disapproval of the petition, since pashas and caids, being civil servants appointed by the monarch, had no right to address a direct reproach to the throne. They added: "Glaoui cannot possibly be unaware that the Moroccan people is fully acquainted with the methods employed by him and by those in his pay to extort the signatures of those in whose name they now pretend to speak." As it finally emerged, among those who had signed "there were only two pashas and some fifty caids, all the other signatures belonging to minor officials".<sup>11</sup> "The only other name" made known at the time by the authorities was strangely enough that "of a newly appointed caid, who until recently had been a *shaoush* (messenger-doorkeeper) in the office of M. Boniface, the French Governor of Casablanca".<sup>12</sup> A few weeks later, the Sultan showed Robert Barrat and the French parliamentarian Clostermann letters received from most of the signatories, "asking his advice and asserting that the [French] *contrôleurs* had put strong pressure upon them to affix their names".<sup>13</sup>

*La Tribune des Nations* in Paris gave this analysis of the events: "The 270 pashas and caids who requested the French government to dismiss the Sultan by no means represent the Berber population of Morocco; for the most part they are officials chosen by the French

<sup>10</sup> June 30, 1953.

<sup>11</sup> Barrat, op. cit., p. 104

<sup>12</sup> Bourdet, op. cit., p. 137.

<sup>13</sup> Barrat, op. cit., p. 128.



Administration. . . . Those among them who have agreed to join this anti-Arab and anti-monarchic demonstration belong to the small clan of Southern 'feudalists' whose exactions, covered up by the French Administration, constitute one of the most crying scandals of the Protectorate. Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh, is a typical representative of that class. . . . More and more he appears as the French Administration's principal instrument of 'Berberism' in the hands of French colonialism."

The *oulema*, 318 strong, condemned the petition roundly, not hesitating to declare that "those who have signed are nothing but tools in the hands of an individual who assumes the largest share of the responsibility in this affair. He himself is but a puppet manoeuvred by other hands." They concluded their protest with a general invocation: "The *oulema* of Morocco address, unanimously, a pressing appeal to the Moroccan people, to the Arab and Muslim world, to Christendom and to universal conscience, asking them to lend their support to the throne of Morocco, and to bring about the triumph of sound Islamic traditions, incarnated in the person of H.M. Sidi Mohammed, whom God protect."<sup>14</sup>

The preliminary coup of Glaoui and Kittani may be said to have failed; but neither admitted defeat, since French support could apparently be relied on. The colonialist press tried to keep up the pretence that there was no collusion between the two native leaders and the Administration. Commenting on this, the Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, wrote: "While there are still some newspapers which take seriously the official phraseology designed to conceal the situation, scepticism is quite evidently spreading. More particularly the *Figaro*, which was converted to a more realistic view of the North African situation some months ago, is very precise in refusing to believe that such high officials as M. De Blesson, second in command to the Resident General, M. Boniface, who is in charge of Casablanca, and M. Vallat, the Director of the Department of the Interior, were in ignorance of El Glaoui's intentions. In view of their failure to act it is reasonable to argue that they were favourable to them, the paper declares."<sup>15</sup> On the following day, *Le Figaro* wrote even more outspokenly: "Without the help and the discreet authorization, that is the encouragement [of the French authorities], Glaoui could never have organized his petition against the Sultan."

Explaining at some length the Moroccan events, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "The plea that the French authorities did not know what the pasha was up to, and that high officials were his

<sup>14</sup> Quoted by *Combat*, Paris, June 6-7, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> August, 19, 1953.

accomplices, only convinces those whose minds are dazed by the August weather. . . . The Moroccans are convinced that the religious impertinence on the part of El Glaoui is French-inspired, and that therefore on this occasion France . . . has interfered with the religion of the country. Glaoui and his friends certainly had the approval of high French authority, including that of Marshal Juin. The French have used the situation they themselves created in order to obtain from the Sultan the delegation of his powers."<sup>16</sup> Indeed while Glaoui and Kittani were trying to rouse the "religious" and Berber elements against the sovereign, the French were putting pressure on him to sign a number of decrees that would divest him of most of his powers. In the words of the *New York Times*, the decrees were, in fact, "the main issue at stake".<sup>17</sup>

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Many critics accused the French government of direct responsibility for the campaign against Sidi Mohammed. Such an accusation over-simplifies the matter, for it credits the government with a clear-cut Moroccan policy. Yet M. Robert Schuman himself, who for many years (and until early in 1953) had been Foreign Minister, made the point<sup>18</sup> that no French government had a clear-cut North African policy, and that, even if one were evolved, it would not be easily imposable upon France's representative in Morocco who, for his part, must give ear to the wishes of the French settlers. In a further article in the review *Semailles*, M. Schuman said: "We have made no political choice for North Africa; but even should we have made one, I have strong fears that, in the present state of the French Administration [in Morocco], and its relations with metropolitan France, it would be impossible to translate it into deeds. . . . It is very difficult—sometimes impossible—to remove an official who does not put orders into effect in their true spirit." M. Schuman also complained about the power of non-official Frenchmen in Morocco ("particularly of certain financial groups") to prevent the execution of orders given by the government in Paris.

A "clear-cut" policy is not necessarily always the right one; but its absence is advantageous to such special interests as the Glaouis and the various lobbies represent. They are on the spot, and answerable to no one but themselves. One word from the Resident General, and Glaoui and Kittani would have been immobilized. But no such word came, and at the beginning of August they set out

<sup>16</sup> August 18, 1953.

<sup>17</sup> August 14, 1953.

<sup>18</sup> *Maroc et Tunisie, Cahier de la Nef*, Paris, Julliard, 1953.

together on a tour of the important Berber districts. This time they were organizing support not merely for anti-Sultan petitions but for the sovereign's complete removal. At that tense moment, the Resident, General Guillaume, whose health was failing, took a holiday in France. His absence, however, did not mean that Glaoui and Kittani could not depend upon French support on the spot. The French colony at Casablanca—the largest in the country—published a declaration in which it expressed its complete confidence in General Guillaume, at the same time denouncing the “agitators of the Istiqlal”. The anti-Sultan movement received its strongest support from M. Boniface, Governor of Casablanca. Robert Barrat reports that Boniface, who was soon to retire from his post, in presence of Glaoui's eldest son and a number of caids, took an oath that he “would not leave his post until the Sultan had been removed”.<sup>19</sup> Those who knew Boniface doubted whether he would take such an oath unless he had been assured that he could keep it.

Thus encouraged, Glaoui now threatened not only the Sultan, but the French government as well. On August 18 he published the following declaration: “This is not the moment to mince words. Let us face the facts in their true reality. The Moroccan people no longer recognizes the Sultan. To-morrow orders might be issued from the Imperial Palace, the general headquarters of the Istiqlal, which will cause new seas of blood to flow. We who represent the tradition, the fidelity, the future of this country, wish to warn the French government. It bears a terrible responsibility. If, contrary to our expectations, it fails at this juncture to display the firmness which the Moroccan people hopes to see displayed, France will have lost her place in Morocco. To-morrow our friends can become the enemies of France. They still have confidence. May God grant that they do not find themselves disappointed. Not a moment must be lost if the worst is not to happen. For forty years I have been a friend of France. I trust France will understand that there are limits to my loyalty.”<sup>20</sup> The feudal conspiracy had sounded the alarm.

<sup>19</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

<sup>20</sup> *Petit Marocain*, Casablanca, August 19, 1953.

## IN THE IMPERIAL PALACE

SUMMER in Rabat was hot and sultry: the kind of season which Sidi Mohammed would have preferred to spend, no doubt, in his coastal villa or his mountain retreat at Ifrane in the Middle Atlas. Even in Rabat he could have escaped, for an evening, to his farm at Zaeers, a few miles beyond the capital, to enjoy horse-riding or some other country sport. But in the summer of 1953 the temptations of sea, mountains or farm beckoned in vain. Sidi Mohammed's apprehensions grew from day to day, and with them the certainty that he must stay on the spot. He tried to find hope in Article 3 of the Protectorate Treaty, according to which the French government "pledges itself to lend constant support to His Shereefian Majesty against all dangers that might threaten his person or throne, or endanger the tranquillity of his States".

For his person and throne were obviously threatened, and many of his friends were in prison or exile. His Grand Vizier and lesser viziers had sworn loyalty, but its quality had yet to be proved. Moroccan rulers traditionally choose their own Ministers, but these had been chosen for him, for the most part. The Grand Vizier had held that same exalted position in his father's time and even under Moulay Hafid, and was over a hundred years old. His age might seem a guarantee of good faith; but old Mohammed el Mokhri was Glaoui's father-in-law, not a dependable ally in the hour of conflict.

One of the few people in whom Sidi Mohammed placed complete confidence was his eldest son, Prince Moulay Hassan, heir presumptive. Though only in his early twenties, the Prince, a passionate believer in "Morocco for the Moors", was credited with great political acumen, and his father had learned to respect his judgment.

There were also some French friends on whose advice Sidi Mohammed relied. Prince Moulay Hassan had a large circle of these: men of serious outlook and interests—writers, journalists and publishers, progressive politicians, parliamentarians, members of the group presided over by François Mauriac. Yet the Prince, by no means a solemn intellectual, was one of his country's best horsemen, and enjoyed tennis, motoring, and other sports. But his overween-

ing passion was Morocco's fight for independence, and his favourite pastime political conversation and argument.

Alarmed by recent events, several of his French friends had come to Rabat, and Moulay Hassan presented them to his father. Some of them had no standing in politics; others held official positions in France, and were trying to act as intermediaries between the Sultan and this or that parliamentary group of government department in Paris. Whether or not such back-room diplomacy was likely to be of much use, it conformed to political tradition in France, and it proved the young Prince's awareness of impending disaster.

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As has been stated already, it was not until a comparatively brief time before the final crisis that Sidi Mohammed had been credited with the rôle of spokesman of his country's political aspirations. For some years his discretion was such that more ardent politicians had to content themselves with reading significance into pregnant silences or veiled expressions. But by 1953 both his ideas and their formulation had become clear. His first insistence was on the point of fact that Morocco was a protectorate and not a colony; next, that it was his duty to restore to his country its legitimate status as a sovereign power. His third complaint was that the Protectorate, while acceptable and beneficent to Morocco in the days when first established, had outgrown its purpose and should yield to a new relationship between Morocco and France. The validity of this last claim may have been debatable on both legal and political grounds, even though informed by realism. In her relations with India and other of her Dominions and Colonies, Great Britain had been wise enough to recognize that an acceptance of unavoidable facts was bound to supersede a narrow legalism. France did not appear to be planning to follow the British example. She could justly protest that much of her first harvest was still to be reaped. The decision which Sidi Mohammed regarded as indefensible was not that she meant to remain in Morocco, but that she intended to transform a protectorate into a colony. His accusations had the sanction of international law, and in making them he found himself on firm ground.

Sidi Mohammed's system of political ideas was outlined in an official communiqué published on June 17, 1953, for the enlightenment of his people: "Our intention has always been to permit the country to conduct its own affairs democratically . . . safeguarding the interests of France and of French people in Morocco. To achieve that aim, we have tried to reach common understanding with the French government, so that an overall plan, in keeping with modern

ideas, might be prepared. . . . In the expectation of such an agreement, and in order to meet the wishes of the French government, we have already given our consent to certain definite projects. . . . As to municipal reforms, we are anxious to furnish the towns with elected consultative assemblies. . . . But a complete agreement [with the Residency General] on that reform cannot be reached in a climate of passionate intrigue. In the social field, a plan is required for providing the country with sufficient hospitals, schools, healthy homes at modest cost, and modern courts of justice. In so far as legal reform is concerned, we remain convinced that it must remain barren unless it is based upon a separation of administrative and juridical powers and upon modern codes of laws. . . . It is important to facilitate foreign investments and to give them solid guarantees. But to make such investments secure, as well as for the sake of social stability, the establishment of a harmonious collaboration between capital and labour is essential. An elementary condition for such a collaboration is the granting of true trade union rights to the working class.”<sup>1</sup>

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Glaoui, Kittani and their associates had complete freedom to come and go as they pleased. The freedom of action of Sidi Mohammed and his family became ever more restricted. On August 12 Prince Moulay Hassan was about to leave the palace to meet some French friends, when he found his way barred. A few days later his younger brother, Prince Abdallah, was returning to the palace, when armed police stopped him at the gate. “But I am Prince Abdallah, son of the Sultan,” the young man protested. The police officer pulled out his gun and, pointing it at the Prince, said: “One more step and I shoot.”<sup>2</sup> It required almost a major palace action to have the Prince admitted into his father’s home.

The royal buildings and precincts were surrounded by armoured cars, tanks and guns pointing in the direction of the main palace. To obviate the risk of embarrassing situations, Sidi Mohammed kept to his rooms, never leaving the palace. In a conversation with Robert Barrat—who throughout these critical weeks was on the spot and in constant communication with both the Residency and the Palace—Sidi Mohammed said, “With one single gesture I could unleash the Moroccan people against the bad shepherds. It would be enough for me to step out of this palace next Friday to attend prayers at the mosque, and to pronounce one word, to call my people

<sup>1</sup> *Informations Nord-Africaines*, Paris, August 1953, pp. 16-17.

<sup>2</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 197

to insurrection. But my religion forbids me to shed blood, and I must think of protecting the lives not only of my own subjects, but also of my French and other guests."<sup>3</sup>

Many Moroccans were eagerly awaiting the Sultan's call. But there were others who saw little reason for such a demonstration when the big battalions were ranged elsewhere.

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In mid-August, when the crisis was coming to a head, Sidi Mohammed sent a last appeal to the President of the French Republic: "The persistence of the subversive moves which are furthered in Morocco by certain persons in authority, compels us to address a message to the President of the French Republic, the French government and public opinion in France. Our aim is to draw their attention to the very grave consequences that those moves might have upon Franco-Moroccan relations. . . .

"It seems strange that in Morocco, where the French authorities still maintain a state of siege and where political meetings cannot take place without previous authorization, members of the [present] 'opposition' enjoy full support of the local press, move about freely, organize demonstrations, and plot openly against the security of the State. This 'opposition' tries publicly to urge the French government to violate the international engagements entered into by France in various treaties. . . .

"We reiterate our request to put an end to this situation. Confident in the wisdom of the French government, we do not cease to enjoin calm on our people. . . . Those Frenchmen in Morocco who inspire and support the rebellion of certain officials can only damage the credit and the higher interests of France. . . . Morocco has never doubted France. May France not betray that confidence."<sup>4</sup>

No reply to this appeal came from Paris, and Sidi Mohammed finally lost faith in France's goodwill. In a conversation with Robert Barrat, he said, "If the French government are not in agreement with all that is going on, why don't they stop it? I no longer place any reliance on them. . . . You know very well that the pashas and caids do not act of their own volition."<sup>5</sup>

On August 13 General Guillaume returned to Rabat, and, in the afternoon, presented Sidi Mohammed with demands amounting to an ultimatum. The Sultan was to sign all those decrees which for years he had refused to sign, such as the delegation of his powers to

<sup>3</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> *Informations Nord-Africaines*, August 1953, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

a Franco-Moroccan committee. Sidi Mohammed asked for a few hours to consider the matter. Early in the evening the general's envoy called on him, and was asked what would happen if the decrees remained unsigned. The reply was: "One telephone call to Paris, and you are deposed."<sup>6</sup>

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Meanwhile the centre of the drama had shifted to Marrakesh, where Glaoui, encouraged by the open support of the French authorities near at hand, and the surprising freedom of action left him by the government in Paris, was preparing his final coup. He must have been well aware that even should the French wish to oppose his plans, things had gone too far. While most of the Sultan's leading followers were in prison, and a counter-movement could no longer be prepared, he and his associates had had more than six months in which to do as they liked, nursing and training the Berber tribes that would be needed for the decisive blow.

Explosive as the Moroccan situation was, the French government had little time for dealing with it. In France, a mounting wave of industrial unrest had culminated in a general strike, and French economic life was almost paralysed. Tempers were running so high that people were talking of the possibility of civil war. The well-nigh perpetual sessions of the French Cabinet were concerned principally with the strike, and other questions were shelved. Several newspapers reported that when a few French parliamentarians managed to see the Prime Minister, M. Laniel, to warn him of the gravity of the Moroccan situation, he replied, "What can I do, gentlemen? This is just one more of Marshal Juin's tricks." According to the parliamentarians Clostermann and Reitzer, the Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, regarded the Moroccan events in terms of a conflict between the forces of Christianity and Islam. When they tried to persuade him to halt the subversive movement in Morocco, he merely replied, "This is a fight of the Cross against the Crescent."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Immediately after the departure of the envoy, Prince Moulay Hassan telephoned to Robert Barrat to give him a detailed account of the evening's events.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted by Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 210. Yet less than a week before the last curtain descended upon the drama enacted at Rabat, M. Bidault seemed fully aware of the danger of the situation. On August 14th he despatched a telegram to General Guillaume containing this summary of suggestions: "1. Proscribe instantly Glaoui's planned meeting [with the caids at Marrakesh]; 2. Summon Glaoui to Rabat with a view of holding a conference in the course of the day; 3. Order other pashas and caids to regain instantly their respective regions and not to leave them without authorization; 4. Get hold, if possible of the pretender [Mohammed ben Arafat, the Sultan-to-be]; 5. Oppose any rising of the partisans siding with Glaoui; Conclusions:



Many French commentators alleged that the government's unfortunate preoccupation with the general strike had helped the plotters in Morocco by encouraging them to act without further delay. Until all the relevant documents are available, it will be hard to decide in what proportion the responsibility for the sequence of events must be borne by each participating faction. From public statements we know already that many office-holders of the French government and the Quai d'Orsay were hoping to get rid of Sidi Mohammed, provided such an event would not compromise them or produce a violent reaction in Morocco. From their point of view, and on a basis of sheer *Realpolitik*, their attitude was understandable. From the moment they allowed the colonialists and the Administration on the spot to determine Moroccan policies and hasten the transformation of the Protectorate into a colony, Sidi Mohammed, or any non-pliant sovereign, was obviously the main obstacle on their path. So long as he remained on the throne, realization of their objects was impossible. It is hardly less surprising that these policies found a wide measure of support in France, not only among uncompromising colonialists but also among disinterested people. The majority of these were only superficially acquainted with the intricacies of Moroccan affairs. In theory the "reforms" which the government had been prevailed upon to propose, and which Sidi Mohammed so stubbornly refused to accept, looked irreproachable. It was easy to present them as "democratic" and "progressive", and to interpret Sidi Mohammed's opposition as proof of a reactionary and autocratic spirit. Few people in France realized that the true effect of those "reforms" would have been to deprive the Sultan and the Makhzen of their last vestige of power, and to grant to French residents in Morocco rights to which, as foreigners, they were not entitled.

Even in government circles in Paris not fully conversant with all the implications of the "reforms", many regarded Sidi Mohammed as an obstacle to progress, and thus unwittingly supported the forces of Moorish feudalism and reaction. He was more genuinely vulnerable to attack because he was, in various respects, heir to a Shereefian tradition that was essentially undemocratic.

But to return to the actual crisis in Morocco: at the beginning of

The consequence of a pronunciamiento could be incalculable. In view of the approbation (*adhésion*) obtained from the Palace [the Sultan's willingness to delegate his former power to two new councils], it is our duty to resist an anarchy which would be the denial of half a century of France's presence in Morocco." (Quoted by *L'Express*, August 20, 1955.) A politician more experienced than those who were organizing the insurrection in Morocco, M. Bidault evidently tried to avert a disaster. What made him change his views at the very last moment, we do not know. But it is obvious that the counsels of those responsible for the "Glaoui plot" were to prove stronger than the recommendations of M. Bidault's telegram.

August, "General Guillaume dispatched to Marrakesh those very men who had given El Glaoui such encouragement: M. Vallat [head of the department of home affairs at Rabat], and M. Boniface, soon to be joined by M. de Blesson [Guillaume's 'number two' at the Residency]. To these was seconded General d'Hauteville, Governor of Marrakesh, always known as a friend of Glaoui. In public they enjoined Glaoui not to go 'too far'. But it is not difficult to guess the kind of advice they gave him in private."<sup>8</sup> A few days later the situation was so evidently getting out of hand that despite the pressure of home disasters the government despatched M. Vimont, a member of the Foreign Minister's staff, to negotiate with Glaoui. According to *La Vie Marocaine*, his instructions were unequivocal: "The deposition of H. M. Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef is not contemplated in Paris." On August 15, M. Vimont, accompanied by General Guillaume, reached Marrakesh, where the pasha's palaces were thronged with all the subservient caids, waiting for their leader's final order.<sup>9</sup> But Glaoui was in no mood to compromise, and only reiterated that "the Sultan would continue to be unfit to be Morocco's spiritual and temporal leader".<sup>10</sup>

Among Glaoui's guests was an uncle of Sidi Mohammed, Moulay Arafa, an obscure gentleman in his middle seventies who had been leading an unexciting life in his native Fez, and of whom few had heard before that date—"an old man who can neither read nor write, nor yet do simple arithmetic, nor speak French", in the words of Robert Barrat.<sup>11</sup> Whatever the old gentleman's virtues or defects, he had one asset which, while not essential for a monarch, is an advantage to a man in any position: with most of his fellow-Fassis and with all the members of the Alaouite family, he shared a distinguished presence and notable courtesy, a felicitous combination that effectively disguised whatever shortcomings might be his.

As a member of the imperial family, Moulay Arafa was a Shereef. Whatever effect M. Vimont's words might have produced on Glaoui and his fellow-king-makers, the old man found himself elected, by their agency, to the supreme office of Imam. Sidi Mohammed was, for the moment, left with his secular prerogatives, but divested of the spiritual headship, the chief source of his kingly power. Such a separation of the spiritual and secular supremacy invested in the person of the monarch was not only unorthodox but heretical.

<sup>8</sup> I. Lepp, op. cit., p. 225.

<sup>9</sup> *La Vie Marocaine*, August 14, 1953.

<sup>10</sup> *New York Times*, August 15, 1953.

<sup>11</sup> Barrat, op. cit., p. 221.

However, that separation had no religious or legal validity, for only the *oulema* had the right of making far-reaching decisions with a religious bearing.

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While this religious play was being enacted in the southern capital, crowds marching through the medina in Rabat, and carrying portraits of Sidi Mohammed, were intoning the solemn *latif*, the invocation of divine clemency, which is only heard in moments of grave danger. The crowds had wished to sing their lament in front of the palace, but troops and police prevented them from doing so.

Sidi Mohammed, still within the tank-and-gun-enclosed walls of his palace, could only watch the events helplessly. "They have taken away my secular power," he said to French friends, "by making me sign this document [Guillaume's ultimatum] and now they have deprived me of my spiritual power by permitting the nomination of that Imam." Yet he still would not go to the mosque to say the few words calling the people to insurrection for which so many were waiting.<sup>12</sup>

While day after day the crowds of the medina marched on solemnly, intoning the *latif*, General Guillaume flew to Paris to report to the government. In Oujda, native anger had exploded for a brief moment, and bands of Berber tribesmen had descended upon the city and knifed a number of innocent Frenchmen. "French blood, alas! flowed yesterday," lamented *Le Petit Marocain*. "To-morrow orders may be issued at the imperial palace which may bring about fresh shedding of French blood." The author of these words was the Pasha of Marrakesh. At a meeting of Parisian journalists, arranged by the French Veterans Association in Casablanca, the view was expressed that "the policy of recent days is a monumental error. That policy is inspired by the *gros intérêts* of a handful of people whose names everyone has on his lips. . . . One of them has made 200 million francs within the last few weeks."<sup>13</sup> One Frenchman on the spot, Robert Gautier, explained the situation as follows: "The army had the choice between occupying the country or occupying the towns," he said. "It decided to occupy the towns. In this way complete freedom of action was left to Glaoui. This is the end of the Morocco of which we have dreamed and for which we have fought for twenty-five years."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

<sup>13</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p. 212.

The occupation of the towns by the military was followed by the march on the towns of Glaoui's tribesmen. That march—as well as the preceding one in 1951 which, as events suggested, had served as a dress rehearsal for the march of 1953—has been described in French documents as “the spontaneous movement of the Berbers against their Sultan”—the formula adopted as approved description of the campaign culminating in events of August 20, 1953. A year later, when the facts had been better sorted, an official of the Residency could still write: “It is the Moroccan people who have demanded, nay exacted, the departure of the autocrat-Sultan.”<sup>15</sup>

On their way to Rabat some of the tribesmen were met by two members of the French National Assembly, Clostermann and Reitzer, acting as intermediaries between Paris and the Sultan. “What are you doing here?” they asked the tribesmen. “We don't know.” “But who has sent you here?” “*Le Contrôleur*” [local French governor].<sup>16</sup> In all their communiqués referring to the events between the 15th and 20th of August, the French took great pains to stress the “purely native” character of the conflict “between the Moroccan people and the Sultan”, in which “the French took absolutely no part”. Yet on August 30, the *London Observer* published, on its front page, a photograph taken by its correspondent, Philip Deane, which showed the beginning of the tribal march. The tribal procession is headed by two jeeps. In the back of the foremost jeep are seated two Moroccans, one of them Glaoui. But the front seats are occupied by two French officers in uniform, one of them at the wheel of the car. In the second jeep only two French officers can be distinguished. According to an impartial observer, “no Berber could participate in the descent on Rabat and Fez in 1951 and 1953 without having previously received the permission, and often the command of the French authorities, and without having been financed by these authorities.”<sup>17</sup>

In actual fact, at the moment of jubilation, the colonialist press itself admitted official French participation in the native drama. To anticipate events, the leading colonialist paper, *La Vigie Marocaine*, wrote on August 23: “We see the dawn of a new collaboration against which the defeated Sultan and his evil genius, the Istiqlal, had set themselves with a fierce determination. In this co-operation, General Guillaume has played a rôle the enormous significance of which will not be appreciated for some time to come. Good strategist that he is, at the right moment, the general knew how to follow and guide the campaign so that it could be won with

<sup>15</sup> *France Outremer*, August-September, 1954.

<sup>16</sup> Barrat, op. cit., p. 213.

<sup>17</sup> Paul Buttin, in *Au Coeur du Problème Marocain, Etudes*, Paris, April 1955, p. 29.

brilliance. Many French people have enquired whether it would not be possible to organize an enormous rally at which the crowds could express their gratitude to General Guillaume and pay him homage." General Guillaume himself stated in a speech a day later that the final act in the drama was the culmination of "events over a period of ten years that had proved that France's co-operation with the Sultan was no longer possible". There would seem to be some discrepancy between his statement and the later official pronouncements according to which it was "the Moroccan people who have exacted the departure of the autocrat-Sultan".<sup>18</sup>

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But to retrace our steps, and follow the events in their chronological order: we have now reached the fateful date of August the 20th. It was the eve of the great religious festival, the Aid el Kebir, or the Feast of the Sacrifice, in commemoration of Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac. This festival ranks as one of the most solemn in Islam. There is no Moor so poor that he will not find some way of procuring for that day a sheep that he has to sacrifice (and, finally, to consume as a rare treat). But to assure the validity of the feast—which, if properly performed, will be a good omen for the subsequent year—the Sultan, as Imam, must personally sacrifice the first sheep.

Feelings were running high on account of Sidi Mohammed's fate. But the natives were equally troubled by their anxiety as to whether on the following day there would still be a rightful Imam to perform the sacrifice. In the early afternoon General Guillaume telephoned the Sultan that he wished to see him immediately. Fifteen minutes later a detachment of motorized troops entered the courtyard of the imperial palace where the Sultan's ceremonial "black guard" performed the honours. This guard was armed with its traditional parade rifles without ammunition. The French soldiers took the rifles away from them, and then ordered them to turn and face the wall with their arms raised. Machine guns were

<sup>18</sup> On November 2, 1954, more than a year after the deposition, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "The disastrous error committed by the Laniel Government, and in particular M. Bidault, in first tolerating the agitation against the Sultan and then dethroning him under pressure from those responsible for it, is more and more apparent."

It was, finally, M. Laniel himself who, almost two years after the event, implicitly admitted the responsibility of his government for the Sultan's deposition. In a speech made at Caen, on June 24th, 1955, he stated: "The safety of the Protectorate as well as that of the Sultan himself demanded that the latter be removed instantly. The operation was put into effect. Peace was preserved in Morocco, and individual terrorism was checked." (*Le Monde*, June 26, 1955.)

placed so as to point towards them. "The general's security being thus assured, he arrived in his car a few minutes later."<sup>19</sup>

The general entered the palace, followed by the chief of the Security Services. As it was the hour of siesta—in mid-August the afternoon temperature in Rabat easily soars to a hundred—Sidi Mohammed was still in pyjamas, over which he had hastily thrown a djellabah. (Apparently the general had arrived some ten minutes earlier than expected.) As soon as Guillaume was brought face to face with the sovereign, he insisted on the necessity for abdication. When Sidi Mohammed refused, the Resident General made a sign to his Security chief. The latter put his hand on the monarch's shoulder, implying that he was arresting him. Sidi Mohammed made no further protest. Then two French officers, revolver in hand, entered the room and led the Sultan to the armoured car awaiting him outside. Prince Moulay Hassan and his younger brother Abdallah, Sidi Mohammed's two sons, were there already. All three were driven post-haste to the military camp at Souissi, a short distance away, and put in a room guarded by soldiers, where they remained *incommunicado*. Prince Moulay Hassan observed that, in view of his father's condition (brought about by many weeks of incessant tension and many sleepless nights) he should first be seen by his (French) doctor to ascertain whether he was fit for air travel. One of the officers called the doctor by telephone, but would not permit him to come to examine Sidi Mohammed. Still only in pyjamas and djellabah, the Sultan, with the two princes, was put into a Dakota plane which made off without further delay in the direction of Corsica.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Barrat, op. cit., p. 217.

<sup>20</sup> Barrat, op. cit., p. 217.

ACCESSION OF  
MOHAMMED MOULAY BEN ARAFA

MOST of the *oulema* of Fez live in the narrow lanes of the city's oldest part, in houses that show but a blank wall to the street, and that are entered by a massive door darkened by the ages. On the night of August 20, a silence heavy with portents was lying over the dimly lit streets. A curfew had been proclaimed from 8 p.m. till 6 on the following morning. But suddenly, in the middle of the night, the silence was rent by the clang and clatter of nailed boots. Armed police were knocking at the door of every *alam*,<sup>1</sup> ordering him to be present in the early morning at the imperial palace to sign the *beia*<sup>2</sup> proclaiming the new monarch.

One *alam* came personally to the door to speak to the police. He was an old man with the white beard of a prophet, but the flashing eyes of a fighter. Something in his broad face, the ironic twinkle of his eyes, and an air of wisdom lightened by scepticism gave him a surprisingly Socratic appearance. (This was, at least, the impression the author gained whenever he met the old sage.) His name was Si Mohammed ben Larbi el Alaoui, and he was the most famous Moroccan *alam*. A former professor at the Karaouine, he had given annually at his old university a series of religious lectures that were in the great tradition of Moorish oratory; therein every national aspiration and every political measure were expressed in terms related to the Kuran and the Hadith.<sup>3</sup> But neither the word "nationalism" nor "politics" would fall from his lips, and everything would be stated by implication or by direct reference to the precepts of the Prophet. On more than one occasion, he had found himself in difficulties with the authorities, and only his great prestige had saved him from imprisonment.

After the police officer had delivered his order, the old man relegated it to its proper place in his scheme of things. "I shall not

<sup>1</sup> *Alam*—singul. of *oulema*.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote on p. 198.

<sup>3</sup> Hadith—traditions relating the Prophet Muhammad's actions and sayings not contained in the Kuran.

be present at the palace," he said, "because according to the law of our Prophet, the new Imam should be executed."

Before morning dawned, Mohammed ben Larbi's house was surrounded by police, and those within were not permitted to leave. Soon afterwards, its master was arrested.

Only one other *alam* refused to sign the *beia*. He was attached to the university at Marrakesh, Glaoui's capital. He was "arrested and beaten *jusqu'à résipiscence*".<sup>4</sup> The other *oulema* obeyed the orders. "It was not the first time in Moroccan history that the learned doctors assembled under pressure at the bidding of a particular faction."<sup>5</sup> They knew only too well that refusal meant imprisonment and, possibly, worse. And, as they were old, had wives, children and grandchildren, they no longer had the spirit to do the one thing that the occasion seemed to demand—to become martyrs. So in the early hours of the 21st, they allowed themselves to be driven<sup>6</sup> into the imperial palace to do the bidding of their master and sign the proclamation of their new sovereign.<sup>7</sup>

In the words of an eyewitness, "While people sat gloomily in the medina, in the palace, surrounded by tanks and the Foreign Legion, the *oulema* . . . signed elaborately written documents during the ceremony of enthroning his [Sidi Mohammed's] successor. Around the hall where the ceremony was staged, stood rugged Berber tribesmen, with knobbly sticks, led by their caid, who was there to see the signing done. In the towns the police dragnet brought in 'nationalist agitators and rioters' by the hundreds. . . . The *oulema* signed 'voluntarily' the act of accession to the throne."<sup>8</sup>

Those closest to Moulay Arafa were Glaoui and Kittani. The first person to sign the document was Moulay Othman, the youngest son of the late Sultan Moulay Hassan, and thus a brother of the new occupant of the ancient throne. As their father had died sixty years earlier, Moulay Othman, like his brother, was no longer a youngster. Indeed, this was an assembly of some of the oldest and most feudal-minded men Morocco could produce.

When, a few days later, the new monarch arrived at his capital, Rabat, there was no popular acclaim. He was greeted by tribesmen

<sup>4</sup> Barrat, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

<sup>5</sup> *L'Actualité religieuse dans le monde*, September 1, 1953.

<sup>6</sup> The correspondent of the London *Observer*, who was present at the ceremony, took some photographs showing unmistakably that the "voluntary" nature of the *oulema's* appearance was open to question.

<sup>7</sup> "Will anyone maintain," wrote *Le Monde* almost two years later [July 28, 1955], "that on that day the freedom of decision [on the part of the *oulema*] was assured at Fez? Tanks surrounded the imperial palace, and the courtyards and doors were guarded by soldiers armed with machine guns."

<sup>8</sup> Philip Deane, in the *Observer*, London, August 23, 1953.



who had been brought in from outside. Surrounded by the Grand Vizier, Glaoui and Kittani, "he was acclaimed by thousands of tribesmen, both on horseback and on foot, who formed a long line all along his route to the palace".<sup>9</sup> "The procession towards the palace proceeded in a somewhat embarrassing silence; for none of the usual crowds were present, special police obstructions having sealed off all exits from the native town."<sup>10</sup>

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The colonialist press hailed the accession of Moulay Arafa to the throne as the dawn of a new era of general happiness. *La Vigie Marocaine* exulted in its leading article of August 23: "It is a great victory that has just been gained by the partisans of solid and durable Franco-Moroccan friendship. From now on nothing will fetter the soaring of hearts and spirits among the inhabitants of this country, and this victory marks the dawn of a new collaboration. . . . The universal calming of spirits that is observable throughout the country is one of the happiest consequences of this settlement. The road is now open—open wide—to those efficacious and generous measures that will translate into facts the desire for fruitful common endeavours that animates both Moroccans and French. General Guillaume has, through the happy outcome that has crowned his efforts, deserved well of Morocco and of France."

In his speech of welcome to the new sovereign, General Guillaume expressed himself similarly. "With the succession to the throne of Your Majesty," he said, "whose high virtues have been recognized by each and all of Your subjects, Morocco finds itself at the end of a testing period, and on the threshold of a future rich in the most brilliant promise."<sup>11</sup>

A discordant note broke the harmony of general jubilation when, during the new monarch's first ceremonial visit to the mosque, a native made an attempt on his life. He drove his car straight into Moulay Arafa's horse, but before his dagger could touch the old man, he was shot down by French police.<sup>12</sup>

There were other signs of disquiet and disapproval. M. Mitterand, a member of M. Laniel's Cabinet (and, in 1954, Minister of the Interior in the Mendès-France government), resigned in protest

<sup>9</sup> *La Nouvelle République*, August 24, 1953.

<sup>10</sup> Charles Favrel, in *Le Monde*, August 25, 1953.

<sup>11</sup> *La Vigie Marocaine*, August 23, 1954.

<sup>12</sup> Policemen were seldom seen when Sidi Mohammed made his way to the mosque; and when he drove his car "off duty", he did so without any police escort. His successor would never leave the palace without being protected by large numbers of police and military. In fact, after the second attempt on his life, he hardly ever left the palace at all.

against Sidi Mohammed's deposition, and declared that "the deposition has increased the difficulties. It has sharpened existing rancour and has made the various antagonisms more passionate. . . . M. Mauriac is absolutely right: the *coup d'état* signifies for the Moroccan people a retrogression and not progress. It has precipitated a rupture the gravity of which needs no emphasizing."<sup>13</sup> M. Robert Schuman and M. Daniel Mayer, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the French parliament, spoke in a similar vein.

*Témoignage Chrétien* in Paris described the events of August in the following terms: "A handful of government officials, in the service of French high finance in Morocco, have staged, with disgusting cynicism, this comedy of the rebellion of the 'big-hearted' feudalists against the 'hated' monarch. The last natural stronghold of his people, the Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef, has been the victim of the insatiable appetite of a league of settlers and swindlers. The *coup de force* is a real crime against a disarmed and defenceless people, a people who have always believed in our word and in our loyalty, and whom we have just plunged into an abyss of despair."<sup>14</sup>

According to *Esprit*, the political and literary monthly review in Paris, it was not so much Glaoui, Kittani and the Berber tribes who were responsible for the events as Marshal Juin, "who, egged on by politicians eager to exploit patriotic sentiments, has been preparing this operation for the last two years", and who was supported by "a handful of former leading Vichyites, economic collaborators and bankrupt business men".<sup>15</sup> Drawing a comparison between, on the one hand, France's downfall in 1940 and the emergence of the Vichy régime, and, on the other hand, the Moroccan events, *Esprit* concluded: "Just as then, it is in the name of the fatherland that France stands dishonoured in the eyes of the world, and, just as then, permits the assassination, deportation, and imprisonment of those whom she should have protected and who placed their trust in us. . . . A *coup de force* such as the one in Morocco awakens the hatred of millions of men against France. . . . But it is no longer naked force that rules Morocco. That force has to be covered up by lies, corruption, and concentration camps."<sup>16</sup> . . . To impose terror in Morocco, one must lie in France." Describing the events leading up to the final coup, the paper adds, "Thousands of natives had been thrown into jail or deported. Worse still: tanks were put in position; hostile native quarters were isolated; native shops were

<sup>13</sup> *L'Express*, Paris, March 20, 1954.

<sup>14</sup> September 4, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> September 1953.

<sup>16</sup> *Esprit* was referring to the new prisoners' camps that were filling up with Moroccan nationalists for whom no more room could be found in the existing prisons.

sacked—all methods by which the SS [in Germany] assumed power.”

Apart from the colonialists, French public opinion, though not sharing the anger of many progressives, Catholic or Protestant, or intellectuals, viewed the events of August with disquiet, often with sadness. In the Paris paper *Franc-Tireur*, Louis Massignon wrote: “There is no *fait accompli* when France’s honour is being tarnished. There is only a sinister comedy staged by two adventurers who are not even ‘false witnesses’, since canonically their witness is null and void.” Referring to the symbolic sacrifice performed by the new sovereign on the occasion of the Feast of the Sacrifice, Prof. Massignon wrote: “The sacrifice performed by Ben Arafa, that musical-comedy Sultan, is irremediably valueless. The only valid sacrifice was that offered in Mecca [by the Pasha Fatemi Ben Slimane]<sup>17</sup> in the name of Mohammed V.”

No responsible paper in Paris sounded the triumphant note of the French press in Morocco. Unhappy France was all too mindful of its seven years’ war in Indo-China and of the manner in which that war had begun. Except for the dyed-in-the-wool colonialists, French people were beginning to realize that France could not afford the threat of a repetition of the Indo-Chinese experience.

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Even some of the victors in Morocco did not appear to be quite happy about their victory. Though many of the minor king-makers were given jobs in the Administration, or gained promotion, and a shower of “Legions of Honour” descended upon them, the biggest plums were snatched from those who considered themselves entitled to them. Glaoui himself, as the true power behind the throne, could scarcely rise any further; but he was said to expect that his sons would be made viziers, or at least be given some of the important pashaliks (that is, governorships of the main provinces). But the Residency did not oblige. It had not deposed a Sultan whose influence was becoming too great in order to increase the power wielded by other natives. A Makhzen and a provincial Administration dominated entirely by Glaoui and his supporters might, in the end, prove an even greater threat to French interests than a progressive-minded though obstinate Sultan. And however great the power of French holders of vested interests, there were still people who believed in the Lyautey tradition, and who were genuinely concerned that France’s name in Morocco should be redeemed. They knew

<sup>17</sup> Fatemi Ben Slimane, one of the Moroccan pashas, was, in August, away from home, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.

that a Franco-Moroccan co-operation aiming at genuine democracy could not be arranged with the help of the Glaouis and Kittanis, but only with that of their opponents.

In May 1954 a group of some seventy-five prominent Frenchmen in Morocco presented an appeal to M. René Coty, the newly elected President of France, part of which ran as follows:

"Conscious of our responsibilities as French citizens of Morocco, we turn to you, the highest representative of the Republic, to express our anxiety and alarm. Rigorous police measures have been taken to protect the population from terrorism, but they have also helped to accentuate the divorce between the French and the natives. . . . The intimidation implied in our policy for several years has revealed itself as ineffectual; moreover, it risks compromising all reconciliation between the French and the Moroccans. Far from having brought about a solution, it has contributed to the maintenance of a climate which makes impossible political, economic and social reforms which would give the Moroccans liberty and a higher standard of living. These reforms cannot be carried out without the aid of those in whose interest they are being taken. The Moroccans must have the right and the means to express their opinion. . . . But to confuse all pacifist opposition with rebellion, and to treat all those who in their own country follow a policy which differs from that of the ruling power as enemies of France, is to furnish terrorism with a pretext. . . . The practical necessity of dealing with any responsible negotiators should compel us to free all those imprisoned solely for their political opinions. . . . We assure you, Mr. President, that an action thus begun, even if it might lead to the withdrawal of a policy followed since December 1950, would gain the support of a large majority of the population of this country."

The position of the clearer-sighted French settlers had become very difficult. They found themselves vilified by their own compatriots even more bitterly than after the events of 1951 and 1952. But the French settlers, whether liberal or reactionary, were only a small minority. Their attitudes and counter-attitudes matter far less to students of world affairs than the less publicized reaction of the Moors themselves to the deposition of Sidi Mohammed.

## THE NATIVE REACTION

THE immediate effect of the Sultan's deposition was unexpected. The French authorities were prepared for a popular rising, for although most of the nationalist leaders were already in prison, and the Istiqlal following was comparable to a boat with neither helmsman nor rudder, the populace might on its own voice some passionate protest. Great, therefore, was the general surprise, and great was the delight of the authorities, when nothing untoward happened beyond a few manifestations here and there, but otherwise, perfect peace. The country appeared to accept the inevitable, and those who had spoken of Sidi Mohammed's great popularity were "proved" to have overestimated it. Those who had a deeper knowledge of Morocco interpreted the unexpected quiescence as a lull before a storm.

The author reached Morocco less than three weeks after the deposition of the Sultan, and the first impression he gained was of a people completely stunned. Before the events of August they might have mistrusted the Protectorate, but they still had faith in "France". "Paris will not permit a finger to be laid on Sidi Mohammed" had been the prevailing opinion. That metropolitan France should have "betrayed" them was something that made even the most staunch-hearted abandon hope.

But within a few weeks the fighting qualities of the people reasserted themselves. The manner of their reawakening seemed as inexplicable as the despondency that had preceded it. Popular indignation suddenly conjured up the figure of the "Sultan in the Moon". How that "lunar" sovereign first made his appearance we can only surmise. A few days after the deposition, individual people here and there began to see Sidi Mohammed's image in the moon. "Mohammed ben Youssef has become a martyr and a saint; God has now placed him in the moon to watch over us"; so the rumour ran, and the rising of the moon was feverishly awaited by ever-growing numbers of simple folk.

Throughout the length and breadth of Morocco, from Oujda to the Tafilalet, and from Tangier to Goulimine on the borders of the Sahara, men, women and children would stand about in groups,

their eyes raised towards the moon, beholding in it the figure of Sidi Mohammed. One night the author himself, after dismissing this moon-legend as a native superstition, joined one such group to gaze at the moon. In its right hand half the lunar landscape showed a formation that suggested Sidi Mohammed's figure as known to every Moroccan from innumerable portraits. While that formation had always been there, it had needed the jolt of the events of August to make people discover it. And the discovery was followed instantly by attribution to the image of a supernatural significance. Though the Sultan could no longer be seen in the flesh, "God ordained" that the people should behold him in a form that even the Resident General could not obliterate. *Allahu Akbar!*—God is Great! Having become thus inviolable, a focus for national sentiments, Sidi Mohammed had assumed an entirely novel stature and power. As François Mauriac was to write several months later: "Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef was never stronger than he is to-day. We are more dependent on him than he is on us. We only hold his body captive; but he holds the spirit and heart of the millions of Moroccans who, a fact without precedence, go so far as to refuse to pray, since they are forbidden to pray in his name."<sup>1</sup> "God has come to our aid," the simple folk would say. Though their more sophisticated brethren might smile at the popular superstition, they could not help agreeing that religious susceptibilities, having been violated on August 20, were now furnishing the impetus for reprisals. Indeed, the French had unwittingly opened a Pandora's box to unleash forces that might easily prove beyond their control.

In the first days following the Sultan's removal the Moroccans thought themselves forgotten and betrayed by all their friends. But it was soon to become clear that "the deposition of the Sultan during Aid el Kebir was considered by the followers of Islam as a sacrilege and an offence", and that it "inflamed the hatred of millions of people against France".<sup>2</sup> The voices of protest raised throughout the Muslim world were putting new heart into the Moroccan people.

Not only among Muslim peoples but in France itself the Moroccans were finding new friends and allies. Inside Morocco many French (men and women) were making common cause with the natives. *Esprit* published the letter of a Frenchwoman living in Casablanca, who wrote: "This noble and proud people will suffer but will not accept the yoke. It will know how to await its hour, for it knows that that hour will come. It has been betrayed by France, but not by its chief. The Sultan has emerged from this

<sup>1</sup> *France-Maghreb*, Paris, March 1954.

<sup>2</sup> J. M. Domenach in *Esprit*, Paris, September 1953.

trial with added greatness, and more than ever worthy of the attachment of his people. He has remained their sovereign and supreme Imam, in whose name they will continue, in their innermost hearts, to recite their prayers."<sup>3</sup>

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Not more than a month elapsed before Moroccan opposition was finding shape and direction. For many years, both Sidi Mohammed and the nationalists had advocated a campaign of legitimate and peaceful methods, and were opposed to any form of violence. Sidi Mohammed himself, brought up to respect and trust France, was convinced that ultimately the French would recognize the justice of his case, and grant the reforms he demanded in the name of his people. But by October 1953 there was no longer a Sultan to direct affairs, and the nationalist leaders, who had always been able to restrain their more impatient followers, were in prison. It would none the less be wrong to say that the events that followed proved that it was the "mob" that took over the direction of the national campaign. While the policy of the Istiqlal was always determined by its acknowledged leaders, it was one of the Party's fundamental principles to encourage leadership on the lower echelons as well. As the Party was forced to act clandestinely, and immediate contact between headquarters and the local groups could not always be assured, the leaders of these groups were left a fair measure of independence. While the great tactical lines would be laid down at the Party's centre in Rabat or Fez, the manner of their execution was the concern of group leaders. The area controlled by such leaders might range from hundreds of square miles to a single village of a few score inhabitants.

And now that the important leaders were under lock and key,<sup>4</sup> many of the minor ones were still free. In most cases they were unknown to the police. Forced to work under cover, the Istiqlal depended upon secrecy, often leaving the French authorities in complete darkness as to its personnel. In many an instance, a Moor in whose adherence the authorities had every confidence, or one who was, possibly, even employed by them, was the head of the local Istiqlal branch. Now among these minor leaders there had been not a few who considered that the policy of the upper hierarchy was not sufficiently militant. As a rule these critics were younger

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> "The repression that preceded and followed the deposition of the Sultan has resulted, up to now, in more than 4,000 supplementary arrests. In taking into account their respective population figures, this would correspond to 45,000 arrests in France." *Esprit*, September 1953.

than the guiding spirits and showed impatience with the "diplomatic" methods which had brought their Party such exiguous results. Even in the higher councils there were some who did not believe that much could be achieved by negotiation, who would have liked to see the application of more drastic methods. But the Istiqlal prided itself on its democratic constitution, and, in a land where democracy was new, they were apt to equate democracy with peaceful progress. The confusion of ideas was, in its way, tragic, for a democratic constitution does not, of course, preclude militant action. Be that as it may, the policies of the leaders, especially Balafrej, el Fassi, Abdeljalil and Mohammed Lyazidi prevailed. Moreover, the Istiqlal was anxious to abide strictly by the policies laid down by the Sultan. With the removal of both the Sultan and the leaders—Balafrej managed to escape to New York and Fassi had stayed on in Cairo—the lesser leaders were able to try out more spectacular schemes. Convinced by the coup of August that the policy of negotiations had been a failure, they chose the method employed from time immemorial by oppressed peoples driven to despair. In their view, French violence, as exemplified by the Sultan's deposition, by imprisonments without trial, and by abolition of fundamental freedom, had to be countered by violence.

Though more conscious of their great historical and cultural past than the Algerians are of theirs, though less impatient than the Tunisians, the Moroccans are essentially a passionate and war-like people. Fighting is in their blood, and to many of them the finality of the August coup came almost as a release. At last they would be able to hit back with something more hurtful than words. But the weapons of a technically unarmed people confronted by an army and police force equipped with the latest engines were of pitiful meagreness. You cannot fight areoplanes, tanks and guns with old rifles and knives. The means dictated the procedure, and a campaign which the press described as one of terrorism (but which the Moroccans themselves viewed as a national war of liberation), was soon under way, its chief elements being sabotage, boycott and individual assault. Though the campaign was undoubtedly directed by nationalists, of whatever grade and colouring, it also attracted elements with no distinct political ideas—adventurers, desperados, young hotheads out for a fight. This seemed inevitable in a clandestine movement, committed to violence, and of ambiguous leadership.

When, in the autumn of 1953, the campaign was launched, most people expected that the victims would be French citizens, both official and private. But the unexpected happened, and most of the victims were native. On one occasion the author expressed his



surprise to some Moors at this choice of targets, and was told: "Before we can attack the French, we want to deprive them of their eyes and ears." The objects of the first sorties were native informers of the French police: ranging from native adventurers, from small shopkeepers and beggars who for a few francs would inform the police of nationalist personalities, to Moorish police inspectors. They were indeed the "eyes and ears" of the authorities. As a rule, their dispatchers acted with a swiftness that defeated the police. The attack would take place at dusk, within the labyrinth of narrow alleys of a native medina. The victim would be approached swiftly by a man on a bicycle who would fire at him from close range. Even if policemen appeared on the scene within a few minutes, the assailant would have disappeared, and no one would have seen him. This was understandable, for any native home would open its doors to him, and shelter him until he felt safe to move on.

The authorities tried to master the situation by increasing the number of their forces, and by taking draconic measures. A "special Brigade" was created. But on the day following its creation, its native inspector, known for his anti-nationalist sentiments, was killed by a hail of bullets. From that day the authorities began to show signs of panic, and arrests were made on an increasing scale.<sup>5</sup>

At first, the authorities were loath to admit that the casting off of Sidi Mohammed was having a boomerang effect and had not brought the expected "climate favourable to Franco-Moroccan co-operation". Had not one of the chief executants of colonialist policy, the Shereef Kittani, written immediately after the Sultan's deposition, "Thanks to the victory which we have just gained, the country is going to garner the fruits of peace, tranquillity and happiness"?<sup>6</sup> Though police informers were being killed in increasing numbers, efforts were made either to hush up or to minimize these murders as the activities of a few "criminal gangsters". Soon, however, "terrorism" became so widespread that it was impossible to dismiss it as something of minor importance. On January 14, 1954, *Témoignage Chrétien* in Paris summarized the situation thus: "Contrary to what the French government has so boldly maintained, the deposition of the Sultan has not succeeded in ending the crisis. We will not make too much of having predicted almost exactly what has happened since then: a police guard in the Muslim quarters, mass arrests, the appearance of terrorism, the absence of any possible arbiter. A practically unknown Sultan whose name is enough to empty the mosques, cannot intervene in the conflict."

A six-column report from *Figaro's* special correspondent was in

<sup>5</sup> *L'Observateur*, Paris, October 1, 1953.

<sup>6</sup> *Al Widad*, August 25, 1953.

itself a symptom of how widespread was the national campaign. "Terrorism is on the increase," he wrote from Morocco. "More than 200 armed assaults have already been committed during the last four months. A psychosis of fear is on the increase among the Europeans. People hesitate to take a train; they avoid travel along the roads at night. . . . Let us not deceive ourselves by illusions. The evil is profound. Simple police measures will not suffice to eradicate it."<sup>7</sup> Yet in spite of the imprisonment of practically all the nationalist leaders, even of the second rank, the resistance movement was consolidating itself rapidly.<sup>8</sup> Even the colonialist press had to admit that "terrorism" was defeating the authorities in spite of their infinitely superior organization and weapons. "How can we make our police measures more efficacious?" queried *Maroc-Presse* on September 27, 1953. "The police complain of silence on the part of the natives. It seems that the high rewards promised to all those willing to assist in finding the murderers are not sufficient." The new Governor of Casablanca, unable to keep up the pretence that everything in the garden was lovely, made a public appeal to the native population: "You have to look upon yourselves as legitimately defending what is yours when you help me to uncover and destroy the instigators."<sup>9</sup>

Originally, the attacks and sabotage were confined to the cities; they soon spread to the rural districts as well. In the words of the *London Times*, "Repression calls for terrorism and terrorism for repression; thus we have anarchy in Morocco."<sup>10</sup> By the spring of 1954 the situation had become graver than it had ever been since 1912. "The natives are afraid of the methods of the French police," wrote *Le Monde* on May 6, 1954. "The French dread the bullets and bombs of the terrorists. . . . Terrorism in Morocco is having a field day. . . . Obviously this movement, to be effective, must have the support of the people." The French were not the only ones to live in terror of the daily menace of resistance fighters. The natives had their own terrorism to put up with. "Whatever the means, age or disposition of the Moroccans, they dread being the object of cruelty. . . . They believe they are exposed to reprisal, regulation, deportation, imprisonment, abuse (the women to rape), theft, and every other kind of mistreatment, the gravest of all being death."<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly, even the waverers among the natives were showing sympathy with their fighting compatriots, and were supporting them in one way or another. What was the reproach they levelled against the French? That they used their "authority

<sup>7</sup> January 2-3, 1954.

<sup>8</sup> *L'Observateur*, October 1, 1953.

<sup>9</sup> *Le Monde*, October 16, 1953.

<sup>10</sup> May 17, 1954.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

as Frenchmen to cover up the abuses of colonial agents. Witnesses are abundant, and their statements are confirmed by French authorities."<sup>12</sup>

Other observers were convinced that, by applying a terrorism of their own, the authorities were merely asking for more and more violent opposition. "In the cities, and especially in Casablanca," wrote Henri Sartout, "police control and bigotry on the part of the Residency are pushed to such extremes that no Moroccan can be sure of remaining free from morning till night. The very fact that a man does not wear the traditional dress, or hasn't shaved his head, or has come from the city, is taken as a sign of nationalism and leads to his imprisonment. . . . There is scarcely a middle-class family left where some member hasn't been imprisoned or deported, and hardly any humble labourer can be found who hasn't been arrested, investigated, even molested and humiliated at least ten times in the last six months."<sup>13</sup> Much of this intense activity was concealed from those not immediately involved. A tourist visiting Morocco at the time heard little about the police measures from his French friends. For "the majority of the French in the cities are scarcely aware of the régime to which the Moroccans are subjected. They have no contact with them and never go into the medinas. There are others who, better informed, severely criticize the indiscriminate and brutal policy followed by the French Director of the Interior. He has, in fact, become a hated symbol."<sup>14</sup>

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Terrorism was indeed "having a field day". Inevitably, adventurers who were not inspired by any exalted patriotic sentiments were quick to cash in on the situation. Penniless individuals who had nothing to lose would willingly hire themselves out for a few thousand francs to kill some police informer or native shopkeeper notorious for his pro-French sympathies.

Armed assault was the most dramatic manifestation of resistance, but more damaging to French interests was the campaign of sabotage. Throughout the spring and summer of 1954 and 1955 the harvested grain of one French settler after another would go up in flames. French business enterprises had their premises burnt out; trains were derailed; French automobiles were put out of action; French shops would be blown up by home-made bombs. Many French farmers no longer dared to spend the night on their secluded farms, and would depart before sunset to the nearest town, from which they would not return before morning. Many French people

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> In *Le Monde*, May 11, 1954.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

were sending their children to France. For the first time since 1912 there was a certain exodus of French settlers from Morocco.<sup>15</sup>

Early in 1954 boycott of French goods was added to assault and sabotage. One of the important sources of French revenue was the tobacco monopoly. The largest proportion of that revenue came from the pockets of natives who constituted over 90 per cent of the tobacco consumers. By April 1954 the sales of tobacco went down by over 78 per cent.<sup>16</sup> It must be assumed that had the nationalist movement been small and lacking in prestige its orders that smoking be given up or curtailed could hardly have had so swift and overwhelming an effect. These orders were obeyed with a self-denial of which even the most ardent friends of the Moroccans had never expected them to be capable. It was, of course, not merely self-denial: a wholesome desire to keep on good terms with desperate men had something to do with the abstention. And it is known that there was much intimidation. Any native merchant willing to continue the sale of cigarettes knew that his days were numbered. The boycott of tobacco was not all. No longer would a Moroccan dare to visit a French cinema or café, or to make his purchases in a French shop.<sup>17</sup> The original source of such interdictions remained a secret; but we do know that they were obeyed uncompromisingly. French threats and cajolery were useless, for the new ways that the people were adopting were enforceable by less suave methods.

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The authorities thought primarily in terms of police measures. "We must change our policy," wrote *Le Figaro*. "But nothing suggests that we even intend doing so. The Residency appears entirely absorbed by thoughts of police action."<sup>18</sup> In France more and more voices were rising in denunciation of a régime of "immobilisme" and of police oppression in Morocco. After December 1952, French public opinion was less influenced by official pronouncements on the subject of Morocco and, in consequence, was based upon a more accurate knowledge of the true state of affairs. "No one in France can any longer rightfully say, 'We did not know'," wrote François Mauriac.<sup>19</sup>

Though the French people may have "known", the government

<sup>15</sup> *Le Monde*, May 6, 1954.

<sup>16</sup> *Le Monde*.

<sup>17</sup> "Transactions in real estate have come practically to a standstill. Tobacco and French textiles no longer find any buyers. The sales of important business houses have gone down by one half." (Paul Buttin, *Le Drame du Maroc*, pp. 202-3, 211.

<sup>18</sup> January 2-3, 1954.

<sup>19</sup> *France-Maghreb*, Paris, March 1954.

appeared to act as though conditions were as presented by official propaganda. Even in the summer of 1954 government spokesmen were still maintaining that Morocco was devoted to the puppet-Sultan, that Sidi Mohammed was forgotten, and that the outbreaks were the work of a few "gangsters" and of Istiqlal elements. If this were so, the bewildered French listeners must have reflected, why should the Istiqlal movement, represented to us as originally tiny, and lately crushed completely,<sup>20</sup> have such a vigorous tail to thrash around with? The measures taken by the authorities consisted almost entirely of fresh draftings of troops from France, and an increase in repressive police measures. Thus it was hardly to be wondered at that one of the political journals in Paris entitled a report from Morocco: *Tout comme chez Hitler*.

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If the resistance movement had been a purely political organization it might have collapsed for lack of general support. But, as has been made clear, the political implications were less apparent to the Moors than the offence against Islam. The Sultan in exile, first in Corsica and then in Madagascar, was far more firmly enshrined in Moorish hearts than he had ever been while present in the flesh among his people. His deposition brought about an entirely new situation in the country's religious life. Ever since Morocco had become Muslim, the mosques would resound every Friday with prayers recited in the Sultan's name. A few preachers, after the events of August, intoned prayers in the name of Moulay Arafa. In consequence they either preached to empty mosques or came to a sudden end.<sup>21</sup> In October 1953 and, again, in December 1954, the author kept watch on the entrance to the great mosque in Tangier, a mosque accommodating several thousand people. On several successive Fridays fewer than a hundred men entered. Subsequently these visitors to the mosque found themselves boycotted by the native population of the city.<sup>22</sup>

So Mohammed ben Youssef, the exile, took on strength which he had never possessed before. What mattered was not his individual worth "but rather what he was and remained in the eyes of the people: the religious leader on the one hand, and on the

<sup>20</sup> "The Istiqlal has been beheaded," wrote *Maroc-Presse* on September 21, 1953.

<sup>21</sup> "The mosques are always empty. In some of them prayers have not been said, for the imams have either resigned or have been deprived of their office because they had insisted on praying in the name of Sidi Mohammed." (*Le Figaro*, January 2-3, 1954.)

<sup>22</sup> For obvious reasons the nationalists refrained from employing in Tangier the drastic measures that had become usual in the French zone.

other, the living incarnation of his people, from the proletariat of the cities to the most educated men in the land".<sup>23</sup> Nothing holds the popular imagination more firmly than a myth, and Sidi Mohammed, like all myths, had become the unwitting repository and wielder of strange, almost magical forces. During the first few months following his departure, people sought him only in the moon, hardly daring to pronounce his name, hiding their pictures of him in secret recesses and crannies. The practical reason for this was that possession of his picture meant arrest. The more compelling motive was preservation and concealment of a source of "magic" power.

By the summer of 1954 things had changed. Gradually the populace was finding that the "magic" influence of Sidi Mohammed was helping his people to get the measure of their opponents, teaching them to strike where it hurt most, and, however drastic the latest police repressions, indicating some new form of aggression, some hitherto untouched weak spot. Each day "the Sultan in the moon" inspired his followers to fresh efforts in this strange form of undeclared warfare. More and more often the cry "Long live Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef" rent the Moroccan air. Even if police were present, people would still find courage to raise their voices in what had truly become a battle cry. On July 9 the *London Times* reported: "To the cries of 'Long live ben Youssef', a violent clash occurred, followed by a general assault by the demonstrators upon the houses occupied by Europeans."

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It is probable that the movement in favour of Sidi Mohammed might not have assumed such proportions and that the opposition to the new state of affairs might have been less virulent, had his aged successor shown even the shadow of a will of his own. But he disappointed even those Moroccans who had originally been prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt in the hope that, once on the throne, he would make some effort to assert himself. As events were to prove, he became in native eyes, a mere "French rubber stamp". He signed and sealed every new decree placed before him by the Residency, and as simply as that handed over all the traditional Shereefian prerogatives.

On September 1, 1953, a mere ten days after his accession to the throne, he sealed an imperial decree delegating his executive powers to an Inner Council to be presided over by the Grand Vizier. In spite of the person of its president, this Council was dominated by

<sup>23</sup> François Mauriac in *France-Maghreb*, March 1954.

French officials, and could be described as a French institution for which the Treaty of Fez had made no provision. Thus the decree was a device for legalizing the colonial status into which Morocco had already been transformed *de facto*, though until that date not *de jure*.

On September 5 Moulay Arafa abolished the "Day of the Throne", a national holiday introduced during his predecessor's reign to commemorate his accession. This was, superficially, a minor deprivation, but the Day of the Throne had acquired undue significance, for it rallied the people around the sovereign's person. It also enabled Sidi Mohammed to use the Speech from the Throne as a vehicle for important statements, for which, otherwise, there might have been no occasion. Each year that speech was awaited with joyful excitement by the natives, and with some trepidation by the Residency. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Residency was eager to abolish the holiday.

On the same day Moulay Arafa proscribed the *heydia*, or the traditional custom of presenting the Sultan with gifts on the three major Muslim holidays. This measure was rich in propaganda possibilities, bearing as it did the imprint of an act of enlightened renunciation. Since on legal and constitutional grounds the position of the recent king-makers was extremely shaky, they sought reinforcement by trying to discredit Sidi Mohammed for his private conduct. They accused him of unlawfully amassing a vast fortune, and of misusing his position for personal enrichment. Some of the ill-gotten gains were supposed to accrue from the *heydia*. In a modern State there should have been no room for that type of levy. Being progressive-minded, Sidi Mohammed might have seen the need to introduce this reform, and should not have left that measure to a sovereign owing his elevation to compatriots of more than questionably acquired wealth. He might have felt more repugnance for the *heydia* had he not been nurtured in the centuries-old tradition according to which the "sultans continued to consider the Imperial Treasury their private property and to make no distinction between State and personal capital or income".<sup>24</sup> However, he undoubtedly felt justified in delaying a reform that implied personal sacrifice on his own part while there seemed no prospect of any of the more important reforms affecting the whole of his country.

On September 10 Moulay Arafa signed over his legislative powers to a Council of Viziers and Directors composed of 16 French directors of departments and 14 Moroccans. Legislation approved by the Council was to be placed before the Sultan for his seal; but even if he should disagree, his objection could be overruled by a

<sup>24</sup> Carleton S. Coon, op. cit., p. 287.

two-thirds majority.<sup>25</sup> Since the 14 Moroccan members had been hand-picked by the French authorities, the Council had to be regarded as French rather than Moroccan.

According to a French jurist, with the imposition of that decree, the Residency abrogated the Protectorate Treaty. "It replaced a bilateral treaty by a unilateral text, which was harmful to the Moroccans. It gave itself powers that, by the Protectorate Treaty, were the Sultan's. It abolished not only the Treaty but, with it, the sovereignty of the Moroccan people that the Treaty had guaranteed. It established co-sovereignty."<sup>26</sup>

On September 19 the new Sultan signed and sealed a decree approving French proposals for municipal elections. As has been shown already, such elections placed legal and political power in the hands of French inhabitants, a power to which, as foreigners, they were not entitled. It will also be remembered that Lyautey, basing his policies on the terms of the Protectorate Treaty, uncompromisingly withheld such far-reaching measures. This problem of municipal elections was for many years one of the meatiest bones of contention between Sidi Mohammed and the French. The new decree provided for elected municipal councils in eighteen towns. In the six major towns—Fez, Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Oujda and Agadir—French and Moroccan councillors were to be in equal numbers, in spite of the fact that in most of them the native population was many times as large as the French.

With such hasty prodigality it took Moulay Arafa less than a month to sign and seal away practically all the powers that, at least juridically, had remained in native hands. In a few weeks he made the transformation of protectorate into colony an established fact, approved at every stage by Morocco's sovereign.

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In spite of the flood of reassuring information designed to show the world that the new Sultan enjoyed great popularity, he felt compelled, on January 24, 1954, to address a proclamation to "all Moroccans", warning them that disloyalty to him would mean expulsion from the Muslim community.<sup>27</sup> Not many weeks later a holy place was desecrated and solemn ritual profaned, when a native threw a bomb at the monarch during his Friday prayers in a mosque in Marrakesh, during the latter's first official visit to the southern capital. Though he received only superficial wounds,

<sup>25</sup> *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C., Winter 1954, p. 82.

<sup>26</sup> Paul Buttin, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-5.

<sup>27</sup> *M.E.J.*, Spring 1954, p. 198.



several members of his entourage were either killed or wounded. It was not surprising that from that day onward the old man seldom dared show himself in public, and, when forced to do so, was hedged in by hundreds of police.

Though the movement against the French and against the new Sultan was concentrated in the cities, it was not confined to urban districts. "City notions have spread to the countryside, and there is a stirring on the plains and in the mountains inhabited by Berbers. It is fallacious to imagine that calm and security exist in rural areas."<sup>28</sup>

But there was still the small faction led by Glaoui and some of the caids. They were separated from the majority of their fellow-Moroccans by a gulf deeper than any rift which in the past had divided *bled es siba* and *bled el makhzen*. This cleavage was perhaps the most perilous as well as the most tragic feature of the situation. It showed that within a single year the patient work of Lyautey had been undone. For Morocco was a house divided; its new disunity was more pronounced, more gravely fraught with danger than ever it had been in its pre-Protectorate days.

<sup>28</sup> Carrefour, Paris, August 18, 1954.

## THE SPANISH REACTION

THOUGH the French in their zone easily forgot their Iberian neighbours further north, the Spanish zone followed events in French Morocco with closest attention. While Spanish interest in the August crisis was foreseeable, the Spanish reaction was rather unexpected.

If we are to understand the course of events in Spanish Morocco after August 20, we must bear in mind that little love was lost between official Rabat and official Tetuan. The Spanish press reports on happenings in the French zone were seldom marked by the graces and flowers that embellished official declarations concerning Franco-Spanish friendship and goodwill. (Not to be outdone, the French press directed many a verbal salvo at Tetuan.)

When in December 1951 General Guillaume paid a visit to his Spanish colleague, Lieutenant-General Rafael Garcia Valiño, High Commissioner in the Spanish zone, the two generals proclaimed after the meeting their "mutual esteem and the ever-growing trust between the French and the Spanish who, in Morocco, pursue analogous missions".<sup>1</sup> The harmony between the two generals was voiced in a five-point communiqué released by General Valiño, in which the identity of future French and Spanish aims in the Maghreb was stressed. The communiqué also hit out at "fanatical Arab nationalism". Its longest paragraph, however, was dedicated to the Americans, whose diplomatic representatives in Morocco were accused of financing Moroccan nationalists and of inciting them to extremes! American policy was even accused of endangering "the evolution and security not merely of Morocco but of the entire Western world".<sup>2</sup> Only two years later a leading French weekly described the same Spanish High Commissioner as "a fat, bald-headed general who had to stand on his toes to make his inadequate figure appear taller". While the official document of the earlier occasion employed the guarded language of diplomacy, the press article expressed the true French attitude towards Spanish Morocco.

<sup>1</sup> *Informations Nord Africaines*, February 1952.

<sup>2</sup> *Maroc-Presse*, February 6, 1954.

We have observed such phenomena elsewhere and merely note this in passing.

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The acrimony informing Spanish reaction to the crisis in French Morocco was due partly to a resentment of the bitter poverty of the Spanish zone which made it impossible for the Spaniards to raise standards to the much higher level attained in the French zone; partly to the dictates of General Franco's Arab policy. It offended Spanish pride that the French, so well buttressed, were in a position to patronize the poverty-stricken Spanish zone. While the French could boast wealth to exploit, news value for the presses of the world, and countless attractions for the tourist, the Spanish ruled over a barely tolerable holding with little news value, few spectacular achievements, and a minimum of acceptable hotels.

The salient factor, however, overriding mere resentment, was Franco's Muslim policy, of which much has been said already. After the Artajo mission to the Middle East, and throughout 1953, the Caudillo remained in close contact with Arab leaders. On several occasions the Secretary and Vice-Secretary of the Arab League visited him in Madrid. The deposition of Sidi Mohammed came as something of a godsend to the Spanish, for it enabled them to affirm their independence in Moroccan affairs. French newspapers spoke at great length of Franco's plan to offer Sidi Mohammed shelter in the Spanish zone, where he was to be regarded as true Sultan, and respected accordingly. It was claimed on the French side that only the speed with which General Guillaume despatched the monarch to Corsica prevented a realization of that plan. But whether this be true or not, the fact remains that immediately after the coup at Rabat, the Spanish High Commissioner made a very outspoken declaration. He completely dissociated his régime from the French coup, and complained that, by having acted unilaterally, and failed to inform Spain of their plans, the French had destroyed such unity of policy as existed between the two régimes. General Franco himself reiterated these views in a famous newspaper article, so that there need be no misinterpretation of the Spanish position.

Since Spain refused to recognize the deposition of Sidi Mohammed, the Khalifa at Tetuan continued to represent the exile in Corsica and not Moulay Arafa. Prayers in the mosques of the Spanish zone were offered in the name of the former. For the first time in many years, nationalists from the French zone could escape into the Spanish without finding themselves being handed over to the French authorities.

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Spectacular confirmation of the Spanish stand was furnished in January 1954. Rumours that the Khalifa would be proclaimed "Regent and Guardian of the Shereefian throne" in the name of the deposed ruler were becoming so persistent that on January 18 "the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, called upon the Spanish Ambassador in Paris to furnish an explanation of those reports". The expected clarification was to be made at a great tribal meeting in Tetuan. "Bidault warned the Spanish Ambassador that if the meeting in any way threatened the unity of the Moroccan empire, 'France would defend this unity by every means at her disposal'."<sup>3</sup> To add force to his threat, M. Bidault made the French government dispatch a cruiser, aircraft carrier, escort ship and flotilla of destroyers to Mers el Kebir, off the coast of Algeria, near the Spanish zone. Moreover, the French authorities posted troops all along the frontier separating the two zones.<sup>4</sup>

On January 21 the much-publicized meeting at Tetuan took place. Some 30,000 Moroccans, mainly Berbers, headed by some 1,500 senior and minor leaders, assembled in the city to present the High Commissioner with a petition and to parade before him. The petition was signed by 430 influential natives, among them all the members of the Khalifa's government, officials and important religious and civil personalities of the Spanish zone. The words of their petition were weighty:

"The events of extraordinary gravity which have taken place in the Moroccan Empire during the past few months have saddened the heart of every good patriot. The injuries inflicted by the French government upon the Moroccans, wounding their finest and most intimate feelings, have caused a general repudiation, despite the strong repressive and coercive measures put into practice throughout the territory of the Empire. . . .

"We ourselves repudiate utterly and unconditionally the policy followed in the zone of the French Protectorate and the measures which have led to the deposition of the legitimate Sultan, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, through the machinations of the French Residency General in conjunction with supporting native elements. This has been carried out with no reference whatsoever to the Moroccan people of this zone, showing complete disregard for their opinions and feelings, and violating the agreements set forth for in respect to the Protectorate. . . .

"We do not recognize the authority of Moulay Ben Arafa, as it was arbitrarily conferred upon him by France against, and in disregard of, the feelings of the Moroccan people. . . . We request the

<sup>3</sup> *The Middle East Journal*, Spring 1954, p. 197.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

temporary separation of the Spanish zone, so long as the present political conditions in the French zone continue, in order that the Khalifa in our zone may exercise full sovereignty therein, without any dependence upon Moulay Ben Arafa."

It must be assumed that the spirit and wording of this petition were those of the Spanish authorities quite as much as of the actual signatories. General Valiño assured the assembled crowds that he would refer their demands to Generalissimo Franco. Two days later the High Commissioner did so, using the occasion for making the following statement: "The French authorities know that Morocco has been wronged and that their actions have been deplorable. The world does not know the truth about the Moroccan problems. But the great significance of the meeting at Tetuan cannot be denied." At the same time the High Commissioner announced an amnesty for all prisoners in his zone serving sentences of less than two years. Prisoners serving sentences of from three to six years would have them halved.<sup>5</sup>

Even French experts acknowledged that it was France's weak position in her zone that had provided the Spanish with a welcome opportunity to stage the Tetuan demonstrations. Marcel Naegelen, a former Governor General of Algeria, and an old hand at North African problems, wrote: "It is because Franco was aware of this situation that he allowed himself to initiate his Tetuan operation, one which aims at aggravating the unrest in the French zone. But it would not have been attempted if the weakness of the new Sultan and of the French Administration had not been evident."<sup>6</sup>

Not surprisingly, Spanish action in Tetuan was acclaimed with enthusiasm throughout the Middle East. The Arab League's Political Committee in Cairo called upon the eight member nations to support Spain's stand on Morocco.<sup>7</sup> Arab newspapers hailed General Franco as "a true friend of the Muslims". On February 13, the Caudillo formally announced that Spain would not recognize Moulay Arafa as Sultan. His support encouraged the "Voice of the Arabs" of Radio Cairo to intensify its propaganda to Morocco. And secret radio stations in Spanish Morocco began a propaganda service to the French zone, specializing in instructions to terrorists.<sup>8</sup>

The amnesty, the petition, the speeches and the celebrations at Tetuan cost Spain nothing, and committed her to little. The Khalifa was not proclaimed "Regent", and things remained more or less as they had been. But Rabat was stung to the core, and Moulay Arafa was prevailed upon by the Residency to address a note of protest to Paris, requesting the French government to "call

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Le Monde*, January 26, 1954.

<sup>7</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, June 13, 1954.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*

the attention of the Madrid government to this situation and to its present and future consequences".<sup>9</sup> There was more than a hint of irony in the righteous indignation of conspirators of yesterday protesting against the possible conspirators of to-morrow.

The French government took a very serious view of developments in the Spanish zone. Before the Tetuan demonstrations, news of native protests could easily be suppressed or their importance minimized, and the official version of the August events could be kept alive.<sup>10</sup> The Tetuan moves and declarations made headline news in the world press, and even those who had previously accepted official French versions of Moroccan events as gospel truth were shocked to find that the deposition of Sidi Mohammed had taken place not because his people had clamoured for his removal, but in spite of their opposition. Even those who claimed that the Tetuan declaration expressed the will of the Spanish Administration rather than that of the natives, had to admit that, if this were so, there was every reason to interpret the supposed anti-Sultan movement in the French zone as a put-up job.

The French government protested to Madrid against the action of native leaders in the Spanish zone, and General Guillaume was asked by his government in Paris to inform Moulay Arafa that all steps would be taken to protect the unity and sovereignty of Morocco, in other words, his authority in the Spanish zone.<sup>11</sup>

In actual fact that vaunted unity had ceased to exist the moment the Madrid government, the Spanish High Commissioner, and the Sultan's Khalifa in Tetuan had refused to acknowledge Moulay Arafa, and had decided to insist upon Sidi Mohammed's legitimate claims. Viewed in retrospect, the complicated affair might seem but a storm in a teacup, but its implications were portentous. For the member-countries of the Arab League General Franco was emerging as the only Western protector of their fellow-Muslims in Morocco. A Spanish zone loyal to Sidi Mohammed was a constant threat to the French zone. If to-day nationalists could find a haven in Spanish Morocco, what guarantee was there that to-morrow arms might not be smuggled therefrom? And should the Spanish dictator really decide one day to introduce autonomy into his zone, the reactions in French Morocco might easily be grave to France.

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There was yet another important consequence of the Spanish

<sup>9</sup> *Middle East Journal*, op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> In the U.S. the *Christian Science Monitor*, and in Great Britain the *Manchester Guardian*, were practically the only dailies that had given a factual, and not the official, version of the events.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

move. After the deposition of Sidi Mohammed, many Moroccans regarded themselves as having been betrayed by the Western Powers. In their despair they showed a new willingness to think in terms of an alliance with the communists, should the latter find means to grant them assistance in some form. Though the nationalist leaders in exile hoped for quite other solutions, and persisted in their unswerving refusal to have anything to do with communists, in Morocco there were many hotheads who, in their disillusionment, looked upon the communists as their only potential allies. The stand taken in Tetuan, and the subsequent pronouncements of the Spanish authorities, checked the drift towards such an unholy alliance, although few nationalists had much confidence in Spanish promises. The Spanish record in their zone did not warrant undue optimism; yet they believed that, having committed himself so openly and repeatedly to a policy of greater liberalism in Morocco, General Franco might find it difficult to go back on his word. While not an ideal ally in their opinion, he was nevertheless the only Western ruler to declare support. Great Britain and the U.S. were, at the moment, still intent on keeping France in a co-operative mood, and would not risk too open a condemnation of the Moroccan affair.

For the time being, the Spanish contented themselves with making statements favourable to Morocco and holding out the prospect of autonomy, without doing much to implement their promises. In mid-August of 1954 the High Commissioner made another declaration that confirmed the policy pursued by Madrid during the previous few years, explaining that he "could not be indifferent to the Moroccan people's deep feeling of disquiet, nor to the trials to which they were being subjected". He announced that he would soon be submitting to his government "a project for increasing the participation of Moroccans in the Administration"<sup>12</sup>—words that the Moroccan people had heard on a number of earlier occasions. He finished his statement with the assurance that the "new" policy of Spain would be continued "until such time as the Moroccans themselves were sufficiently prepared to rule their own destinies". The Moroccans did not consider that this amounted to much, but it seemed rather more than what their brothers in the French zone could expect. Whatever the validity of General Valiño's statement, there was little doubt that it was meant to be an indirect challenge to France.<sup>13</sup> For if there was one point on which the French and Spanish authorities in Morocco agreed it was that they seldom agreed on anything.

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<sup>12</sup> *London Times*, August 16th, 1954.

<sup>13</sup> *Observer*, London, August 15th, 1954.

The Spanish resentment of France's Moroccan policies manifested itself again a few months later, on the occasion of the "Day of the Throne". As we know, in the French zone that national holiday had been abolished. In spite of its official proscription, when the 18th of November came, the natives in that zone proclaimed an unofficial holiday: native shops remained closed for two days, and practically all Moorish employees and workmen failed to appear at their place of work. In Casablanca, the police had to fire at the crowds, and there were some killed and wounded.<sup>14</sup> In the Spanish zone, on the other hand, the authorities made every effort to stress the validity and importance of the "Day". The 18th was proclaimed an official holiday, and the employees of the Spanish Administration as well as of private Spanish enterprises were given leave of absence. The *Diario de Africa*, the paper of the High Commissioner, published a two-column portrait of Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef on its front page, and made the following comment: "They seek to-day [in the French zone] opportunist solutions and call them the 'dynastic question'. This question does not exist. There exists only the necessity to rectify the obvious errors which, with each day, become more difficult to unmake." In an official broadcast, Radio Tetuan proclaimed: "In the course of the coming year France is bound to experience some lively reactions against her stupid colonialist policy." The Moroccans might well believe, at long last, that they had found an ally.

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Just before the end of 1954, the Caudillo and General Valiño established the proof that their oft-repeated promises had substance behind them. The author happened to be visiting Tetuan at that time, and at each step he found signs of an entirely new spirit. A few years previously an impenetrable wall of mutual mistrust separated the Spanish from the native population; the prisons were crowded with political "criminals"; those nationalists who were not in hiding lived in exile, chiefly in Tangier. Abdelhaleq Torres, the head of the nationalist movement in the Spanish zone, too, was living in the international city; and no foreign visitor would dare to establish contact even with Moors on the fringe of the nationalist movement. During the last week of 1954, Spaniards and Moroccans sat amicably together in the open-air cafés, sipping their coffee or mint tea; the jails had been emptied of political prisoners, nationalists who had escaped from the French zone received a ready and open welcome; the Spanish authorities issued them with labour per-

<sup>14</sup> *Le Monde*, November 19 and 20, 1954.



mits, and set special buildings aside in which to house them. The tension prevailing in the French zone was here conspicuous by its complete absence. The prevailing atmosphere was one of peace and contentment, and, thanks to the relaxation of certain restrictions, and the sudden influx of foreign tourists who, in the past, had visited the French zone at the expense of the Spanish, even economic conditions appeared to have improved. Torres had been back in residence for over a year, and he spoke to the author appreciatively of his cordial relations with the High Commissioner and the other Spanish authorities. He also spoke of the High Commissioner's promise that nationalists would be invited to join the native government, and indeed, a few days later, decrees of a truly revolutionary nature were published. The government was to be reformed, younger men were to join it, and, above all, nationalists were invited to take over some of the key posts. Torres found himself Minister of Social Affairs, a department newly founded, and two of his friends were given the departments of Justice and of Education and Culture respectively. After more than forty-two years, this was the first occasion since the establishment of the two foreign régimes that nationalists were permitted to take over part-conduct of native affairs.

Everyone seemed to agree that the man responsible for this new departure was General Valiño himself who, in the face of strong opposition on the part of the Spanish Foreign Office, had received the full support of the Caudillo. Possibly more astute than the professional diplomats, Valiño was said to have realized that the only way to save Spanish Morocco from repeating the example set by the French zone was to introduce the first stage of self-government. The peace and contentment reigning throughout the Spanish zone seemed a telling proof of the General's political wisdom.



*Part Nine*

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THE MOROCCAN CRISIS AND THE WEST



## MOROCCO IN THE UNITED NATIONS

THE seventh meeting of the United Nations Assembly opened on October 14, 1952—a particularly solemn occasion, for this was the first meeting in its new headquarters on the East river in New York. Leading figures of the political world—Eleanor Roosevelt, Anthony Eden, Dean Acheson, Vishinsky, Mrs. Pandit, General Romulos, Sir Zafrullah Khan—were there, and even a stray visitor in the famous “Delegates’ Lounge”, with its broad view of the river and the passing ships, could rub shoulders with them at almost any time of the day. The tenseness of the international situation was reflected in the sombrely preoccupied mien of most of the delegates. The Korean war hung like an ever-present cloud over the assembly, and in its wake were trailing the lesser clouds cast by such problems as the question of disarmament and the Israeli conflict. In spite of the weight of these perplexing matters, precedence was given to discussion, at a very early stage, of Morocco’s present and future. This was not the first occasion on which the representatives of almost all the world’s nations had been called upon to turn their attention to the Maghreb; but it was to be the first time that specific recommendations thereon were to arise from their deliberations.

After the crisis of February 1951, it became evident that the Arab States would no longer stand passive while their Moroccan brothers continued to be, as they expressed it, “the victims of French colonialism”.

On October 4, 1951, the Foreign Minister of Egypt asked the Secretary General of the U.N. to place on the agenda of the sixth session of the General Assembly a complaint regarding “Violation of the principles of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights by France in Morocco”.<sup>1</sup> The Egyptian request concluded with the statement that, in view of the failure of the Arab States to achieve anything through direct negotiations with France, the question was being put before the U.N. “in order to satisfy the just aspirations of the Moroccan people and avoid the developments to

<sup>1</sup> General Assembly, Official Records: Sixth Session, 1951, Agenda Item 7: Annexes, p. 4.

which this state of tension, dangerous to peace in that region, might give rise". Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen associated themselves with the Egyptian request.

The new quarters of the U.N. in New York were not ready at that date, and the sixth meeting took place in Paris. The Arab delegations regarded this as a disadvantage to their cause. As the guests of France they felt that there were limits to the degree of indignation they might express—but even so, bitter words were uttered on the subject of France's Moroccan régime. The Egyptian Foreign Minister spoke of "great resentment" throughout the Arab world caused by recent Moroccan events.<sup>2</sup> In his reply, the French representative denied that his country was accountable to the Assembly for its Moroccan policies. The American delegate supported France, suggesting that a "detailed discussion" would not be in the interests of the Moroccan people.<sup>3</sup> Finally the General Committee adopted a Canadian resolution, recommending that the General Assembly postpone "for the time being" the placing of the Moroccan question on the agenda.<sup>4</sup> When this matter reached the full Assembly, the Arab States tried to bring about a reversal of the General Committee's decision. "Feeling was high and mutual accusations bitter as the delegates of the Arab States, Pakistan and Indonesia argued that the Assembly would be failing in its duty if it refused to consider the grievances of the Moroccan people, while the French delegate expressed his country's resentment that its policy should be called in question and asked for "faith in France and in its sincere desire to continue its work in Morocco to the end of preparing the Moroccan people for self-government and for the management of their own affairs".<sup>5</sup>

The United States continued to support France, to the disappointment of the Arab-Asian States "which had hoped it would follow its traditional support for colonial peoples and for the airing of controversial issues in the U.N. The final vote on the General Committee's recommendation to postpone . . . placing the item on the agenda was close, but the Arab States lost, 28-23, with 7 abstentions."<sup>6</sup>

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By the autumn of 1952, when the U.N. Assembly was to meet for the first time in New York, the Arab nations were determined that

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.* 75th meeting, November 8, 1951, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.* 76th meeting, November 9th, 1951, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Rom Landau, *Morocco, International Conciliation*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, September 1952, p. 315.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 316.

the Moroccan question should at last figure on the agenda. They were supported by all the Asian countries, and especially India, which is not Muslim. It was at the 1952 meeting of the U.N. that the alliance which was to become known as the Arab-Asian Bloc emerged. Preoccupation with the questions of Morocco and Tunisia was the cement that welded the member-countries together.

It may be asked why countries as far away from French North Africa as Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines or Siam should have shown such lively interest in Moroccan problems. Few of them, if any, had direct interests in the Maghreb; some did not even share its religion. The answer is that they were united by a detestation of European colonialism. For many lands of Asia and the Middle East colonialism was still the overriding problem. Although they had attained their own independence, they still mistrusted the great colonial Powers, and took a very grey view of their motives. Even when the West tried to render them genuine assistance—economic, financial and advisory—they suspected that such gestures might merely be the excuse for a new type of Western imperialist infiltration. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, moreover, were the only Muslim countries which, while formerly sovereign, were still forced to live “under a foreign yoke”. Both the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations assured all countries of their right to self-determination; yet though Morocco and Tunisia were clamouring for independence, their demands were left unheeded. For the Arab-Asian Bloc these North African affairs served as test-cases of the West’s goodwill and sincerity. The seriousness of purpose and the passion with which the Bloc identified itself with Moroccan-Tunisian claims can only be understood if we bear in mind that the Maghreb had become a symbol.

The Arab-Asian Bloc felt the more entitled to demand an airing of the Moroccan question for the fact that “nothing in the preceding year indicated that a satisfactory solution might be brought about by direct negotiations between the French government and the Sultan. . . . The note the Sultan dispatched to Paris on March 30, 1952, did not evoke a response until September 27, a few weeks before the General Assembly was to meet. Moreover, neither that reply nor previous ones dealt with the fundamental problems raised by the monarch. The Arab-Asian governments felt there had never been any negotiations worthy of the name between Paris and Rabat.”<sup>7</sup>

Throughout the spring and summer of 1952 French spokesmen, official and unofficial, declared that France would pay no attention to any resolutions on Morocco the General Assembly might make.

<sup>7</sup> *Newsletter*, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., February 1, 1953, p. 3.

It would not, indeed, permit any foreign Power or international organization to "interfere" in "purely domestic French matters". General Juin, by that time Marshal, but no longer Resident, stated categorically that should the Assembly decide to discuss the Moroccan question, France might feel compelled to leave not only the NATO organization, but even the U.N. Neither resignations did occur, but the French government refused to send representatives to the Moroccan debates.

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Was the U.N. Assembly entitled to debate the Moroccan question? Many of France's supporters in the U.N. maintained that it was not, and that Morocco was a "domestic" concern of France. In this connection it should be remembered that for a number of years France insisted on the exclusion from international debates of the problem of war in Indo-China, maintaining that it was "solely a French concern". By 1954, however, when France found herself sorely pressed in Indo-China, she made feverish efforts to secure large-scale American assistance and to "internationalize" her formerly "private" war. Finally, she permitted an international forum—the conference at Geneva—to extricate her from her difficulties, and to assist in settling the war for her.

In spite of having introduced co-sovereignty and direct administration into Morocco, France did not claim *de jure* sovereignty. In fact, Morocco's sovereign status was guaranteed in the Act of Algeciras, which might be said to be the country's international charter. The Treaty of Fez of 1912 did not—in fact, *could* not—reverse the guarantees given at Algeciras. Between the two world wars the International Court of Justice at the Hague in several of its verdicts reaffirmed Moroccan sovereignty. Part of its judgment on August 27, 1952, in the case concerning "Rights of Nationals of the U.S.A. in Morocco", runs: "It is not disputed by the French government that Morocco, even under the Protectorate, has retained its personality as a *State in international law*". (Author's italics.) The Court also ruled that "under the Treaty [of Fez] Morocco remained a sovereign State, but it made an arrangement of a contractual character whereby France undertook to exercise certain sovereign powers *in the name and on behalf of Morocco*".<sup>8</sup> (Author's italics.) Since by France's own admission Morocco was a sovereign State, the pro-Moroccan delegates maintained that a dispute between these two countries was not a matter of exclusively French jurisdiction.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix VI.



On a previous occasion, in 1923, France had tried to uphold the principle that French jurisdiction governed Franco-Moroccan relations. The Court at the Hague refuted that claim, rejecting the contention of the French government that the "public powers [*puissance publique*] exercised by the protecting State, taken in conjunction with the local sovereignty of the protected State, constitute full sovereignty equivalent to that upon which international relations are based".

The Moroccan case in the U.N. was certainly not of the same nature as that of Cyprus and Great Britain, raised in the U.N. in September 1954. Cyprus was juridically a Colony, having neither sovereignty nor independence. In consequence, Britain claimed that the matter was a "domestic" one, and that Article 11 (7) of the U.N. Charter applied to it. For that article provides that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the Present Charter". In spite of this, the Assembly decided to put the question of Cyprus on its agenda. It might, thus, be considered that the U.N. had an even more valid right to discuss the issue between the two "sovereign Powers, France and Morocco".

The Arab-Asian delegates argued that since the dispute between France and Morocco had its basis in international treaties (Act of Algeciras, and Treaty of Fez), it was an *international* dispute, and, as such, fell within the jurisdiction of the U.N. Assembly. They stressed that, while Article 10 of the Charter states, "The General Assembly may discuss any question or any matter within the scope of the present Charter", Article 1 charges the U.N. with responsibility for bringing about, by peaceful means, settlements of international disputes which might lead to a breach of the peace.

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Countries with colonial possessions, such as Belgium, Holland and Great Britain, supported the point of view that the Assembly was not competent to deal with Morocco. The majority of countries, however, including the U.S.A., held the opposite view, and the Moroccan question was put on the agenda. This defeat for France was made all the more painful by her boycott of the debates. For the prevailing opinion was that if France's case was a good one she could well afford to defend it. In the end the actual resolution put forward by the Arab-Asian group was defeated, for many of the major Western Powers and Latin-American Republics suddenly

reversed their previous attitude and decided to support the French point of view.

The American and British arguments may be taken as typical of many of those that helped to defeat the Arab-Asian proposals. Prof. Philip C. Jessup, head of the U.S. delegation and a distinguished member of the Faculty of Columbia University, said that the American point of view was "determined by the belief that the Committee could not usefully concern itself with specific problems which could only be solved in direct negotiation between the parties concerned".<sup>9</sup> Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, for the United Kingdom, declared that his delegation "considered that the General Assembly was not competent to examine the question and that in so doing it was usurping functions to which it had no title". According to his thesis, "neither an international dispute nor a threat to international peace was involved". He asked that the U.N. should recognize that in the interests of Non-Self-Governing Territories and of the Organization (the U.N.), "it was time that constant attacks upon the governments responsible for administering Non-Self-Governing Territories should cease".<sup>10</sup>

The last-minute *volte-face* of the delegations supporting the French point of view was generally interpreted not as a sanction of the French régime in Morocco, but as an indication that the complex interlocking of various trends in international affairs meant the sacrifice of certain considerations to the claims of expediency. In view of Western defence, NATO, and France's delay in ratifying the E.D.C. agreement, the Western Powers had no wish to offend French susceptibilities.

Nevertheless, at the eleventh hour the Assembly put to the vote a new (Latin-American) resolution, thus once again tacitly admitting that the question fell within its competence. The vote in favour of the resolution was 45 to 3, with 11 abstentions. Only Belgium, South Africa and Luxembourg rigidly upheld the French view to the last. The Soviet Bloc abstained from voting.<sup>11</sup>

The resolution was regarded generally as unsatisfactory. It represented a modest victory for Morocco and a moral defeat for France. Though the delegates who defended the Moroccan case invariably tried to make a distinction between France and French colonialism in the Maghreb, the debates were saddening to any lover of France. That the Arab-Asian delegations would criticize the Protectorate régime was only to be expected. What seemed distressing was that none of the pro-French delegates made any effort to

<sup>9</sup> General Assembly, Seventh Session, First Committee, 548th meeting.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, 549th meeting.

<sup>11</sup> For full text of the resolution, see Appendix VII.

praise French achievements in Morocco. Thus even the régime's positive aspects went by default. The Assembly was left with the impression that France's record in the Maghreb was as black as the various pro-Moroccan delegations had painted it.

More ominous yet was the fact that the final resolution revealed a distinct gulf between the Western Powers and the Arab-Asian Bloc. This Bloc, one of the largest in the world, commanded most of the decisive strategic positions between Europe and Asia. Many of its delegations were, rightly or wrongly, driven to the conclusion that the "U.N. was becoming more and more an instrument of the great Powers, and that the 'have-nots' had no means of asserting their will in the U.N."<sup>12</sup>

Morocco again focused the attention of the U.N. Assembly at its eighth meeting in October 1953. Less than two months had elapsed since the eviction of Sidi Mohammed, and the feelings of the Arab-Asian delegations on the Moroccan issue were extremely strong. Only a year earlier the majority of the world's nations represented at the U.N. had expressed confidence that "in pursuance of its proclaimed policies the government of France will endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco". That same majority had also appealed to France (and Morocco) to "conduct their relations in an atmosphere of goodwill, mutual confidence and respect and to settle their dispute in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, thus refraining from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension".

The events that led to the Sultan's exile and the manner in which it had been effected were regarded by the Arab-Asian governments, and, as time went on, by other governments as well, as a deliberate flouting of the U.N. by France. Innumerable speeches in defence of the Moroccan cause were made by representatives of countries as different and as far apart as Sweden and the Philippines, Yugoslavia and Indonesia, Norway, India and Mexico. Such views found their most forceful expression in a speech made by Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who pointed out that during the year following the resolutions adopted by the Assembly in 1952 "fundamental liberties in Morocco, instead of being furthered . . . have been abolished"; that "there have been no negotiations in conformity with the hope" expressed in the resolution; that "there had been no refraining on the part of the dominant power from acts or measures likely to aggravate the tension". It was because of these conditions that "the thirteen Asiatic-African powers"<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Newsletter*, M.E.I., op. cit.

<sup>13</sup> Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

presented a resolution" in 1953, "which recommended that in order that goodwill, mutual confidence and respect may be restored, martial law and other exceptional measures should be terminated, political prisoners should be released and civil liberties should be restored. It also recommended that democratic representative institutions should be established through free elections based upon universal franchise, and that complete independence and sovereignty should be established in Morocco within a period of five years."

While, on October 19, this resolution was adopted by the Political Committee, two weeks later it failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds majority in the plenary session of the Assembly.

Though the French delegation again boycotted the Moroccan debates, it certainly did not renounce its right to canvass for support behind the scenes. In the U.N. Assembly, as at most diplomatic conferences, activities "*dans les coulisses*" were almost more effective than those performed in open sessions. Much of the voting in such sessions was not the outcome of what was taking place in a public debate, but had been settled beforehand. These "occult" negotiations usually took place over glasses of whisky or cups of coffee in the Delegates' Lounge or at dinner tables in the innumerable restaurants within the proximity of the U.N. building. In the days following the Political Committee's adoption of the Moroccan resolution, the French delegation naturally missed few opportunities of securing the last-minute support of delegates whose governments were either hesitant or inclined to take no particular interest in Moroccan affairs. To this group belonged, for instance, the Republics of Central and South America. Though in population figures most of these might be insignificant, they usually tipped the scales one way or another because their number was so great, and thus they disposed of so many votes: in fact, of almost one-third of the total vote. It is not possible, of course, to allege that coffee-table talk and bar-room persuasion were entirely responsible for the 1953 climate. Whatever the cause of the change of heart, mind or tactics, when the vote was taken on November 3, in the plenary session of the Assembly, 12 of the Latin-American Republics voted against the resolution. Only 5 voted in favour of it, while 2 abstained.<sup>14</sup> Just one year earlier, 17 Latin-American Republics had voted for the Moroccan resolution, and not a single one against it. Among the other delegations rejecting it were those of the U.S.A. and the colonialist Powers. Among those in favour were, for the first time, the Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The communist countries naturally voted

<sup>14</sup> United Nations Doc. A/2530, October 28, 1953.

against the Western Powers. What was surprising was that even nationalist China, which almost automatically voted against any resolution sponsored by the "red" bloc, supported Morocco. An analysis of the vote revealed that the defeated delegations voting for the resolution represented a far larger number of people than did the victorious ones.<sup>15</sup> In actual fact 32 votes were cast in favour of the Moroccans and only 22 against them (with 5 abstentions). But since, in the plenary session, a two-thirds majority is required, the resolution was defeated.

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The argument of the pro-French delegates was that any action implying criticism of France would worsen the situation, and provoke disturbances in Morocco. And, once again, the attitude of the great Western Powers was determined not so much by the Moroccan issue itself as by wider international considerations. Nothing must be done to weaken the Western alliance and the prospect of France's ratifying the E.D.C. agreement. The imperative need to maintain a solid front against communism was more compelling than the desirability of appeasing the Arab-Asian Bloc.

Most of the Arab-Asian delegates recognized the predicament in which their Western colleagues found themselves. They doubted, however, whether appeasement of France should be deemed of greater importance than the security of their own friendship. Everyone knew that both internationally and internally France was too weak to be able to turn her back on the Western camp, even if pressure should have been exerted to compel her to make concessions in Morocco. If, on the other hand, such pressure should be enough to drive France into the arms of communism, then any other disagreement with her allies might produce a similar effect.<sup>16</sup>

Great Britain, by the Franco-British Treaty of 1904, had renounced all interest in Morocco. But the U.S.A. was free to act more independently, never having acknowledged the Protectorate, and never having bound herself by treaty to respect France's Moroccan aspirations. Even within the U.S. delegation there were those who doubted whether, on the long-term view, the right policy had been adopted. Though the threat to the West came from the communist world and not from the Arab-Asian countries, both numerically and strategically these latter represented a factor of great importance in

<sup>15</sup> For full text of the resolution, see Appendix VIII.

<sup>16</sup> These views were expressed to the author, who attended the debates both in 1952 and 1953, by the leaders of most of the Arab-Asian delegations.

international affairs. To disregard their demands on behalf of Morocco year after year might further weaken their confidence in the West and, by that token, their willingness to align themselves whole-heartedly with the anti-communist States. The official American standpoint implied support for French colonialism, a support which appeared to be going against the grain of America's traditional regard for a fair deal. In fact, only a few weeks before the U.S. delegation had voted against "the right of the people of Morocco to free democratic political institutions" and to "complete self-determination", Mr. Foster Dulles, the head of the U.S. foreign service, said that "No peace can be enduring which repudiates the concept that governments should rest on free consent, or which denies to others the opportunity to embrace that concept".

It was left to Sir Zafrullah Khan to point out that the Assembly's vote amounted to a repudiation of the whole Charter of the United Nations. Sir Zafrullah's great political authority, matched by the strength of his spiritual convictions, made him one of the most respected figures in the Assembly. The occasion on which he made his criticism of the Assembly's attitude was an exceptional one. For on November 3, 1953, when Sir Zafrullah delivered his speech, the King and Queen of Greece were paying an official visit to the U.N., and the vast Assembly hall was packed with distinguished visitors. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan reminded the Assembly that even in international politics "certain spiritual principles could not be disregarded with impunity". "There is something very much higher than this Assembly which runs the universe," he said, addressing an audience unaccustomed to the more rarefied atmosphere of spirituality, yet listening to him with obvious respect. "If we put ourselves in accord with the will of the higher Being, we will act beneficently. If we do not, we must take the consequences. We should open the doors of hope to those peoples [Moroccans and Tunisians] in their frustration and despair, lest they open their hearts to counsels of despair and proceed to adopt desperate courses. We may congratulate ourselves that we have been of service to France in not passing any resolution on Morocco, and France may rejoice over it. If our lack of resoluteness merely amounts to stifling the urge of a people to attain its freedom, we are paving the way to violence. We are not here to say one thing and to go on enacting another. Believe me, nothing, however trivial in our eyes, occurs without producing its consequences—for good or ill."<sup>17</sup>

As we already know, Sir Zafrullah's warnings were borne out

<sup>17</sup> General Assembly, Official Records: Plenary Session, 455th Meeting, November 3, 1953.

by events in Morocco, where the "despair" of which he had spoken certainly "paved the way to violence".

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From the Moroccan point of view the negative vote of the Assembly was a setback, yet the pro-Moroccan elements in the U.N. considered that the debates had not been without value. The nationalist reaction was expressed in a press statement made by the Secretary General of the Istiqlal, who attended the debates in 1952 and 1953. "The Moroccan people," he said, "knew full well that the U.N. was not a tribunal with executive powers but merely a platform where the world's opinion on international affairs could be formulated. Thanks to the debates in the U.N. the world has been made aware of our claims for independence and of the injustices of French colonialism in North Africa. Our chief gain in the U.N. is the world's awareness of the truth. Nations representing more than two-thirds of the world's population have supported our cause in the U.N."<sup>18</sup>

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Again in 1954, fourteen nations asked the General Assembly to consider the Moroccan question, adding the observation that "All large cities [in Morocco] are under military occupation and each city ward is cut off from the rest of the world for a period of about three weeks to allow free scope for atrocities. Morocco has been transformed into a concentration camp, and the inhabitants are subjected to indescribable tortures. . . . Repression and violence . . . in the face of strong nationalist resistance . . . have created a situation referred to by the London *Times* as 'a state of anarchy'."<sup>19</sup>

Morocco's sponsors put forward a resolution that even their opponents regarded as very mild. It was submitted to the Assembly by the Syrian delegate, Ahmed Shukairy, and merely recommended that "negotiations take place between the true representatives of the Moroccan people and the government of France for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter".<sup>20</sup> The subsequent Moroccan debates were completely dominated by the improving situation in Tunisia to which the government of M. Mendès-France had promised self-government. Most of the delegates believed that the French Premier would repeat in Morocco

<sup>18</sup> *Free Morocco*, op. cit., December 25, 1953, No. 8.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Doc. A/2682, July 29, 1954, p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Doc. A/C.1/L.122, December 10, 1954.

the Tunisian experiment. The sentiments of the Assembly were expressed by Dr. Charles Malik, the delegate from Lebanon, who stated: "Things are moving in Tunisia, and in fairness one must give the French government time to get around to Morocco." He was sure that some progress would be made next year, and he was not prepared to "cast stones" at the French government until it had been given a fair chance.<sup>21</sup> Precisely the same view was expressed by the American delegate, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, who said that his country was "strongly impressed by the sincerity and the ingenuity of M. Mendès-France and the progress achieved in Tunisia".

Realizing that in the prevailing atmosphere the original resolution would be defeated, the delegates of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, decided to withdraw that resolution and to replace it by a comparatively unconstructive one that merely stated, "The General Assembly, having examined the Moroccan question, noting that some delegations declared that negotiations between France and Morocco will be initiated regarding this question, decides to postpone for the time being further consideration of the item".<sup>22</sup> This resolution was adopted, on December 13, by 39 votes to 15 with 4 abstentions.<sup>23</sup>

Since none of the hoped-for negotiations between France and Morocco took place, and the situation in the latter country was worsening from day to day, on July 29, 1955, the 14 countries of the African-Asian Bloc again requested the Secretary General of the U.N. to place the Moroccan question on the agenda. But by the time this matter had fallen due for debate, the Moroccan situation had changed fundamentally, with the return of the legitimate Sultan; and the demand for a debate was withdrawn unanimously.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.* Press Release GA/PS/672, December 13, 1954.

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> It is interesting to compare the U.N. resolution with the one adopted unanimously in April 1955 by the twenty-nine Asian-African nations represented at the Conference of Bandung in Indonesia. This ran: "In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa, and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declares its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence, and urges the French government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay."



## TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

THE Morocco of 1954 presented a picture that was not particularly reassuring. Acts of political violence followed one another with sickening regularity. No native reputed to be "pro-French" could be certain of seeing another day; no French settler living on the land some distance from a town dared to move about unarmed; the boycott of French goods was gaining momentum; acts of sabotage were a regular occurrence. Though the Istiqlal leaders were in jail or in exile, and the nationalist movement was supposed to have ceased to exist, a clandestine nationalist organization was more active than ever. It distributed printed tracts in secret; it despatched warnings to personalities considered to be anti-nationalist; it ordered merchants to close their shops on specific occasions or workmen to strike on certain days; it was sufficiently influential even to be obeyed by the big native importers at Casablanca who were given orders, on a given day, to stop all further imports of goods coming from France.<sup>1</sup> In the first few days of August, acts of violence at Port-Lyautey, Petitjean and Fez cost a further 76 lives, of which 8 were French. "Individual terrorist attacks continue to be an almost daily occurrence," wrote the London *Times* on September 30. And as a special correspondent of the *Wall Street Journal* in New York pointed out in a despatch from Morocco, violent nationalism proved far more popular with the natives than its more peaceful predecessor had ever been. "Only since the party recently started to resort to organized terrorism in a big way," he wrote, "has it developed a broad popular base."<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, the predictions of those who claimed that Spain's "new" policy in her Moroccan zone might enable gun-runners to smuggle arms into the French zone, were proved right. Throughout the summer of 1954 there were rumours that some of the arms used by the "terrorists" came from the Spanish zone, but there was no proof of that fact. Then, in October, newspapers reported that the French authorities had caught a few Moroccans crossing from the Spanish into the French zone, their horses laden with arms

<sup>1</sup> *Le Monde*, September 14, 1954.

<sup>2</sup> August 31, 1954.

and ammunition. They were alleged to have admitted that they were not the only ones; that many, in fact, had for some time past been engaged in that martial trade.

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Two important events occurred in the course of the year, and of each of these far-reaching consequences were expected. In Paris, the right-wing cabinet of M. Laniel had made room for the government of M. Mendès-France, a "progressive", well known for his anti-colonialist views; and, at Rabat, General Guillaume was replaced by M. Francis Lacoste. Unlike his predecessor, M. Lacoste was not a soldier but a career diplomat of wide experience. He had served at the French Embassy in Washington, and for several years had been heading the French delegation to the United Nations. He was intimately acquainted with Moroccan affairs, for under General Juin he had occupied the second most important post in the French Administration at Rabat, as *Ministre et Délégué* of the French government. During his two years in that position he had gained the confidence of many Moroccans, and his liberal views and personal charm had endeared him to many progressive-minded elements in both the French and the Moroccan camps. Many observers wondered, however, whether he possessed the one qualification most urgently to be desired in a Resident General, namely strength backed by courage. As has been stated earlier, liberal views and gifts of diplomacy were insufficient assets for the Moroccan assignment unless they were supported by virtues of stronger fibre. Even at a time when the Moroccan situation was far less critical, neither the diplomatic talents of an Henri Ponsot nor the good intentions of an Eiric Labonne proved a sound enough background for success.

Nevertheless, optimists were hoping that the combination of a strong and progressive-minded government in Paris and a Resident of M. Lacoste's qualities would succeed in mastering the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Maghreb. By granting inner autonomy to Tunisia, the French Premier naturally raised the hopes of the Moroccans. But even had he wished to repeat his Tunisian move in Morocco, M. Mendès-France could ill afford to pursue a policy diametrically opposed to the interests of such Frenchmen and Moroccans as the events of August '53 had raised to the pinnacle of power, i.e. Thami el Glaoui and all those who made common cause with him. The one solution these feudalists were not prepared to consider was the "solution Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef", that is the return of the exiled Sultan. It was therefore not surprising that

M. Mendès-France should declare, on August 27, that he did not envisage that particular solution of the Moroccan crisis.

But in the matter of the Sultan's rights the Moroccans were tenacious. It was not so much the personality of Sidi Mohammed that inspired his people to such passionate obstinacy. Rather was it their country's sovereign rights which he legitimately embodied. It was not for us to say, at that date, whether they were well advised to hitch their wagon so exclusively to one particular star, and, in the confused situation, it would not have been easy to forecast whether they would continue to focus all their claims in the person of Mohammed ben Youssef. The indisputable fact is that throughout 1954 and most of the following year, with its dramatic culmination, they would listen to no other solution. It was no longer the Istiqlal alone—in so far as it could still make its voice heard—that insisted upon the return of Sidi Mohammed. Even the former splinter parties, once considered "pro-French" and more open to compromise than the Istiqlal, declared that his reinstatement was the first matter to be settled in any future French-Moroccan negotiations.<sup>4</sup> And finally, El Glaoui himself made the same declaration, leaving his supporters no alternative but to eat their words as he ate his.

The Moroccans insisted, then, that Sidi Mohammed was their only legitimate spokesman or "*interlocuteur*", and could be replaced by no one else should the French consent to open new discussions between the two countries. This point of view was stressed by a Moroccan who at one time was supposed to be an opponent of the Istiqlal, and who enjoyed great prestige in France, namely Lt.-Col. Bekkai, former Pasha of Sefrou. Upon the deposition of Sidi Mohammed he resigned from his post as a protest, and went to live as a private citizen in France. Having greatly distinguished himself during the Second World War, losing a limb in defence of the French cause, he could claim to speak in the name of his "pro-French" compatriots. Yet even he stated that "no Moroccan who is truly representative of public opinion in his country can act as second *interlocuteur* so long as the credentials of the first one [i.e. Sidi Mohammed] are disputed. I dare believe that the French government will realize how faithful the Moroccan nation is to its legitimate sovereign."<sup>5</sup>

The attitude of the nationalists was formulated by the Secretary of the Istiqlal, who deemed the following three preliminary conditions essential for a settlement of the crisis: the return of Sidi Mohammed; the bringing to trial of all Moroccans detained in

<sup>4</sup> *Carrefour*, August 18, 1954.

<sup>5</sup> *Le Monde*, September 7, 1954.

prison for alleged acts of terrorism; and revision of all legislation introduced in Morocco since August 20, 1953. The boundless trust of the nationalists in Sidi Mohammed was reaffirmed in their leader's promise that, should the Sultan be brought back, the nationalists would support, without reservation, any agreement reached between him and the French government. To meet French fears as to the fate of French interests in the Maghreb, the Secretary of the Istiqlal declared that the legitimate Sultan would give a solemn declaration safeguarding such interests, and that this guarantee should be underwritten by representatives of the Moroccan people by all native political parties, and by the entire body of the *oulema*.<sup>6</sup>

The dynastic question presented the French with a problem that seemed well-nigh insoluble. Considerations of prestige and fear of Glaoui and his adherents made it almost impossible for them to reinstate Sidi Mohammed. At the same time they were fully aware of the fact that general antagonism to the "puppet-Sultan", the hapless Moulay Arafa, was at the back of the terrorism and the growing tension. All efforts to increase the old man's popularity had failed. Fully aware of the sentiments he inspired in the population, the unfortunate man lived in constant fear, and refused to leave his palace.<sup>7</sup> It was common knowledge that the authorities would have been only too glad to rid themselves of that royal homunculus of their own making; but the question of his successor seemed beyond solution. Throughout the spring and summer of 1954, the French were said to be making efforts to find a generally acceptable candidate for the throne,<sup>8</sup> and to be considering Sidi Mohammed's youngest son, Prince Abdallah. But nothing came of all this heart-searching. Another solution that appeared to be in the offing consisted of a replacement of Moulay Arafa by a temporary Regency Council on which the various native factions were to be represented.

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In view of the unequivocal attitude of the natives in regard to the dynastic question, the efforts of the Resident General inevitably assumed an academic air. In his speech of August 27 M. Mendès-France had given an outline of the proposed reforms, and on September 20 M. Lacoste laid a detailed programme of these reforms before the Moroccan people. First of all he warned against the growing dangers of the prevailing terrorism and anti-terrorism, that is, terrorist acts by French settlers who had taken the law into their

<sup>6</sup> *The Times*, August 21, 1954.

<sup>7</sup> *Carrefour*, August 18, 1954.

<sup>8</sup> *Observer*, London, September 29, 1954.

own hands.<sup>9</sup> The projected changes were to be of two different kinds: those that could be introduced immediately by the Protectorate authorities, and others that would follow later, only after deliberations with the Moroccans. Among the former were the raising of the natives' standard of living; a wider distribution of labour; intensification of the development of local (small-scale) industries; the raising of minimum wages for agricultural labourers; the lowering of the price of certain products essential to farming. Natives were to be permitted to form their own trade unions and they were to be employed in larger numbers in the Administration. Innovations of a purely political nature were to be discussed later—to begin with, by a special Franco-Moroccan council for the study of reforms.<sup>10</sup>

Evidently conscious of the fact that the proposed political reforms could not be discussed with feudalists alone, the Resident speeded up the work of the magistrates who for twenty months had been examining the charges against the Istiqlal members imprisoned since December 1952. As has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, the subsequent examination revealed that the charges were unfounded, and the leading nationalists could no longer be kept in jail. Among those set at liberty were Ahmed Lyazidi, former President of the Chamber of Commerce at Rabat, Ahmed Bennani, a judge and former member of the Sultan's Imperial Cabinet, Abderrahman Harishi, a professor at the Karaouine University, and Mehdi Ben Barka, one of the Istiqlal's most fiery spirits, who had spent four years in solitary confinement without a charge having been made against him.<sup>11</sup> The Resident was hoping to find among these ex-prisoners the requisite *interlocuteurs* for his proposed council of reforms. But, as *Le Monde* pointed out,<sup>12</sup> "would their release facilitate the Resident General's task? This is still a question without an answer. For a large section [of these ex-prisoners] considers the dynastic problem as primordial, and demands its solution." So things were where they had been before the release of the prisoners:

<sup>9</sup> This terrorism was originally directed only against Moorish nationalists. But in the course of 1954 Frenchmen whose conciliatory attitude towards nationalism was resented by the colonialists also fell victim to it. Thus, in October, the settlers tried to murder the Deputy, Pierre Clostermann, France's leading fighter pilot in the Second World War, a national hero, and a member of the French Assembly in Paris, well known for his pro-Moroccan views and his earlier association with Mohammed ben Youssef. According to M. Clostermann, the bomb-attack upon his home at Anfa, near Casablanca, was the work of "French anti-terrorists". This being so, he demanded that the government undertake "an energetic action against the French newspapers and organs that publish incitements to murder". (*Le Monde*, October 29, 1954.)

<sup>10</sup> *Le Monde*, September 21, 1954.

<sup>11</sup> *Le Monde*, October 7, 1954.

<sup>12</sup> September 28, 1954.

on the one hand stood a proposal of reforms independent of the dynastic question, on the other hand, a refusal to discuss reforms without a return of Sidi Mohammed, the "only legitimate interlocuteur".

In view of past experiences, could there be a hope that the stalemate would really be broken? As M. André La Fond, Secretary of the French Organization of Labour, *Force Ouvrière*, wrote a year later: "The fact remains that, despite much talk of political reforms, which are the object of many reports and studies, comments and discussions, the plans remain on paper. This is one of the persistent mistakes that can prove fatal."<sup>13</sup> It was the very situation which, in earlier years, Lyautey had been so anxious to avoid, that is to say, a concentration on one set of problems (chiefly economic) to the detriment of difficulties and impasses in other spheres.

By the autumn of 1954, Morocco had ceased to be merely a French responsibility. Whatever the opinions of legal experts and the wrangles of diplomats, events had outstripped them, as they had outdated the notion that Morocco was the exclusive concern of France or that France's main objectives in Morocco were the well-being and advancement of the natives.<sup>14</sup> It was only towards the end of 1954 that the fallacy of such conceptions was brought home so forcibly that they were abandoned even by those who had accepted them as axiomatic. Ironically enough, that revelation was brought about, not by events in Morocco, but by unrest in France's oldest North African possession, Algeria, "a part of metropolitan France". To most French people, and to the world at large, the insurrection that blew up, in early November 1954, in the Constantine district of Algeria, came as a complete surprise; but to those better versed in North African affairs it was a foreseeable dénouement. Official propaganda always denied that there was any "independence" movement of consequence in Algeria. When, in November 1954,

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in *Free Morocco*, June 1955.

<sup>14</sup> While the doleful events in Morocco in 1954 and 1955 had become sufficiently well known in France to induce the government to adopt a more realistic note in its pronouncements designed for home consumption, official statements destined for foreign countries kept repeating the familiar tune. Thus, early in 1955, when the boycott of French goods was universal throughout Morocco, and not a day passed without acts of sabotage and political murder, the Residency General in Rabat stated in the columns of the *New York Times* (January 4) that "Rumours of a crisis have been passed around; but just a glance at trade figures for the last two years is enough to disprove the rumour". In June of the same year, M. Pierre July, Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, declared in an interview published by *France-Etats Unis*: "It is regrettable that there still should exist Americans who refuse to understand France's policies in North Africa. . . . France has the duty to maintain peace there and to establish the rule of security. . . . I appeal to our American friends to try to understand our action in Africa in that spirit of solidarity that our reciprocal undertakings demand."

that movement became militant, some sections of the press still tried to dismiss the agitation as a sporadic outburst of some unco-ordinated "terrorist" groups. These "terrorists" had, however, been in existence for many years, organized in a very large nationalist movement, supported not only within Algeria itself, but also by the majority of Algerian workmen and students living in France. This movement tended to be more extreme than were the nationalist groups in either Morocco or Tunisia. Though often suppressed and disbanded by the authorities, it always re-emerged with added strength and popularity.

Nationalism in Algeria is not our concern. But it has one aspect which is relevant to the Moroccan situation, and which the Constantine rising brought into the full light of day, namely the close relation between North African nationalism and the Arab world in general, and Egypt in particular. The press of the West tried to explain away Egypt's support as a more or less personal adventure of the military *junta* in Egypt and, especially of Lt.-Col. Nasser, the young Prime Minister, who was said to have embarked thereon in order to satisfy some of the more fanatical elements within his own country, particularly within the ranks of the Muslim League. The reader may, however, remember that as early as 1951, when Nasser was still an unknown junior officer and King Farouk was on Egypt's throne, it was the Foreign Minister of Egypt who in the name of the Arab League requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to place the Moroccan question on the Assembly's agenda. Even since then Egypt has been one of Morocco's (and Tunisia's) staunchest supporters both inside and outside the U.N., irrespective of whether the Egyptian State has had King Farouk, General Neguib or the young Nasser at its head.

The reader will also remember that the entire Arab League proclaimed itself champion of Moroccan nationalism, Egypt being merely one of its most vocal sponsors. Thus Egypt's championship of North African nationalism in the autumn of 1954 was nothing new. Its sole novelty was its assumption of a more militant approach. Its chief instrument was "The Voice of the Arabs", an important department of Radio Cairo which made daily broadcasts to North Africa. Directed by nationalist exiles from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the "Voice" became the repository and exponent of all the grudges and hatreds that North African nationalism had accumulated in the course of years. These exiles formed a heterogeneous collection ranging from experienced patriots and respected politicians to fanatical adventurers, semi-educated hot-heads and ambitious youths only too eager to fish in troubled waters. The only thing they all had in common was their nationalism, at

varying stages of maturity, and their opposition to France. But it was the latter rather than the former that led to their most exuberant declarations in front of the microphone. They incited their compatriots in North Africa to embark on deeds of violence, although fully aware of the fact that such ventures would be pitilessly crushed by the overwhelming force of French arms. The attitude of their Arab sponsors was summed up in a declaration by the Egyptian Prime Minister who said, "Everything that concerns one Arab nation is felt strongly by all Arab nations. That is why these nations cannot remain indifferent to the present developments in North Africa."<sup>15</sup>

If we are to understand the attitude of the men behind "The Voice of the Arabs", we must bear in mind the words of Ahmed Balafrej after the Moroccans' defeat in the U.N.<sup>16</sup> The nationalists envisaged no drastic measure (which, as they knew, was beyond the means of the Assembly), but hoped that the *démarches* in the U.N. meetings would fix the attention of the whole world upon their problem. The "Voice" in Cairo pursued a similar aim, but with a colder realism, for since gun-fire and corpses speak more eloquently than words, Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians were prevailed upon, by them, to take up arms. Whatever we may think of the wisdom of such a policy, and however strongly some felt impelled to condemn it as callous, events have proved the instigators of that policy to be right in their assessment of what constitutes effective opposition. Twenty years of nationalist propaganda in Algeria had not produced one-tenth of the repercussions caused by the Constantine rising. Scores of notes, protests and proclamations by the Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef and the nationalists in Morocco had hardly stirred a ripple, whereas the post-1953 terrorism of Moorish nationalists almost daily "made the headlines" in the world's press. Events, unfortunately, had at last proved that the "methods of despair" of which Sir Zafrullah Khan had warned the U.N., were more potent than peaceful diplomacy.

Just as, in 1954, the Tunisian nationalists maintained that, had there been no anti-French terrorism in their country in the preceding years, Tunisia would not have obtained self-government in 1955, so, in 1955, the Moroccans claimed that the more realistic policies of M. Edgar Faure and M. Grandval were the direct result of similar disturbances in Morocco after 1953.

By lending such vigorous support to North African nationalism, Egypt (and, less directly, most of the Arab States) removed that nationalism from a purely French orbit, and made of it a highly

<sup>15</sup> *Le Monde*, November 12, 1954.

<sup>16</sup> See page 357.



important factor in the relations between the world of Islam and the West. This, of course, rendered far more arduous the French government's task of finding a way out of the Moroccan impasse.

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No one doubted the goodwill of the French Premier, M. Mendès-France. But even the resourceful and energetic Mendès-France could not undo overnight the damage wrought during the previous years. In spite of his good intentions, he was a prisoner of the past. In November 1954, five months after he had been in power, the group *Conscience française*, consisting of those French residents in Morocco who, earlier in the same year, had sent a petition to the French President,<sup>17</sup> addressed to him an open letter in which it described the situation then prevailing in Morocco as follows: "On the social plane, misery continues. The industrial worker still earns 51 fr. 70 per hour;<sup>18</sup> unemployment is alarming. On the political plane, what value can be attached to the present efforts, so long as no guarantees whatever are given to the Moroccans? Arrest and deportations go on, and all too frequently the police do not know the difference between repression and legitimate safeguards. The appearance of a counter-terrorism *qui se dit français* and which, so far, has been enjoying a strange impunity, has raised passions to danger level. Certain elements of the French colony and the police, certain local governors and district officers, constitute the gravest obstacle to a constructive policy. This is indeed an authentic, well-organized rebellion, a *bled es siba* of a new kind. Those who are organizing this new rebellion are the same who have already contributed to the creation of the dynastic question. . . . Time passes; but it does not work for us. It would be regrettable if you [Mr. Prime Minister] were to be blamed for yesterday's errors and made responsible for the consequences of the already-committed crime."<sup>19</sup>

Emboldened by the apparent inactivity of the authorities, the French anti-terrorists increased their activities, and in June 1955 murdered M. Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreil, the owner and publisher of *Maroc-Presse*, the single French newspaper in Morocco that exposed the French extremists, while preaching a policy of goodwill towards the natives. A prominent member of France's financial aristocracy, the victim had been conferring, only twenty-four hours earlier, with the new French Premier, M. Edgar Faure. "As no other incident had done, the murder shocked France into a sense of

<sup>17</sup> See page 322.

<sup>18</sup> Just over one shilling or fifteen American cents.

<sup>19</sup> *Le Monde*, November 17, 1954.

urgency." At last the French were beginning to realize that French counter-terrorists were "operating with the indulgence and sometimes co-operation of the local French police. They were manned by hired killers imported from France, professional thugs, sometimes ex-policemen. The counter-terrorists operated with the obvious sympathy of diehard *colon* organizations."<sup>20</sup> When, at last, the first anti-terrorist was arrested, it was found that he was the "former head of the Casablanca police unit charged with combating Arab terrorism, one-time Chief Police Inspector Jean Delrieu".<sup>21</sup>

No longer were the nationalists the only ones to express doubts as to the integrity of the French Administration in Morocco. "While waiting for these murderers to be brought to justice," wrote M. Charles Cellier, *maître des requêtes honoraire au Conseil d'Etat*, "we refuse to believe that French authority in Morocco has sunk so low as to guarantee their impunity."<sup>22</sup> And M. Mendès-France, the ex-Prime Minister, admitted that the French Administration in Morocco "has almost always ignored liberal Frenchmen to the extent of denying them physical protection". In the past, the Administration had persistently claimed that only the colonialists represented French opinion in Morocco. It has even "treated them with favouritism" against the liberal-minded elements. At last, "Frenchmen in France should know and remember that these habitual spokesmen do not really represent the unanimous voice of the French community in Morocco".<sup>23</sup> "Those responsible [for the murder]," wrote Jean Rous in *Franc-Tireur*, "belong to the same gang of North African colonialism which, since the assassination of Ferhat Hashed [the Tunisian trade union leader] has been acting with ever-increasing impudence, and with total impunity, as a police State within a State."<sup>24</sup>

The Casablanca branch of the French Socialist Party issued a statement pointing out that, although Moroccan terrorists are sometimes arrested and condemned, no one of the counter-terrorist murderers has ever been disturbed; "it is as though these unhappy people were benefiting from occult protection". In tolerating this discrimination, "the government is assuming a heavy responsibility".<sup>25</sup>

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The extreme colonialist press alone went on reiterating its thesis laid down by its chief exponent, *La Vie Marocaine* on January 9. According to that thesis only the progressive French elements

<sup>20</sup> *Time*, New York, June 27, 1955.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Le Monde*, June 14, 1955.

<sup>23</sup> *L'Express*, Paris, June 18, 1955.

<sup>24</sup> June 18, 1955.

<sup>25</sup> *The Times*, London, June 14, 1955.

"emphasize counter-terrorism, and, contrary to all truth, proclaim that anti-terrorism enjoys the tacit support of the authorities on the spot". Yet even that press gradually began to change its tune. In the past, it would denounce any promise of reform as amounting to revolution, and would press for a maintenance of the *status quo*. Now, even *La Vigie Marocaine's* demand was that things had to change. On June 13 it wrote: "The best way to emerge from the era of crime and violence is to abandon '*immobilisme*'. What is called '*attentisme*', and which is really a lamentable lack of decision, must lead to a perpetuation of terrorism."

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On June 16, 1955, the French Cabinet decided to recall M. Lacoste. The lack of a constructive policy in Paris, the power of the colonialists, and the mounting violence of a native population driven to despair had made M. Lacoste's task impossible. Moreover, he was being accused of inability, or unwillingness, to bring French terrorists to justice.

On June 20, he was replaced by Ambassador Gilbert Grandval, head of the French diplomatic mission in the Saar. In the French Assembly, the Premier, M. Edgar Faure, announced that the new Resident General would base himself on the "true conception of the Protectorate" as defined in the Treaty of 1912, which, according to M. Faure, "precluded direct administration by the local French authorities". The government's new policy would be guided by the following principles: 1. the sanctity of French interests; 2. the progressive abolition of direct French administration; 3. the formation of the modern institutions to which Morocco aspires; 4. the development of an intimate French-Moroccan community.<sup>26</sup>

M. Grandval, completely new to Morocco, and unaffected by the spirit of North African colonialism, instantly dismissed most of the top-ranking French officials, the appointment of many of whom went back to the days of the Vichy régime. Within a week of his arrival at Rabat, he succeeded in having some of the French anti-terrorists arrested. Most of them were members of the French police, both high-ranking and of lower grades.<sup>27</sup> If M. Grandval's predecessors tried to keep alive the fiction that all Moroccan troubles were due to native nationalists, the new Resident General himself almost became the victim of a terrorism that was not of native manufacture. A particularly callous native bomb assault at Casablanca

<sup>26</sup> The *New York Times*, June 22, 1955.

<sup>27</sup> *Le Monde*, June 24, 1955.

on July 14, which caused the death of a number of innocent French and Moroccans, provoked events that shook even some of the colonialist circle. "Large crowds of Europeans descended upon the native quarters of Casablanca, pillaging and burning Moroccan shops and houses, and killing natives. In front of the war memorial [the French] Admiral, Le Fluch, addressed the crowds, inciting them against the Resident General. . . . The crowds broke into cries, 'Grandval to the gallows!' . . . Then, for a quarter of an hour, they exclaimed, 'Glaoui, Glaoui!' . . . In the rue de Strasbourg, they tried to burn Moroccan and Jewish shops. . . . By 10 p.m. Casablanca was in the hands of a hostile crowd."<sup>28</sup> When, two days later, M. Grandval entered the church to attend the funeral service of the French bomb victims, members of the French War Veterans Association tried to prevent him from proceeding further. After the service, he tried to reach his car and his fellow-countrymen "spat in his face, tried to manhandle him, called him 'traitor' and 'murderer'. They tore off one of his epaulettes."<sup>29</sup>

What were the French police doing during the events of the 14th and 16th? Their attitude on both occasions "showed the incredible complicity of the police with the insurrectionaries", wrote the eye-witness correspondent of *Le Monde*. "The police on the spot did absolutely nothing to prevent the crowd from engulfing the Resident General. We saw one of them laugh; a police *commissaire* applauded."<sup>30</sup> The same day *Le Monde* published the following notice: "The principal police commissioner Vergnolle has been suspended from his functions. He is held responsible for the attitude of the police during the European manifestations on Friday. His removal has equally been merited by his attitude during the funeral service of the recent bomb victims."

Unlike his predecessors, M. Grandval did not identify himself with the colonialist bloc and appeared to make genuine efforts to dispense justice impartially, and to restore peace in a country heading rapidly towards chaos. But he had to fight on two fronts, and the colonialists did not make his task any easier.<sup>31</sup> A few days after the events of July 14, one section of the colonialists, the *Organisation de défense antiterroriste*, circulated tracts with the following

<sup>28</sup> *Le Monde*, July 17 and 18, 1955.

<sup>29</sup> Associated Press, quoted by *Le Monde*, July 19, 1955.

<sup>30</sup> July 19, 1955.

<sup>31</sup> "He [M. Grandval] stands for the conviction in France that colonialism is obsolete, and that it is colonialism that French interests have been practising in Morocco under the name of a protectorate. French 'colonists' in Morocco have quickly sensed what this means to their privileged position there. Many of them would doubtless be glad to see the new Resident General and his policies discredited before they can even be tried." From an editorial in *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 1955.

words: "The Jewish renegade Hirsch-Ollendorf, known as 'Grandval', an accomplice of the honourable Abramovitch, known as 'Mendès-France', has arrived to sell Morocco as they have already sold Tunisia. You have already given them a foretaste of the irresistible force of an indignant people. We ask you to be prepared for our first appeal in order, if necessary, to liberate by force our second home land. Some of those responsible will have to pay [for their crimes] without much delay."<sup>32</sup>

The events of July seemed to confirm the old nationalist thesis—expressed, in more guarded language, by M. Robert Schuman himself—that the true rulers of Morocco were neither the French government nor the Resident General, but an occult alliance of colonialists, lobbyists, big business and the local police. Jules-Albert Jaeger described this alliance as one composed "partly by the rich, partly by the Administration, and partly by the police. All the high officials," he wrote, "who, during the last three years, have not bowed before that camarilla, have recognized its power and its utter lack of scruples, and have prophesied that, sooner or later, there will be a clash between the forces representing legality and those representing the actual power. . . . The former governor of Casablanca, M. Boniface, sent into retirement [in 1953], is said to be more powerful than the Resident General himself. . . . Representatives of capitalism and plutocracy make use, without scruples and with a sadistic callousness, of the lowest possible rabble and a police force partly misdirected and partly rotten. Their sole aim is the maintenance of their long-standing power. . . . The events in Casablanca were not spontaneous. Men with overwhelming local responsibilities have unleashed the tempest. There is no other way of re-establishing order but to do away with a discredited police."<sup>33</sup>

Even M. Grandval, the only Resident General regarded as "strong" and as having constructive ideas based on the realities of the situation and not on wishdreams, did not prove a match for the colonialists. Realizing that the presence of Ben Arafa on the throne, and the absence of Mohammed ben Youssef, were at the heart of the troubles, he pressed the French government for a deposition of the former and a return (at least to France) of the latter.<sup>34</sup> The second anniversary of the legitimate Sultan's deposition was approaching, and M. Grandval knew that, should the perennial *immobilisme* continue, the situation might become explosive on August 20. But rather than follow his advice, M. Faure, afraid that he might lose the support of the right wing of his Cabinet, decided

<sup>32</sup> *Le Monde*, July 21, 1955.

<sup>33</sup> *Le Monde*, July 20, 1955.

<sup>34</sup> *The New York Times*, August 19, 1955.

to invite Ben Arafa to form a new and "representative" government. "Does one really believe in Paris," wrote *Franc-Tireur* (August 15), "that the Sultan could succeed? Everyone knows that the majority of the Moroccan people does not follow him. With the exception of Glaoui and his friends no one in Morocco would accept his invitation." On the same day Marcel Fourrier exclaimed in the columns of *Libération*, "Are we going to tolerate that Frenchmen should pay with their blood and their money for the frivolities and errors of right-wing politicians, anxious to cover up the dishonest dealings and the sordid machinations of business interests?" Even the dignified *Figaro* found it hard to conceal its disgust. "Everyone seemed agreed on the necessity of a rapid solution of the problem of the throne," it stated on that same day. "But in the evening papers one reads the parliamentary vocabulary, one belonging to another world, another reality perhaps (that is, if the government phantasms can be called realities) . . . one reads there about *prestige* at a time when the whole of Morocco is in flames."

Like so many "reforms" of recent years, Ben Arafa's "representative" government proved stillborn. Though the colonialists dismissed M. Grandval's forecasts as panic-mongering and nationalist propaganda (see *L'Aurore* for the first half of August), August 20 proves indeed a "Black Saturday" in Morocco's history.

Major outbreaks occurred in most parts of the Moroccan countryside as well as in Algeria. The most surprising, however, was the revolt of tens of thousands of Moroccan Berbers. For years the authorities had tried to keep alive the fiction of the pro-French and anti-nationalist sentiments of the Berbers. Yet it was they who descended, like lightning, upon the townlet of Oued Zem, close to the Middle Atlas—the traditional Berber stronghold—murdering every French man, woman or child they could lay hands on. The magnitude and horror of the killings made all earlier outbreaks by the "Arab" section of the population look like a picnic. "If the French had moved more quickly to meet the obvious nationalist threat and had reached a settlement in Morocco . . . this slaughter and all the grief and bitterness it entails might well have been avoided," wrote the *New York Times* in an editorial on the 23rd.

Among the new factors disclosed by the risings of August was the hitherto unimaginable participation of native women. In the past they had confined themselves to their personal, chiefly domestic duties, and had refrained from political activity. After the eviction of Sidi Mohammed in 1953, they began to realize that they had been duped by the anti-Sultan propaganda, one of its favourite accusations being that he had transgressed against the precepts of Islam by letting his daughters discard the veil and take an active

part in public life. Under the impact of events, they understood that Sidi Mohammed's reform had, in fact, been the first step on the path of emancipation of the Moroccan woman. More even than for their menfolk, the departed Sultan had become the women's national hero and martyr. In most of the risings of 1955 women marched in the front ranks of the demonstrators. It was they who incited the men to acts of ever greater courage and violence; it was they who brandished the red-and-green national banner; it was they who hurled the first stone at a French policeman. "They would insult their male companions who hesitated, and would spit their contempt into the face of cowards, inciting them to the holy war against the 'rumis' who supported the usurper Ben Arafa."<sup>35</sup> This attitude of the women represented a revolutionary departure from all traditions of Moroccan history. Examples of it were as frequent in the towns as in the *bled*, among the Arabs as among the Berbers. Though the Berber myth had been finally exploded, Paris seemed still unable to accept its demise. "When it is considered," wrote the *New York Times*, "that the Sultan is weak and unpopular and that the Pasha of Marrakesh, el Glaoui, has clearly been repudiated by his own Berber people, it is strange, indeed, to see the French holding back in their names."

Only a week earlier leading Berbers declared unequivocally that they considered themselves to be an intrinsic part of the Moroccan nation, and that Glaoui had no right to speak in their name. The four most important caids of the Middle Atlas addressed a telegram to the French Premier in which they stated: "Neither in the past nor in the present could there ever be any question of accepting the Pasha of Marrakesh as chief of the Berbers. These form a part of the whole: the Moroccan people. To deny this fact will only serve to create new illusions. In the Berber mountains the pasha is considered not merely as an agitator, but as an obstacle on the path of Franco-Moroccan friendship."<sup>36</sup> A few days later these caids were joined by other Berber chieftains who expressed themselves even more forcibly against Glaoui.

One very significant fact emerged from the outbreaks of August 20. Wherever the nationalists still maintained a skeleton organization and could make their voice heard, that is, mainly in the cities, the troubles were on a minor scale. In the mountain districts their "cells" had been smashed by the authorities, and the Istiqlal had lost most of its control over the populace. It was precisely there, at Oued Zem, Khenifra, and in the phosphate mines of Khouribga, that the despair of the people found its most savage expression.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *Le Monde*, September 9, 1955.

<sup>37</sup> *Le Monde*, August 24, 1955.

<sup>36</sup> *Le Monde*, August 13, 1955.

In spite of all the warnings, Paris still hesitated. The Premier invited a number of Moroccan nationalists for consultations at Aix-les-Bains. The latter insisted that only an immediate deposition of ben Arafa, the return to France of Sidi Mohammed, the establishment of a representative Throne Council, and the formation of a national government approved by Sidi Mohammed (whom the nationalists still considered as their only legitimate sovereign) could pacify the country. Rather than accept these suggestions, M. Faure dismissed M. Grandval<sup>38</sup> and replaced him by General Boyer de Latour, Resident General in Tunisia. In the words of *Time*,<sup>39</sup> he "agreed to sack Grandval in return for the support of his right wing". And who were the men sufficiently powerful to force the Premier into submission? The answer had been provided several weeks earlier by *Libération*, which carried this comment on August 12: "M. Faure has already compromised far too much with the reactionaries of his parliamentary majority and with the famous Moroccan 'lobby' whose real chiefs are Bidault, Juin, Boussac [the wealthy industrialist and racehorse owner] and Glaoui. . . . These men do their best to render the Moroccan situation inextricable." According to most French newspapers not subservient to the colonialists, the lobby which in 1953 had managed the deposition of Mohammed V, and which, in February 1955, brought about the downfall of Mendès-France, triumphed once again. But as *Time* observed on September 5, "beyond the nasty whirlpools of French politics, beyond the *colons'* prejudice . . . loom forces that will be impervious to manœuvres that gratify politics but ignore realities".

One of these realities was that even those who had previously upheld the thesis that Morocco was a "purely French domestic" concern, now admitted that Morocco had become a world problem. While some of France's traditional friends still blamed the Moroccans or their supporters in the Arab world, claiming that the continuous revolts were not really "home-made" but instigated from abroad, in August 1955, prevailing international opinion took the opposite view. The German Christian-Democratic *General Anzeiger* of Bonn wrote: "France refuses to understand the true state of mind of the [North African] populations. Her policy is outmoded and caused her regularly to lose ground in her sphere of influence." According to the London *Tribune*: "In North Africa, colonialism evokes hatred and violence. . . . Will the French understand? Or will they oppose butchery by butchery?" The *New York Herald Tribune* expressed surprise at the Moroccans'

<sup>38</sup> The London *Economist* of September 10, 1955, described that dismissal as "ignoble".

<sup>39</sup> *Time*, September 5, 1955.



"unimaginable and inexplicable hatred of the French". And on the following day, August 28, it added, "An energetic decision taken by the French government but a few days earlier might have stabilized the situation for a generation. The paralysis that affects the French political system is decidedly an expensive luxury."

The French colonialists were not the only ones who supported the contention that France had "*une mission civilisatrice*" in North Africa and that she was, in fact, the champion of European progress in a backward continent. Among the by no means rare defenders of that thesis we find the Swiss daily *Die Tat* of Zurich, which wrote on August 31: "The attack in North Africa is directed not only against the French but against 'Europeans'. It is against them in general that hate raises its head. . . . Thus it is Europe as a whole that ought to react. Europe must know that it cannot permit itself to lose North Africa. Europe must not leave the task of defending Europe to France alone. . . . This is the moment to prove that European unity is a fact."

As was only to be expected, the Moroccan events produced the strongest reaction in Asia. In Syria, the mosques resounded with prayers on behalf of the victims of "French oppression". In Pakistan, anti-French processions filled the cities, and at Karachi the Governor General assured them of his own and the government's solidarity. The Foreign Minister of Thailand promised to support steps to be taken by the Arab-Asian Bloc against France's policy in North Africa. Parliament in Burma adopted a unanimous resolution condemning French policies in Morocco.<sup>40</sup>

The French Premier promised solemnly that the crisis would be solved by September 12. The Moroccan nationalists who, for several days, had held discussion with him and his four leading colleagues at Aix-les-Bains, were, on the whole, sympathetic to his proposals; but the 12th came, and nothing happened. M. Grandval had been sacrificed but Ben Arafa still occupied the throne at Rabat, claiming that "God alone" could relieve him from his duties. Yet it was generally known that the hapless ruler was completely without power or influence. However, the colonialists stood behind him, and, for the moment, their influence proved stronger than that of M. Faure, the Premier. The seed of disruption was, in fact, planted within the Cabinet itself. The Defence Minister, General Koenig, a spokesman of the colonialists, made public his disagreement with the Premier, without, however, accepting the tradition compelling resignation in such circumstances.

While the Premier was doing his best to convince ben Arafa to step down voluntarily from his throne, the chairman of the French

<sup>40</sup> *Le Monde*, August 28-29, 1955.

Assembly's Defence Commission, Pierre Montel, flew to Rabat to persuade ben Arafa not to listen to M. Faure or the Resident General and not to vacate the throne.<sup>41</sup> "What governmental authority is there left," lamented M. Mendès-France, former Prime Minister, in a speech at Niort, "when high officials and soldiers of the very highest rank follow their own policy, which is not always that of the government?"<sup>42</sup>

"It is seldom," added the *Daily Telegraph*, "that the chaos which passes in France for Cabinet responsibility has been so disconcertingly exposed."<sup>43</sup> This situation was made inevitable both by the precarious balance of power in the French Assembly (and thus, within successive French governments), and by the very great power of the lobbies representing colonial interests.

The colonial attitude to disorder was formulated by one of their leading spokesmen, General Rime-Bruneau, President of *Présence Française* (in Tunisia) in an official declaration. He stated therein: "The horrors [of August 20] are the direct result of the French government's policy which, in spite of all warnings, wanted to deal with assassins, and to continue negotiating with them at Aix-les-Bains. We address our final protest to the French government, to France and to the world. The extremists of North Africa, responsible for all the blood that has flowed, have shown by their savagery that they are not worthy to govern themselves or even to be treated as human beings. They are beasts to be destroyed. . . . They must be chastised in such a way that the children of their children will still shudder in fifty years' time. . . . We demand that all dealings with the murderers should cease."<sup>44</sup>

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The military aspect of the events in 1955 should not be overlooked. By the war in Indo-China France had been, militarily, almost bled white. Yet while the remnants of her troops were returning from the Indo-Chinese battle-fronts, hoping to get back to civilian life, they would find themselves switched over to North Africa with very little warning. Even in the early years of the Protectorate when Lyautey had the task of pacifying an inimical Morocco, France never poured so many troops into Morocco as she did in the summer of 1955. "Since the beginning of September almost 200,000 men have had their release deferred or have been called to the colours. . . . It

<sup>41</sup> *Le Monde*, September 24, 25, 26, 1955.

<sup>42</sup> *Le Monde*, October 4, 1955.

<sup>43</sup> *Daily Telegraph*, September 14, 1955.

<sup>44</sup> *Le Monde*, September 4-5, 1955.

is a secret mobilization for a war which no one has the courage to call by such a name," wrote the Paris correspondent of the *New Statesman and Nation* on September 17. Yet, as he went on, "newspapers of all political colours have been bombarded with letters of protest, and with the inevitable question of the young reservists: 'Why do we have to go?' . . . A state of discontent, which is becoming more and more difficult to contain, prevails in every military establishment. Last Sunday, several hundred men who had been recalled refused to be sent to North Africa, and an ugly fracas took place between them and the police. . . . The military situation in Morocco and Algeria has degenerated, in recent weeks, to the point where to continue the policy of strength—so dear to the dyed-in-the-wool settler—would require the despatch to North Africa of the whole French army."

The sigh of relief throughout France that greeted the end of the Indo-Chinese war had also been very audible in NATO headquarters. But that relief was evidently only short-lived, and Morocco, besides having become politically an international problem, was also rapidly developing into one affecting both Western defences and the spirit of the French army.

The situation demanded rapid and drastic solution. Yet increasing dissension within the French Cabinet made such a solution more and more unattainable. This situation was summarized by *Stocks et Marchés*, a Casablanca newspaper dedicated to economic affairs, in the following words: "For the last three months, at sunrise the announcement has been made that the new day was to be decisive and that definite measures were to be taken. At sunset nothing further would be said, and at nightfall it would be announced that an agreement had been reached and would be instantly put into effect. But on the following morning everyone realized that a new start had to be made. Is this game going to last much longer? The government is losing its authority and France its prestige, while in Morocco the economic crisis grows ever more menacing."<sup>45</sup>

Ever since the August talks at Aix-les-Bains the French Cabinet was committed to a deposition of ben Arafa and his replacement by a Regency Council. But, for the time being, the opposing groups proved stronger than the Premier. "The right-wing groups," wrote the London *Times* on September 15, "no longer trouble to conceal their links both with the right-wing settlers' groups in Morocco and with the entourage of the Sultan himself, whose flagging resistance is reported to be encouraged afresh by daily telephone calls from Paris." And on September 27, the dispassionate *Figaro* added:

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in *Le Monde*, September 21, 1955.

"Nothing uttered by the Sultan Arafa, whether in writing or by word of mouth, comes from him. His utterances are manufactured either in Paris or in Rabat; not, however, in some obscure offices, but by a kind of *junta* on the South American model, which prepares his plans, executes his orders and proclaims his dictates. This is subversion." For a change, the leaders of that "subversion" came not merely from among the *colons* and the lobbyists. French generals holding important posts in Morocco "proved an invaluable support for the colonial lobby. Conscious of a weak executive behind him, General Latour fell into line all the more readily with the body of military opinion, headed by Marshal Juin. . . . Once again a marshal was having the last word in France and the past of Alphonse Juin—France's only marshal—evoked memories of Vichy."<sup>46</sup>

Finally, however, M. Faure managed to impose the by no means unanimous will of his government upon the Resident General at Rabat, and, on October 1, the aged occupant of the Moroccan throne was put on a plane and despatched to the palace of his predecessor and uncle Moulay Abd el Aziz at Tangier, one that the French government had purchased for him a year earlier. But the government did not prove strong enough to keep its promise of replacing him by a Throne Council acceptable to the majority of the Moroccan people. The will of the lobby and the colonialists prevailed, and ben Arafa left the throne "in charge" [*"le soin de s'occuper des affaires relatives à la couronne"*<sup>47</sup>] of Abdallah ben Abdel Hafid, a cousin, one of the numerous sons of the late Sultan Moulay Hafid, who, up to that moment, had led an obscure existence. The natives responded by fairly widespread risings against the French authorities and by Berber attacks upon French outposts in the Middle Atlas and along the borders of the Rif country. It was significant that ever since the bloody events of August 20 the most vicious blows were being delivered by Berbers and not by Arabs.

The government in Paris, torn by inner discords, had not enough power to impose its will either upon the natives or the settlers.

A French army of almost a quarter of a million was hitting out more or less blindly against a few thousand guerrilla fighters who, after delivering their attack, would seem to be swallowed up by the brushwood and crevices of their mountains. The colonialists, on the other hand, managed to sabotage any governmental decision of fundamental reforms. It was thus not surprising that when, on October 15, the formation of a Council of the Throne was announced, its composition reflected neither the government's oft-

<sup>46</sup> *The Economist*, London, October 8, 1955.

<sup>47</sup> *Le Monde*, October 2 and 3, 1955.

repeated promises nor the supposed agreement arrived at by the government and the nationalists during the August talks at Aix-les-Bains.<sup>48</sup> Four instead of the promised three Regents were announced, and only one of them, Si Bekkai, represented (and these in their most moderate section) the nationalists. The other three were the Grand Vizier Mokhri, aged over 110, Mohammed ben Taibi Sbihi, the elderly Pasha of Sale who had held his post under both Mohammed ben Youssef and his successor, and "an obscure young caïd named Tahar Ouassou Loudyi" who appeared to represent no one but himself and his particular tribe.<sup>49</sup>

The new Council was instantly repudiated by the Istiqlal party, and native manifestations against it in the streets of Rabat indicated that the Moroccan people would have none of it.<sup>50</sup> The same antagonism was shown to Si Ben Slimane, the former Pasha of Fez, whom the Throne Council, with the backing of Paris, had chosen as the future Prime Minister of a "representative Moroccan government". Neither the people nor the Istiqlal would have any dealings with representatives appointed—directly or indirectly—by Paris, and not sanctioned formally by the exile in Madagascar.

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The insurrection of the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas and of the area adjoining the Rif mountains went on unabated, and there were many signs that Morocco was relapsing into a state of rebellion and chaos so similar to the disorder it had taken the French from 1912 till 1932 to suppress. It is always easier to create anarchy than order, and much of the country seemed to be developing into a new *bled es siba*. Ironically enough, however, this time the dissenting *bled* was rising not against the legitimate Sultan, but in order to restore him to his throne. But whatever its aim, the forces that moved it were of a disruptive nature: they pushed the clock back, and they threatened to weaken the laboriously re-established national and social fabric of the country.

Yet whatever the designs of those in Paris and Rabat, and the inevitable reactions on the part of the natives, forces stronger than the combined efforts of the political wirepullers brought about the final consequences. For many a long year the legends of the dichotomy of Arab and Berber, of the unpopularity of Sidi ben Youssef, of the unrepresentative character of the Istiqlal, and of the

<sup>48</sup> See declaration by Mehdi ben Barka in *New York Herald Tribune*, October 22, 1955.

<sup>49</sup> *New York Times*, October 17, 1955.

<sup>50</sup> *Le Monde*, October 23-24, 1955.

general weakness of the forces of nationalism had been kept alive. The events of 1953-55 exposed one by one the fallacious elements of this wholesale assessment, and revealed it for what it really was: a propaganda stunt designed to mislead both France and the outside world. Finally, in October 1955, the long-sustained myth received its *coup de grâce*. Even Thami el Glaoui, "leader of the Berbers", "strongest man in Morocco", "outstanding patriot", finally realized that the cause he was fighting for was a fiction, unsubstantiated by facts and with no historical justification worthy of consideration.

On October 26, accompanied by his son Abdessadeq, the pasha appeared in his black Bentley car in the Sultan's palace at Rabat, and, after paying his first visit to the Throne Council, made his son read out a declaration, the main sentence of which was, "I identify myself with the wish of the Moroccan nation for a prompt restoration of Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef and for his return to the throne, a return that by itself can unify hearts and spirits in harmony". It would be an understatement to say that Glaoui's dramatic change of front acted as a bombshell throughout Morocco and France. Had the old man realized, at last, that the entire Moroccan people were against him, and that he had been playing a losing game? According to *Le Monde* (October 27), "The Glaoui's turnabout is not disinterested. Undoubtedly he is thinking of the future of his family, of which he entertains an entirely feudal conception. He bows before the facts. . . . He hopes to save his patrimony."

Neither in the Moroccan camp nor in the French did anyone believe that Glaoui's decision sprang from unselfish motives. But whatever may have provoked it, it represented—in the words of the French Deputy M. Verdier, "a humiliating *démenti* for those who had claimed in August 1953 that the deposition of the Sultan had been imposed by a spontaneous and powerful movement of the Moroccan people supporting Glaoui".<sup>51</sup> "Experts" in France as well as in Morocco now had to eat their words.

The Moroccan people, including even Glaoui, had demonstrated to the world that they stood united behind the man who had become the symbol of their national aspirations. However bitter the pill, the government in Paris, the lobbyists and the settlers had to swallow it. Had they not always claimed that the question of the throne concerned none but the Moroccan people, and that it was they themselves who had evicted Ben Youssef and enthroned Arafa? All the solemn promises of successive French Premiers, Cabinet Ministers, Governors General, *e tutti quanti* that Mohammed Ben Youssef would never return to his ancestral throne melted away in the flame

<sup>51</sup> *Le Monde*, October 27, 1955.

of facts generated by the unswerving determination of the Moroccan people.

Events now followed one another with the speed and momentum of an avalanche. On October 31 Sidi Mohammed arrived by air at Nice, with his family and retinue, and was received by the authorities not as a "refugee" permitted to reside on French soil, but as a sovereign. "The French government," we read in *Le Monde* two days later, "bows before the united will of the Moroccan people to restore its sovereign." The Sultan's "exile" in the South of France lasted less than twenty-four hours. Almost before the breathless journalists could catch up with him, he was in Paris, received with even greater honours by the French government and the hundreds of Moroccan dignitaries who had been permitted to hasten from their country to pay homage to their king. Sidi Mohammed's arch enemy, the Sherif Kittani, one of the chief tools employed by the Residency in 1953 to bring about the deposition, followed in the footsteps of Glaoui and declared himself in favour of the "exile". All over Morocco—and France—men who had taken a solemn oath never to allow Sidi Mohammed to return to his throne were jumping on the band wagon, fearing to be caught on the wrong foot. Post-haste, old Ben Arafa dispatched from Tangier a letter to the French President announcing his abdication and calling upon the Moroccans to rally round the person of Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef. M. Pinay, French Foreign Minister, absorbed in an important Geneva conference of the four Foreign Ministers, hastily left Messrs. Dulles, Macmillan and Molotov, struggling on the shores of Lake Lemman, and flew to Paris to pay his respects to "His Majesty". Throughout Morocco thousands of pictures of Ben Youssef appeared in streets and on houses, in shop windows and on taxis. Only a few weeks previously the display of such a picture might lead to instant imprisonment, if not worse. Not to be outdone, Glaoui proclaimed on November 2 that the "arrival in France of His Majesty Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, Sultan of Morocco by the grace of God", had brought him "*la joie immense*", and to the Moroccan people "a great happiness".<sup>52</sup>

But, as the "Lion of the Atlas" was to learn, he had to drink the bitter cup to its last dregs by making a personal submission to the man over whom, two years earlier, he had triumphed. He, too, had to make the journey to Paris, but while for the nationalists this was an occasion of joy and triumph, for Glaoui it was to prove a journey to Canossa. He arrived at the Sultan's Paris headquarters, the Hôtel Henri IV, and, possibly for the first time in his life, was kept waiting for over an hour in the anteroom, while far less impor-

<sup>52</sup> *Le Monde*, November 3, 1955.

tant visitors were received by the monarch. Then, in the words of a popular daily newspaper, "with reporters and photographers recording the scene from behind the windows of the grand salon, El Glaoui crawled in on hands and knees, his head bowed to the floor. He kissed Ben Youssef's grey robe, then his feet, prostrated himself four times. 'I am a slave at the feet of Your Majesty,' said the 78-years-old 'Lord of the Atlas', mumbling the hope that Ben Youssef would forgive him."<sup>53</sup> The Sultan could afford to be magnanimous, and he replied "'Do not speak to me any more of the past. . . . What counts is the future . . . and it is on what you will do in the future that you will be judged.' Whereupon the mighty Glaoui, raised from the floor by one of Ben Youssef's aides, backed bowing out of the room."<sup>54</sup>

In Morocco itself nothing showed more telling evidence of the new situation than the mosques on Friday. For two long years, when public prayers had to be said in the name of Ben Arafa, the houses of worship had remained empty. Now that Ben Youssef's name was intoned, the mosques filled to overflowing. Morocco's leading rabbis met in solemn session at Rabat, and published a declaration in which they expressed "their great joy on the occasion of Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef's arrival in France and in his early return to Morocco".<sup>55</sup> One after another the artificial clouds that had darkened the Moroccan sky since 1953 were swept away by the new breeze of reality. On November 2 the members of the short-lived Throne Council placed their resignation in the Sultan's hands.<sup>56</sup>

It was not left to Moroccans alone to comment on the poetical justice of the fact that Sidi Mohammed, who but two years earlier had been called every uncomplimentary name by members of French Cabinets, high officials and generals, now found himself accorded full royal honours.<sup>57</sup> While he was laying a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier at the Arc de Triomphe, "all traffic was diverted from the Place de l'Etoile, and the full ceremonial for visits by reigning monarchs was observed". In the afternoon he received the pretender to the French throne, "the Comte de Paris with the Comtesse and two of their children, for tea at St. Germain". Later in the day he had a meeting with General de Gaulle.<sup>58</sup>

In this rush of events the dismissal of one Resident General and

<sup>53</sup> *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 13, 1955.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Le Monde*, November 3, 1955.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> "Only yesterday", to quote *Le Monde* of October 30, referring to these detractors, "the Sultan was presented as venal, sensual, anti-French, pro-Hitler, and disgraced in the eyes of his people."

<sup>58</sup> *The London Times*, November 8, 1955.



the appointment of a new one went almost unnoticed, even though France's new master at Rabat, André Dubois, Chief of the Paris Police, was to be his country's fourth representative in Morocco within a single year.

To the surprise of most people, that is of that vast majority whose knowledge of Sidi Mohammed was based on the official propaganda of preceding years, the Sultan refused ever to mention the events of 1953 and his years of exile, and, instead, made a number of remarkably pro-French statements. In the official communiqué he issued at the end of his negotiations with M. Pinay, the Foreign Minister of France, he declared, "His Majesty has confirmed his willingness to constitute a Moroccan government for the purpose of administration and negotiation. That government will represent the various tendencies of Moroccan opinion. Its mission will consist particularly in preparing the institutional reforms which will make of Morocco a democratic State based on a constitutional monarchy, and in negotiating with France with a view to obtaining for Morocco the status of an independent State, united to France by the permanent links of an interdependence freely agreed upon and defined."<sup>59</sup>

While the Sultan's declaration was greeted warmly in France, it did not appear to satisfy the more extreme elements within Morocco, and was followed by further bloody outbreaks. Indeed the disruptive forces conjured up by the events of August 1953 could hardly be expected to be tamed overnight. The dissidence among the Berbers—traditionally a threat to Moroccan unity—might well, having been reawakened, once again undermine law and order. For two long years the monopoly of native powers had rested in the hands of men whom the majority of the people regarded as traitors. It was hardly to be expected that these two years, with all the sufferings, persecution and sudden death, would easily be forgotten by those who had been or had known the victims, and who, with Sidi Mohammed's return, would once again be able to make public their long-suppressed point of view.

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This shadow of disunity darkened the Moroccan horizon even on November 17, the day on which the Sultan returned to his country, a day which was celebrated by the entire nation, except a small minority, with an almost fanatical joy.

The return of Sidi Mohammed to Rabat seems an appropriate moment for taking leave of the reader and of Morocco. A great

<sup>59</sup> Royal communiqué issued on November 6, 1955, from La Celle-Saint-Cloud.

deal is sure to happen and change the face of that country between the end of November 1955 and the date of this book's appearance. Our aim has been to review the course of events that have led to the climax of 1955, a climax that marks both the end of a long age in Moroccan history and the beginning of a new period. To go beyond that aim and indulge in hypotheses or prophecies would serve no useful purpose. But whatever the events that will take place after the last word of this book is written they cannot unmake the past fifty-five years in the Moroccan drama; and, unless we grasp the import of the ebb and flow of action and reaction in these years of ferment, the development and dénouement of the drama will lose in intensity.

# THE FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT of April 8, 1904

## *Declarations respecting Egypt and Morocco*

ARTICLE I.—His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they concur with the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present Agreement, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, but only on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885.

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French expert.

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

ARTICLE II.—The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

ARTICLE III.—His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

ARTICLE IV.—The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in

the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An Agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this proviso is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

ARTICLE V.—His Britannic Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

ARTICLE VI.—In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29 October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

ARTICLE VII.—In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

ARTICLE VIII.—The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government. Any agreement which may be arrived at on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE IX.—The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

SECRET ARTICLES ADDED TO THE  
FRANCO-BRITISH DECLARATION  
of April 8, 1904

ARTICLE I.—In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect of Egypt and Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles IV, VI and VII of the Declaration of to-day's date would remain intact.

ARTICLE II.—His Britannic Majesty's Government have at present no intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to align the Egyptian legislative system with that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view to introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

ARTICLE III.—The two Governments agree that a certain area of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta and other *Présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles IV and VII of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole or a part of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

ARTICLE IV.—If Spain, when invited to agree to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the Agreement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day's date, would be none the less applicable.

ARTICLE V.—Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Article I of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged and Unified Debts after the 15 July, 1910.

Signed in duplicate, London, April 8, 1904.

# THE FRANCO-SPANISH CONVENTION of October 3, 1904<sup>1</sup>

(For France, M. Delcassé; for Spain, M. Léon y Castillo,  
Spanish ambassador to France)

The published Declaration is translated thus:

The Government of the French Republic and that of His Majesty the King of Spain, having come to an agreement as to the extent of the rights and as to the guaranteeing of interests arising for France from her possession of Algeria, and for Spain from her possessions on the Moroccan coast; and His Majesty the King of Spain having in consequence declared his adherence to the Franco-English Declaration of April 8, 1904, relating to Morocco and Egypt, communication of which Declaration was made to him by the Government of the French Republic, hereby declare that they are firmly attached to the principle of the integrity of the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

<sup>1</sup> For full details, see Marcel Dubois, *Le Maroc et l'accord franco-espagnol*; Rouard de Card, *Le Protectorat de la France sur le Maroc*, page 35; and Rougier, *La coopération franco-espagnole au sujet de Maroc* (t. xvi, 1909, page 193).

## THE FRANCO-SPANISH CONVENTION of October 3, 1904 (secret articles)

The secret clauses to the above Declaration (Appendix III) remained unpublished until 1911, when they were published in *Le Matin* on 8 November.

The secret clauses embodied eleven principal considerations, here summarized: The Spanish sphere of influence was to be twofold; in the North from the Moulouya Mediterranean outlet to a line running between the river basins of Inaouen and Sebon and those of Kert and Ouergha, then tending northward to Loukkos by way of Djebel Moulai-bou-Chta, passing thence to the Atlantic coast near Ez-Serga (*Article 2*).

In the south, in addition to the Rio de Oro possessions already defined in the Convention of June 27, 1900, the Spanish zone was delineated by a line following the Draa thalweg and Sous, and reaching the sea at the Mesa estuary (*Articles 4 and 5*).

Spain undertook not to transfer or abandon her control of any of these regions, wholly or partially (*Article 7*).

In the northern zone she agreed not to take independent action without first consulting France—this proviso to be valid for a maximum period of fifteen years. The only conditions invalidating this undertaking would be:

1. If Morocco's political system and the Sherifian authority should break down.
2. If maintenance of the *status quo* became impossible through the Sherifian Government's inability to maintain public order.
3. If for any other cause, the nature of which should be subject to Franco-Spanish agreement, the maintenance of the *status quo* should prove impossible (*Article 3*).

The international status of Tangier to be preserved (*Article 9*).

As well as the political secret clauses there were clauses affecting the social and economic order. Articles 10 and 11 permitted Franco-Spanish co-operation in certain commercial undertakings, the free circulation of Spanish money, and the foundation of Spanish schools.

## MAIN POINTS OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS (April 7, 1906)

*The first chapter* dealt with police and declared:

1. Police should be under Sultan's authority, recruited from native population, and stationed in the eight "trade ports".
2. French and Spanish non-commissioned officers to assist the Sultan in organizing the force—these officers to be employed for a five-year period. Detailed arrangements to be submitted for approval to the diplomatic body at Tangier.
3. Police to number not more than 5,000, not less than 2,000.
4. The State Bank to supply funds.
5. The Inspector General to be a Swiss citizen.
6. Copies of the Inspector General's report to be sent to Tangier, and Tangier entitled to demand reports of him in case of need.
7. The salary of the Inspector General to be discussed.
8. His contract to be communicated to Tangier.
9. Inspectors to be *Spanish* at Tetuan and Laraiche; *French* at Rabat; *mixed* at Tangier and Casablanca; *French* at three remaining ports.

*The second chapter* dealt with arms traffic, drawing up detailed regulations. France to apply these regulations on the Algerian frontier, and Spain in the Spanish zone.

*The third chapter* dealt with the State Bank—the "State Bank of Morocco"—having the right to issue paper money, act as Treasury of Morocco, and moreover:

1. Should have exclusive right of short-term loans and priority for public issues.
2. May, on conditions, make advances to the Moorish Government.
3. Will assume the functions of a Royal Mint.
4. Will keep separate account for a special tax of  $2\frac{1}{2}\%$  *ad valorem* on foreign imports.

The Bank to be under French law, and subsequent agreement to determine exact relations between the Bank and Moorish Government. The Board of the Bank to be at Tangier.

In all, this chapter embodied twenty-seven clauses.

*The fourth chapter* dealt with revenue and taxation (the clauses numbering eighteen).

One clause declared that foreign nationals must pay *tertib*. Another gave them the right to purchase land and erect buildings. The minor clauses dealt with fiscal proposals, duties, etc., and the important Clause



66 allowed the Moorish Government to impose temporary  $2\frac{1}{2}\%$  *ad valorem* duty on foreign imports, the revenue therefrom to be devoted to public works (contracts under supervising diplomatic body).

*The fifth chapter* (Clauses 77 to 104) was concerned with Customs.

*The sixth chapter* dealt with Public works and services and established that:

1. None of these could be alienated to private interests.
2. The signatory powers could reserve to themselves the right to see that concessions granted to foreign capital *were not of a nature to weaken the control of the Moorish Government over important public services.*
3. The Moorish Government should submit all contracts to the diplomatic body.
4. The diplomatic body should have rights of supervision over concessions for mines, quarries, forests, and all matters of expropriation.

*The seventh, and last, chapter* dealt with general dispositions regarding ratification.

## APPENDIX VI

# PROTECTORATE TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND MOROCCO

*Signed at Fez on March 30, 1912*

The Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Sherifian Majesty, desirous of inaugurating a regular régime in Morocco based upon internal order and general security, which will make it possible to introduce reforms and to ensure the economic development of the country, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1.—The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty the Sultan have agreed to establish in Morocco a new régime comprising the administrative, judicial, educational, economic, financial and military reforms which the French Government may see fit to introduce within the Moroccan territory.

This régime shall safeguard the religious status, the respect and traditional prestige of the Sultan, the exercise of the Mohammedan religion and of all religious institutions, in particular those of the *Habus*. It shall include the organization of a reformed Sherifian Makhzen.

The Government of the Republic will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government regarding the interests which this Government derives from its geographical position and territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast.

In like manner, the city of Tangier shall retain its recognized distinctive characteristic, which will determine its municipal organization.

ARTICLE 2.—His Majesty the Sultan agrees that henceforth the French Government, subject to prior notification to the Makhzen, may proceed to such military occupation of the Moroccan territory as it may deem necessary for the maintenance of good order and the security of commercial transactions, and may exercise every police supervision on land and within the Moroccan waters.

ARTICLE 3.—The Government of the Republic pledges itself to lend constant support to His Sherifian Majesty against all dangers which might threaten his person or throne, or endanger the tranquillity of his states. The same support shall be given the heir to the throne and his successors.

ARTICLE 4.—Such measures as the new régime of the Protectorate may require shall be established by decree, upon the proposal of the French Government, by His Sherifian Majesty or the authorities to whom he may have delegated his power. The same procedure shall be observed

in the matter of new regulations and of modifications of the existing regulations.

ARTICLE 5.—The French Government shall be represented to His Sherifian Majesty by a Commissioner Resident-General, representative of all the powers of the Republic in Morocco, who shall attend to the execution of the present Agreement.

The Commissioner Resident-General shall be the sole intermediary between the Sultan and foreign representatives and in the relations which these representatives maintain with the Moroccan Government. In particular, he shall have charge of all matters relating to foreigners in the Sherifian Empire. He shall have the power to approve and promulgate, on behalf of the French Government, all the decrees issued by His Sherifian Majesty.

ARTICLE 6.—The diplomatic and consular agents of France shall be charged with the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests abroad.

His Majesty the Sultan pledges himself not to conclude any act of an international nature without the previous approval of the French Republic.

ARTICLE 7.—The Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Sherifian Majesty reserve unto themselves the right to determine by mutual agreement the basis of a financial reorganization which, while respecting the rights conferred upon bondholders of the Moroccan public loans, shall make it possible to guarantee the commitments of the Sherifian Treasury and to collect regularly the revenues of the Empire.

ARTICLE 8.—His Sherifian Majesty declares that in future, he will refrain from contracting, directly or indirectly, any public or private loan, and from granting in any form whatever any concession without the authorization of the French Government.

ARTICLE 9.—The present Treaty shall be submitted to the Government of the French Republic for ratification and the instrument of the said ratification shall be handed without delay to His Majesty the Sultan.

In faith whereof, the undersigned have drawn up the present Act and have affixed their seals thereto.

Fez, March 30, 1912 (II rebiah 1330).

## U.N. RESOLUTION ON MOROCCO, 1952

"Having debated the question of Morocco as proposed by thirteen member States in Document A/2175,

"Mindful of the necessity of developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

"Considering that the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to the attainment of their common ends under the charter, should strive towards removing any causes or factors of misunderstanding among member States, thus reassuring the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Expresses the confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the government of France will endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter;

"Expresses the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis towards developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations;

"Appeals to the parties to conduct their relations in an atmosphere of goodwill, mutual confidence and respect and to settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, thus refraining from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension."

(General Assembly, 407th Meeting. December 19, 1952.)

## APPENDIX VIII

### U.N. RESOLUTION ON MOROCCO, 1953

"Having considered the question of Morocco proposed by fifteen Member States in document A/2406,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 612 (VII) of December 19, 1952,

"Considering that the motives and objectives of that resolution had and continue to have the merit of recognizing the necessity for the development of the free political institutions of the people of Morocco,

"Considering that the fact that this item has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its eighth session indicates that those objectives had not yet been fulfilled,

"Recognizing the right of the people of Morocco to complete self-determination in conformity with the Charter,

"Renews its appeal for the reduction of tension in Morocco and urges that the right of the people of Morocco to free democratic political institutions be ensured."

(General Assembly, Official Records: Plenary Session, 455th Meeting, November 3, 1953.)

JOINT DECLARATION OF LA CELLE-  
SAINT-CLOUD (November 6, 1955).

"His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, and M. Antoine Pinay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, met on November 6, 1955, at the Château of La Celle-Saint-Cloud.

"M. Pinay outlined the general principles of the policy of the French government, as referred to in the communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers on November 5, 1955.

"His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco confirmed his agreement to those principles. Pending his return to Rabat, he has, in agreement with the French government, instructed the Council of the Throne—which was instituted on October 17, 1955, and tendered its resignation on November 3, 1955—to continue administering the current affairs of the Empire.

"His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco confirmed his desire to set up a Moroccan government, both for managing the country's affairs and for carrying on negotiations, which would be representative of the various trends in Moroccan public opinion. This government will be in charge, among other things, of elaborating institutional reforms which will make Morocco a democratic state with a constitutional monarchy; and of conducting negotiations with France designed to enable Morocco to achieve the status of an independent state, united to France by the permanent ties of an interdependence freely accepted and defined.

"His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco and M. Pinay agreed in confirming that France and Morocco must build together, without the intervention of a third party, their interdependent future, while affirming their sovereignty, mutually guaranteeing their rights and the rights of their nationals, and maintaining due respect for the situation granted by existing treaties to foreign powers."

## THE SULTAN SIDI MOHAMMED BEN YOUSSEF'S SPEECH FROM THE THRONE (November 18, 1955)

"God alone be praised! To our dear and faithful people: On this blessed day, God is overwhelming us with His mercies in allowing us, after a painful separation, to return to our dear country and to the midst of our people, this people who have never ceased to wait for us as we have never lost hope of seeing them again, and who have generously repaid our fidelity towards them. Together, we have been subjected to a trial which, far from impairing our common will, has only succeeded in strengthening our faith in our destiny and in making us more than ever conscious of our rights and duties.

"On this gala day, the twenty-eighth anniversary of our accession to the Throne of our glorious ancestors, we address to you, our people, according to our custom, our Speech from the Throne, recalling our past efforts and defining the objectives to be attained. You know our perseverance: We have always acted with a view to enabling Morocco to accede to a rank worthy of its wondrous past and of its important position in the modern world. Difficulties have not shaken us; obstacles have not made us retreat. We have never hesitated to proclaim the truth and to demand a change in the established régime in order to satisfy the will of our people and to fulfil their aspirations. Then a crisis arose and we had to face many perils. Almighty God, having judged us in that trial, willed that it should have a happy outcome. Once again the mosques were filled with the faithful and on every hand prayers were offered for us and for our people. The sorrow of separation has given way to rejoicing. Praise be to God, Who, in His infinite mercy, has taken away our afflictions!

"We immediately took up our task again in accordance with the responsibilities that are ours, seeking advice from the most authoritative sources, following the course of reason and wisdom. While we were in France, we had talks full of cordiality and understanding with the French government on the subject of Morocco. These talks resulted in agreement on essential principles.

"It will be the task of the Government to be formed under our auspices to begin negotiations with the French government. We rejoice in being able to announce the end of the régime of trusteeship and of the Protectorate and the coming of an era of freedom and independence.

"The time has come to mobilize all the energies available for the construction of a new Morocco. This undertaking will demand a thorough-

going transformation of the habits, the institutions and the methods of government, as it will also imply an emancipation of the individual, assuring him the secure enjoyment of all his freedoms. Thus Morocco will succeed in attaining the independence that we have never ceased to claim not only as the natural right of all peoples without distinction, but also as the surest means of enabling them to benefit both from the evolution of the modern world and from the advantages of a democratic régime free from all racial discrimination and inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"The independence to which our people aspire must not signify a weakening of our ties with France, for the friendship between our two countries is firmly rooted and has a long history. Furthermore, we have not lost sight of the fact that, thanks to this friendship and to French achievements in various domains, Morocco has been able to progress at a very rapid rate. We are counting on France's co-operation in inaugurating a new era of interdependence between our two countries.

"Our first objective is the constitution of a responsible and representative Moroccan government, truly expressive of the people's will. This government will have three simultaneous tasks to fulfil:

"1. The administration of public affairs.

"2. The creation of democratic institutions resulting from free elections and founded on the principle of the separation of powers, within the framework of a constitutional monarchy granting to Moroccans of all faiths citizenship rights and the exercise of political and trade union freedom. It stands to reason that Moroccan Jews have the same rights and duties as other Moroccans.

"3. The third task of the future Moroccan government will be to open negotiations with the French government on the basis of the following considerations: the ideas of freedom and democracy have taken on such wide scope in the post-war world that the conscience of mankind no longer allows independence and dignity to be the exclusive prerogative of a few peoples. Moreover, owing to the difficulties of the present-day world and to interdependent interests, all nations, in order to safeguard their heritage and ensure their security, must unite ever more securely and co-operate always more closely. That is why the Moroccan government, in the course of the negotiations, must define the framework and the real meaning of the independence of our country and the new relations of interdependence between Morocco and France on the basis of their equality and with mutual respect for each other's sovereignty.

"These new relations are not incompatible with the maintenance of our spiritual and cultural bonds with the other Arabic peoples. We should like to see the West take into consideration the needs and aspirations of these peoples and co-operate with them for the common welfare and happiness of mankind.

"At the conclusion of these negotiations, the Protectorate régime will come to an end and Morocco will enter into a new era in which it will



exercise its sovereignty in accordance with the new agreements and in spirit of understanding and faithful co-operation with the French people. Such are the fundamental political principles of which the Moroccan government will have to work out the details with the French government.

"It is essential not to forget that Morocco has among its inhabitants a substantial number of French citizens who have contributed to its general development and more particularly to its economic prosperity. We have noted with satisfaction the understanding which most of them have shown for our people's aspirations to liberty and independence. We want them all to be reassured as to their future. We are ever ready to safeguard their interests, their rights and their personal status with due respect for Moroccan sovereignty. Our wish is to see Moroccans and Frenchmen working together for the prosperity of Morocco and the welfare of all with a view to consolidating their relations and safeguarding the friendship of our two countries.

"Now that we have set forth our objectives, we call upon you to unite as brothers and to draw closer together so as to form a single unit. May the general interest and the defence of the rights of the Nation remain your constant preoccupation. We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all those who have given evidence of their sympathy and their solidarity with us. We pray God to help us in our efforts to maintain the unity of the Nation, watch over its interests and ensure its happiness."

## FRANCO-MOROCCAN AGREEMENT

of March 2, 1956

"The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, hereby solemnly state their determination to make fully operative the Declaration of La Celle-Saint-Cloud of November 6, 1955.

"They note that, in view of Morocco's advance along the road to progress, the Treaty of Fez of March 30, 1912, is no longer consistent with the requirements of modern life and can no longer govern Franco-Moroccan relations.

"Consequently, the Government of the French Republic hereby solemnly confirms its recognition of the independence of Morocco—which implies in particular the right to a diplomacy and an army—as well as its determination to respect, and to see to it that others respect, the integrity of Moroccan territory, as guaranteed by international treaties.

"The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, hereby declare that the purpose of the negotiations which have just opened in Paris between Morocco and France, as equal and sovereign States, is to conclude new agreements which will define the interdependence of the two countries in the fields where they have common interests, will thus organize their co-operation on a basis of liberty and equality, especially in matters of defence, foreign relations, economy and culture, and will guarantee the rights and liberties of French persons settled in Morocco and of Moroccans settled in France, with due respect for the sovereignty of the two States.

"The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, hereby agree that, pending the entry into force of these agreements, the new relations between France and Morocco shall be founded on the provisions of the annexed Protocol to the present Declaration.

"Done at Paris, in two original copies, on March 2, 1956.

(Signed) Christian Pineau, Embarek Bekkai."

## ANNEXED PROTOCOL

"I.—The legislative power shall be exercised as a sovereign right by His Majesty the Sultan. The representative of France shall be advised of draft dahirs and decrees: during the transition period, he shall have the right to submit observations on these texts when they concern the interests of France, French nationals or foreigners.

"II.—His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, shall have at his disposal a national army. France will render assistance to Morocco in the constitution of that army. The present status of the French army in Morocco shall remain unchanged, during the transitional period.

"III.—Those administrative powers which up until now have been reserved shall be transferred in a manner to be determined by common agreement.

"The Moroccan Government shall be represented, with a deliberative voice, on the Committee of the Franc Area, the central organ determining the monetary policy of the Franc Area as a whole.

"Furthermore, the guarantees enjoyed by French civil servants and Government employees serving in Morocco shall be continued.

"IV.—The representative of the French Republic in Morocco shall have the title of High Commissioner of France.

"Done at Paris, in two original copies, on March 2, 1956.

(Signed) Christian Pineau, Embarek Bekkai."

## FRANCO-MOROCCAN DIPLOMATIC ACCORD

of May 28, 1956

"The President of the French Republic and His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco,

"Desirous to lay down the principles by which the two states intend to organize, in full equality and with due respect for their independence, the ties of friendship and co-operation which will serve the mutual interests of France and Morocco,

"Anxious to define the modalities of the interdependence freely established between the two countries in the field of external relations, in pursuance of the Declaration of March 2, 1956, and determined thus to maintain and to strengthen the solidarity which unites them,

"Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

"The President of the French Republic: His Excellency Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the French Republic;

"His Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco: His Excellency Ahmed Balafrej, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of His Majesty the Sultan;

"Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form,

"Have agreed on the following provisions:

"*Article 1.*—The two High Contracting Parties, resolved to maintain between them relations of lasting friendship, mutual aid and assistance, will keep each other informed of all questions concerning their common interest and will hold regular consultations on problems of general interest.

"*Article 2.*—If the High Parties are in any way threatened in their common interests, they will immediately consult each other in order to meet this threat if the situation so requires.

"*Article 3.*—In order to ensure united action in the field of foreign policy, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two Governments shall meet periodically, or at the request of one of the Parties.

"*Article 4.*—The High Contracting Parties hereby undertake, as far as each is concerned, not to adhere to any policy which, after joint examination, they have recognized as incompatible with the interests of one of them.

"*Article 5.*—Each of the Parties hereby undertakes not to conclude

any international conventions which would render ineffective the rights it has recognized, by agreement, as belonging to the other Party.

*“Article 6.*—None of the present provisions can be interpreted as infringing upon the obligations which result either from the United Nations Charter, or from commitments, treaties or conventions in force between one of the High Contracting Parties and a third power.

*“None of the present provisions must, furthermore, be interpreted as limiting the power of one of the High Contracting Parties to negotiate and conclude treaties, conventions or other international acts.*

*“Article 7.*—The High Contracting Parties hereby agree that any disagreement as to the application or interpretation of the present treaty which they have not succeeded in solving through direct negotiations between themselves may be taken, on the proposal of one of the Parties before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

*“Article 8.*—France will second Morocco’s candidacy to international organizations in which it is not represented.

*“The delegations of the two Governments in the international organizations shall keep each other mutually informed of their activities, shall consult with each other and discuss their action along the lines of the present accord.*

*“Article 9.*—The French Republic is disposed, if the Moroccan Government so requests, to ensure the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests, in the countries where Morocco has not decided to send permanent diplomatic mission. In this case, French diplomatic and consular agents shall act in accordance with the directives of the Moroccan Government.

*“Article 10.*—The diplomatic representatives whom each of the High Contracting Parties shall accredit to the other, shall respectively bear the titles of Ambassador Extraordinary and Special Envoy of the French Republic to His Majesty the Sultan, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Special Envoy of His Majesty the Sultan to the French Republic.

*“Article 11.*—Morocco hereby assumes the obligations resulting from international treaties concluded by France in the name of Morocco, as well as those which result from the international acts concerning Morocco, on which it has made no observations.

*“In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present accord and thereto affixed their seals.*

*“Done at Rabat, May 20, 1956, in two original copies.*

*“Signed at Paris, May 28, 1956*

*“For France, C. Pineau.*

*For Morocco, A. Balafrej.”*



# CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF RULERS OF MOROCCO

*with dates of accession up to 1955. (The Sultanate dates from 1637.)*

A.D.	788	Idrees, or Idris I	
	791	Rashid (Regent)	
	804	Idrees II	
	828	Muhammed I	
	837	Ali I	
	848	Yahya I	
	881	Yahya II	
	894	Ali II	
	?	Yahya III	} Date not definitely known. He and the two preceding were cousins. Yahya IV was Ali II's nephew.
	905	Yahya IV	
		Yahya IV died 917. Usurper Rihan-el-Katami, 912.	
	922	El Hasan I (great-grandson of Idrees II)	
	925	Musa I	
	935	Kennun	
	938	Madeen	
	948	Ahmad I	
	952	Ibrahim	
	958	El Hasan II—died 985	
	961	Abd Allah I	
	970	Muhammed II	
	973	El Buri	
	988	Zeeri-ibn-Ateea	
	1000	El Muaz	
	1014	El Kasem—dethroned 1071	} Miknasa and Maghrawa dynasties in parallel succession Almoravides Almoravides (Murabtis)
after	1026	Hammama	
after	1039	Dunas	
	1060	El Fatuh	
	1061	Yusef I (Tashfine)	
	1065	Moannasir	
	1067	Tamin	
		(Almoravides: see p. 21)	
	1106	Ali III	
	1143	Tashfine I	

- 1145 Ibrahim I (Murabiti)  
 1147 Ishak  
 1149 Abd-el-Mumin Almohades (Muwahhadis)  
 1163 Yusef II  
 1184 Yakuts I (El Mansur)  
 1199 Muhammed III  
 (Break-up of empire. Abd-el-Hakk was already aiming at creation of a new dynasty. The Beni-Marin period lasted from 1213 to 1524. Muwahaddi succession on left, Beni-Marin on right.)
- |                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| 1214 Yusef III    | 1213 Abd-el-Hakk (1216 the Beni-Marin Victory) |
| 1223 Abd el Wahad |  |
| 1224 Abd Allah II | 1217 Othman I                                  |
| 1225 Yahya V      | 1232 Muhammed IV                               |
| 1227 Idrees III   | 1244 Abu Bakr                                  |
| 1232 Rashid I     | 1258 Yakub II                                  |
| 1242 Ali IV       | 1286 Yusef IV                                  |
| 1248 Omar I       |  |
| 1266 Idrees IV    |  |
- (last of the Muwahaddi dynasty)
- 1307 Amr  
 1308 Sulaiman I  
 1310 Othman II (Omar II at Sayilmasa, 1320 to 1332)  
 1331 Ali V  
 1348 Faris I  
 1358 Said I (son of Preading, a child whose uncle, Ibrahim II, seized rule for 2 years)  
 1359 Ibrahim II  
 1361 Tashfin II  
 (Civil war, and three aspirants to the throne, led to five years of partition. Attacks on Fez and Marrakesh brought now one faction, now another, into power. Late fourteenth-century records are confused and incomplete.)
- |               |                |
|---------------|----------------|
| Abd-el-Haleem | } in the 1360s |
| Muhammed V    |                |
- 1366 Abd-el-Aziz I  
 1372 Muhammed VI  
 1374 Ahmed II (and in Marrakesh, Abd-el-Rahman)  
 1384 Musa II (and Ahmad III)  
 1386 Muhammed VII  
 1387 Ahmed II (Restoration)  
 1393 Abd-el-Aziz II



- 139? Faris II  
 1408 Abu Said III  
 1416 Said II and Yakub III (2 claimants, partition)  
 1423 Abd Allah III (last of the Beni-Marin line)  
 (The Moroccan Empire was in chaos. The next ruler (first of the four Watasi, North Morocco) was Said III, who had to come to terms with the triumphant Portuguese before he could become Ameer of Fez. Islam's hold on Spain was gone.)  
 1471 Said III Watasis  
 1500 Muhammed VIII  
 1530 Ahmad IV  
 1548 Muhammed X  
 (Muhammed IX, 1524, was the first of the Saadi Shereefs. Cf. Tarudant, he entered Marrakesh and attacked the Ameer of Fez.)  
 1524 Muhammed IX Saadiens (Saadi Shereefs)  
 1557 Abd Allah IV  
 1574 Muhammed XI  
 1576 Abd-el-Malek I  
 1578 Ahmad V  
 1603 Muhammed XII  
 (Three sons again claimed the succession. Abd-el-Aziz III was driven out in 1606.)  
 1608 Zeedan  
 1628 Abd-el-Malek II  
 1631 El Waleed  
 1637 Muhammed XIII: title of "ameer" from henceforward = sultan  
 1654 Ahmad VI  
 Muhammed XIV  
 Muhammed XV  
 El Rasheed II, 1664  
 Ismail, 1672  
 Abd el Kareem (usurper)  
 1672 Ismail—55 years' reign  
 1727 Ahmad VII  
 1728 Abd-el-Malek III  
 1729 Abd Allah V  
 1734 Ali VI  
 1736 Muhammed XVI  
 1738 Mustada  
 1745 Zeen-el-Abdeen  
 1757 Muhammed XVII
- } parallel succession Alaouites  
 (Filali Shereefs)
- } Struggle of  
 Ismail's sons

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